THE 

PROBLEM 

OF 

c wm 


BERTRAND 

RUSSELL 


//.fy  .2.2., 

LIBRARY  OF  THE  THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY 

PRINCETON.  N.  J. 


Purchased  by  the  Hamill  Missionary  Fund. 


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I 


I 


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THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 


THE  ANALYSIS  OF  MIND 

BOLSHEVISM:  PRACTICE  AND  THEORY 

INTRODUCTION  TO  MATHEMATICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  EXTERNAL  WORLD 

POLITICAL  IDEALS 

PROPOSED  ROADS  TO  FREEDOM 

THE  PROSPECTS  OF  INDUSTRIAL  CIVILIZATION 
(in  preparation) 


WHY  MEN  FIGHT 


THE 

PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


BY 


V 

BERTRAND  RUSSELL 


SOMETIME  PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  GOVERNMENT 
UNIVERSITY  OF  PEKING 


NEW  YORK 
THE  CENTURY  CO. 
1922 


Copyright,  1922,  by 

The  Century  Co. 


PRINTED  IN  T7.  8.  A, 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTEB  PAGE 

I.  Questions 3 

II.  China  Before  the  Nineteenth  Century  . . 15 

III.  China  and  the  Western  Powers  ....  45 

IV.  Modern  China 61 

Y.  Japan  Before  the  Restoration 85 

VI.  Modern  Japan 98 

VII.  Japan  and  China  Before  1914 121 

VIII.  Japan  and  China  During  the  War  ....  135 

IX.  The  Washington  Conference 156 

X.  Present  Forces  and  Tendencies  in  the  Far 

East 167 

XI.  Chinese  and  Western  Civilization  Contrasted  195 

XII.  The  Chinese  Character 210 

XIII.  Higher  Education  in  China  .....  226 

XIV.  Industrialism  in  China 239 

XV.  The  Outlook  for  China 254 

Appendix 267 

Index > - 271 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


I 


The  Ruler  of  the  Southern  Ocean  was  ShU  (Heed- 
less), the  Ruler  of  the  Northern  Ocean  was  Hfl  (Sud- 
den ) , and  the  Ruler  of  the  Center  was  Chaos.  Shti 
and  Hu  were  continually  meeting  in  the  land  of  Chaos, 
who  treated  them  very  well.  They  consulted  together 
how  they  might  repay  his  kindness,  and  said,  “Men 
all  have  seven  orifices  for  the  purpose  of  seeing, 
hearing,  eating,  and  breathing,  while  this  poor  Ruler 
alone  has  not  one.  Let  us  try  and  make  them  for  him.” 
Accordingly  they  dug  one  orifice  in  him  every  day;  and 
at  the  end  of  seven  days  Chaos  died. — [ Ghu<mg  Tze, 
Legge’s  translation.] 


The  Problem  of  China 


CHAPTER  I 


QUESTIONS 


EUROPEAN  lately  arrived  in  China,  if  he  is 


of  a receptive  and  reflective  disposition,  finds 
himself  confronted  with  a number  of  very  puzzling 
questions,  for  many  of  which  the  problems  of  western 
Europe  will  not  have  prepared  him.  Russian  prob- 
lems, it  is  true,  have  important  affinities  with  those  of 
China,  but  they  have  also  important  differences;  more- 
over they  are  decidedly  less  complex.  Chinese  prob- 
lems, even  if  they  affected  no  one  outside  China,  would 
be  of  vast  importance,  since  the  Chinese  are  estimated 
to  constitute  about  a quarter  of  the  human  race.  In 
fact,  however,  all  the  world  will  be  vitally  affected  by 
the  development  of  Chinese  affairs,  which  may  well 
prove  a decisive  factor,  for  good  or  evil,  during  the 
next  two  centuries.  This  makes  it  important,  to  Eu- 
rope and  America  almost  as  much  as  to  Asia,  that  there 
should  be  an  intelligent  understanding  of  the  questions 
raised  by  China,  even  if,  as  yet,  definite  answers  are 
difficult  to  give. 

The  questions  raised  by  the  present  condition  of 
China  fall  naturally  into  three  groups,  economic,  polit- 


3 


4 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


ical,  and  cultural.  No  one  of  these  groups,  however, 
can  be  considered  in  isolation,  because  each  is  inti- 
mately bound  up  with  the  other  two.  For  my  part,  I 
think  the  cultural  questions  are  the  most  important, 
both  for  China  and  for  mankind;  if  these  could  be 
solved,  I would  accept,  with  more  or  less  equanimity, 
any  political  or  economic  system  which  ministered  to 
that  end.  Unfortunately,  however,  cultural  questions 
have  little  interest  for  practical  men,  who  regard  money 
and  power  as  the  proper  ends  for  nations  as  for  indi- 
viduals. The  helplessness  of  the  artist  in  a hard- 
headed  business  community  has  long  been  a common- 
place of  novelists  and  moralizers,  and  has  made  collec- 
tors feel  virtuous  when  they  bought  up  the  pictures  of 
painters  who  had  died  in  penury.  China  may  be  re- 
garded as  an  artist  nation,  with  the  virtues  and  vices 
to  be  expected  of  the  artist:  virtues  chiefly  useful  to 
others,  and  vices  chiefly  harmful  to  oneself.  Can  Chi- 
nese virtues  be  preserved?  Or  must  China,  in  order 
to  survive,  acquire,  instead,  the  vices  which  make  for 
success  and  cause  misery  to  others  only?  And  if  China 
does  copy  the  model  set  by  all  foreign  nations  with 
which  she  has  dealings,  what  will  become  of  all  of  us? 

China  has  an  ancient  civilization  which  is  now  under- 
going a very  rapid  process  of  change.  The  tradi- 
tional civilization  of  China  had  developed  in  almost 
complete  independence  of  Europe,  and  had  merits  and 
demerits  quite  different  from  those  of  the  West.  It 
would  be  futile  to  attempt  to  strike  a balance;  whether 
our  present  culture  is  better  or  worse,  on  the  whole, 
than  that  which  seventeenth-century  missionaries  found 


QUESTIONS 


5 


in  the  Celestial  Empire  is  a question  as  to  which  no  prud- 
ent person  would  venture  to  pronounce.  But  it  is  easy 
to  point  to  certain  respects  in  which  we  are  better  than 
old  China,  and  to  other  respects  in  which  we  are  worse. 
If  intercourse  between  Western  nations  and  China  is  to 
be  fruitful,  we  must  cease  to  regard  ourselves  as  mis- 
sionaries of  a superior  civilization,  or,  worse  still,  as 
men  who  have  a right  to  exploit,  oppress,  and  swindle 
the  Chinese  because  they  are  an  “inferior”  race.  I do 
not  see  any  reason  to  believe  that  the  Chinese  are  in- 
ferior to  ourselves;  and  I think  most  Europeans,  who 
have  any  intimate  knowledge  of  China,  would  take  the 
same  view. 

In  comparing  an  alien  culture  with  one’s  own,  one  is 
forced  to  ask  oneself  questions  more  fundamental  than 
any  that  usually  arise  in  regard  to  home  affairs.  One 
is  forced  to  ask:  What  are  the  things  that  I ultimately 
value?  What  would  make  me  judge  one  sort  of  society 
more  desirable  than  another  sort?  What  sort  of  ends 
should  I most  wish  to  see  realized  in  the  world?  Dif- 
ferent people  will  answer  these  questions  differently, 
and  I do  not  know  of  any  argument  by  which  I could 
persuade  a man  who  gave  an  answer  different  from  my 
own.  I must  therefore  be  content  merely  to  state  the 
answer  which  appeals  to  me,  in  the  hope  that  the  reader 
may  feel  likewise. 

The  main  things  which  seem  to  me  important  on  their 
own  account,  and  not  merely  as  means  to  other  things, 
are : knowledge,  art,  instinctive  happiness,  and  relations 
of  friendship  or  affection.  When  I speak  of  knowl- 
edge, I do  not  mean  all  knowledge;  there  is  much  in 


6 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


the  way  of  dry  lists  of  facts  that  is  merely  useful,  and 
still  more  that  has  no  appreciable  value  of  any  kind. 
But  the  understanding  of  nature,  incomplete  as  it  is 
which  is  to  be  derived  from  science,  I hold  to  be  a thing 
which  is  good  and  delightful  on  its  own  account.  The 
same  may  be  said,  I think,  of  some  biographies  and 
parts  of  history.  To  enlarge  on  this  topic  would,  how- 
ever, take  me  too  far  from  my  theme.  When  I speak 
of  art  as  one  of  the  things  that  have  value  on  their 
own  account,  I do  not  mean  only  the  deliberate  produc- 
tions of  trained  artists,  though  of  course  these,  at 
their  best,  deserve  the  highest  place.  I mean  also  the 
almost  unconscious  effort  after  beauty  which  one  finds 
among  Russian  peasants  and  Chinese  coolies,  the  sort 
of  impulse  that  creates  folk-songs,  that  existed  among 
ourselves  before  the  time  of  the  Puritans,  and  survives 
in  cottage  gardens.  Instinctive  happiness,  or  joy  of 
life,  is  one  of  the  most  important  wide-spread  popular 
goods  that  we  have  lost  through  industrialism  and  the 
high  pressure  at  which  most  of  us  live;  its  common- 
ness in  China  is  a strong  reason  for  thinking  well  of 
Chinese  civilization. 

In  judging  of  a community,  we  have  to  consider,  not 
only  how  much  of  good  or  evil  there  is  within  the  com- 
munity, but  also  what  effects  it  has  in  promoting  good 
or  evil  in  other  communities,  and  how  far  the  good 
things  which  it  enjoys  depend  upon  evils  elsewhere. 
In  this  respect,  also,  China  is  better  than  we  are.  Our 
prosperity,  and  most  of  what  we  endeavor  to  secure 
for  ourselves,  can  only  be  obtained  by  wide-spread 
oppression  and  exploitation  of  weaker  nations,  while  the 


QUESTIONS 


7 


Chinese  are  not  strong  enough  to  injure  other  countries, 
and  secure  whatever  they  enjoy  by  means  of  their  own 
merits  and  exertions  alone. 

These  general  ethical  considerations  are  by  no  means 
irrelevant  in  considering  the  practical  problems  of 
China.  Our  industrial  and  commercial  civilization  has 
been  both  the  effect  and  the  cause  of  certain  more  or 
less  unconscious  beliefs  as  to  what  is  worth  while;  in 
China  one  becomes  conscious  of  these  beliefs  through 
the  spectacle  of  a society  which  challenges  them  by  be- 
ing built,  just  as  unconsciously,  upon  a different  stand- 
ard of  values.  Progress  and  efficiency,  for  example, 
make  no  appeal  to  the  Chinese,  except  to  those  who 
have  come  under  Western  influence.  By  valuing  prog- 
ress and  efficiency,  we  have  secured  power  and  wealth; 
by  ignoring  them,  the  Chinese,  until  we  brought  disturb- 
ance, secured  on  the  whole  a peaceable  existence  and  a 
life  full  of  enjoyment.  It  is  difficult  to  compare  these 
opposite  achievements  unless  we  have  some  standard  of 
values  in  our  minds ; and,  unless  it  is  a more  or  less  con- 
scious standard,  we  shall  undervalue  the  less  familiar 
civilization,  because  evils  to  which  we  are  not  accustomed 
always  make  a stronger  impression  than  those  that  we 
have  learned  to  take  as  a matter  of  course. 

The  culture  of  China  is  changing  rapidly,  and  un- 
doubtedly rapid  change  is  needed.  The  change  that  has 
hitherto  taken  place  is  traceable  untimately  to  the  mili- 
tary superiority  of  the  West;  but  in  future  our  eco- 
nomic superiority  is  likely  to  be  quite  as  potent.  I be- 
lieve that,  if  the  Chinese  are  left  free  to  assimilate  what 
they  want  of  our  civilization,  and  to  -reject  what  strikes 


8 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


them  as  bad;  they  will  be  able  to  achieve  an  organic 
growth  from  their  own  tradition,  and  to  produce  a very 
splendid  result,  combining  our  merits  with  theirs.  There 
are,  however,  two  opposite  dangers  to  be  avoided  if  this 
is  to  happen.  The  first  danger  is  that  they  may  become 
completely  westernized,  retaining  nothing  of  what  has 
hitherto  distinguished  them,  adding  merely  one  more  to 
the  restless,  intelligent,  industrious,  and  militaristic 
nations  which  now  afflict  this  unfortunate  planet.  The 
second  danger  is  that  they  may  be  driven,  in  the  course 
of  resistance  to  foreign  aggression,  into  an  intense  anti- 
foreign  conservatism  as  regards  everything  except  arma- 
ments. This  has  happened  in  Japan,  and  it  may  easily 
happen  in  China.  The  future  of  Chinese  culture  is  in- 
timately bound  up  with  political  and  economic  questions ; 
and  it  is  through  their  influence  that  dangers  arise. 

China  is  confronted  with  two  very  different  groups 
of  foreign  powers,  on  the  one  hand  the  white  nations, 
on  the  other  hand  Japan.  In  considering  the  effect  of 
the  white  races  on  the  Far  East  as  a whole,  modern 
Japan  must  count  as  a Western  product;  therefore  the 
responsibility  for  Japan’s  doings  in  China  rests  ul- 
timately with  her  white  teachers.  Nevertheless,  Japan 
remains  very  unlike  Europe  and  America,  and  has  am- 
bitions different  from  theirs  as  regards  China.  We 
must  therefore  distinguish  three  possibilities:  (1) 

China  may  become  enslaved  to  one  or  more  white 
nations;  (2)  China  may  become  enslaved  to  Japan;  (3) 
China  may  recover  and  retain  her  liberty.  Temporarily 
there  is  a fourth  possibility,  namely  that  a consortium 
of  Japan  and  the  white  powers  may  control  China;  but 


QUESTIONS 


9 


I do  not  believe  that,  in  the  long  run,  the  Japanese  will 
be  able  to  cooperate  with  England  and  America.  In  the 
long  run,  I believe  that  Japan  must  dominate  the  Far 
East  or  go  under.  If  the  Japanese  had  a different 
character  this  would  not  be  the  case ; but  the  nature  of 
their  ambitions  makes  them  exclusive  and  unneighborly. 
I shall  give  the  reasons  for  this  view  when  I come  to 
deal  with  the  relations  of  China  and  Japan. 

To  understand  the  problem  of  China,  we  must  first 
know  something  of  Chinese  history  and  culture  before 
the  irruption  of  the  white  man,  then  something  of 
modern  Chinese  culture  and  its  inherent  tendencies; 
next,  it  is  necessary  to  deal  in  outline  with  the  military 
and  diplomatic  relations  of  the  Western  powers  with 
China,  beginning  with  our  war  of  1840  and  ending  with 
the  treaty  concluded  after  the  Boxer  rising  of  1900.  Al- 
though the  Sino- Japanese  War  comes  in  this  period,  it 
is  possible  to  separate,  more  or  less,  the  actions  of  Japan 
in  that  war,  and  to  see  what  system  the  white  powers 
would  have  established  if  Japan  had  not  existed.  Since 
that  time,  however,  J apan  has  been  the  dominant  foreign 
influence  in  Chinese  affairs.  It  is  therefore  necessary 
to  understand  how  the  J apanese  became  what  they  are : 
what  sort  of  nation  they  were  before  the  West  destroyed 
their  isolation,  and  what  influence  the  West  has  had  up- 
on them.  Lack  of  understanding  of  Japan  has  made 
people  in  England  blind  to  Japan’s  aims  in  China,  and 
unable  to  apprehend  the  meaning  of  what  Japan  has 
done. 

Political  considerations  alone,  however,  will  not  suf- 
fice to  explain  what  is  going  on  in  relation  to  China; 


10 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


economic  questions  are  almost  more  important.  China 
is  as  yet  hardly  industrialized,  and  is  certainly  the  most 
important  undeveloped  area  left  in  the  world.  Whether 
the  resources  of  China  are  to  be  developed  by  China,  by 
Japan,  or  by  the  white  races,  is  a question  of  enormous 
importance,  affecting  not  only  the  whole  development  nf 
Chinese  civilization,  but  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
world,  the  prospects  of  peace,  the  destiny  of  Russia, 
and  the  chances  of  development  toward  a better  eco- 
nomic system  in  the  advanced  nations. 

The  Washington  conference  has  partly  exhibited  and 
partly  concealed  the  conflict  for  the  possession  of  China 
between  nations  all  of  which  have  guaranteed  China’s 
independence  and  integrity.  Its  outcome  has  made  it 
far  more  difficult  than  before  to  give  a hopeful  answer  as 
regards  Far  Eastern  problems,  and  in  particular  as  re- 
gards the  question:  Can  China  preserve  any  shadow  of 
independence  without  a great  development  of  nation- 
alism and  militarism?  I cannot  bring  myself  to  ad- 
vocate nationalism  and  militarism,  yet  it  is  difficult  to 
know  what  to  say  to  patriotic  Chinese  who  ask  how  they 
can  be  avoided.  So  far,  I have  found  only  one  answer. 
The  Chinese  nation  is  the  most  patient  in  the  world;  it 
thinks  of  centuries  as  other  nations  think  of  decades. 
It  is  essentially  indestructible,  and  can  afford  to  wait. 
The  “ civilized”  nations  of  the  world,  with  their  block- 
ades their  poison  gases,  their  bombs  submarines  and 
negro  armies,  will  probably  destroy  each  other  within 
the  next  three  hundred  years,  leaving  the  stage  to  those 
whose  pacifism  has  kept  them  alive,  though  poor  and 
powerless.  If  China  can  avoid  being  goaded  into  war, 


QUESTIONS 


11 


her  oppressors  may  wear  themselves  out  in  the  end,  and 
leave  the  Chinese  free  to  pursue  humane  ends,  instead  of 
war  and  rapine  and  destruction  which  all  white  nations 
love.  It  is  perhaps  a slender  hope  for  China,  and  for 
ourselves  it  is  little  better  than  despair.  But  unless  the 
great  powers  learn  some  moderation  and  some  tolerance, 
I do  not  see  any  better  possibility,  though  I see  many 
that  are  worse. 

Our  Western  civilization  is  built  upon  assumptions 
which,  to  a psychologist,  are  rationalizings  of  excessive 
energy.  Our  industrialism,  our  militarism,  our  love  of 
progress,  our  missionary  zeal,  our  imperialism,  our  pas- 
sion for  dominating  and  organizing,  all  spring  from  a 
superflux  of  the  itch  for  activity.  The  creed  of  ef- 
ficiency for  its  own  sake,  without  regard  for  the  ends  to 
which  it  is  directed,  has  become  somewhat  discredited  in 
Europe  since  the  war,  which  would  have  never  taken 
place  if  the  Western  nations  had  been  slightly  more  in- 
dolent. But  in  America  this  creed  is  still  almost  uni- 
versally accepted;  so  it  is  in  Japan,  and  so  it  is  by  the 
Bolsheviks,  who  have  been  aiming  fundamentaHy  at  the 
Americanization  of  Russia.  Russia,  like  China,  may  be 
described  as  an  artist  nation;  but  unlike  China  it  has 
been  governed,  since  the  time  of  Peter  the  Great,  by  men 
who  wished  to  introduce  all  the  good  and  evil  of  the 
West.  In  former  days,  I might  have  had  no  doubt  that 
such  men  were  in  the  right.  Some  (though  not  many) 
of  the  Chinese  returned  students  resemble  them  in  the 
belief  that  Western  push  and  hustle  are  the  most  desir- 
able things  on  earth.  I cannot  now  take  this  view.  The 
evils  produced  in  China  by  indolence  seem  to  me  far  less 


12 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


disastrous,  from  the  point  of  view  of  mankind  at  large, 
than  those  produced  throughout  the  world  by  the  domi- 
neering cocksureness  of  Europe  and  America.  The 
Great  War  showed  that  something  is  wrong  with  our 
civilization;  experience  of  Russia  and  China  has  made 
me  believe  that  those  countries  can  help  to  show  us  what 
it  is  that  is  wrong.  The  Chinese  have  discovered,  and 
have  practised  for  many  centuries,  a way  of  life  which, 
if  it  could  be  adopted  by  all  the  world,  would  make  all 
the  world  happy.  We  Europeans  have  not.  Our  way 
of  life  demands  strife,  exploitation,  restless  change,  dis- 
content, and  destruction.  Efficiency  directed  to  des- 
truction can  only  end  in  annihilation,  and  it  is  to  this 
consummation  that  our  civilization  is  tending,  if  it  can- 
not learn  some  of  that  wisdom  for  which  it  despises  the 
East. 

It  was  on  the  Volga,  in  the  summer  of  1920,  that  I 
first  realized  how  profound  is  the  disease  in  our  West- 
ern mentality,  which  the  Bolsheviks  are  attempting  to 
force  upon  an  essentially  Asiatic  population,  just  as 
Japan  and  the  West  are  doing  in  China.  Our  boat 
traveled  on,  day  after  day,  through  an  unknown  and 
mysterious  land.  Our  company  were  noisy,  gay, 
quarrelsome,  full  of  facile  theories,  with  glib  explana- 
tions of  everything,  persuaded  that  there  is  nothing 
they  could  not  understand  and  no  human  destiny  out- 
side the  purview  of  their  system.  One  of  us  lay  at 
death’s  door,  fighting  a grim  battle  with  weakness  and 
terror  and  the  indifference  of  the  strong,  assailed  day 
and  night  by  the  sounds  of  loud-voiced  love-making  and 
trivial  laughter.  And  all  around  us  lay  a great  silence, 


QUESTIONS 


13 


strong  as  death,  unfathomable  as  the  heavens.  It  seemed 
that  none  had  leisure  to  hear  the  silence,  yet  it  called 
to  me  so  insistently  that  I grew  deaf  to  the  harangues 
of  propagandists  and  the  endless  information  of  the 
well-informed. 

One  night,  very  late,  our  boat  stopped  in  a desolate 
spot  where  there  were  no  houses,  but  only  a great  sand- 
bank, and  beyond  it  a row  of  poplars  with  the  rising 
moon  behind  them.  In  silence  I went  ashore,  and  found 
on  the  sand  a strange  assemblage  of  human  beings,  half- 
nomads, wandering  from  some  remote  region  of  famine, 
each  family  huddled  together  surrounded  by  all  its  be- 
longings, some  sleeping,  others  silently  making  small 
fires  of  twigs.  The  flickering  flames  lighted  up  gnarled, 
bearded  faces  of  wild  men,  strong,  patient,  primitive 
women,  and  children  as  sedate  and  slow  as  their  parents. 
Human  beings  they  undoubtedly  were,  and  yet  it  would 
have  been  far  easier  for  me  to  grow  intimate  with  a dog 
or  a cat  or  a horse  than  with  one  of  them.  I knew  that 
they  would  wait  there  day  after  day,  perhaps  for  weeks, 
until  a boat  came  in  which  they  could  go  to  some  distant 
place  in  which  they  had  heard — falsely  perhaps — that 
the  earth  was  more  generous  than  in  the  country  they 
had  left.  Some  would  die  by  the  way,  all  would  suffer 
hunger  and  thirst  and  the  scorching  midday  sun,  but 
their  sufferings  would  be  dumb.  To  me  they  seemed  to 
typify  the  very  soul  of  Russia,  unexpressive,  inactive 
from  despair,  unheeded  by  the  little  set  of  westernizers 
who  make  up  all  the  parties  of  progress  or  reaction. 
Russia  is  so  vast  that  the  articulate  few  are  lost  in  it  as 
man  and  his  planet  are  lost  in  interstellar  space.  It  is 


14 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


possible,  I thought,  that  the  theorists  may  increase  the 
misery  of  the  many  by  trying  to  force  them  into  actions 
contrary  to  their  primeval  instincts,  but  I could  not  be- 
lieve that  happiness  was  to  be  brought  to  them  by  a 
gospel  of  industrialism  and  forced  labor. 

Nevertheless,  when  morning  came  I resumed  the  in- 
terminable discussions  of  the  materialistic  conception 
of  history  and  the  merits  of  a truly  popular  government. 
Those  with  whom  I discussed  had  not  seen  the  sleeping 
wanderers,  and  would  not  have  been  interested  if  they 
had  seen  them,  since  they  were  not  material  for  propa- 
ganda. But  something  of  that  patient  silence  had  com- 
municated itself  to  me,  something  lonely  and  unspoken 
remained  in  my  heart  throughout  all  the  comfortable 
familiar  intellectual  talk.  And  at  last  I began  to  feel 
that  all  politics  are  inspired  by  a grinning  devil,  teach- 
ing the  energetic  and  quick-witted  to  torture  submissive 
populations  for  the  profit  of  pocket  or  power  or  theory. 
As  we  journeyed  on,  fed  by  food  extracted  from  the 
peasants,  protected  by  an  army  recruited  from  among 
their  sons,  I wondered  what  we  had  to  give  them  in  re- 
turn. But  I found  no  answer.  From  time  to  time  I 
heard  their  sad  songs  or  the  haunting  music  of  the  bala- 
laika; but  the  sound  mingled  with  the  great  silence  of 
the  steppes,  and  left  me  with  a terrible  questioning  pain 
in  which  Occidental  hopefulness  grew  pale. 

It  was  in  this  mood  that  I set  out  for  China  to  seek 
a new  hope. 


CHAPTER  II 


CHINA  BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY 

HERE  the  Chinese  came  from  is  a matter  of  con- 


jecture. Their  early  history  is  known  only  from 
their  own  annals,  which  throw  no  light  upon  the  ques- 
tion. The  ‘ ‘ Shu-King,  ’ ’ one  of  the  Confucian  classics 
(edited,  not  composed,  by  Confucius),  begins,  like  Livy, 
with  legendary  accounts  of  princes  whose  virtues  and 
vices  are  intended  to  supply  edification  or  warning  to 
subsequent  rulers.  Yao  and  Shun  were  two  model  em- 
perors, whose  date  (if  any)  was  somewhere  in  the  third 
millennium  b.  c.  “The  age  of  Yao  and  Shun,”  in 
Chinese  literature,  means  what  “the  golden  age”  means 
with  us.  It  seems  certain  that,  when  Chinese  history 
begins,  the  Chinese  occupied  only  a small  part  of  what 
is  now  China,  along  the  banks  of  the  Yellow  River. 
They  were  agricultural,  and  had  already  reached  a fairly 
high  level  of  civilization — much  higher  than  that  of  any 
other  part  of  Eastern  Asia.  The  Yellow  River  is  a 
fierce  and  terrible  stream,  too  swift  for  navigation,  tur- 
gid, and  full  of  mud,  depositing  silt  upon  its  bed  until 
it  rises  above  the  surrounding  country,  when  it  suddenly 
alters  its  course,  sweeping  away  villages  and  towns  in  a 
destructive  torrent.  Among  most  early  agricultural 


15 


16 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


nations  such  a river  would  have  inspired  superstitious 
awe,  and  floods  would  have  been  averted  by  human  sacri- 
fice; in  the  “Shu-King,”  however,  there  is  little  trace  of 
superstition.  Yao  and  Shun,  and  Yii  (the  latter’s  suc- 
cessor), were  all  occupied  in  combating  the  inundations, 
but  their  methods  were  those  of  the  engineer,  not  of  the 
miracle-worker.  This  shows,  at  least,  the  state  of  belief 
in  the  time  of  Confucius.  The  character  ascribed  to  Yao 
shows  what  was  expected  of  an  emperor : 

He  was  reverential,  intelligent,  accomplished,  and  thought- 
ful— naturally  and  without  effort.  He  was  sincerely  cour- 
teous, and  capable  of  all  complaisance.  The  display  of  these 
qualities  reached  to  the  four  extremities  of  the  empire,  and 
extended  from  earth  to  heaven.  He  was  able  to  make  the 
able  and  virtuous  distinguished,  and  thence  proceeded  to  the 
love  of  the  nine  classes  of  his  kindred,  who  all  became  har- 
monious. He  also  regulated  and  polished  the  people  of  his 
domain,  who  all  became  brightly  intelligent.  Finally,  he 
united  and  harmonized  the  myriad  states  of  the  empire;  and 
lo!  the  black-haired  people  were  transformed.  The  result 
was  universal  concord.1 

The  first  date  which  can  be  assigned  with  precision  in 
Chinese  history  is  that  of  an  eclipse  of  the  sun  in  776 
B.  c.2  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  general  correct- 
ness of  the  records  for  considerably  earlier  times,  but 
their  exact  chronology  cannot  be  fixed.  At  this  period, 

1 Legge’s  “Shu -King,”  p.  15.  Quoted  in  Hirth,  “Ancient  His- 
tory of  China,”  Columbia  University  Press,  1911 — a book  which 
gives  much  useful  critical  information  about  early  China. 

2 Hirth,  op.  cit.f  p.  174,  775  often  wrongly  given. 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  17 


the  Chou  dynasty,  which  fell  in  249  b.  c.  and  is  supposed 
to  have  begun  in  1122  b.  c.,  was  already  declining  in 
power  as  compared  with  a number  Of  nominally  sub- 
ordinate feudal  states.  The  position  of  the  emperor  at 
this  time,  and  for  the  next  five  hundred  years,  was  simi- 
lar to  that  of  the  king  of  France  during  those  parts  of 
the  middle  ages  when  his  authority  was  at  its  lowest 
ebb.  Chinese  history  consists  of  a series  of  dynasties, 
each  strong  at  first  and  weak  afterward,  each  gradually 
losing  control  over  subordinates,  each  followed  by  a 
period  of  anarchy  (sometimes  lasting  for  centuries), 
and  ultimately  succeeded  by  a new  dynasty  which 
temporarily  reestablishes  a strong  central  government. 
Historians  always  attribute  the  fall  of  a dynasty  to  the 
excessive  power  of  eunuchs,  but  perhaps  this  is,  in  part, 
a literary  convention. 

What  distinguishes  the  emperor  is  not  so  much  his 
political  power,  which  fluctuates  with  the  strength  of 
his  personality,  as  certain  religious  prerogatives.  The 
emperor  is  the  Son  of  Heaven;  he  sacrifices  to  Heaven 
at  the  winter  solstice.  The  early  Chinese  used  ‘ ‘ Heaven” 
as  synonymous  with  “The  Supreme  Ruler,”  a mono- 
theistic God;3  indeed  Professor  Giles  maintains,  by 
arguments  which  seem  conclusive,  that  the  correct  trans- 
lation of  the  emperor’s  title  would  be  “Son  of  God.” 
The  word  “Tien,”  in  Chinese,  is  used  both  for  the  sky 
and  for  God,  though  the  latter  sense  has  become  rare. 
The  expression  “Shang  Ti,”  which  means  “Supreme 
Ruler,”  belongs  in  the  main  to  pre-Confucian  times, 

3 See  Hirth,  op.  cit.,  p.  100  ff. 


18 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


but  both  terms  originally  represented  a God  as  definitely 
anthropomorphic  as  the  God  of  the  Old  Testament.4 

As  time  went  by  the  Supreme  Ruler  became  more 
shadowy,  while  “Heaven”  remained,  on  account  of  the 
imperial  rites  connected  with  it.  The  emperor  alone  had 
the  privilege  of  worshipping  “Heaven,”  and  the  rites 
continued  practically  unchanged  until  the  fall  of  the 
Manchu  dynasty  in  1911.  In  modern  times  they  were 
performed  in  the  Temple  of  Heaven  in  Peking,  one  of 
the  most  beautiful  places  in  the  world.  The  animal 
sacrifice  in  the  Temple  of  Heaven  represented  almost 
the  sole  official  survival  of  pre-Confucian  religion,  or  in- 
deed of  anything  that  could  be  called  religion  in  the 
strict  sense;  for  Buddhism  and  Taoism  have  never  had 
any  connection  with  the  state. 

The  history  of  China  is  known  in  some  detail  from 
the  year  772  b.  c.,  because  with  this  year  begins  Con- 
fucius ’ 1 1 Springs  and  Autumns,  ’ ’ which  is  a chronicle  of 
the  state  of  Lu,  in  which  Confucius  was  an  official. 

One  of  the  odd  things  about  the  history  of  China  is 
that  after  the  emperors  have  been  succeeding  each  other 
for  more  than  two  thousand  years,  one  comes  to  a ruler 
who  is  known  as  the  “First  Emperor,”  Shih  Huang  Ti. 
He  acquired  control  over  the  whole  empire,  after  a series 
of  wars,  in  221  b.  c.,  and  died  in  210  b.  c.  Apart  from 
his  conquests,  he  is  remarkable  for  three  achievements: 
the  building  of  the  Great  Wall  against  the  Huns,  the  de- 
struction of  feudalism,  and  the  burning  of  the  books. 
The  destruction  of  feudalism,  it  must  be  confessed,  had 

4 On  this  subject,  see  Professor  Giles’s  “Confucianism  and  its 
Rivals,”  Williams  & Norgate,  1915,  Lecture  I,  especially  p.  9. 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  19 


to  be  repeated  by  many  subsequent  rulers;  for  a long 
time,  feudalism  tended  to  grow  up  again  whenever  the 
central  government  was  in  weak  hands.  But  Shih 
Huang  Ti  was  the  first  ruler  who  made  his  authority 
really  effective  over  all  China  in  historical  times.  Al- 
though his  dynasty  came  to  an  end  with  his  son,  the  im- 
pression he  made  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  our  word 
‘ ‘ China ” is  probably  derived  from  his  family  name, 
Tsin  or  Chin.1  (The  Chinese  put  the  family  name 
first.)  His  empire  was  roughly  coextensive  with  what 
is  now  China  proper. 

The  destruction  of  the  books  was  a curious  incident. 
Shih  Huang  Ti,  as  appears  from  his  calling  himself 
“First  Emperor,’ ’ disliked  being  reminded  of  the  fact 
that  China  had  existed  before  his  time;  therefore  his- 
tory was  anathema  to  him.  Moreover  the  literati  were 
already  a strong  force  in  the  country,  and  were  always 
(following  Confucius)  in  favor  of  the  preservation  of 
ancient  customs,  whereas  Shih  Huang  Ti  was  a vigorous 
innovator.  Moreover,  he  appears  to  have  been  unedu- 
cated and  not  of  pure  Chinese  race.  Moved  by  the  com- 
bined motives  of  vanity  and  radicalism,  he  issued  an 
edict  decreeing  that — 

All  official  histories,  except  the  memoirs  of  Tsin  (his  own 
family),  shall  be  burned;  except  the  persons  who  have  the 
office  of  literati  of  the  great  learning,  those  who  in  the  empire 
permit  themselves  to  hide  the  “Shi-King,”  the  “Shu-King” 
(Confucian  classics),  or  the  discourses  of  the  hundred  schools, 

i Cf.  Henri  Cordier,  “Histoire  Gen6rale  de  la  Chine,”  Paris, 
1920,  Yol.  I,  p.  213. 


20 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


must  all  go  before  the  local  civil  and  military  authorities  so 
that  they  may  be  burned.  Those  who  shall  dare  to  discuss 
among  themselves  the  “Shi-King”  and  the  “Shu-King”  shall 
be  put  to  death  and  their  corpses  exposed  in  a public  place; 
those  who  shall  make  use  of  antiquity  to  belittle  modem 
times  shall  be  put  to  death  with  their  relations.  . . . Thirty 
days  after  the  publication  of  this  edict,  those  who  have  not 
burned  their  books  shall  be  branded  and  sent  to  forced  labor. 
The  books  which  shall  not  be  proscribed  are  those  of  med- 
icine and  pharmacy,  of  divination  ...  of  agriculture  and 
of  arboriculture.  As  for  those  who  desire  to  study  the  laws 
and  ordinances,  let  them  take  the  officials  as  masters.  (Cor- 
dier,  op.  cit.,  Yol.  I,  p.  203.) 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  First  Emperor  was  some- 
thing of  a Bolshevik.  The  Chinese  literati,  naturally, 
have  blackened  his  memory.  On  the  other  hand,  modern 
Chinese  reformers,  who  have  experienced  the  opposition 
of  old-fashioned  scholars,  have  a certain  sympathy  with 
his  attempt  to  destroy  the  innate  conservatism  of  his 
subjects.  Thus  Li  Ung  Bing  says : 2 

No  radical  change  can  take  place  in  China  without  encoun- 
tering the  opposition  of  the  literati.  This  was  no  less  the 
case  then  than  it  is  now.  To  abolish  feudalism  by  one  stroke 
was  a radical  change  indeed.  Whether  the  change  was  for 
the  better  or  the  worse,  the  men  of  letters  took  no  time  to 
inquire;  whatever  was  good  enough  for  their  fathers  was 
good  enough  for  them  and  their  children.  They  found  nu- 
merous authorities  in  the  classics  to  support  their  contention 
and  these  they  freely  quoted  to  show  that  Shih  Huang  Ti 

2 “Outlines  of  Chinese  History”  ( Shanghai,  Commercial  Press, 
1914),  p.  61. 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  21 


was  wrong.  They  continued  to  criticize  the  government  to 
such  an  extent  that  something  had  to  be  done  to  silence  the 
voice  of  antiquity.  ...  As  to  how  far  this  decree  (on  the 
burning  of  the  books)  was  enforced,  it  is  hard  to  say.  At 
any  rate,  it  exempted  all  libraries  of  the  government,  or 
such  as  were  in  possession  of  a class  of  officials  called  Po 
Szu  or  Learned  Men.  If  any  real  damage  was  done  to 
Chinese  literature  under  the  decree  in  question,  it  is  safe  to 
say  that  it  was  not  of  such  a nature  as  later  writers  would 
have  us  believe.  Still,  this  extreme  measure  failed  to  secure 
the  desired  end,  and  a number  of  the  men  of  letters  in  Han 
Yang,  the  capital,  were  subsequently  buried  alive. 

This  passage  is  written  from  the  point  of  view  of 
Young  China,  which  is  anxious  to  assimilate  Western 
learning  in  place  of  the  dead  scholarship  of  the  Chinese 
classics.  China,  like  every  other  civilized  country,  has 
a tradition  which  stands  in  the  way  of  progress.  The 
Chinese  have  excelled  in  stability  rather  than  in  prog- 
ress; therefore  Young  China,  which  perceives  that  the 
advent  of  industrial  civilization  has  made  progress  es- 
sential to  continued  national  existence,  naturally  looks 
with  a favorable  eye  upon  Shih  Huang  TPs  struggle 
with  the  reactionary  pedants  of  his  age.  The  very  con- 
siderable literature  which  has  come  down  to  us  from  be- 
fore his  time  shows,  in  any  case,  that  his  edict  was  some- 
what ineffective;  and  in  fact  it  was  repealed  after 
twenty-two  years,  in  191  b.  c. 

After  a brief  reign  by  the  son  of  the  First  Emperor, 
who  did  not  inherit  his  capacity,  we  come  to  the  great 
Han  dynasty,  which  reigned  from  206  b.  c.  to  a.  d.  220. 
This  was  the  great  age  of  Chinese  imperialism — exactly 


22 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


coeval  with  the  great  age  of  Rome.  In  the  course  of 
their  campaigns  in  Northern  India  and  Central  Asia, 
the  Chinese  were  brought  into  contact  with  India,  with 
Persia,  and  even  with  the  Roman  Empire.3  Their  re- 
lations with  India  had  a profound  effect  upon  their  re- 
ligion, as  well  as  upon  that  of  Japan,  since  they  led  to 
the  introduction  of  Buddhism.  Relations  with  Rome 
were  chiefly  promoted  by  the  Roman  desire  for  silk, 
and  continued  until  the  rise  of  Mohammedanism.  They 
had  little  importance  for  China,  though  we  learn  for 
example,  that  about  a.  d.  164  a treatise  on  astronomy 
was  brought  to  China  from  the  Roman  Empire.4  Marcus 
Aurelius  appears  in  Chinese  history  under  the  name  of 
An  Tun,  which  stands  for  Antonius. 

It  was  during  this  period  that  the  Chinese  acquired 
that  immense  prestige  in  the  Far  East  which  lasted  un- 
til the  arrival  of  European  armies  and  navies  in  the 
nineteenth  century.  One  is  sometimes  tempted  to  think 
that  the  irruption  of  the  white  man  into  China  may 
prove  almost  as  ephemeral  as  the  raids  of  Huns  and  Tar- 
tars into  Europe.  The  military  superiority  of  Europe 
to  Asia  is  not  an  eternal  law  of  nature,  as  we  are  tempted 
to  think ; and  our  superiority  in  civilization  is  a mere  de- 
lusion. Our  histories,  which  treat  the  Mediterranean  as 
the  center  of  the  universe,  give  quite  a wrong  perspec- 
tive. Cordier,5  dealing  with  the  campaigns  and  voyages 

3 See  Hirth,  “China  and  the  Roman  Orient”  (Leipzig  and 
Shanghai,  1885),  an  admirable  and  fascinating  monograph. 
There  are  allusions  to  the  Chinese  in  Virgil  and  Horace;  cf. 
Cordier,  op.  tit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  271. 

4 Cordier,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  281. 

s Cordier,  op.  cit .,  Vol.  I,  p.  237. 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  23 


of  discovery  which  took  place  under  the  Han  dynasty, 
says : 

The  Occidentals  have  singularly  contracted  the  field  of  the 
history  of  the  world  when  they  have  grouped  around  the 
people  of  Israel,  Greece,  and  Rome  the  little  that  they  knew 
of  the  expansion  of  the  human  race,  being  completely  ig- 
norant of  these  voyagers  who  plowed  the  China  Sea  and  the 
Indian  Ocean,  of  these  cavalcades  across  the  immensities  of 
Central  Asia  up  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  The  greatest  part  of 
the  universe,  and  at  the  same  time  a civilization  different 
but  certainly  as  developed  as  that  of  the  ancient  Greeks  and 
Romans,  remained  unknown  to  those  who  wrote  the  history 
of  their  little  world  while  they  believed  that  they  were  set- 
ting forth  the  history  of  the  world  as  a whole. 

In  our  day,  this  provincialism,  which  impregnates  all 
our  culture,  is  liable  to  have  disastrous  consequences 
politically,  as  well  as  for  the  civilization  of  mankind. 
We  must  make  room  for  Asia  in  our  thoughts,  if  we 
are  not  to  arouse  Asia  to  a fury  of  self-assertion. 

After  the  Han  dynasty  there  are  various  short  dy- 
nasties and  periods  of  disorder,  until  we  come  to  the 
Tang  dynasty  (a.  d.  618-907).  Under  this  dynasty,  in 
its  prosperous  days,  the  empire  acquired  its  greatest  ex- 
tent, and  art  and  poetry  reached  their  highest  point.6 

6 Murdoch,  in  his  “History  of  Japan”  (Vol.  I,  p.  146),  thus 
describes  the  greatness  of  the  early  Tang  Empire: 

“In  the  following  year  (618)  Li  Yuen,  Prince  of  T’ang  estab- 
lished that  illustrious  dynasty  of  that  name,  which  continued 
to  sway  the  fortunes  of  China  for  nearly  three  centuries  (618- 
008).  After  a brilliant  reign  of  ten  years  he  handed  over  the 


24 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


The  empire  of  Jenghis  Khan  (died  1227)  was  con- 
siderably greater,  and  contained  a great  part  of  China; 
but  Jenghis  Khan  was  a foreign  conqueror.  Jenghis 
and  his  generals,  starting  from  Mongolia,  appeared  as 
conquerors  in  C.hina,  India,  Persia,  and  Russia. 
Throughout  Central  Asia,  Jenghis  destroyed  every  man, 
woman,  and  child  in  the  cities  he  captured.  When  Merv 
was  captured,  it  was  transformed  into  a desert  and  700,- 
000  people  were  killed.  But  it  was  said  that  many  had 
escaped  by  lying  among  the  corpses  and  pretending  to 
be  dead;  therefore  at  the  capture  of  Nishapur,  shortly 
afterward,  it  was  ordered  that  all  the  inhabitants  should 
have  their  heads  cut  off.  Three  pyramids  of  heads  were 
made,  one  of  men,  one  of  women,  and  one  of  children. 
As  it  was  feared  that  some  might  have  escaped  by  hid- 
ing underground,  a detachment  of  soldiers  was  left  to 
kill  any  that  might  emerge.7  Similar  horrors  were  en- 
acted at  Moscow  and  Kieff,  in  Hungary  and  Poland. 
Yet  the  man  responsible  for  these  massacres  was  sought 

imperial  dignity  to  his  son,  Tai-tsung  (627-650),  perhaps  the 
greatest  monarch  the  Middle  Kingdom  has  ever  seen.  At  this 
time  China  undoubtedly  stood  in  the  very  forefront  of  civiliza- 
tion.. She  was  then  the  most  powerful,  the  most  enlightened, 
the  most  progressive,  and  the  best  governed  empire,  not  only 
in  Asia,  but  on  the  face  of  the  globe.  Tai-tsung’s  frontiers 
reached  from  the  confines  of  Persia,  the  Caspian  Sea,  and  the 
Altai  of  the  Kirghis  steppe,  along  these  mountains  to  the  north 
side  of  the  Gobi  Desert  eastward  to  the  inner  Hing-an,  while 
Sogdiana,  Khorassan,  and  the  regions  around  the  Hindu  Kush 
also  acknowledged  his  suzerainty.  The  sovereign  of  Nepal  and 
Magadha  in  India  sent  envoys;  and  in  643  envoys  appeared 
from  the  Byzantine  Empire  and  the  court  of  Persia.” 

7 Cordier,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  212. 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  25 


in  alliance  by  St.  Louis  and  the  pope.  The  times  of 
Jenghis  Khan  remind  one  of  the  present  day,  except 
that  his  methods  of  causing  death  were  more  merciful 
than  those  that  have  been  employed  since  the  armistice. 

Kublai  Khan  (died  1294),  who  is  familiar,  at  least 
by  name,  through  Marco  Polo  and  Coleridge,  was  the 
grandson  of  Jenghis  Khan,  and  the  first  Mongol  who 
was  acknowledged  emperor  of  China,  where  he  ousted 
the  Sung  dynasty  (960-1277).  By  this  time,  contact 
with  China  had  somewhat  abated  the  savagery  of  the 
first  conquerors.  Kublai  removed  his  capital  from 
Kara  Korom  in  Mongolia  to  Peking.  He  built  walls 
like  those  which  still  surround  the  city,  and  established 
on  the  walls  an  observatory  which  is  preserved  to  this 
day.  Until  1900,  two  of  the  astronomical  instruments 
constructed  by  Kublai  were  still  to  be  seen  in  this  ob- 
servatory, but  the  Germans  removed  them  to  Potsdam 
after  the  suppression  of  the  Boxers.8  I understand  they 
have  been  restored  in  accordance  with  one  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the*  Treaty  of  Versailles.  If  so,  this  was 
probably  the  most  important  benefit  which  that  treaty 
secured  to  the  world. 

Kublai  plays  the  same  part  in  Japanese  history  that 
Philip  II  plays  in  the  history  of  England.  He  pre- 
pared an  Invincible  Armada,  or  rather  two  successive 
armadas,  to  conquer  Japan,  but  they  were  defeated, 
partly  by  storms,  and  partly  by  Japanese  valor. 

After  Kublai,  the  Mongal  emperors  more  and  more 
adopted  Chinese  ways,  and  lost  their  tyrannical  vigor. 
Their  dynasty  came  to  an  end  in  1370,  and  was  suc- 

8 Cordier,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  339. 


26 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


ceeded  by  the  pure  Chinese  Ming  dynasty,  which  lasted 
until  the  Manchu  conquest  of  1644.  The  Manchus  in 
turn  adopted  Chinese  ways,  and  were  overthrown  by  a 
patriotic  revolution  in  1911,  having  contributed  noth- 
ing notable  to  the  native  culture  of  China  except  the 
pigtail,  officially  abandoned  at  the  revolution. 

The  persistence  of  the  Chinese  Empire  down  to  our 
own  day  is  not  to  be  attributed  to  any  military  skill; 
on  the  contrary,  considering  its  extent  and  resources, 
it  has  at  most  times  shown  itself  weak  and  incompetent 
in  war.  Its  southern  neighbors  were  even  less  warlike, 
and  were  less  in  extent.  Its  northern  and  western  neigh- 
bors inhabited  a barren  country,  largely  desert,  which 
was  only  capable  of  supporting  a very  sparse  population. 
The  Huns  were  defeated  by  the  Chinese  after  centuries 
of  warfare;  the  Tartars  and  Manchus,  on  the  contrary, 
conquered  China.  But  they  were  too  few  and  too  un- 
civilized to  impose  their  ideas  or  their  way  of  life  upon 
China,  which  absorbed  them  and  went  on  its  way  as  if 
they  had  never  existed.  Rome  could  have  survived  the 
Goths,  if  they  had  come  alone,  but  the  successive 
waves  of  barbarians  came  too  quickly  to  be  all  civilized 
in  turn.  China  was  saved  from  this  fate  by  the  Gobi 
Desert  and  the  Tibetan  uplands.  Since  the  white  men 
have  taken  to  coming  by  sea,  the  old  geographical  im- 
munity is  lost,  and  greater  energy  will  be  required  to 
preserve  the  national  independence. 

In  spite  of  geographical  advantages,  however,  the 
persistence  of  Chinese  civilization,  fundamentally  un- 
changed since  the  introduction  of  Buddhism,  is  a re- 
markable phenomenon.  Egypt  and  Babylonia  persisted 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  27 


as  long,  but  since  they  fell*  there  has  been  nothing  com- 
parable in  the  world.  Perhaps  the  main  cause  is  the 
immense  population  of  China,  with  an  almost  complete 
identity  of  culture  throughout.  In  the  middle  of  the 
eighth  century,  the  population  of  China  is  estimated  at 
over  fifty  millions,  though  ten  years  later,  as  a result 
of  devastating  wars,  it  is  said  to  have  sunk  to  about 
seventeen  millions.9  A census  has  been  taken  at  va- 
rious times  in  Chinese  history,  but  usually  a census  of 
houses,  not  of  individuals.  From  the  number  of  houses 
the  population  is  computed  by  a more  or  less  doubtful 
calculation.  It  is  probable,  also,  that  different  methods 
were  adopted  on  different  occasions,  and  that  compari- 
sons between  different  enumerations  are  therefore  rather 
unsafe.  Putnam  Weale  says: 10 

The  first  census  taken  by  the  Manchus  in  1651,  after  the 
restoration  of  order,  returned  China’s  population  at  55  mil- 
lion persons,  which  is  less  than  the  number  given  in  the  first 
census  of  the  Han  dynasty,  a.d.  1,  and  about  the  same  as 
when  Kublai  Khan  established  the  Mongal  dynasty  in  1295. 
(This  is  presumably  a misprint,  as  Kublai  died  in  1294.) 
Thus  we  are  faced  by  the  amazing  fact  that,  from  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Christian  era,  the  toll  of  life  taken  by  internecine 
and  frontier  wars  in  China  was  so  great  that  in  spite  of  all 
territorial  expansion  the  population  for  upwards  of  sixteen 
centuries  remained  more  or  less  stationary.  There  is  in  all 
history  no  similar  record.  Now,  however,  came  a vast 
change.  Thus  three  years  after  the  death  of  the  celebrated 

9 Cordier,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  484. 

10  “The  Truth  About  China  and  Japan,”  George  Allen  & 
Unwin,  Ltd.,  pp.  13,  14 


28 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


Manchu  Emperor  Kang  Hsi,  in  1720,  the  population  had 
risen  to  125  millions.  At  the  beginning  of  the  reign  of  the 
no  less  illustrious  Ch’ien  Lung  (1743)  it  was  returned  at  145 
millions;  towards  the  end  of  his  reign,  in  1783,  it  had 
doubled,  and  was  given  as  283  millions.  In  the  reign  of 
Chia  Ch’ing  (1812)  it  had  risen  to  360  millions;  before  the 
Taiping  rebellion  (1842)  it  had  grown  to  413  millions;  after 
that  terrible  rising  it  sunk  to  261  millions. 

I do  not  think  such  definite  statements  are  warranted. 
The  “ China  Year  Book”  for  1919  (the  latest  I have 
seen)  says  p.  1)  : 

The  taking  of  a census  by  the  methods  adopted  in  West- 
ern nations  has  never  yet  been  attempted  in  China,  and  con- 
sequently estimates  of  the  total  population  have  varied  to  an 
extraordinary  degree.  The  nearest  approach  to  a reliable 
estimate  is,  probably,  the  census  taken  by  the  Minchengpu 
(Ministry  of  Interior)  in  1910,  the  results  of  which  are  em- 
bodied in  a report  submitted  to  the  Department  of  State  at 
Washington  by  Mr.  Raymond  P.  Tenney,  a Student  Inter- 
preter at  the  U.  S.  Legation,  Peking.  ...  It  is  pointed  out 
that  even  this  census  can  only  be  regarded  as  approximate, 
as,  with  few  exceptions,  households  and  not  individuals  were 
counted. 

The  estimated  population  of  the  Chinese  Empire  (ex- 
clusive of  Tibet)  is  given,  on  the  basis  of  this  census, 
as  329,542,000,  while  the  population  of  Tibet  is  esti- 
mated at  1,500,000.  Estimates  which  have  been 
made  at  various  other  dates  are  given  as  follows 

(p.  2) 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  29 


A.D. 

A.D. 

1381 

59,850,000 

1760 

1412 

65,377,000 

1580 

60,692,000 

1761 

1662 

21,068,000 

1762 

1668 

25,386,209 

1790 

[ 23,312,200 

1792 

1710  - 

) 27,241,129 

1711 

28,241,129 

1736 

125,046,245 

1812 

1 

' 157,343,975 

1842 

1743  J 

149,332,730 

1868 

1 

t 150,265,475 

1881 

1753 

" 103,050,600 

1882 

1885 

143,125,225 

203,916,477 

205,293,053 

198,214,553 

155,249,897 

307,467,200 

333.000. 000 
362,467,183 

360.440.000 

413.021.000 
404,946,514 

350.000. 000 

381.309.000 

377.636.000 


These  figures  suffice  to  show  how  little  is  known  about 
the  population  of  China.  Not  only  are  widely  diver- 
gent estimates  made  in  the  same  year  (e.  g.  1760),  but 
in  other  respects  the  figures  are  incredible.  Mr.  Put- 
nam Weale  might  contend  that  the  drop  from  sixty 
millions  in  1580  to  twenty-one  millions  in  1662  was  due 
to  the  wars  leading  to  the  Manchu  conquest.  But  no 
one  can  believe  that  between  1711  and  1736  the  popula- 
tion increased  from  twenty-eight  millions  to  125  millions, 
or  that  it  doubled  between  1790  and  1792.  No  one 
knows  whether  the  population  of  China  is  increasing 
or  diminishing,  whether  people  in  general  have  large 
or  small  families,  or  any  of  the  other  facts  that  vital 
statistics  are  designed  to  elucidate.  What  is  said  on 
these  subjects,  however  dogmatic,  is  no  more  than  guess- 
work. Even  the  population  of  Peking  is  unknown.  It 


30 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


is  said  to  be  about  900,000,  but  it  may  be  anywhere  be- 
tween 800,000  and  a million.  As  for  the  population 
of  the  Chinese  Empire,  it  is  probably  safe  to  assume 
that  it  is  between  three  and  four  hundred  millions,  and 
somewhat  likely  that  it  is  below  three  hundred  and 
fifty  millions.  Very  little  indeed  can  be  said  with  con- 
fidence as  to  the  population  of  China  in  former  times; 
so  little  that,  on  the  whole,  authors  who  give  statistics 
are  to  be  distrusted. 

There  are  certain  broad  features  of  the  traditional 
Chinese  civilization  which  give  it  its  distinctive  charac- 
ter. I should  be  inclined  to  select  as  the  most  impor- 
tant: (1)  the  use  of  ideograms  instead  of  an  alphabet 
in  writing;  (2)  the  substitution  of  the  Confucian  ethic 
for  religion  among  the  educated  classes;  (3)  govern- 
ment by  literati  chosen  by  examination  instead  of  by 
a hereditary  aristocracy.  The  family  system  dis- 
tinguishes traditional  China  from  modern  Europe,  but 
represents  a stage  which  most  other  civilizations  have 
passed  through,  and  which  is  therefore  not  distinctively 
Chinese;  the  three  characteristics  which  I have  enumer- 
ated, on  the  other  hand,  distinguish  China  from  all 
other  countries  of  past  times.  Something  must  be  said 
at  this  stage  about  each  of  the  three. 

1.  As  every  one  knows,  the  Chinese  do  not  have 
letters,  as  we  do,  but  symbols  for  whole  words.  This 
has,  of  course,  many  inconveniences:  it  means  that,  in 
learning  to  write,  there  are  an  immense  number  of  dif- 
ferent signs  to  be  learned,  not  only  twenty-six  as  with  us ; 
that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  alphabetical  order,  so  that 
dictionaries,  files,  catalogues,  etc.,  are  difficult  to  arrange, 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  31 


and  linotype  is  impossible;  that  foreign  words,  such  as 
proper  names  and  scientific  terms,  cannot  be  written 
down  by  sound,  as  in  European  languages,  but  have  to 
be  represented  by  some  elaborate  device. 11  For  these 
reasons,  there  is  a movement  for  phonetic  writing  among 
the  more  advanced  Chinese  reformers;  and  I think  the 
success  of  this  movement  is  essential  if  China  is  to  take 
her  place  among  the  bustling,  hustling  nations  which 
consider  that  they  have  a monopoly  of  all  excellence. 
Even  if  there  were  no  other  argument  for  the  change, 
the  difficulty  of  elementary  education,  where  reading  and 
writing  take  so  long  to  learn,  would  be  alone  sufficient 
to  decide  any  believer  in  democracy.  For  practical 
purposes,  therefore,  the  movement  for  phonetic  writing 
deserves  support. 

There  are,  however,  many  considerations,  less  obvious 
to  a European,  which  can  be  adduced  in  favor  of  the 
ideographic  system,  to  which  something  of  the  solid 
stability  of  the  Chinese  civilization  is  probably  trace- 
able. To  us,  it  seems  obvious  that  a written  word  must 
represent  a sound,  whereas  to  the  Chinese  it  represents 
an  idea.  We  have  adopted  the  Chinese  system  our- 
selves as  regards  numerals;  “1922,”  for  example,  can 
be  read  in  English,  French,  or  any  other  language,  with 
quite  different  sounds,  but  with  the  same  meaning. 
Similarly,  what  is  written  in  Chinese  characters  can 
be  read  throughout  China,  in  spite  of  the  difference  of 

11  For  example,  the  nearest  approach  that  could  be  made  in 
Chinese  to  my  own  name  was  “Lo-Su.”  There  is  a word  “Lo,” 
and  a word  “Su,”  for  both  of  which  there  are  characters;  but 
no  combination  of  characters  gives  a better  approximation  to 
the  sound  of  my  name. 


32 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


dialects  which  are  mutually  unintelligible  when  spoken. 
Even  a Japanese,  without  knowing  a word  of  spoken 
Chinese,  can  read  out  Chinese  script  in  Japanese,  just  as 
he  could  read  a row  of  numerals  written  by  an  English- 
man. And  the  Chinese  can  still  read  their  classics,  al- 
though the  spoken  language  must  have  changed  as  much 
as  French  has  changed  from  Latin. 

The  advantage  of  writing  over  speech  is  its  greater 
permanence,  which  enables  it  to  be  a means  of  communi- 
cation between  different  places  and  different  times. 
But  since  the  spoken  language  changes  from  place  to 
place  and  from  time  to  time,  the  characteristic  advan- 
tage of  writing  is  more  fully  attained  by  a script  which 
does  not  aim  at  representing  spoken  sounds  than  by  one 
which  does. 

Speaking  historically,  there  is  nothing  peculiar  in  the 
Chinese  method  of  writing,  which  represents  a stage 
through  which  all  writing  probably  passed.  Writing 
everywhere  seems  to  have  begun  as  pictures,  not  as  a 
symbolic  representation  of  sounds.  I understand  that 
in  Egyptian  hieroglyphics  the  course  of  development 
from  ideograms  to  phonetic  writing  can  be  studied. 
What  is  peculiar  in  China  is  the  preservation  of  the 
ideographic  system  throughout  thousands  of  years  of 
advanced  civilization — a preservation  probably  due,  at 
least  in  part,  to  the  fact  that  the  spoken  language  is 
monosyllabic,  uninflected  and  full  of  homonyms. 

As  to  the  way  in  which  the  Chinese  system  of  writ- 
ing has  affected  the  mentality  of  those  who  employ  it,  I 
find  some  suggestive  reflections  in  an  article  published 
in  the  “Chinese  Students’  Monthly”  (Baltimore),  for 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  33 


February  1922,  by  Mr.  Chi  Li,  in  an  article  on  i ‘Some 
Anthropological  Problems  of  China.”  He  says  (p. 
327): 

Language  has  been  traditionally  treated  by  European 
scientists  as  a collection  of  sounds  instead  of  an  expression 
of  something  inner  and  deeper  than  the  vocal  apparatus  as 
it  should  be.  The  accumulative  effect  of  language-symbols 
upon  one’s  mental  formulation  is  still  an  unexploited  field. 
Dividing  the  world  culture  of  the  living  races  on  this  basis, 
one  perceives  a fundamental  difference  of  its  types  between 
the  alphabetical  users  and  the  hieroglyphic  users,  each  of 
which  has  its  own  virtues  and  vices.  Now,  with  all  respects 
to  alphabetical  civilization,  it  must  be  frankly  stated  that  it 
has  a grave  and  inherent  defect  in  its  lack  of  solidity.  The 
most  civilized  portion  under  the  alphabetical  culture  is  also 
inhabited  by  the  most  fickle  people.  The  history  of  the 
Western  land  repeats  the  same  story  over  and  over  again. 
Thus  up  and  down  with  the  Greeks;  up  and  down  with 
Rome;  up  and  down  with  the  Arabs.  The  ancient  Semitic 
and  Hametic  peoples  are  essentially  alphabetic  users,  and 
their  civilizations  show  the  same  lack  of  solidity  as  the 
Greeks  and  the  Romans.  Certainly  this  phenomenon  can 
be  partially  explained  by  the  extra-fluidity  of  the  alphabet- 
ical language  which  cannot  be  depended  upon  as  a suitable 
organ  to  conserve  any  solid  idea.  Intellectual  contents  of 
these  people  may  be  likened  to  waterfalls  and  cataracts, 
rather  than  seas  and  oceans.  No  other  people  is  richer  in 
ideas  than  they;  but  no  people  would  give  up  their  valuable 
ideas  as  quickly  as  they  do.  . . . 

The  Chinese  language  is  by  all  means  the  counterpart  of 
the  alphabetic  stock.  It  lacks  most  of  the  virtues  that  are 
found  in  the  alphabetic  language;  but  as  an  embodiment  of 


34 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


simple  and  final  truth,  it  is  invulnerable  to  storm  and  stress. 
It  has  already  protected  the  Chinese  civilization  for  more 
than  forty  centuries.  It  is  solid,  square,  and  beautiful,  ex- 
actly as  the  spirit  of  it  represents.  Whether  it  is  the 
spirit  that  has  produced  this  language  or  whether  this 
language  has  in  turn  accentuated  the  spirit  remains  to  be 
determined. 

Without  committing  ourselves  wholly  to  the  theory 
here  set  forth,  which  is  impregnated  with  Chinese 
patriotism,  we  must  nevertheless  admit  that  the 
Westerner  is  unaccustomed  to  the  idea  of  “alphabetical 
civilization  ’ ’ as  merely  one  kind,  to  which  he  happens 
to  belong.  I am  not  competent  to  judge  as  to  the  im- 
portance of  the  ideographic  script  in  producing  the 
distinctive  characteristics  of  Chinese  civilization,  but  I 
have  no  doubt  that  this  importance  is  very  great,  and 
is  more  or  less  of  the  kind  indicated  in  the  above  quo- 
tation. 

2.  Confucius  (b.  c.  551-479)  must  be  reckoned,  as  re- 
gards his  social  influence,  with  the  founders  of  religions. 
His  effect  on  institutions  and  on  men’s  thoughts  has 
been  of  the  same  kind  of  magnitude  as  that  of  Buddha, 
Christ,  or  Mohammed,  but  curiously  different  in  its 
nature.  Unlike  Buddha  and  Christ,  he  is  a completely 
historical  character,  about  whose  life  a great  deal  is 
known,  and  with  whom  legend  and  myth  have  been  less 
busy  than  with  most  men  of  his  kind.  What  most  dis- 
tinguishes him  from  other  founders  is  that  he  inculcated 
a strict  code  of  ethics,  which  has  been  respected  ever 
since,  but  associated  it  with  very  little  religious  dogma, 
which  gave  place  to  complete  theological  skepticism  in 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  35 


the  countless  generations  of  Chinese  literati  who  revered 
his  memory  and  administered  the  empire. 

Confucius  himself  belongs  rather  to  the  type  of 
Lycurgus  and  Solon  than  to  that  of  the  great  founders 
of  religions.  He  was  a practical  statesman,  concerned 
with  the  administration  of  the  state;  the  virtues  he 
sought  to  inculcate  were  not  those  of  personal  holiness 
or  designed  to  secure  salvation  in  a future  life,  but 
rather  those  which  lead  to  a peaceful  and  prosperous 
community  here  on  earth.  His  outlook  was  essentially 
conservative,  and  aimed  at  preserving  the  virtues  of 
former  ages.  He  accepted  the  existing  religion — a 
rather  unemphatic  monotheism,  combined  with  belief 
that  the  spirits  of  the  dead  preserved  a shadowy  exist- 
ence, which  it  was  the  duty  of  their  descendants  to 
render  as  comfortable  as  possible.  He  did  not,  how- 
ever, lay  any  stress  upon  supernatural  matters.  In 
answer  to  a question,  he  gave  the  following  definition 
of  wisdom:  “To  cultivate  earnestly  our  duty  towards 

our  neighbor,  and  to  reverence  spiritual  beings  while 
maintaining  always  a due  reserve.  ’ ’ 12  But  reverence 
for  spiritual  beings  was  not  an  active  part  of  Confu- 
cianism, except  in  the  form  of  ancestor-worship,  which 
was  part  of  filial  piety,  and  thus  merged  in  duty  to- 
ward one’s  neighbor.  Filial  piety  included  obedience 
to  the  emperor,  except  when  he  was  so  wicked  as  to 
forfeit  his  divine  right — for  the  Chinese,  unlike  the 

12  Giles,  op.  cit.,  p.  74.  Professor  Giles  adds,  a propos  of  the 
phrase  “maintaining  always  a due  reserve/’  the  following  foot- 
note: “Dr.  Legge  has  ‘to  keep  aloof  from  them,’  which  would 

he  equivalent  to  ‘have  nothing  to  do  with  them.’  Confucius 
seems  rather  to  have  meant  ‘no  familiarity.’  ” 


36 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


Japanese,  have  always  held  that  resistance  to  the  em- 
peror was  justified  if  he  governed  very  badly.  The 
following  passage  from  Professor  Giles 13  illustrates  this 
point : 

The  Emperor  has  been  uniformly  regarded  as  the  son  of 
God  by  adoption  only,  and  liable  to  be  displaced  from  that 
position  as  a punishment  for  the  offence  of  misrule.  ...  If 
the  ruler  failed  in  his  duties,  the  obligation  of  the  people 
was  at  an  end,  and  his  divine  right  disappeared  simultaneously. 
Of  this  we  have  an  example  in  a portion  of  the 
Canon  to  be  examined  by  and  by.  Under  the  year  558  b.c. 
we  find  the  following  narrative.  One  of  the  feudal  princes 
asked  an  official,  saying,  ‘TIave  not  the  people  of  the  Wei 
State  done  very  wrong  in  expelling  their  ruler?”  “Perhaps 
the  ruler  himself,”  was  the  reply,  “may  have  done  very 
wrong.  ...  If  the  life  of  the  people  is  impoverished,  and 
if  the  spirits  are  deprived  of  their  sacrifices,  of  what  use 
is  the  ruler,  and  what  can  the  people  do  but  get  rid  of 
him?” 


This  very  sensible  doctrine  has  been  accepted  at  all 
times  throughout  Chinese  history,  and  has  made  re- 
bellions only  to  frequent. 

Filial  piety,  and  the  strength  of  the  family  generally, 
are  perhaps  the  weakest  point  in  Confucian.  ethics,  the 
only  point  where  the  system  departs  seriously  from 
common  sense.  Family  feeling  has  militated  against 
public  spirit,  and  the  authority  of  the  old  has  increased 
the  tyranny  of  ancient  custom.  In  the  present  day, 

is  Op.  dt.,  p.  21. 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  37 


when  China  is  confronted  with  problems  requiring  a 
radically  new  outlook,  these  features  of  the  Confucian 
system  have  made  it  a barrier  to  necessary  reconstruc- 
tion, and  accordingly  we  find  all  those  foreigners  who 
wish  to  exploit  China  praising  the  old  tradition  and 
deriding  the  efforts  of  Young  China  to  construct  some- 
thing more  suited  to  modern  needs.  The  way  in  which 
Confucian  emphasis  on  filial  piety  prevented  the 
growth  of  public  spirit  is  illustrated  by  the  following 
story : 14 

One  of  the  feudal  princes  was  boasting  to  Confucius  of 
the  high  level  of  morality  which  prevailed  in  his  own  State. 
“Among  us  here,”  he  said,  “you  will  find  upright  men.  If 
a father  has  stolen  a sheep,  his  son  will  give  evidence  against 
him.”  “In  my  part  of  the  country,”  replied  Confucius, 
“there  is  a different  standard  from  this.  A father  will 
shield  his  son,  a son  will  shield  his  father.  It  is  thus  that 
uprightness  will  be  found.” 

It  is  interesting  to  contrast  this  story  with  that  of 
the  elder  Brutus  and  his  sons,  upon  which  we  in  the 
"West  were  all  brought  up. 

Chao  Ki,  expounding  the  Confucian  doctrine,  says 
it  is  contrary  to  filial  piety  to  refuse  a lucrative  post  by 
which  to  relieve  the  indigence  of  one’s  aged  parents.15 
This  form  of  sin,  however,  is  rare  in  China  as  in  other 
countries. 

The  worst  failure  of  filial  piety,  however,  is  to  re- 

1*  Giles,  op.  cit.,  p.  86. 

15  Cordier,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  176. 


38 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


main  without  children,  since  ancestors  are  supposed  to 
suffer  if  they  have  no  descendants  to  keep  up  their 
cult.  It  is  probable  that  this  doctrine  has  made  the 
Chinese  mdre  prolific,  in  which  case  it  has  had  great 
biological  importance.  Filial  piety  is,  of  course,  in  no 
way  peculiar  to  China,  but  has  been  universal  at  a cer- 
tain stage  of  culture.  In  this  respect,  as  in  certain 
others,  what  is  peculiar  to  China  is  the  preservation 
of  the  old  custom  after  a very  high  level  of  civilization 
had  been  attained.  The  early  Greeks  and  Romans  did 
not  differ  from  the  Chinese  in  this  respect,  but  as  their 
civilization  advanced  the  family  became  less  and  less 
important.  In  China,  this  did  not  begin  to  happen 
until  our  own  day. 

Whatever  may  be  said  against  filial  piety  carried  to 
excess,  it  is  certainly  less  harmful  than  its  Western 
counterpart,  patriotism.  Both,  of  course,  err  in  in- 
culcating duties  to  a certain  portion  of  mankind  to  the 
practical  exclusion  of  the  rest.  But  patriotism  directs 
one’s  loyalty  to  a fighting  unit,  which  filial  piety  does 
not  (except  in  a very  primitive  society).  Therefore 
patriotism  leads  much  more  easily  to  militarism  and 
imperialism.  The  principal  method  of  advancing  the 
interests  of  one’s  nation  is  homicide;  the  principal 
method  of  advancing  the  interest  of  one’s  family  is 
corruption  and  intrigue.  Therefore  family  feeling  is 
less  harmful  than  patriotism.  This  view  is  borne  out 
by  the  history  and  present  condition  of  China  as  com- 
pared to  Europe. 

Apart  from  filial  piety,  Confucianism  was,  in  practice, 
mainly  a code  of  civilized  behavior,  degenerating  at 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  39 


times  into  an  etiquette  book.  It  taught  self-restraint, 
moderation,  and  above  all  courtesy.  Its  moral  code 
was  not,  like  those  of  Buddhism  and  Christianity,  so 
severe  that  only  a few  saints  could  hope  to  live  up  to 
it,  or  so  much  concerned  with  personal  salvation  as  to 
be  incompatible  with  political  institutions.  It  was  not 
difficult  for  a man  of  the  world  to  live  up  to  the  more 
imperative  parts  of  the  Confucian  teaching.  But  in 
order  to  do  this  he  must  exercise  at  all  times  a certain 
kind  of  self-control — an  extension  of  the  kind  which 
children  learn  when  they  are  taught  to  “ behave.’ ’ He 
must  not  break  into  violent  passions;  he  must  not  be 
arrogant;  he  must  “save  face,”  and  never  inflict  humil- 
iations upon  defeated  adversaries ; he  must  be  moderate 
in  all  things,  never  carried  away  by  excessive  love  or 
hate;  in  a word,  he  must  keep  calm  reason  always  in 
control  of  all  his  actions.  This  attitude  existed  in 
Europe  in  the  eighteenth  century,  but  perished  in  the 
French  Revolution : romanticism,  Rousseau,  and  the 
guillotine  put  an  end  to  it.  In  China,  though  wars  and 
revolutions  have  occurred  constantly,  Confucian  calm 
has  survived  them  all,  making  them  less  terrible  for  the 
participants,  and  making  all  who  were  not  immediately 
involved  hold  aloof.  It  is  bad  manners  in  China  to 
attack  your  adversary  in  wet  weather.  Wu-Pei-Fu,  I 
am  told,  once  did  it,  and  won  a victory;  the  beaten 
general  complained  of  the  breach  of  etiquette;  so  Wu- 
Pei-Fu  went  back  to  the  position  he  held  before  the 
battle,  and  fought  all  over  again  on  a fine  day.  (It 
should  be  said  that  battles  in  China  are  seldom  bloody.) 
In  such  a country,  militarism  is  not  the  scourge  it  is 


40 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


with  ns;  and  the  difference  is  due  to  the  Confucian 
ethics.16 

Confucianism  did  not  assume  its  present  form  until 
the  twelfth  century  a.  d.,  when  the  personal  God  in 
whom  Confucius  had  believed  was  thrust  aside  by  the 
philosopher  Chu  Fu  Tze 17  whose  interpretation  of 
Confucianism  has  ever  since  been  recognized  as  ortho- 
dox. Since  therfall  of  the  Mongols  (1370),  the  Govern- 
ment has  uniformly  favored  Confucianism  as  the  teach- 
ing of  the  state ; before  that,  there  were  struggles  with 
Buddhism  and  Taoism,  which  were  connected  with 
magic,  and  appealed  to  superstitious  emperors,  quite  a 
number  of  whom  died  of  drinking  the  Taoist  elixir  of 
life.  The  Mongol  emperors  were  Buddhists  of  the  lama 
religion,  which  still  prevails  in  Tibet  and  Mongolia; 
but  the  Manchu  emperors,  though  also  northern  con- 
querors, were  ultra-orthodox  Confucians.  It  has  been 
customary  in  China,  for  many  centuries,  for  the  literati 
to  be  pure  Confucians,  skeptical  in  religion  but  not  in 
morals,  while  the  rest  of  the  population  believed  and 
practised  all  three  religions  simultaneously.  The 

16  As  far  as  anti-militarism  is  concerned,  Taoism  is  even  more 
emphatic.  “The  best  soldiers,”  says  Lao-Tze,  “do  not  fight.” 
(Giles,  op.  cit.,  p.  150.)  Chinese  armies  contain  many  good 
soldiers. 

17  Giles,  op.  cit.,  Lecture  VUE.  When  Chu  Fu  Tze  was  dead, 
and  his  son-in-law  was  watching  beside  his  coffin  a singular  in- 
cident occurred.  Although  the  sage  had  spent  his  life  teaching 
that  miracles  are  impossible,  the  coffin-  rose  and  remained  sus- 
pended three  feet  above  the  ground.  The  pious  son-in-law  was 
horrified.  “O  my  revered  father-in-law,”  he  prayed,  “do  not 
destroy  my  faith  that  miracles  are  impossible.”  Whereupon  the 
coffin  slowly  descended  to  earth  again,  and  the  son-in-law’s  faith 
revived. 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  41 


Chinese  have  not  the  belief,  which  we  owe  to  the  Jews, 
that  if  one  religion  is  true,  all  others  must  be  false. 
At  the  present  day,  however,  there  appears  to  be  very 
little  in  the  way  of  religion  in  China,  though  the  belief 
in  magic  lingers  on  among  the  uneducated.  At  all 
times,  even  when  there  was  religion,  its  intensity  was  far 
less  than  in  Europe.  It  is  remarkable  that  religious 
skepticism  has  not  led,  in  China,  to  any  corresponding 
ethical  skepticism,  as  it  has  done  repeatedly  in'  Europe. 

3.  I come  now  to  the  system  of  selecting  officials  by 
competitive  examination,  without  which  it  is  hardly 
likely  that  so  literary  and  unsuperstitious  a system  as 
that  of  Confucius  could  have  maintained  its  hold.  The 
view  of  the  modern  Chinese  on  this  subject  is  set  forth 
by  the  present  president  of  the  Republic  of  China,  Hsu 
Shi-chang,  in  his  book  on  4 ‘China  after  the  War,”  pp. 
59-60.18  After  considering  the  educational  system  un- 
der the  Chou  dynasty,  he  continues: 

In  later  periods,  in  spite  of  minor  changes,  the  importance 
of  moral  virtues  continued  to  be  stressed  upon.  For  in- 
stance, during  the  most  flourishing  period  of  Tang  Dynasty 
(627-650  a.d.),  the  Imperial  Academy  of  Learning,  known 
as  Kuo-tzu-chien,  was  composed  of  four  collegiate  depart- 
ments, in  which  ethics  was  considered  as  the  most  important 
of  all  studies.  It  was  said  that  in  the  Academy  there  were 
more  than  three  thousand  students  who  were  able  and  vir- 
tuous in  nearly  all  respects,  while  the  total  enrolment,  in- 
cluding aspirants  from  Korea  and  Japan,  was  as  high  as 
eight  thousand.  At  the  same  time,  there  was  a system  of 

18  Translated  by  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Information,  Peking, 
1920. 


42 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


“elections”  through  which  able  and  virtuous  men  were  rec- 
ommended by  different  districts  to  the  Emperor  for  ap- 
pointment to  public  offices.  College  training  and  local  elec- 
tions supplemented  each  other,  but  in  both  moral  virtues 
were  given  the  greatest  emphasis. 

Although  the  Imperial  Academy  exists  till  this  day,  it  has 
never  been  as  flourishing  as  during  that  period.  For  this 
change  the  introduction  of  the  competitive  examination  or 
Ko-chii  system,  must  be  held  responsible.  The  “election” 
system  furnished  no  fixed  standard  for  the  recommendation 
of  public  service  candidates,  and,  as  a result,  tended  to  create 
an  aristocratic  class  from  which  alone  were  to  be  found 
eligible  men.  Consequently,  the  Sung  Emperors  (960-1277 
A.  d.  ) abolished  the  elections,  set  aside  the  Imperial  Academy, 
and  inaugurated  the  competitive  examination  system  in 
their  place.  The  examinations  were  to  supply  both  scholars 
and  practical  statesmen,  and  they  were  periodically  held 
throughout  the  later  dynasties  until  the  introduction  of  the 
modern  educational  regime.  Useless  and  stereotyped  as  they 
were  in  later  days,  they  once  served  some  useful  purpose. 
Besides,  the  ethical  background  of  Chinese  education  had 
already  been  so  firmly  established,  that,  in  spite  of  the  em- 
phasis laid  by  these  examinations  on  pure  literary  attain- 
ments, moral  teachings  have  survived  till  this  day  in  family 
education  and  in  private  schools. 

Although  the  system  of  awarding  government  posts 
for  proficiency  in  examinations  is  much  better  than 
most  other  systems  that  have  prevailed,  such  as  nepo- 
tism, bribery,  threats  of  insurrection,  etc.,  yet  the 
Chinese  system,  at  any  rate  after  it  assumed  its  final  form 
was  harmful  through  the  fact  that  it  was  based  solely 
on  the  classics,  that  it  was  purely  literary,  and  that  it 


BEFORE  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  43 


allowed  no  scope  whatever  for  originality.  The  system 
was  established  in  its  final  form  by  the  Emperor  Hung 
Wu  (1368-98),  and  remained  unchanged  until  1905. 
One  of  the  first  objects  of  modern  Chinese  reformers 
was  to  get  it  swept  away.  Li  Ung  Bing  says : 19 

In  spite  of  the  many  good  things  that  may  be  said  to  the 
credit  of  Hung  Wu,  he  will  ever  be  remembered  in  connec- 
tion with  a form  of  evil  which  has  eaten  into  the  very  heart 
of  the  nation.  This  was  the  system  of  triennial  examina- 
tions, or  rather  the  form  of  Chinese  composition,  called  the 
“Essay, : ” or  the  “Eight  Legs,”  which,  for  the  first  time  in 
the  history  of  Chinese  literature,  was  made  the  basis  of  all 
literary  contests.  It  was  so-named,  because  after  the  intro- 
duction of  the  theme  the  writer  was  required  to  treat  it  in 
four  paragraplis,  each  consisting  of  two  members,  made  up 
of  an  equal  number  of  sentences  and  words.  The  theme  was 
always  chosen  from  either  the  Four  Books,  or  the  Five 
Classics.  The  writer  could  not  express  any  opinion  of  his 
own,  or  any  views  at  variance  with  those  expressed  by  Chu 
Hsi  and  his  school.  All  he  was  required  to  do  was  to  put 
the  few  words  of  Confucius,  or  whomsoever  it  might  be,  into 
an  essay  in  conformity  with  the  prescribed  rules.  Degrees, 
which  were  to  serve  as  passports  to  Government  positions, 
w'ere  awarded  the  best  writers.  To  say  that  the  training  af- 
forded by  the  time  required  to  make  a man  efficient  in  the 
art  of  such  writing,  would  at  the  same  time  qualify  him  to 
hold  the  various  offices  under  the  Government,  was  absurd. 
But  absurd  as  the  whole  system  was,  it  was  handed  down  to 
recent  times  from  the  third  year  of  the  reign  of  Hung  Wu, 
and  was  not  abolished  until  a few  years  ago.  No  system 
was  more  perfect  or  effective  in  retarding  the  intellectual 

I9  Op.  cit.,  p.  233. 


44 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


and  literary  development  of  a nation.  With  her  “Eight 
Legs/’  China  long  ago  reached  the  lowest  point  on  her  down- 
hill journey.  It  is  largely  on  account  of  the  long  lease  of 
life  that  was  granted  to  this  rotten  system  that  the  teach- 
ings of  the  Sung  philosophers  have  been  so  long  venerated. 

These  are  the  words  of  a Chinese  patriot  of  the  pres- 
ent day,  and  no  doubt,  as  a modern  system,  the  “Eight 
Legs”  deserve  all  the  hard  things  that  he  says  about 
them.  But  in  the  fourteenth  century,  when  one  con- 
siders the  practicable  alternatives,  one  can  see  that  there 
was  probably  much  to  be  said  for  such  a plan.  At  any 
rate,  for  good  or  evil,  the  examination  system  profoundly 
affected  the  civilization  of  China.  Among  its  good 
effects  were : a widely-diffused  respect  for  learning ; the 
possibility  of  doing  without  a hereditary  aristocracy; 
the  selection  of  administrators  who  must  at  least  have 
been  capable  of  industry ; and  the  preservation  of 
Chinese  civilization  in  spite  of  barbarian  conquest. 
But,  like  so  much  else  in  traditional  China,  it  has  had  to 
be  swept  away  to  meet  modern  needs.  I hope  nothing 
of  greater  value  will  have  to  perish  in  the  struggle  to 
repel  the  foreign  Exploiters  and  the  fierce  and  cruel 
system  which  they  miscall  civilization. 


CHAPTER  III 


CHINA  AND  THE  WESTERN  POWERS 

IN  order  to  understand  the  international  position  of 
China,  some  facts  concerning  its  nineteenth-century 
history  are  indispensable.  China  was  for  many  ages 
the  supreme  empire  of  the  Far  East,  embracing  a 
vast  and  fertile  area,  inhabited  by  an  industrious  and 
civilized  people.  Aristocracy,  in  our  sense  of  the  word, 
came  to  an  end  before  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  era, 
and  government  was  in  the  hands  of  officials  chosen  for 
their  proficiency  in  writing  in  a dead  language,  as  in 
England.  Intercourse  with  the  West  was  spasmodic 
and  chiefly  religious.  In  the  early  centuries  of  the 
Christian  era,  Buddhism  was  imported  from  India,  and 
some  Chinese  scholars  penetrated  to  that  country  to 
master  the  theology  of  the  new  religion  in  its  native 
home,  but  in  later  times  the  intervening  barbarians 
made  the  journey  practically  impossible.  Nestorian 
Christianity  reached  China  in  the  seventh  century,  and 
had  a good  deal  of  influence,  but  died  out  again.  (What 
is  known  on  this  subject  is  chiefly  from  the  Nestorian 
monument  discovered  in  Hsianfu  in  1625.)  In  the 
seventeenth  and  early  eighteenth  centuries  Roman 
Catholic  missionaries  acquired  considerable  favor  at 
court,  because  of  their  astronomical  knowledge  and  their 

45 


46 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


help  in  rectifying  the  irregularities  and  confusions  of 
the  Chinese  calendar.1  Their  globes  and  astrolabes  are 
still  to  be  seen  on  the  walls  of  Peking.  But  in  the  long 
run  they  could  not  resist  quarrels  between  different 
orders,  and  were  almost  completely  excluded  from  both 
China  and  Japan. 

In  the  year  1793,  a British  ambassador,  Lord  Macart- 
ney, arrived  in  China,  to  request  further  trade  facili- 
ties and  the  establishment  of  a permanent  British  dip- 
lomatic representative.  The  emperor  at  this  time  was 
Chien  Lung,  the  best  of  the  Mancku  dynasty,  a culti- 
vated man,  a patron  of  the  arts,  and  an  exquisite  calli- 
graphist.  (One  finds  specimens  of  his  writing  in  all 
sorts  of  places  in  China.)  His  reply  to  King  George  III 
is  given  by  Backhouse  and  Bland.2  I wish  I could 
quote  it  all,  but  some  extracts  must  suffice.  It  begins : 

You,  0 King,  live  beyond  the  confines  of  many  seas, 
nevertheless,  impelled  by  your  humble  desire  to  partake  of 
the  benefits  of  our  civilization,  you  have  despatched  a mis- 
sion respectfully  bearing  your  memorial.  ...  To  show  your 
devotion,  you  have  also  sent  offerings  of  your  country’s  prod- 
uce. I have  read  your  memorial : the  earnest  terms  in 
which  it  is  cast  reveal  a respectful  humility  on  your  part, 
which  is  highly  praiseworthy. 

1 In  1691  the  Emperor  Kang  Hsi  issued  an  edict  explaining 

his  attitude  toward  various  religions.  Of  Roman  Catholicism  he 
says:  “As  to  the  western  doctrine  which  glorifies  Tien  Chu, 

the  Lord  of  the  Sky,  that,  too,  is  heterodox;  but  because  its 
priests  are  thoroughly  conversant  with  mathematics,  the  Gov- 
ernment makes  use  of  them — a point  which  you  soldiers  and 
people  should  understand.”  (Giles,  op.  cit.,  p.  252.) 

2 “Annals  and  Memoirs  of  the.  Court  of  Peking,”  pp.  322  ff. 


THE  WESTERN  POWERS 


47 


He  goes  on  to  explain,  with  the  patient  manner  appro- 
priate in  dealing  with  an  importunate  child,  why  George 
Ill’s  desires  cannot  possibly  be  gratified.  An  ambassa- 
dor, he  assures  him,  would  be  useless,  for : 

If  you  assert  that  your  reverence  for  our  Celestial  Dynasty 
fills  you  with  a desire  to  acquire  our  civilization,  our  cere- 
monies and  code  of  laws  differ  so  completely  from  your  own 
that,  even  if  your  Envoy  were  able  to  acquire  the  rudiments 
of  our  civilization,  you  could  not  possibly  transplant  our 
manners  and  customs  to  your  alien  soil.  Therefore,  however 
adept  the  Envoy  might  become,  nothing  would  be  gained 
thereby. 

Swaying  the  wide  world,  I have  but  one  aim  in  view, 
namely,  to  maintain  a perfect  governance  and  to  fulfill  the 
duties  of  the  State;  strange  and  costly  objects  do  not  inter- 
est me.  I . . . have  no  use  for  your  country’s  manufactures. 
. . . It  behoves  you,  0 King,  to  respect  my  sentiments 
and  to  display  even  greater  devotion  and  loyalty  in  fu- 
ture, so  that,  by  perpetual  submission  to  our  Throne,  you 
may  secure  peace  and  prosperity  for  your  country  here- 
after. 

He  can  understand  the  English  desiring  the  produce 
of  China,  but  feels  that  they  have  nothing  worth  hav- 
ing to  offer  in  exchange : 

“Our  Celestial  Empire  possesses  all  things  in  prolific 
abundance  and  lacks  no  product  within  its  own  borders. 
There  was  therefore  no  need  to  import  the  manufactures 
of  outside  barbarians  in  exchange  for  our  own  produce. 
But  as  the  tea,  silk  and  porcelain  which  the  Celestial 
Empire  produces  are  absolute  necessities  to  European 


48 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


nations  and  to  yourselves, ’ ’ the  limited  trade  hitherto 
permitted  at  Canton  is  to  continue. 

He  would  have  shown  less  favor  to  Lord  Macartney, 
but  “I  do  not  forget  the  lonely  remoteness  of  your 
island,  cut  off  from  the  world  by  intervening  wastes  of 
sea,  nor  do  I overlook  your  excusable  ignorance  of  the 
usages  of  our  Celestial  Empire.’ ’ He  concludes  with 
the  injunction : ‘ ‘ Tremblingly  obey  and  show  no  negli- 

gence ! 9 ’ 

What  I want  to  suggest  is  that  no  one  understands 
China  until  this  document  has  ceased  to  seem  absurd. 
The  Romans  claimed  to  rule  the  world,  and  what  lay 
outside  their  empire  was  to  them  of  no  account.  The 
empire  of  C.hien  Lung  was  more  extensive,  with  probably 
a larger  population;  it  had  risen  to  greatness  at  the 
same  time  as  Rome,  and  had  not  fallen,  but  invariably  de- 
feated all  its  enemies,  either  by  war  or  by  absorption. 
Its  neighbors  were  comparatively  barbarous,  except  the 
Japanese,  who  acquired  their  civilization  by  slavish 
imitation  of  China.  The  view  of  Chien  Lung  was  no 
more  absurd  than  that  of  Alexander  the  Great,  sighing 
for  new  worlds  to  conquer  when  he  had  never  even 
heard  of  China,  where  Confucius  had  been  dead  already 
for  a hundred  and  fifty  years.  Nor  was  he  mistaken  as 
regards  trade:  China  produces  everything  needed  for 
the  happiness  of  its  inhabitants,  and  we  have  forced 
trade  upon  them  solely  for  our  benefit,  giving  them  in 
exchange  only  things  which  they  would  do  better  with- 
out. 

Unfortunately  for  China,  its  culture  was  deficient  in 
one  respect,  namely,  science.  In  art  and  literature,  in 


THE  WESTERN  POWERS 


49 


manners  and  customs,  it  was  at  least  the  equal  of 
Europe;  at  the  time  of  the  Renaissance,  Europe  would 
not  have  been  in  any  way  the  superior  of  the  Celestial 
Empire.  There  is  a museum  in  Peking  where,  side  by 
side  with  good  Chinese  art,  may  be  seen  the  presents 
which  Louis  XIV  made  to  the  emperor  when  he  wished 
to  impress  him  with  the  splendor  of  Le  Boi  Soleil. 
Compared  to  the  Chinese  things  surrounding  them,  they 
are  tawdry  and  barbaric.  The  fact  that  Britain  has  pro- 
duced Shakspere  and  Milton,  Locke  and  Hume,  and  all 
the  other  men  who  have  adorned  literature  and  the 
arts,  does  not  make  us  superior  to  the  Chinese.  What 
makes  us  superior  is  Newton  and  Robert  Boyle  and  their 
scientific  successors.  They  make  us  superior  by  giving 
us  greater  proficiency  in  the  art  of  killing.  It  is  easier 
for  an  Englishman  to  kill  a Chinaman  than  for  a China- 
man to  kill  an  Englishman.  Therefore  our  civilization 
is  superior  to  that  of  China,  and  Chien  Lung  is  absurd. 
When  we  had  finished  with  Napoleon,  we  soon  set  to 
work  to  demostrate  this  proposition. 

Our  first  war  with  China  was  in  1840,  and  was 
fought  because  the  Chinese  Government  endeavored  to 
stop  the  importation  of  opium.  It  ended  with  the  ces- 
sion of  Hong-Kong  and  the  opening  of  five  ports  to 
British  trade,  as  well  as  (soon  afterward)  to  the  trade 
of  France,  America,  and  Scandinavia.  In  1856-60,  the 
English  and  French  jointly  made  war  on  China,  and 
destroyed  the  Summer  Palace  near  Peking, 3 a building 
whose  artistic  value,  on  account  of  the  treasures  it  con- 

3 The  Summer  Palace  now  shown  to  tourists  is  modern,  chiefly 
built  by  the  empress  dowager. 


50 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


tained,  must  have  been  about  equal  to  that  of  Saint 
Mark’s  in  Venice  and  much  greater  than  that  of  Rheims 
Cathedral.  This  act  did  much  to  persuade  the  Chinese 
of  the  superiority  of  our  civilization,  so  they  opened 
seven  more  ports  and  the  river  Yangtze,  paid  an  idem- 
nity  and  granted  us  more  territory  at  Hong-Kong.  In 
1870,  the  Chinese  were  rash  enough  to  murder  a British 
diplomat,  so  the  remaining  British  diplomats  demanded 
and  obtained  an  indemmity,  five  more  ports,  and  a fixed 
tariff  for  opium.  Next,  the  French  took  Annam  and 
the  British  took  Burma,  both  formerly  under  Chinese 
suzerainty.  Then  came  the  war  with  Japan  in  1894- 
95,  leading  to  Japan’s  complete  victory  and  conquest 
of  Korea.  Japan’s  acquisitions  would  have  been  much 
greater  but  for  the  intervention  of  France,  Germany, 
and  Russia,  England  holding  aloof.  This  was  the  be- 
ginning of  our  support  of  Japan,  inspired  by  fear  of 
Russia.  It  also  led  to  an  alliance  between  China  and 
Russia,  as  a reward  for  which  Russia  acquired  all  the 
important  rights  in  Manchuria,  which  passed  to  Japan, 
partly  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  and  partly  after 
the  Bolshevik  revolution. 

The  next  incident  begins  with  the  murder  of  two 
German  missionaries  in  Shantung  in  1897.  Nothing  in 
their  life  became  them  like  the  leaving  of  it;  for  if 
they  had  lived  they  would  probably  have  made  very  few 
converts,  whereas  by  dying  they  afforded  the  world  an 
object-lesson  in  Christian  ethics.  The  Germans  seized 
Kiaochow  Bay  and  created  a naval  base  there ; they  also 
acquired  railroad  and  mining  rights  in  Shantung,  which 
by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  passed  to  Japan  in  accord- 


THE  WESTERN  POWERS 


51 


ance  with  the  Fourteen  Points.  Shantung  therefore  be- 
came virtually  a J apanese  possession,  though  America  at 
Washington  has  insisted  upon  its  restitution.  The  serv- 
ices of  the  two  missionaries  to  civilization  did  not,  how- 
ever, end  in  China,  for  their  death  was  constantly  used 
in  the  German  Reichstag  during  the  first  debates  on  the 
German  Big  Navy  Bills,  since  it  was  held  that  war-ships 
would  make  Germany  respected  in  China.  Thus  they 
helped  to  exacerbate  the  relations  of  England  and  Ger- 
many and  to  hasten  the  advent  of  the  Great  War. 
They  also  helped  to  bring  on  the  Boxer  rising,  which  is 
said  to  have  begun  as  a movement  against  the  Germans 
in  Shantung,  though  the  other  powers  emulated  the 
Germans  in  every  respect,  the  Russians  by  creating  a 
naval  base  at  Port  Arthur,  the  British  by  acquiring 
Wei-hai-wei  and  a sphere  of  influence  in  the  Yangtze, 
and  so  on.  The  Americans  alone  held  aloof,  proclaim- 
ing the  policy  of  Chinese  integrity  and  the  Open 
Door. 

The  Boxer  rising  is  one  of  the  few  Chinese  events 
that  all  Europeans  know  about.  After  we  had  demon- 
strated our  superior  virtue  by  the  sack  of  Peking,  we 
exacted  a huge  indemnity,  and  turned  the  Legation 
Quarter  of  Peking  into  a fortified  city.  To  this  day, 
it  is  inclosed  by  a wall,  filled  with  European,  American, 
and  Japanese  troops,  and  surrounded  by  a bare  space 
on  which  the  Chinese  are  not  allowed  to  build.  It  is 
administered  by  the  diplomatic  body,  and  the  Chinese 
authorities  have  no  powers  over  any  one  within  its  gates. 
When  some  unusually  corrupt  and  traitorous  govern- 
ment is  overthrown,  its  members  take  refuge  in  the 


52 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


Japanese  (or  other)  legation  and  so  escape  the  punish- 
ment of  their  crimes,  while  within  the  sacred  precincts 
of  the  Legation  Quarter  the  Americans  erect  a vast 
wireless  station  said  to  be  capable  of  communicating 
directly  with  the  United  States.  And  so  the  refutation 
of  Chien  Lung  is  completed. 

Out  of  the  Boxer  indemnity,  however,  one  good  thing 
has  come.  The  Americans  found  that,  after  paying  all 
just  claims  for  damages,  they  still  had  a large  surplus. 
This  they  returned  to  China  to  he  spent  on  higher 
education,  partly  in  colleges  in  China  under  American 
control,  partly  by  sending  advanced  Chinese  students 
to  American  universities.  The  gain  to  China  has  been 
enormous,  and  the  benefit  to  America  from  the  friend- 
ship of  the  Chinese  (especially  the  most  educated  of 
them)  is  incalculable.  This  is  obvious  to  every  one,  yet 
England  shows  hardly  any  signs  of  following  suit. 

To  understand  the  difficulties  with  which  the  Chinese 
Government  is  faced,  it  is  necessary  to  realize  the  loss 
of  fiscal  independence  which  China  has  suffered  as  the 
result  of  the  various  wars  and  treaties  which  have  been 
forced  upon  her.  In  the  early  days,  the  Chinese  had  no 
experience  of  European  diplomacy,  and  did  not  know 
what  to  avoid ; in  later  days,  they  have  not  been  allowed 
to  treat  old  treaties  as  scraps  of  paper,  since  that  is  the 
prerogative  of  the  great  powers — a prerogative  which 
every  single  one  of  them  exercises. 

The  best  example  of  this  state  of  affairs  is  the  customs 
tariff. 4 At  the  end  of  our  first  war  with  China,  in 

4 There  is  an  admirable  account  of  this  question  in  Chap.  VIII 
of  Sih-Gung  Cheng’s  “Modern  China,”  Clarendon  Press,  1919. 


THE  WESTERN  POWERS 


53 


1842,  we  concluded  a treaty  which  provided  for  a duty 
at  treaty  ports  of  5 per  cent,  on  all  imports  and  not 
more  than  5 per  cent,  on  exports.  This  treaty  is  the 
basis  of  the  whole  customs  system.  At  the  end  of  our 
next  war,  in  1858,  we  drew  up  a schedule  of  conventional 
prices  on  which  the  5 per  cent,  was  to  be  calculated. 
This  was  to  be  revised  every  ten  years,  but  has  in  fact 
only  been  revised  twice,  once  in  1902  and  once  in  1918. 5 
Revision  of  the  schedule  is  merely  a change  in  the  con- 
ventional prices,  not  a change  in  the  tariff  which  remains 
fixed  at  5 per  cent.  Change  in  the  tariff  is  practically 
impossible,  since  China  has  concluded  commercial 
treaties  involving  a most-favored-nation  clause,  and 
the  same  tariff,  with  twelve  states  besides  Great 
Britain,  and  therefore  any  change  in  the  tariff  requires 
the  unanimous  consent  of  thirteen  powers. 

When  foreign  powers  speak  of  the  Open  Door  as  a 
panacea  for  China,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  Open 
Door  does  nothing  to  give  the  Chinese  the  usual  auton- 
omy as  regards  customs  that  is  enjoyed  by  other  sover- 
eign states.6  The  treaty  of  1842,  on  which  the  system 
rests,  has  no  time-limit  or  provision  for  denunciation 
by  either  party,  such  as  other  commercial  treaties  con- 
tain. A low  tariff  suits  the  powers  that  wish  to  find  a 
market  for  their  goods  in  China,  and  they  have  there- 

5 A new  revision  has  been  decided  upon  by  the  Washington 
conference. 

6 If  you  lived  in  a town  where  the  burglars  had  obtained  pos- 
session of  the  town  council,  they  would  very  likely  insist  upon 
the  policy  of  the  Open  Door,  but  you  might  not  consider  it 
wholly  satisfactory.  Such  is  China’s  situation  among  the  great 
powers. 


54 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


fore  no  motive  for  consenting  to  any  alteration.  In 
the  past,  when  we  practised  free  trade,  we  could  defend 
ourselves  by  saying  that  the  policy  we  forced  upon 
China  was  the  same  as  that  which  we  adopted  ourselves. 
But  no  other  nation  could  make  this  excuse,  nor  can 
we  know  that  we  have  abandoned  free  trade  by  the  Safe- 
guarding of  Industries  Act. 

The  import  tariff  being  so  low,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment is  compelled,  for  the  sake  of  revenue,  to  charge 
the  maximum  of  5 per  cent,  on  all  exports.  This,  of 
course,  hinders  the  development  of  Chinese  commerce, 
and  is  probably  a mistake.  But  the  need  of  sources  of 
revenue  is  desperate,  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
Chinese  authorities  should  consider  the  tax  indispen- 
sable. 

There  is  also  another  system  in  China,  chiefly  in- 
herited from  the  time  of  the  Taiping  Rebellion,  namely, 
the  erection  of  internal  customs  barriers  at  various  im- 
portant points.  This  plan  is  still  adopted  with  the 
internal  trade.  But  merchants  dealing  with  the  inte- 
rior and  sending  goods  to  or  from  a treaty  port  can 
escape  internal  customs  by  the  payment  of  half  the 
duty  charged  under  the  external  tariff.  As  this  is  gen- 
erally less  than  the  internal  tariff  charges,  this  provi- 
sion favors  foreign  produce  at  the  expense  of  that  of 
China.  Of  course  the  system  of  internal  customs  is 
bad,  but  it  is  traditional,  and  is  defended  on  the  ground 
that  revenue  is  indispensable.  China  offered  to  abolish 
internal  customs  in  return  for  certain  uniform  increases 
in  the  import  and  export  tariff,  and  Great  Britain, 
Japan,  and  the  United  States  consented.  But  there 


THE  WESTERN  POWERS 


55 


were  ten  other  powers  whose  consent  was  necessary, 
and  not  all  could  be  induced  to  agree.  So  the  old  sys- 
tem remains  in  force,  not  chiefly  through  the  fault  of 
the  Chinese  central  government.  It  should  be  added 
that  internal  customs  are  collected  by  the  provincial 
authorities,  who  usually  intercept  them  and  use  them 
for  private  armies  and  civil  war.  At  the  present  time, 
the  central  government  is  not  strong  enough  to  stop 
these  abuses. 

The  administration  of  the  customs  is  only  partially 
in  the  hands  of  the  Chinese.  By  treaty,  the  inspector- 
general,  who  is  at  the  head  of  the  service,  must  be 
British  so  long  as  our  trade  with  China  exceeds  that 
of  any  other  treaty  state;  and  the  appointment  of  all 
subordinate  officials  is  in  his  hands.  In  1918  (the  latest 
year  for  which  I have  the  figures)  there  were  7500  per- 
sons employed  in  the  customs,  and  of  these  2000  were 
non-Chinese.  The  first  inspector-general  was  Sir  Robert 
Hart,  who,  by  the  unanimous  testimony  of  all  parties, 
fulfilled  his  duties  exceedingly  well.  For  the  time  be- 
ing, there  is  much  to  be  said  for  the  present  system. 
The  Chinese  have  the  appointment  of  the  inspector- 
general,  and  can  therefore  choose  a man  who  is  sym- 
pathetic to  their  country.  Chinese  officials  are,  as  a 
rule,  corrupt  and  indolent,  so  that  control  by  foreigners 
is  necessary  in  creating  a modern  bureaucracy.  So 
long  as  the  foreign  officials  are  responsible  to  the 
Chinese  Government,  not  to  foreign  states,  they  fulfill 
a useful  educative  function,  and  help  to  prepare  the 
way  for  the  creation  of  an  efficient  Chinese  state.  The 
problem  for  China  is  to  secure  practical  and  intellec- 


56 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


tual  training  from  the  white  nations  without  becoming 
their  slaves.  In  dealing  with  this  problem,  the  system 
adopted  in  the  customs  has  much  to  recommend  it  dur- 
ing the  early  stages.7 

At  the  same  time,  there  are  grave  infringements  of 
Chinese  independence  in  the  present  position  of  the 
customs,  apart  altogether  from  the  fact  that  the  tariff 
is  fixed  by  treaty  forever.  Much  of  the  revenue  de- 
rivable from  customs  is  mortgaged  for  various  loans 
and  indemnities,  so  that  the  customs  cannot  be  dealt 
with  from  the  point  of  view  of  Chinese  interests  alone. 
Moreover,  in  the  present  state  of  anarchy,  the  customs 
administration  can  exercise  considerable  control  over 
Chinese  politics  by  recognizing  or  not  recognizing  a 
given  de  facto  government.  (There  is  no  government 
de  jure,  at  any  rate  in  the  North.)  At  present,  the 
customs  revenue  is  withheld  in  the  South,  and  an  arti- 
ficial bankruptcy  is  being  engineered.  In  view  of  the 
reactionary  instincts  of  diplomats,  this  constitutes  a 
terrible  obstacle  to  internal  reform.  It  means  that  no 
government  which  is  in  earnest  in  attempting  to  intro- 

7 “The  Times”  of  November  26,  1921,  had  a leading  article  on 
Mr.  Wellington  Koo’s  suggestion,  at  Washington,  that  China 
ought  to  be  allowed  to  recover  fiscal  autonomy  as  regards  the 
tariff.  Mr.  Koo  did  not  deal  with  the  customs  administration, 
nevertheless  “The  Times”  assumed  that  his  purpose  was  to  get 
the  administration  into  the  hands  of  the  Chinese  on  account  of 
the  opportunities  of  lucrative  corruption  which  it  would  af- 
ford. I wrote  to  “The  Times”  pointing  out  that  they  had  con- 
fused the  administration  with  the  tariff,  and  that  Mr.  Koo  was 
dealing  only  with  the  tariff.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  they  did 
not  print  either  my  letter  or  any  other  to  the  same  effect,  are 
we  to  conclude  that  their  misrepresentation  was  deliberate  and 
intentional  ? 


THE  WESTERN  POWERS 


57 


duce  radical  improvements  can  hope  to  enjoy  the  cus- 
toms revenue,  which  interposes  a formidable  fiscal 
barrier  in  the  way  of  reconstruction. 

There  is  a similar  situation  as  regards  the  salt  tax. 
This  also  was  accepted  as  security  for  various  foreign 
loans,  and  in  order  to  make  the  security  acceptable  the 
foreign  powers  concerned  insisted  upon  the  employment 
of  foreigners  in  the  principal  posts.  As  in  the  case  of 
the  customs,  the  foreign  inspectors  are  appointed  by  the 
Chinese  Government,  and  the  situation  is  in  all  respects 
similar  to  that  existing  as  regards  the  customs. 

The  customs  and  the  salt  tax  form  the  security  for 
various  loans  to  China.  This,  together  with  foreign  ad- 
ministration, gives  opportunities  of  interference  by  the 
powers  which  they  show  no  inclination  to  neglect.  The 
way  in  which  the  situation  is  utilized  may  be  illustrated 
by  three  telegrams  in  “The  Times”  which  appeared 
during  January  of  this  year. 

On  January  14,  1922,  “The  Times”  published  the  fol- 
lowing in  a telegram  from  its  Peking  correspondent: 

It  is  curious  to  reflect  that  this  country  (China)  could  be 
rendered  completely  solvent  and  the  Government  provided 
with  a substantial  income  almost  by  a stroke  of  the  foreign- 
er’s pen,  while  without  that  stroke  there  must  be  bank- 
ruptcy, pure  and  simple.  Despite  constant  civil  war  and 
political  chaos,  the  Customs  revenue  consistently  grows,  and 
last  year  exceeded  all  records  by  £1,000,000.  The  increased 
duties  sanctioned  by  the  Washington  Conference  will  pro- 
vide sufficient  revenue  to  liquidate  the  whole  foreign  and 
domestic  floating  debt  in  a very  few  years,  leaving  the 
splendid  salt  surplus  unencumbered  for  the  Government. 


58 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


The  difficulty  is  not  to  provide  money,  but  to  find  a Govern- 
ment to  which  to  entrust  it.  Nor  is  there  any  visible  pros- 
pect of  the  removal  of  this  difficulty. 

I venture  to  think  “The  Times’ ’ would  regard  the  dif- 
ficulty as  removed  if  the  Manchu  Empire  were  restored. 

As  to  the  “splendid  salt  surplus,”  there  are  two  tele- 
grams from  the  Peking  correspondent  to  “The  Times” 
(of  January  12  and  23,  respectively)  showing  what  we 
gain  by  making  the  Peking  government  artificially  bank- 
rupt. The  first  telegram  (sent  on  January  10)  is  as 
follows : — 

Present  conditions  in  China  are  aptly  illustrated  by  what 
is  happening  in  one  of  the  great  salt  revenue  stations  on  the 
Yangtsze,  near  Chinkiang.  That  portion  of  the  Chinese  fleet 
faithful  to  the  Central  Government — the  better  half  went 
over  to  the  Canton  Government  long  ago — has  dispatched  a 
squadron  of  gunboats  to  the  salt  station  and  notified  Peking 
that  if  $3,000,000  (about  £400,000)  arrears  of  pay  were  not 
immediately  forthcoming  the  amount  would  be  forcibly  re- 
covered from  the  revenue.  Meanwhile  the  immense  salt  traffic 
on  the  Yangtsze  has  been  suspended.  The  Legations  con- 
cerned have  now  sent  an  Identic  Note  to  the  Government 
warning  it  of  the  necessity  for  immediately  securing  the  re- 
moval of  the  obstruction  to  the  traffic  and  to  the  operations 
of  the  foreign  collectorate. 

The  second  telegram  is  equally  interesting.  It  is  as 
follows : 

The  question  of  interference  with  the  Salt  Gabelle  is  as- 
suming a serious  aspect.  The  Chinese  squadron  of  gunboats 
referred  to  in  my  message  of  the  10th  is  still  blocking  the 


THE  WESTERN  POWERS 


59 


salt  traffic  near  Chinldang,  while  »a  new  intruder  in  the  shape 
of  an  agent  of  Wu-Pei-Fu  [the  Liberal  military  leader]  has 
installed  himself  in  the  collectorate  at  Hankow,  and  is 
endeavoring  to  appropriate  the  receipts  for  his  powerful 
master.  The  British,  French,  and  Japanese  Ministers  accord- 
ingly have  again  addressed  the  Government,  giving  notice 
that  if  these  irregular  proceedings  do  not  cease  they  will 
be  compelled  to  take  independent  action.  The  Reorganiza- 
tion Loan  of  £25,000,000  is  secured  on  the  salt  revenues, 
and  interference  with  the  foreign  control  of  the  department 
constitutes  an  infringement  of  the  loan  agreement.  In  va- 
rious parts  of  China,  some  independent  of  Peking,  others 
not,  the  local  Tucliuns  (military  governors)  impound  the 
collections  and  materially  diminish  the  total  coming  under 
the  control  of  the  foreign  inspectorate,  but  the  balance  re- 
maining has  been  so  large,  and  protest  so  useless,  that 
hitherto  all  concerned  have  considered  it  expedient  to  ac- 
quiesce. But  interference  at  points  on  the  Yangtsze,  where 
naval  force  can  be  brought  to  bear,  is  another  matter.  The 
situation  is  interesting  in  view  of  the  amiable  resolutions 
adopted  at  Washington,  by  which  the  Powers  would  seem  to 
have  debarred  themselves,  in  the  future,  from  any  active 
form  of  intervention  in  this  country.  In  view  of  the  exten- 
sive opposition  to  the  Liang  Sliih-yi  Cabinet  and  the  pres- 
ent interference  with  the  salt  negotiations,  the  $90,000,000 
(£11,000,000)  loan  to  be  secured  on  the  salt  surplus  has  been 
dropped.  The  problem  of  how  to  weather  the  new  year 
settlement  on  January  28th  remains  unsolved. 

It  is  a pretty  game:  creating  artificial  bankruptcy, 
and  then  inflicting  punishment  for  the  resulting  an- 
archy. How  regrettable  that  the  Washington  confer- 
ence should  attempt  to  interfere! 


60 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


It  is  useless  to  deny  that  the  Chinese  have  brought 
these  troubles  upon  themselves,  by  their  inability  to  pro- 
duce capable  and  honest  officials.  This  inability  has  its 
roots  in  Chinese  ethics,  which  lay  stress  upon  a man’s 
duty  to  his  family  rather  than  to  the  public.  An  of- 
ficial is  expected  to  keep  all  his  relations  supplied  with 
funds,  and  therefore  can  only  be  honest  at  the  expense 
of  filial  piety.  The  decay  of  the  family  system  is  a 
vital  condition  of  progress  in  China.  All  Young  China 
realizes  this,  and  one  may  hope  that  twenty  years  hence 
the  level  of  honesty  among  officials  may  not  be  lower  in 
China  than  in  Europe — no  very  extravagant  hope. 
But  for  this  purpose  friendly  contact  with  Western 
nations  is  essential.  If  we  insist  upon  rousing  Chinese 
nationalism  as  we  have  roused  that  of  India  and  Japan, 
the ‘Chinese  will  begin  to  think  that  wherever  they  differ 
from  Europe,  they  differ  for  the  better.  There  is  more 
truth  in  this  than  Europeans  like  to  think,  but  it  is  not 
wholly  true,  and  if  it  comes  to  be  believed  our  power 
for  good  in  China  will  be  at  an  end. 

I have  described  briefly  in  this  chapter  what  the 
Christian  powers  did  to  China  while  they  were  able  to 
act  independently  of  Japan.  But  in  modern  China  it 
is  Japanese  aggression  that  is  the  most  urgent  problem. 
Before  considering  this,  however,  we  must  deal  briefly 
with  the  rise  of  modern  Japan — a quite  peculiar  blend 
of  East  and  West,  which  I hope  is  not  prophetic  of  the 
blend  to  be  ultimately  achieved  in  China.  But  before 
passing  to  Japan,  I will  give  a brief  description  of  the 
social  and  political  condition  of  modem  China,  without 
which  Japan’s  action  in  China  would  be  unintelligible. 


CHAPTER  IV 


MODERN  CHINA 


HE  position  of  China  among  the  nations  of  the 


world  is  quite  peculiar,  because  in  population  and 
potential  strength  China  is  the  greatest  nation  in  the 
world,  while  in  actual  strength  at  the  moment  it  is  one 
of  the  least.  The  international  problems  raised  by  this 
situation  have  been  brought  into  the  forefront  of  world- 
politics  by  the  Washington  conference.  What  settle- 
ment, if  any,  will  ultimately  be  arrived  at,  it  is  as  yet 
impossible  to  foresee.  There  are,  however,  certain 
broad  facts  and  principles  which  no  wise  solution  can 
ignore,  for  which  I shall  try  to  give  the  evidence  in  the 
course  of  the  following  chapters,  but  which  it  may  be 
as  well  to  state  briefly  at  the  outset.  First,  the  Chinese, 
though  as  yet  incompetent  in  politics  and  backward  in 
economic  development,  have,  in  other  respects,  a civili- 
zation at  least  as  good  as  our  own,  containing  elements 
■which  the  world  greatly  needs,  and  which  we  shall  de- 
stroy at  our  peril.  Secondly,  the  powers  have  inflicted 
upon  China  a multitude  of  humiliations  and  disabilities, 
for  which  excuses  have  been  found  in  China’s  misdeeds, 
but  for  which  the  sole  reason  has  been  China’s  military 
and  naval  weakness.  Thirdly,  the  best  of  the  great 
powers  at  present,  in  relation  to  China,  is  America,  and 


61 


62 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


the  worst  is  Japan;  in  the  interests  of  China,  as  well  as 
in  our  own  larger  interests,  it  is  an  immense  advance 
that  we  have  ceased  to  support  Japan  and  have  ranged 
ourselves  on  the  side  of  America,  in  so  far  as  America 
stands  for  Chinese  freedom,  but  not  when  Japanese  free- 
dom is  threatened.  Fourthly,  in  the  long  run,  the  Chi- 
nese cannot  escape  economic  domination  by  foreign  pow- 
ers unless  China  becomes  military  or  the  foreign  powers 
become  Socialistic,  because  the  capitalist  system  involves 
in  its  very  essence  a predatory  relation  of  the  strong  to- 
ward the  weak,  internationally  as  well  as  nationally. 
A strong  military  China  would  be  a disaster;  therefore 
socialism  in  Europe  and  America  affords  the  only  ul- 
timate solution. 

After  these  preliminary  remarks,  I come  to  the  theme 
of  this  chapter,  namely,  the  present  internal  condition 
of  China. 

As  every  one  knows,  China,  after  having  an  emperor 
for  forty  centuries,  decided,  eleven  years  ago,  to  become 
a modern  democratic  republic.  Many  causes  led  up  to 
this  result.  Passing  over  the  first  3700  years  of  Chinese 
history,  we  arrive  at  the  Manchu  conquest  in  1644,,  when 
a warlike  invader  from  the  north  succeeded  in  establish- 
ing himself  upon  the  Dragon  Throne.  He  set  to  work 
to  induce  Chinese  men  to  wear  pigtails  and  Chinese 
women  to  have  big  feet.  After  a time  a statesmanlike 
compromise  was  arranged:  pigtails  were  adopted  but 
big  feet  were  rejected ; the  new  absurdity  was  accepted 
and  the  old  one  retained.  This  characteristic  com- 
promise shows  how  much  England  and  China  have  in 
common. 


MODERN  CHINA 


63 


The  Manchu  emperors  soon  became  almost  completely 
Chinese,  bnt  the  differences  of  dress  and  manners  kept 
the  Manchns  distinct  from  the  more  civilized  people 
whom  they  had  conquered,  and  the  Chinese  remained 
inwardly  hostile  to  them.  Fibm  1840  to  1900,  a series 
of  disastrous  foreign  wars,  culminating  in  the  humilia- 
tion of  the  Boxer  time,  destroyed  the  prestige  of  the 
imperial  family  and  showed  all  thoughtful  people  the 
need  of  learning  from  Europeans.  The  Taiping  Rebel- 
lion, which  lasted  for  fifteen  years  (1849-64),  is  thought 
by  Putnam  Weale  to  have  diminished  the  population  by 
150  millions,1  and  was  almost  as  terrible  a business  as 
the  Great  War.  For  a long  time  it  seemed  doubtful 
whether  the  Manchus  could  suppress  it,  and  when  at 
last  they  succeeded  (by  the  help  of  Gordon)  their  energy 
was  exhausted.  The  defeat  of  China  by  Japan  (1894- 
95)  and  the  vengeance  of  the  powers  after  the  Boxer 
rising  (1900)  finally  opened  the  eyes  of  all  thoughtful 
Chinese  to  the  need  for  a better  and  more  modern 
government  than  that  of  the  imperial  family.  But 
things  move  slowly  in  China,  and  it  was  not  till  eleven 
years  after  the  Boxer  movement  that  the  revolution 
broke  out. 

The  revolution  of  1911,  in  China,  was  a moderate  one, 
similar  in  spirit  to  ours  of  1688.  Its  chief  promoter, 

i “The  Truth  about  China  and  Japan,”  Allen  & Unwin,  1921, 
p.  14.  On  the  other  hand  Sih-Gung  Cheng  (“Modern  China,” 
p.  13)  says  that  it  “killed  twenty  million  people,”  which  is 
the  more  usual  estimate,  of  “China  for  the  Chinese”  by  E.  T.  C. 
Werner,  p.  24.  The  extent  to  which  the  population  was  dimin- 
ished is  not  accurately  known,  but  I have  no  doubt  that  twenty 
millions  is  nearer  the  truth  than  150  millions, 


64 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


Sun  Yat  Sen,  now  at  the  head  of  the  Canton  govern- 
ment, was  supported  by  the  Republicans,  and  was  elected 
provisional  president.  But  the  Northern  army  re- 
mained faithful  to  the  dynasty,  and  could  probably  have 
defeated  the  revolutionaries.  Its  commander-in-chief, 
Yuan  !Shih-k’ai,  however,  hit  upon  a better  scheme.  He 
made  peace  with  the  revolutionaries  and  acknowledged 
the  republic,  on  condition  that  he  should  be  the  first 
president  instead  of  Sun  Yat  Sen.  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  was, 
of  course,  supported  by  the  Legations,  being  what  is 
called  a “strong  man,”  i.  e.,  a believer  in  blood  and 
iron,  not  likely  to  be  led  astray  by  talk  about  democracy 
or  freedom.  In  China,  the  North  has  always  been  more 
military  and  less  liberal  than  the  South,  and  Yuan  Shih- 
k’ai  had  created  out  of  Northern  troops  whatever  China 
possessed  in  the  way  of  a modern  army.  As  he  was  also 
ambitious  and  treacherous,  he  had  every  quality  needed 
for  inspiring  confidence  in  the  diplomatic  corps.  In 
view  of  the  chaos  which  has  existed  since  his  death,  it 
must  be  admitted,  however,  that  there  was  something 
to  be  said  in  favor  of  his  policy  and  methods. 

A constituent  assembly,  after  enacting  a provisional 
constitution,  gave  place  to  a duly  elected  parliament, 
which  met  in  April,  1913,  to  determine  the  permanent 
constitution.  Yuan  soon  began  to  quarrel  with  the 
parliament  as  to  the  powers  of  the  president,  which  the 
parliament  wished  to  restrict.  The  majority  in  parlia- 
ment was  opposed  to  Yuan,  but  he  had  the  preponder- 
ance in  military  strength.  Under  these  circumstances, 
as  was  to  be  expected,  constitutionalism  was  soon  over- 
thrown. Yuan  made  himself  financially  independent  of 


MODERN  CHINA 


65 


parliament  (which  had  been  duly  endowed  with  the 
power  of  the  purse)  by  unconstitutionally  concluding  a 
loan  with  the  foreign  bankers.  This  led  to  a revolt  of 
the  South,  which,  however,  Yuan  quickly  suppressed. 
After  this,  by  various  stages,  he  made  himself  virtually 
absolute  ruler  of  China.  He  appointed  his  army  lieu- 
tenants military  governors  of  provinces,  and  sent  North- 
ern troops  into  the  South.  His  regime  might  have 
lasted  but  for  the  fact  that,  in  1915,  he  tried  to  become 
emperor,  and  was  met  by  a successful  revolt.  He  died 
in  1916 — of  a broken  heart,  it  was  said. 

Since  then  there  has  been  nothing  but  confusion  in 
China.  The  military  governors  appointed  by  Yuan  re- 
fused to  submit  to  the  central  government  when  his 
strong  hand  was  removed,  and  their  troops  terrorized 
the  populations  upon  whom  they  were  quartered.  Ever 
since  there  has  been  civil  war,  not,  as  a rule  for  any 
definite  principle,  but  simply  to  determine  which  of 
various  rival  generals  should  govern  various  groups  of 
provinces.  There  still  remains  the  issue  of  North  versus 
South,  but  this  has  lost  most  of  its  constitutional  signif- 
icance. 

The  military  governors  of  provinces  or  groups  of 
provinces,  who  are  called  tuchuns,  govern  despotically 
in  defiance  of  Peking,  and  commit  depredations  on  the 
inhabitants  of  the  districts  over  which  they  rule.  They 
intercept  the  revenue,  except  the  portions  collected  and 
administered  by  foreigners,  such  as  the  salt  tax.  They 
are  nominally  appointed  by  Peking,  but  in  practice  de- 
pend only  upon  the  favor  of  the  soldiers  in  their  prov- 
inces. The  central  government  is  nearly  bankrupt,  and 


66 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


is  usually  unable  to  pay  the  soldiers,  who  live  by  loot 
and  by  such  portions  of  the  tucliun’s  ill-gotten  wealth 
as  he  finds  it  prudent  to  surrender  to  them.  When  any 
faction  seemed  near  to  complete  victory,  the  Japanese 
supported  its  opponents,  in  order  that  civil  discord 
might  be  prolonged.  While  I was  in  Peking,  the  three 
most  important  tuchuns  met  there  for  a conference  on 
the  division  of  the  spoils.  They  were  barely  civil  to  the 
president  and  the  prime  minister,  who  still  officially 
represent  China  in  the  eyes  of  foreign  powers.  The  un- 
fortunate nominal  government  was  obliged  to  pay  to 
these  three  worthies,  out  of  a bankrupt  treasury,  a sum 
which  the  newspapers  stated  to  be  nine  million  dollars, 
to  secure  their  departure  from  the  capital.  The  largest 
share  went  to  Chang-tso-lin,  the  viceroy  of  Manchuria 
and  commonly  said  to  be  a tool  of  Japan.  His  share 
was  paid  to  cover  the  expenses  of  an  expedition  to  Mon- 
golia, which  had  revolted ; but  no  one  for  a moment  sup- 
posed that  he  would  undertake  such  an  expedition,  and 
in  fact  he  has  remained  at  Mukden  ever  since.2 

In  the  extreme  South,  however,  there  has  been  es- 
tablished a government  of  a different  sort,  for  which  it 
is  possible  to  have  some  respect.  Canton,  which  has  al- 
ways been  the  center  of  Chinese  radicalism,  succeeded, 
in  the  autumn  of  1920,  in  throwing  off  the  tyranny  of  its 
Northern  garrison  and  establishing  a progressive  efficient 
government  under  the  presidency  of  Sun  Yat  Sen. 
This  government  now  embraces  two  provinces,,  Kwang- 

2 In  January,  1922,  lie  came  to  Peking  to  establish  a more 
subservient  government,  the  dismissal  of  which  has  been  ordered 
by  Wu-Pei-Fu.  A clash  is  imminent.  See  Appendix. 


MODERN  CHINA 


67 


tung  (of  which  Canton  is  the  capital)  and  Kwangsi. 
For  a moment  it  seemed  likely  to  conquer  the  whole  of 
the  South,  but  it  has  been  checked  by  the  victories  of  the 
Northern  General  Wu-Pei-Fu  in  the  neighboring  prov- 
ince of  Hunan.  Its  enemies  allege  that  it  cherishes 
designs  of  conquest,  and  wishes  to  unite  all  China  under 
its  sway.3  In  all  ascertainable  respects  it  is  a govern- 
ment which  deserves  the  support  of  all  progressive 
people.  Professor  Dewey,  in  articles  in  “The  New  Re- 
public, ” has  set  forth  its  merits,  as  well  as  the  bitter 
enmity  which  it  has  encountered  from  Hong-Kong  and 
the  British  generally.  This  opposition  is  partly  on  gen- 
eral principles,  because  we  dislike  radical  reform,  partly 
because  of  the  Cassel  agreement.  This  agreement — of  a 
common  type  in  China — would  have  given  us  a virtual 
monopoly  of  the  railways  and  mines  in  the  province  of 
Kwangtung.  It  had  been  concluded  with  the  former 
government,  and  only  awaited  ratification,  but  the  change 
of  government  has  made  ratification  impossible.  The 
new  government,  very  properly,  is  befriended  by  the 
Americans,  and  one  of  them,  Mr.  Shank,  concluded  an 
agreement  with  the  new  government  more  or  less  sim- 
ilar to  that  which  we  had  concluded  with  the  old  one. 
The  American  Government,  however,  did  not  support 
Mr.  Shank,  whereas  the  British  Government  did  support 
the  Cassel  agreement.  Meanwhile  we  have  lost  a very 

3 The  blame  for  this  is  put  upon  Sun  Yat  Sen,  who  is  said 
to  have  made  an  alliance  with  Chang-tso-lin.  The  best  element 
in  the  Canton  government  was  said  to  be  represented  by  Sun's 
colleague  General  Cheng  Chiung  Ming,  who  is  now  reported  to 
have  been  dismissed  (“The  Times,”  April  24,  1922).  These 
statements  are  apparently  unfounded.  See  Appendix. 


68 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


valuable  though  very  iniquitous  concession,  merely  be- 
cause we,  but  not  the  Americans,  prefer  what  is  old  and 
corrupt  to  what  is  vigorous  and  honest.  I understand, 
moreover,  that  the  Shank  agreement  lapsed  because  Mr. 
Shank  could  not  raise  the  necessary  capital. 

The  anarchy  in  China  is,  of  course,  very  regrettable, 
and  every  friend  of  China  must  hope  that  it  will  be 
brought  to  an  end.  But  it  would  be  a mistake  to  ex- 
aggerate the  evil,  or  to  suppose  that  it  is  comparable  in 
magnitude  to  the  evils  endured  in  Europe.  China  must 
not  be  compared  to  a single  European  country,  but  to 
Europe  as  a whole.  In  “The  Times”  of  November  11, 
1921,  I notice  a pessimistic  article  headed : ‘ ‘ The  Peril 
of  China.  A dozen  rival  Governments.”  But  in  Eu- 
rope there  are  much  more  than  a dozen  governments, 
and  their  enmities  are  much  fiercer  than  those  of  China. 
The  number  of  troops  in  Europe  is  enormously  greater 
than  in  China,  and  they  are  infinitely  better  provided 
with  weapons  of  destruction.  The  amount  of  fighting 
in  Europe  since  the  armistice  has  been  incomparably 
more  than  the  amount  in  China  during  the  same  period. 
You  may  travel  through  China  from  end  to  end,  and  it 
is  ten  to  one  that  you  will  see  no  signs  of  war.  Chinese 
battles  are  seldom  bloody,  being  fought  by  mercenary 
soldiers  who  take  no  interest  in  the  cause  for  which  they 
are  supposed  to  be  fighting.  I am  inclined  to  think 
that  the  inhabitants  of  China,  at  the  present  moment, 
are  happier,  on  the  average,  than  the  inhabitants  of  Eu- 
rope, taken  as  a whole. 

It  is  clear,  I think,  that  political  reform  in  China, 
when  it  becomes  possible,  will  have  to  take  the  form  of 


MODERN  CHINA 


69 


a federal  constitution,  allowing  a very  large  measure  of 
autonomy  to  the  provinces.  The  division  into  provinces 
is  very  ancient,  and  provincial  feeling  is  strong.  After 
the  revolution,  a constitution  more  or  less  resembling  our 
own  was  attempted,  only  with  a president  instead  of  a 
king.  But  the  successful  working  of  a non-federal  con- 
stitution requires  a homogeneous  population  without 
much  local  feeling,  as  may  be  seen  from  our  own  ex- 
perience in  Ireland.  Most  progressive  Chinese,  as  far 
as  I was  able  to  judge,  now  favor  a federal  constitution, 
leaving  to  the  central  government  not  much  except  arma- 
ments, foreign  affairs,  and  customs.  But  the  difficulty 
of  getting  rid  of  the  existing  military  anarchy  is  very 
great.  The  central  government  cannot  disband  the 
troops,  because  it  cannot  find  the  money  to  pay  them. 
It  would  be  necessary  to  borrow  from  abroad  enough 
money  to  pay  off  the  troops  and  establish  them  in  new 
jobs.  But  it  is  doubtful  whether  any  power  or  powers 
would  make  such  a loan  without  exacting  the  sacrifice 
of  the  last  remnants  of  Chinese  independence.  One 
must  therefore  hope  that  somehow  the  Chinese  will  find 
a way  of  escaping  their  troubles  without  too  much  for- 
eign assistance. 

It  is  by  no  means  impossible  that  one  of  the  tuchuns 
may  become  supreme,  and  may  then  make  friends  with 
the  constitutionalists  as  the  best  way  of  consolidating 
his  influence.  China  is  a country  where  public  opinion 
has  great  weight,  and  where  the  desire  to  be  thought 
well  of  may  quite  possibly  lead  a successful  militarist 
into  patriotic  courses.  There  are,  at  the  moment,  two 
tuchuns  who  are  more  important  than  any  of  the  others. 


70 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


These  are  Chang-tso-lin  and  'Wu-Pei-Fu,  both  of  whom 
have  been  already  mentioned.  Chang-tso-lin  is  supreme 
in  Manchuria,  and  strong  in  Japanese  support;  he  rep- 
resents all  that  is  most  reactionary  in  China.  Wu-Pei- 
Fu,  on  the  other  hand,  is  credited  with  liberal  tendencies. 
He  is  an  able  general;  not  long  ago,  nominally  at  the 
bidding  of  Peking,  he  established  his  authority  on  the 
Yangtze  and  in  Hunan,  thereby  dealing  a blow  to  the 
hopes  of  Canton.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  how  he  could 
come  to  terms  with  the  Canton  government,  especially 
since  it  has  allied  itself  with  Chang-tso-lin,  but  in  the 
rest  of  China  he  might  establish  his  authority  and  seek 
to  make  it  permanent  by  being  constitutional  (see  Ap- 
pendix). If  so,  China  might  have  a breathing-space, 
and  a breathing-space  is  all  that  is  needed. 

The  economic  life  of  China,  except  in  the  treaty  ports 
and  in  a few  regions  where  there  are  mines,  is  still 
wholly  pre-industrial.  Peking  has  nearly  a million  in- 
habitants, and  covers  an  enormous  area,  owing  to  the  fact 
that  all  the  houses  have  only  a ground  floor  and  are 
built  round  a courtyard.  Yet  it  has  no  trams  or  buses 
or  local  trains.  So  far  as  I could  see,  there  are  not  more 
than  two  or  three  factory  chimneys  in  the  whole  town. 
Apart  from  begging,  trading,  thieving,  and  government 
employment,  people  live  by  handicrafts.  The  products 
are  exquisite  and  the  work  less  monotonous  than 
machine-minding,  but  the  hours  are  long  and  the  pay 
infinitesimal. 

Seventy  or  80  per  cent,  of  the  population  of  China 
are  engaged  in  agriculture.  Rice  and  tea  are  the  chief 
products  of  the  South,  while  wheat  and  other  kinds  of 


MODERN  CHINA 


71 


grain  form  the  staple  crops  in  the  North.4  The  rain- 
fall is  very  great  in  the  South,  but  in  the  North  it  is 
only  just  sufficient  to  prevent  the  land  from  being  a 
desert.  When  I arrived  in  China,  in  the  autumn  of 
1920,  a large  area  in  the  North,  owing  to  drought,  was 
afflicted  with  a terrible  famine,  nearly  as  bad,  probably, 
as  the  famine  in  Russia  in  1921.  As  the  Bolsheviks 
were  not  concerned,  foreigners  had  no  hesitation  in  try- 
ing to  bring  relief.  As  for  the  Chinese,  they  regarded 
it  passively  as  a stroke  of  fate,  and  even  those  who  died 
of  it  shared  this  view. 

Most  of  the  land  is  in  the  hands  of  peasant  pro- 
prietors, who  divide  their  holdings  among  their  sons,  so 
that  each  man’s  share  becomes  barely  sufficient  to  sup- 
port himself  and  his  family.  Consequently,  when  the 
rainfall  is  less  than  usual,  immense  numbers  perish  of 
starvation.  It  would  of  course  be  possible,  for  a time, 
to  prevent  famines  by  more  scientific  methods  of  agri- 
culture, and  to  prevent  droughts  and  floods  by  afforesta- 
tion. More  railways  and  better  roads  would  give  a 
vastly  improved  market,  and  might  greatly  enrich  the 
peasants  for  a generation.  But  in  the  long  run,  if  the 
birth-rate  is  as  great  as  is  usually  supposed,  no  per- 
manent cure  for  their  poverty  is  possible  while  their 
families  continue  to  be  so  large.  In  China,  Malthus’s 
theory  of  population,  according  to  many  writers,  finds 
full  scope.5  If  so,  the  good  done  by  any  improvement 

4 The  soya  bean  is  rapidly  becoming  an  important  product, 
especially  in  Manchuria. 

5 There  are,  however,  no  accurate  statistics  as  to  the  birth- 
rate or  the  death-rate  in  China,  and  some  writers  question 


72 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


of  methods  will  lead  to  the  survival  of  more  children, 
involving*  a greater  subdivision  of  the  land,  and  in  the 
end,  a return  to  the  same  degree  of  poverty.  Only  edu- 
cation and  a higher  standard  of  life  can  remove  the 
fundamental  cause  of  these  evils.  And  popular  educa- 
tion on  a large  scale,  is  of  course  impossible  until  there 
is  a better  government  and  an  adequate  revenue.  Apart 
even  from  these  difficulties,  there  does  not  exist,  as  yet, 
a sufficient  supply  of  competent  Chinese  teachers  for  a 
system  of  universal  education. 

Apart  from  war,  the  impact  of  European  civilization 
upon  the  traditional  life  of  China  takes  two  forms,  one 
commercial,  the  other  intellectual.  Both  depend  upon 
the  prestige  of  armaments;  the  Chinese  would  never 
have  opened  either  their  ports  to  our  trade  or  their 
minds  to  our  ideas  if  we  had  not  defeated  them  in  war. 
But  the  military  beginning  of  our  intercourse  with  the 
Middle  Kingdom  has  now  receded  into  the  background; 
one  is  not  conscious,  in  any  class,  of  a strong  hostility 
to  foreigners  as  such.  It  would  not  be  difficult  to  make 
out  a case  for  the  view  that  intercourse  with  the  white 
races  in  proving  a misfortune  to  China,  but  apparently 
this  view  is  not  taken  by  any  one  in  China  except  where 
unreasoning  conservative  prejudice  outweighs  all  other 

whether  the  birth-rate  is  really  very  large.  From  a privately 
printed  pamphlet  by  my  friend  Mr.  V.  K.  Ting,  I learn  that 
Dr.  Lennox,  of  the  Peking  Union  Medical  College,  from  a care- 
ful study  of  4000  families,  found  that  the  average  number  of 
children  (dead  and  living)  per  family  was  2.1,  while  the  infant 
mortality  was  184.1.  Other  investigations  are  quoted  to  show 
that  the  birth-rate  near  Peking  is  between  30  and  50.  In  the 
absence  of  statistics,  generalizations  about  the  population  ques- 
tion in  China  must  be  received  with  extreme  caution. 


MODERN  CHINA 


73 


considerations.  The  Chinese  have  a very  strong  instinct 
for  trade,  and  a considerable  intellectual  curiosity,  to 
both  of  which  we  appeal.  Only  a bare  minimum  of 
common  decency  is  required  to  secure  their  friendship, 
whether  privately  or  politically.  And  I think  their 
thought  is  as  capable  of  enriching  our  culture  as  their 
commerce  of  enriching  our  pockets. 

In  the  treaty  ports,  Europeans  and  Americans  live 
in  their  own  quarters,  with  streets  well  paved  and 
lighted,  houses  in  European  style,  and  shops  full  of 
American  and  English  goods.  There  is  generally  also 
a Chinese  part  of  the  town,  with  narrow  streets,  gaily 
decorated  shops,  and  the  rich  mixture  of  smells  char- 
acteristic of  China.  Often  one  passes  through  a gate, 
suddenly,  from  one  to  the  other ; after  the  cheerful  dis- 
ordered beauty  of  the  old  town,  Europe’s  ugly  cleanli- 
ness and  Sunday-go-to-meeting  decency  make  a strange 
complex  impression,  half  love  and  half  hate.  In  the 
European  town  one  finds  safety,  spaciousness  and  hy- 
giene ; in  the  Chinese  town,  romance,  overcrowding,  and 
disease.  In  spite  of  my  affection  for  China,  these  tran- 
sitions always  made  me  realize  that  I am  a European; 
for  me,  the  Chinese  manner  of  life  would  not  mean 
happiness.  But  after  making  all  necessary  deductions 
for  the  poverty  and  the  disease,  I am  inclined  to  think 
that  Chinese  life  brings  more  happiness  to  the  Chinese 
than  English  life  does  to  us.  At  any  rate  this  seemed 
to  me  to  be  true  for  the  men;  for  the  women  I do  not 
think  it  would  be  true. 

Shanghai  and  Tientsin  are  white  men’s  cities;  the 
first  sight  of  Shanghai  makes  one  wonder  what  is  the 


74 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


use  of  traveling,  because  there  is  so  little  change  from 
what  one  is  used  to.  Treaty  ports,  each  of  which  is  a 
center  of  European  influence,  exist  practically  all  over 
China,  not  only  on  the  sea  coast.  Hankow,  a very  im- 
portant treaty  port,  is  almost  exactly  in  the  center  of 
China.  North  and  South  China  are  divided  by  the 
Yangtze;  East  and  West  China  are  divided  by  the  route 
from  Peking  to  Canton.  These  two  dividing  lines  meet 
at  Hankow,  which  has  long  been  an  important  strategi- 
cal point  in  Chinese  history.  From  Peking  to  Hankow 
there  is  a railway,  formerly  Franco-Belgian,  now  owned 
by  the  Chinese  Government.  From  Wuchang,  opposite 
Hankow  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  river,  there  is  to 
be  a railway  to  Canton,  but  at  present  it  only  runs  half- 
way,  to  Changsha,  also  a treaty  port.  The  completion 
of  the  railway,  together  with  improved  docks,  will 
greatly  increase  the  importance  of  Canton  and  diminish 
that  of  Honk-Kong. 

In  the  treaty  ports  commerce  is  the  principal  busi- 
ness; but  in  the  lower  Yangtze  and  in  certain  mining 
districts  there  are  beginnings  of  industrialism.  China 
produces  large  amounts  of  raw  cotton,  which  are  mostly 
manipulated  by  primitive  methods ; but  there  are  a cer- 
tain number  of  cotton-mills  on  modern  lines.  If  low 
wages  meant  cheap  labor  for  the  employer,  there  would 
be  little  hope  for  Lancashire,  because  in  Southern  China 
the  cotton  is  grown  on  the  spot,  the  climate  is  damp, 
and  there  is  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  industrious 
coolies  ready  to  work  very  long  hours  for  wages  upon 
which  an  English  working-man  would  find  it  literally 
impossible  to  keep  body  and  soul  together.  Neverthe- 


MODERN  CHINA 


75 


less,  it  is  not  the  underpaid  Chinese  coolie  whom  Lan- 
cashire has  to  fear,  and  China  will  not  become  a formi- 
dable competitor  until  improvement  in  methods  and 
education  enables  the  Chinese  workers  to  earn  good 
wages.  Meanwhile,  in  China,  as  in  every  other  country, 
the  beginnings  of  industry  are  sordid  and  cruel.  The 
intellectuals  wish  to  be  told  of  some  less  horrible  method 
by  which  their  country  may  be  industrialized,  but  so  far 
none  is  in  sight. 

The  intelligentsia  in  China  has  a very  peculiar  posi- 
tion, unlike  that  which  it  has  in  any  other  country. 
Hereditary  aristocracy  has  been  practically  extinct  in 
China  for  about  two  thousand  years,  and  foi*  many 
centuries  the  country  has  been  governed  by  the  success- 
ful candidates  in  competitive  examinations.  This  has 
given  to  the  educated  the  kind*  of  prestige  elsewhere 
belonging  to  a governing  aristocracy.  Although  the  old 
traditional  education  is  fast  dying  out,  and  higher  edu- 
cation now  teaches  modern  subjects,  the  prestige  of 
education  has  survived,  and  public  opinion  is  still  ready 
to  be  influenced  by  those  who  have  intellectual  qualifi- 
cations. The  tuchuns,  many  of  whom,  including  Chang- 
tso-lin,  have  begun  by  being  brigands,6  are,  of  course, 
mostly  too  stupid  and  ignorant  to  share  this  attitude, 

6 I repeat  what  everybody,  Chinese  or  foreign,  told  me.  Mr. 
Bland,  per  contra,  describes  Chang-tso-lin  as  a polished  Confu- 
cian.  Contrast  p.  104  of  his  “China,  Japan  and  Korea”  with 
pp.  143,  146  of  Coleman’s  “The  Far  East  Unveiled,”  which  gives 
the  view  of  everybody  except  Mr.  Bland.  Lord  Northcliffe  had 
an  interview  with  Chang-tso-lin  reported  in  “The  Times”  re- 
cently, but  he  was,  of  course,  unable  to  estimate  Chang-tso-lin’s 
claims  to  literary  culture. 


76 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


but  that  in  itself  makes  their  regime  weak  and  unstable. 
The  influence  of  Young  China — i.  e.,  of  those  who  have 
been  educated  either  abroad  or  in  modern  colleges  at 
home — is  far  greater  than  it  would  be  in  a country  with 
less  respect  for  learning.  This  is,,  perhaps,  the  most 
hopeful  feature  in  the  situation,  because  the  number  of 
modern  students  is  rapidly  increasing,  and  their  out- 
look and  aims  are  admirable.  In  another  ten  years  or 
so  they  will  probably  be  strong  enough  to  regenerate 
China — if  only  the  powers  will  allow  ten  years  to  elapse 
without  taking  any  drastic  action. 

It  is  important  to  try  to  understand  the  outlook  and 
potentialities  of  Young  China.  Most  of  my  time  was 
spent  among  those  Chinese  who  had  had  a modern  educa- 
tion, and  I should  like  to  give  some  idea  of  their  mental- 
ity. It  seemed  to  me  that  one  could  already  distinguish 
two  generations:  the  older  men,  who  had  fought  their 
way  with  great  difficulty  and  almost  in  solitude  out  of 
the  traditional  Confucian  prejudices;  and  the  younger 
men,  who  had  found  modern  schools  and  colleges  waiting 
for  them,  containing  a whole  world  of  modern-minded 
people  ready  to  give  sympathy  and  encouragement  in  the 
inevitable  fight  against  the  family.  The  older  men — 
men  varying  in  age  from  thirty  to  fifty — have  gone 
through  an  inward  and  outward  struggle  resembling 
that  of  the  rationalists  of  Darwin’s  and  Mill’s  genera- 
tion. They  have  had,  painfully  and  with  infinite  diffi- 
culty, to  free  their  minds  from  the  beliefs  instilled  in 
youth,  and  to  turn  their  thoughts  to  a new  science  and  a 
new  ethic.  Imagine,  say,  Plotinus  recalled  from  the 
shades  and  miraculously  compelled  to  respect  Mr.  Henry 


MODERN  CHINA 


77 


Ford;  this  will  give  you  some  idea  of  the  centuries 
across  which  these  men  have  had  to  travel  in  becoming 
European.  Some  of  them  are  a little  weary  with  the 
effort,  their  forces  somewhat  spent  and  their  originality 
no  longer  creative.  But  this  can  astonish  no  one  who 
realizes  the  internal  revolution  they  have  achieved  in 
their  own  minds. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  an  able  Chinaman,  when 
he  masters  our  culture,  becomes  purely  imitative. 
This  may  happen  among  the  second-rate  Chinese, 
especially  when  they  turn  Christians,  but  it  does  not 
happen  among  the  best.  They  remain  Chinese,  critical 
of  European  civilization  even  when  they  have  assimi- 
lated it.  They  retain  a certain  crystal  candor  and  a 
touching  belief  in  the  efficacy  of  moral  forces;  the  in- 
dustrial revolution  has  not  yet  affected  their  mental 
processes.  When  they  become  persuaded  of  the  impor- 
tance of  some  opinion,  they  try  to  spread  it  by  setting 
forth  the  reasons  in  its  favor ; they  do  not  hire  the  front 
page  of  newspapers  for  advertising,  or  put  up  on  board- 
ings along  the  railways,  “So-and-so’s  opinion  is  the 
best.”  In  all  this  they  differ  greatly  from  more  ad- 
vanced nations,  and  particularly  from  America ; it 
never  occurs  to  them  to  treat  opinions  as  if  they  were 
soaps.  And  they  have  no  admiration  for  ruthlessness, 
or  love  of  bustling  activity  without  regard  to  its  pur- 
pose. Having  thrown  over  the  prejudices  in  which 
they  were  brought  up,  they  have  not  taken  on  a new 
set,  but  have  remained  genuinely  free  in  their  thoughts, 
able  to  consider  any  proposition  honestly  on  its  merits. 

The  younger  men,  however,  have  something  more  than 


78 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


the  first  generation  of  modern  intellectuals.  Having  had 
less  of  a struggle,  they  have  retained  more  energy  and 
self-confidence.  The  candor  and  honesty  of  the  pioneers 
survive,  with  more  determination  to  be  socially  effective. 
This  may  be  merely  the  natural  character  of  youth,  but 
I think  it  is  more  than  that.  Young  men  under  thirty 
have  often  come  in  contact  with  Western  ideas  at  a 
sufficiently  early  age  to  have  assimilated  them  without 
a great  struggle,  so  that  they  can  acquire  knowledge 
without  being  torn  by  spiritual  conflicts.  And  they 
have  been  able  to  learn  Western  knowledge  from 
Chinese  teachers  to  begin  with,  which  has  made  the  pro- 
cess less  difficult.  Even  the  youngest  students,  of 
course,  still  have  reactionary  families,  but  they  find  less 
difficulty  than  their  predecessors  in  resisting  the  claims 
of  the  family,  and  in  realizing  practically,  not  only 
theoretically,  that  the  traditional  Chinese  reverence  for 
the  old  may  well  be  carried  too  far.  In  these  young 
men  I see  the  hope  of  China.  When  a little  experience 
has  taught  them  practical  wisdom,  I believe  they  will 
be  able  to  lead  Chinese  opinion  in  the  directions  in  which 
it  ought  to  move. 

There  is  one  traditional  Chinese  belief  which  dies 
very  hard,  and  that  is  the  belief  that  correct  ethical 
sentiments  are  more  important  then  detailed  scientific 
knowledge.  This  view  is,  of  course,  derived  from  the 
Confucian  tradition,  and  is  more  or  less  true  in  a pre- 
industrial society.  It  would  have  been  upheld  by  Rous- 
seau or  Dr.  J ohnson,  and  broadly  speaking  by  everybody 
before  the  Benthamites.  We,  in  the  West,  have  now 
swung  to  the  opposite  extreme:  we  tend  to  think  that 


MODERN  CHINA 


79 


technical  efficiency  is  everything  and  moral  purpose  noth- 
ing. A battle-ship  may  be  taken  as  the  concrete  embodi- 
ment of  this  view.  When  we  read,  say,  of  some  new 
poison-gas  by  means  of  which  one  bomb  from  an  aero- 
plane can  exterminate  a whole  town,  we  have  a thrill 
of  what  we  fondly  believe  to  be  horror,  but  it  is  really 
delight  in  scientific  skill.  Science  is  our  god ; we  say  to 
it,  “Though  thou  slay  me,  yet  will  I trust  in  thee/’ 
And  so  it  slays  us.  The  Chinese  have  not  this  defect, 
but  they  have  the  opposite  one,  of  believing  that  good 
intentions  are  the  only  thing  really  necessary.  I will 
give  an  illustration.  Forsythe  Sherfesee,  forestry  ad- 
visor to  the  Chinese  Government,  gave  an  address  at  the 
British  legation  in  January,  1919,  on  “Some  National 
Aspects  of  Forestry  in  China.  ”7  In  this  address  he 
proves  (so  far  a person  ignorant  of  forestry  can  judge) 
that  large  parts  of  China  which  now  lie  waste  are  suit- 
able for  forestry,  that  the  importation  of  timber  (e.  g., 
for  railway  sleepers)  which  now  takes  place  is  wholly 
unnecessary,  and  that  the  floods  which  often  sweep  away 
whole  districts  would  be  largely  prevented  if  the  slopes 
of  the  mountains  from  which  the  rivers  come  were  re- 
afforested. Yet  it  is  often  difficult  to  interest  even  the 
most  reforming  Chinese  in  afforestation,  because  it  is 
not  an  easy  subject  for  ethical  enthusiasm.  Trees  are 
planted  round  graves,  because  Confucius  said  they 
should  be;  if  Confucianism  dies  out,  even  these  will  be 
cut  down.  But  public-spirited  Chinese  students  learn 
political  theory  as  it  is  taught  in  our  universities,  and 

7 Printed  in  “China  in  1918,”  published  by  the  “Peking 
Leader.” 


80 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


despise  such  humble  questions  as  the  utility  of  trees. 
After  learning  all  about,  say,  the  proper  relations  of 
the  two  houses  of  Parliament,  they  go  home  to  find  that 
some  tuchun  has  dismissed  both  houses,  and  is  govern- 
ing in  a fashion  not  conidered  in  our  text-books.  Our 
theories  of  politics  are  only  true  in  the  West  (if  there)  ; 
our  theories  of  forestry  are  equally  true  everywhere. 
Yet  it  is  our  theories  of  politics  that  Chinese  students 
are  most  eager  to  learn.  Similarly  the  practical  study 
of  industrial  processes  might  be  very  useful,  but  the 
Chinese  prefer  the  study  of  our  theoretical  economics, 
which  is  hardly  applicable  except  where  industry  is  al- 
ready developed.  In  all  these  respects,  however,  there 
is  beginning  to  be  a marked  improvement. 

It  is  science  that  makes  the  difference  between  our 
intellectual  outlook  and  that  of  the  Chinese  intelli- 
gentsia. The  Chinese  even  the  most  modern,  look  to 
the  white  nations,  especially  America,  for  moral  maxims 
to  replace  those  of  Confucius.  They  have  not  yet 
grasped  that  men’s  morals  in  the  mass  are  the  same 
everywhere : they  do  as  much  harm  as  they  dare,  and  as 
much  good  as  they  must.  In  so  far  as  there  is  a differ- 
ence of  morals  between  us  and  the  Chinese,  we  differ 
for  the  worse,  because  we  are  more  energetic,  and  can 
therefore  commit  more  crimes  per  diem.  What  we  have 
to  teach  the  Chinese  is  not  morals,  or  ethical  maxims 
about  government  but  science  and  technical  skill.  The 
real  problem  for  the  Chinese  intellectuals  is  to  acquire 
Western  knowledge  without  acquiring  the  mechanistic 
outlook. 

Perhaps  it  is  not  clear  what  I mean  by  “the  mechan- 


, 


MODERN  CHINA 


81 


istic  outlook.  ” I mean  something  which  exists  equally 
in  imperialism,  Bolshevism,  and  the  Y.M.C.A. ; some- 
thing which  distinguishes  all  these  from  the  Chinese 
outlook,  and  which  I,  for  my  part,  consider  very  evil. 
What  I mean  is  the  habit  of  regarding  mankind  as  raw 
material,  to  be  molded  by  our  scientific  manipulation 
into  whatever  form  may  happen  to  suit  our  fancy.  The 
essence  of  the  matter,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
individual  who  has  this  point  of  view,  is  the  cultivation 
of  will  at  the  expense  of  perception,  the  fervent  moral 
belief  that  it  is  our  duty  to  force  other  people  to  realize 
our  conception  of  the  world.  The  Chinese  intellectual 
is  not  much  troubled  by  imperialism  as  a creed,  but  is 
vigorously  assailed  by  Bolshevism  and  the  Y.M.C.A.,  to 
one  or  other  of  which  he  is  too  apt  to  fall  a victim,  learn- 
ing a belief  from  the  one  in  the  class  war  and  the  dic- 
tatorship of  the  communists,  from  the  other  in  the 
mystic  efficacy  of  cold  baths  and  dumb-bells.  Both 
these  creeds,  in  their  Western  adepts,  involve  a con- 
tempt for  the  rest  of  mankind  except  as  potential  con- 
verts, and  the  belief  that  progress  consists  in  the  spread 
of  a doctrine.  They  both  involve  a belief  in  govern- 
ment and  a life  against  nature.  This  view,  though  I 
have  called  it  mechanistic,  is  as  old  as  religion,  though 
mechanism  has  given  it  new  and  more  virulent  forms. 
The  first  of  Chinese  philosophers,  Lao-Tze,  wrote  his 
book  to  protest  against  it,  and  his  disciple  Chuang-Tze 
put  his  criticism  into  a fable : 8 

s “Musings  of  a Chinese  Mystic,”  by  Lionel  Giles  (Murray), 
p.  66.  For  Legge’s  translation,  see  Vol.  I,  p.  277,  of  his  “Texts 
of  Taoism”  in  “Sacred  Books  of  the  East,”  Vol.  XXXIX. 


82 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


Horses  have  hoofs  to  carry  them  over  frost  and  snow; 
hair,  to  protect  them  from  wind  and  cold.  They  eat  grass 
and  drink  water,  and  fling  up  their  heels  over  the  cham- 
paign. Such  is  the  real  nature  of  horses.  Palatial  dwellings 
are  of  no  use  to  them. 

One  day  Po  Lo  appeared,  saying : “I  understand  the 

management  of  horses.” 

So  he  branded  them,  and  clipped  them,  and  pared  their 
hoofs,  and  put  halters  on  them,  tying  them  up  by  the  head 
and  shackling  them  by  the  feet,  and  disposing  them  in  stables, 
with  the  result  that  two  or  three  in  every  ten  died.  Then  he 
kept  them  hungry  and  thirsty,  trotting  them  and  galloping 
them,  and  grooming,  and  trimming,  with  the  misery  of  the 
tasselled  bridle  before  and  the  fear  of  the  knotted  whip  be- 
hind, until  more  than  half  of  them  were  dead. 

The  potter  says:  “I  can  do  what  I will  with  clay.  If  I 

want  it  round,  I use  compasses;  if  rectangular,  a square.” 

The  carpenter  says : “I  can  do  what  I will  with  wood.  If 

I want  it  curved.  I use  an  arc;  if  straight,  a line.” 

But  on  what  grounds  can  we  think  that  the  natures  of  clay 
and  wood  desire  this  application  of  compasses  and  square,  of 
arc  and  line?  Nevertheless,  every  age  extols  Po  Lo  for  his 
skill  in  managing  horses,  and  potters  and  carpenters  for  their 
skill  with  clay  and  wood.  Those  who  govern  the  Empire 
make  the  same  mistake. 

Although  Taoism,  of  which  Lao-Tze  was  the  founder 
and  Chuang-Tze  the  chief  apostle,  was  displaced  by 
Confucianism,  yet  the  spirit  of  this  fable  has  penetrated 
deeply  into  Chinese  life,  making  it  more  urbane  and 
tolerant,  more  contemplative  and  observant,  than  the 
fiercer  life  of  the  West.  The  Chinese  watch  foreigners 
as  we  watch  animals  in  the  zoo,  to  see  whether  they 


MODERN  CHINA 


83 


11  drink  water  and  fling  up  their  heels  over  the  cham- 
paign, ” and  generally  to  derive  amusement  from  their 
curious  habits.  Unlike  the  Y.M.C.A.,  they  have  no  wish 
to  alter  the  habits  of  the  foreigners,  any  more  than  we 
wish  to  put  the  monkeys  at  the  zoo  into  trousers  and 
stiff  shirts.  And  their  attitude  toward  each  other  is, 
as  a rule,  equally  tolerant.  When  they  became  a re- 
public, instead  of  cutting  off  the  emperor’s  head,  as 
other  nations  do,  they  left  him  his  title,  his  palace,  and 
four  million  dollars  a year  (about  £600,000),  and  he  re- 
mains to  this  moment  with  his  officials,  his  eunuchs,  and 
his  etiquette,  but  without  one  shred  of  power  or  in- 
fluence. In  talking  with  a Chinese,  you  feel  that  he  is 
trying  to  understand  you,  not  to  alter  you  or  interfere 
with  you.  The  result  of  his  attempt  may  be  a carica- 
ture or  a panegyric,  but  in  either  case  it  will  be  full 
of  delicate  perception  and  subtle  humor.  A friend  in 
Peking  showed  me  a number  of  pictures,  among  which 
I specially  remember  various  birds:  a hawk  swooping 
on  a sparrow,  an  eagle  clasping  a big  bough  of  a tree 
in  his  claws,  water-fowl  standing  on  one  leg  disconso- 
late in  the  snow.  All  these  pictures  showed  that  kind 
of  sympathetic  understanding  which  one  feels  also  in 
their  dealings  with  human  beings — something  which  I 
can  perhaps  best  describe  as  the  antithesis  of  Nietzsche. 
This  quality,  unfortunately,  is  useless  in  warfare,  and 
foreign  nations  are  doing  their  best  to  stamp  it  out. 
But  it  is  an  infinitely  valuable  quality,  of  which  our 
Western  world  has  far  too  little.  Together  with  their 
exquisite  sense  of  beauty  it  makes  the  Chinese  nation 
quite  extraordinary  lovable.  The  injury  that  we  are 


84 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


doing  to  China  is  wanton  and  cruel,  the  destruction  of 
something  delicate  and  lovely  for  the  sake  of  the  gross 
pleasures  of  barbarous  millionaires.  One  of  the  poems 
translated  from  the  Chinese  by  Mr.  Waley9  is  called 
“Business  Men,”  and  it  expresses,  perhaps  more  accu- 
rately than  I could  do,  the  respects  in  which  the  Chinese 
are  our  superiors : — 

Business  men  boast  of  their  skill  and  cunning 
But  in  philosophy  they  are  like  little  children. 

Bragging  to  each  other  of  successful  depredations 
They  neglect  to  consider  the  ultimate  fate  of  the  body. 
What  should  they  know  of  the  Master  of  Dark  Truth 
Who  saw  the  wide  world  in  a jade  cup, 

By  illumined  conception  got  clear  of  heaven  and  earth: 

On  the  chariot  of  Mutation  entered  the  Gate  of  Immu- 
tability ? 

I wish  I could  hope  that  some  respect  for  “the  Mas- 
ter of  Dark  Truth’’  would  enter  into  the  hearts  of  our 
apostles  of  Western  culture.  But  as  that  is  out  of  the 
question,  it  is  necessary  to  seek  other  ways  of  solving 
the  Far  Eastern  question. 

9 Waley,  “170  Chinese  Poems,”  p.  95. 


CHAPTER  V 


JAPAN  BEFORE  THE  RESTORATION 

FOR  modern  China,  the  most  important  foreign  na- 
tion is  Japan.  In  order  to  understand  the  part 
played  by  Japan,  it  is  necessary  to  know  something 
of  that  country,  to  which  we  must  now  turn  our  atten- 
tion. 

In  reading  the  history  of  Japan,  one  of  the  most 
amazing  things  is  the  persistence  of  the  same  forces  and 
the  same  beliefs  throughout  the  centuries.  Japanese 
history  practically  begins  with  a “Restoration”  by  no 
means  unlike  that  of  1867-68.  Buddhism  was  intro- 
duced into  Japan  from  Korea  in  552  a.  d.1  At  the 
same  time  and  from  the  same  source  Chinese  civiliza- 
tion  became  much  better  known  in  Japan  than  it  had 
been  through  the  occasional  intercourse  of  former  cen- 
turies. Both  novelties  won  favor.  Two  Japanese  stu- 
dents (followed  later  by  many  others  went  to  China 

i The  best  book  known  to  me  on  early  J apan  is  Murdoch’s 
“History  of  Japan.”  The  volume  dealing  with  the  earlier  period 
is  published  by  Kegan  Paul,  1910.  The  chronologically  later 
volume  was  published  earlier;  its  title  is:  “A  History  of  Ja- 

pan during  the  Century  of  Early  Foreign  Intercourse  ( 1542- 
1651),”  by  James  Murdoch  M.  A.  in  collaboration  with  Isoh 
Yamagata;  Kobe,  office  of  the  “Japan  Chronicle,”  1903.  I shall 
allude  to  these  volumes  as  Murdoch,  I,  and  Murdoch,  II,  respec- 
tively. 


85 


86 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


in  608  a.  dv  to  master  the  civilization  of  that  country. 
The  Japanese  are  an  experimental  nation,  and  before 
adopting  Buddhism  nationally  they  ordered  one  or  two 
prominent  courtiers  to  adopt  it,  with  a view  to  seeing 
whether  they  prospered  more  or  less  than  the  adher- 
ents of  the  traditional  Shinto  religion.2  After  some 
vicissitudes,  the  experiment  was  held  to  have  favored 
the  foreign  religion  which,  as  a court  religion,  acquired 
more  prestige  than  Shinto,  although  the  latter  was  never 
ousted,  and  remained  the  chief  religion  of  the  peasantry 
until  the  thirteenth  century.  It  is  remarkable  to  find 
that,,  as  late  as  the  sixteenth  century,  Hideyoshi,  who 
was  of  peasant  origin,  had  a much  higher  opinion  of 
“the  way  of  the  gods’’  (which  is  what  “Shinto” 
means)  than  of  Buddhism.3  Probably  the  revival  of 
Shinto  in  modern  times  was  facilitated  by  a continuing 
belief  in  that  religion  on  the  part  of  the  less  noisy 
sections  of  the  population.  But  so  far  as  the  people 
mentioned  in  history  are  concerned,  Buddhism  plays  a 
very  much  greater  part  than  Shinto. 

The  object  of  the  Restoration  in  1867-68  was,  at 
any  rate  in  part,  to  restore  the  constitution  of  645  a.  d. 
The  object  of  the  constitution  of  645  a.  d.  was  to  re- 
store the  form  of  government  that  had  prevailed  in 
the  good  old  days.  What  the  object  was  of  those  who 
established  the  government  of  the  good  old  days,  I do 
not  profess  to  know.  However  that  may  be,  the 
country  before  645  a.  d.  was  given  over  to  feudalism 
and  internal  strife,  while  the  power  of  the  mikado  had 

2 Murdoch,  I,  pp.  113  ff. 

3 Ibid.,  II,  pp.  375  ff. 


JAPAN  BEFORE  THE  RESTORATION  87 


sunk  to  a very  low  ebb.  The  mikado  had  had  the  civil 
power,  but  had  allowed  great  feudatories  to  acquire 
military  control,  so  that  the  civil  government  fell  into 
contempt.  Contact  with  the  superior  civilization  of 
China  made  intelligent  people  think  that  the  Chinese 
constitution  deserved  imitation,  along  with  the  Chinese 
morals  and  religion.  The  Chinese  emperor  was  the 
Son  of  Heaven,  so  the  mikado  came  to  be  descended  from 
the  Sun  Goddess.  The  Chinese  emperor,  whenever  he 
happened  to  be  vigorous  man,  was  genuinely  supreme 
so  the  mikado  must  be  made  so. 

The  similarity  of  the  influence  of  China  in  produc- 
ing the  Restoration  of  645  a.  d.  and  that  of  Europe  in 
producing  the  Restoration  of  1867-68  is  set  forth  by 
Murdoch  4 as  follows : 

In  the  summer  of  1SG3  a band  of  four  Choshu  youths  were 
smuggled  on  board  a British  steamer  by  the  aid  of  kind 
Scottish  friends  who  sympathized  with  their  endeavour  to 
proceed  to  Europe  for  purposes  of  study.  These  friends 
possibly  did  not  know  that  some  of  the  four  had  been  protag- 
onists in  the  burning  down  of  the  British  Legation  on 
Gotenyama  a few  months  before,  and  they  certainly  could 
never  have  suspected  that  the  real  mission  of  the  four  youths 
was  to  master  the  secrets  of  Western  civilization  with  a sole 
view  of  driving  the  Western  barbarians  from  the  sacred  soil 
of  Japan.  Prince  Ito  and  Marquis  Inouye — for  they  were 
two  of  this  venturesome  quartette — have  often  told  of  their 
rapid  disillusionment  when  they  reached  London,  and  saw 
these  despised  Western  barbarians  at  home.  On  their  return 
to  Japan  they  at  once  became  the  apostles  of  a new  doctrine, 

4 Murdoch,  I,  p.  147. 


88 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


and  their  effective  preaching  has  had  much  to  do  with  the 
pride  of  place  Dai  Nippon  now  holds  among  the  Great  Pow- 
ers of  the  world. 

The  two  students  who  went  to  China  in  608  a.  d. 
“rendered  even  more  illustrious  service  to  their  country 
perhaps  than  Ito  and  Inouye  have  done.  For  at  the 
Revolution  of  1868,  the  leaders  of  the  movement 
harked  back  to  the  645-650  a.  d.  period  for  a good 
deal  of  their  inspiration,  and  the  real  men  of  political 
knowledge  at  that  time  were  the  two  National  Doc- 
tors.’’ 

Politically,  what  was  done  in  645  a.  d.  and  the  period 
immediately  following  was  not  unlike  what  was  done 
in  France  by  Louis  XI  and  Richeleiu — a curbing  of 
the  great  nobles  and  an  exaltation  of  the  sovereign,  with 
a substitution  of  civil  justice  for  military  anarchy.  The 
movement  was  represented  by  its  promoters  as  a resto- 
ration, probably  with  about  the  same  amount  of  truth 
as  in  1867.  At  the  later  date,  there  was  restoration  so 
far  as  the  power  of  the  mikado  was  concerned,  but  in- 
novation as  regards  the  introduction  of  Western  ideas. 
Similarly,  in  645  a.  d.,  what  was  done  about  the  mikado 
was  a return  to  the  past,  but  what  was  done  in  the 
way  of  spreading  Chinese  civilization  was  just  the  oppo- 
site. There  must  have  been,  in  both  cases,  the  same 
curious  mixture  of  antiquarian  and  reforming  tenden- 
cies. 

Throughout  subsequent  Japanese  history,  until  the 
Restoration,  one  seems  to  see  the  opposite  forces  strug- 


JAPAN  BEFORE  THE  RESTORATION  89 


gling  for  mastery  over  people’s  minds,  namely,  the  ideas 
of  government,  civilization,  and  art  derived  from  China 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  native  tendency  to  feudalism, 
clan  government,  and  civil  war  on  the  other.  The  con- 
flict is  very  analogous  to  that  which  went  on  in  medieval 
Europe  between  the  church,  which  represented  ideas 
derived  from  Rome,  and  the  turbulent  barons,  who  were 
struggling  to  preserve  the  way  of  life  of  the  ancient 
Teutons.  Henry  IV  at  Canossa,  Henry  II  doing  penance 
for  Becket,  represent  the  triumph  of  civilization  over 
rude  vigor ; and  something  similar  is  to  be  seen  at  inter- 
vals in  Japan. 

After  645,  the  mikado’s  government  had  real  power 
for  some  centuries,  but  gradually  it  fell  more  and  more 
under  the  sway  of  the  soldiers.  So  long  as  it  had 
wealth  (which  lasted  long  after  it  ceased  to  have  power) 
it  continued  to  represent  what  was  most  civilized  in 
Japan:  the  study  of  Chinese  literature,  the  patronage 
of  art,  and  the  attempt  to  preserve  respect  for  something 
other  than  brute  force.  But  the  court  nobles  (who 
remained  throughout  quite  distinct  from  the  military 
feudal  chiefs)  were  so  degenerate  and  feeble,  so  stereo- 
typed and  unprogressive,  that  it  would  have  been  quite 
impossible  for  the  country  to  be  governed  by  them  and 
the  system  they  represented.  In  this  respect  they 
differed  greatly  from  the  medieval  church,  which  no 
one  could  accuse  of  lack  of  vigor,  although  the  vigor 
of  the  feudal  aristocracy  may  have  been  even  greater. 
Accordingly,  while  the  church  in  Europe  usually  de- 
feated the  secular  princes,  the  exact  opposite  happened 


90 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


in  Japan,  where  the  mikado  and  his  court  sank  into 
greater  and  greater  contempt  down  to  the  time  of  the 
Restoration. 

The  Japanese  have  a curious  passion  for  separating 
the  real  and  the  nominal  governments,  leaving  the  show 
to  the  latter  and  the  substance  of  power  to  the  former. 
First  the  emperors  took  to  resigning  in  favor  of  their 
infant  sons,  and  continuing  to  govern  in  reality,  often 
from  some  monastery,  where  they  had  become  monks. 
Then  the  shogun,  who  represented  the  military  power, 
became  supreme,  but  still  governed  in  the  name  of 
the  emperor.  The  word  “shogun”  merely  means  “gen- 
eral”; the  full  title  of  the  people  whom  we  call  “sho- 
gun” is  “Sei-i-Tai  Shogun,”  which  means  “Barbarian- 
subduing  great  General”;  the  barbarians  in  question 
being  the  Ainus,  the  Japanese  aborigines.  The  first 
to  hold  this  office  in  the  form  which  it  had  at  most 
times  until  the  Restoration  was  Minamoto  Yoritomo, 
on  whom  the  title  was  conferred  by  the  mikado  in 
1192.  But  before  long  the  shogun  became  nearly  as 
much  of  a figure  head  as  the  mikado.  Custom  confined 
the  shogunate  to  the  Minamoto  family,  and  the  actual 
power  was  wielded  by  regents  in  the  name  of  the  sho- 
gun. This  lasted  until  near  the  end  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  when  it  happened  that  Iyeyasu,  the  supreme 
military  commander  of  his  day,  belonged  to  the  Min- 
amoto family,  and  was  therefore  able  to  assume  the 
office  of  shogun  himself.  He  and  his  descendants  held 
the  office  until  it  was  abolished  at  the  Restoration.  The 
Restoration,  however,  did  not  put  an  end  to  the  prac- 
tice of  a real  government  behind  the  nominal  one. 


JAPAN  BEFORE  THE  RESTORATION  91 


The  prime  minister  and  his  cabinet  are  presented  to 
the  world  as  the  Japanese  Government,  but  the  real 
government  is  the  Genro,  or  Elder  Statesmen,  and  their 
successors,  of  whom  I shall  have  more  to  say  in  the 
next  chapter. 

What  the  Japanese  made  of  Buddhism  reminds  one 
in  many  ways  of  what  the  Teutonic  nations  made  of 
Christianity.  Buddhism  and  Christianity,  originally, 
were  very  similar  in  spirit.  They  were  both  religions 
aiming  at  the  achievement  of  holiness  by  renunciation 
of  the  world.  They  both  ignored  politics  and  govern- 
ment and  wealth,  for  which  they  substituted  the  future 
life  as  what  was  of  real  importance.  They  were  both 
religions  of  peace,  teaching  gentleness  and  non-resis- 
tance. But  both  had  to  undergo  great  transformations 
in  adapting  themselves  to  the  instincts  of  warlike  bar- 
barians. In  Japan,  a multitude  of  sects  arose,  teaching 
doctrines  which  differed  in  many  ways  from  Mahayana 
orthodoxy.  Buddhism  became  national  and  militaristic ; 
the  abbots  of  great  monasteries  became  important  feudal 
chieftains,  whose  monks  constituted  an  army  which  was 
ready  to  fight  on  the  slightest  provocation.  Sieges  of 
monasteries  and  battles  with  monks  are  of  constant 
occurrence  in  Japanese  history. 

The  Japanese,  as  every  one  knows,  decided,  after 
about  one  hundred  years’  experience  of  Western  mis- 
sionaries and  merchants,  to  close  their  country  com- 
pletely to  foreigner^,  with  the  exception  of  a very  re- 
stricted and  closely  supervised  commerce  with  the 
Dutch.  The  first  arrival  of  the  Portuguese  in  Japan 
was  in  or  about  the  year  1543,  and  their  final  expulsion 


92 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


was  in  the  year  1639.  What  happened  between  these 
two  dates  is  instructive  for  the  understanding  of  Japan. 
The  first  Portuguese  brought  with  them  Christianity  and 
fire  arms,  of  which  the  Japanese  tolerated  the  former 
for  the  sake  of  the  latter.  At  that  time  there  was  vir- 
tually no  central  government  in  the  country,  and  the 
various  D-aimyo  were  engaged  in  constant  wars  with 
each  other.  The  south  western  island,  Kyushu,  was  even 
more  independent  of  such  central  authority  as  existed 
than  were  the  other  parts  of  Japan,  and  it  was  in  this 
island  (containing  the  port  of  Nagasaki)  that  the  Portu- 
guese first  landed  and  were  throughout  chiefly  active. 
They  traded  from  Macao,  bringing  merchandise,  match- 
locks and  Jesuits,  as  well  as  artillery  on  their  larger 
vessels.  It  was  found  that  they  attached  importance 
to  the  spread  of  Christianity,  and  some  of  the  Daimyo, 
in  order  to  get  their  trade  and  their  guns,  allowed 
themselves  to  be  baptized  by  the  Jesuits.  The  Portu- 
guese of  those  days  seem  to  have  been  genuinely  more 
anxious  to  make  converts  than  to  extend  their  trade; 
when,  later  on,  the  Japanese  began  to  object  to  mission- 
aries while  still  desiring  trade,  neither  the  Portuguese 
nor  the  Spaniards  could  be  induced  to  refrain  from 
helping  the  fathers.  However,  all  might  have  gone  well 
if  the  Portuguese  had  been  able  to  retain  the  monopoly 
which  had  been  granted  to  them  by  a papal  bull.  Their 
monopoly  of  trade  was  associated  wTith  a Jesuit  monop- 
oly of  missionary  activity.  But,  from  1592  onward, 
the  Spaniards  from  Manila  competed  with  the  Portu- 
guese from  Macao,  and  the  Dominican  and  Franciscan 
missionaries,  brought  by  the  Spaniards,  competed  with 


JAPAN  BEFORE  THE  RESTORATION  93 


the  Jesuit  missionaries  brought  by  the  Portuguese. 
They  quarreled  furiously,  even  at  times  when  they  were 
suffering  persecution;  and  the  Japanese  naturally  be- 
lieved the  accusations  that  each  side  brought  against 
the  other.  Moreover,  when  they  were  shown  maps  dis- 
playing the  extent  of  the  king  of  Spain’s  dominions, 
they  became  alarmed  for  their  national  independence. 
In  the  year  1596,  a Spanish  ship,  the  San  Felipe,  on  its 
way  from  Manila  to  Acapulco,  was  becalmed  off  the 
coast  of  Japan.  The  local  Daimyo  insisted  on  sending 
men  to  tow  it  into  his  harbor,  and  gave  them  instructions 
to  run  it  aground  on  a sand-bank,  which  they  did.  He 
thereupon  claimed  the  whole  cargo,  valued  at  600,000 
crowns.  However,  Hideyoshi,  who  was  rapidly  acquir- 
ing supreme  power  in  Japan,  thought  this  too  large  a 
windfall  for  a private  citizen,  and  had  the  Spanish 
pilot  interviewed  by  a man  named  Masuda.  The 
pilot,  after  trying  reason  in  vain,  attempted  intimida- 
tion. 

He  produced  a map  of  the  world,  and  on  it  pointed  out 
the  vast  extent  of  the  dominions  of  Philip  II.  Thereupon 
Masuda  asked  him  how  it  was  so  many  countries  had  been 
brought  to  acknowledge  the  sway  of  a single  man.  . . . “Our 
Kings,”  said  this  outspoken  seaman,  “begin  by  sending  into 
the  countries  they  wish  to  conquer  religieux  who  induce  the 
people  to  embrace  our  religion,  and  when  they  have  made 
considerable  progress,  troops  are  sent  who  combine  with  the 
new  Christians,  and  then  our  Kings  have  not  much  trouble 
in  accomplishing  the  rest.”  5 


5 Murdoch,  II,  p.  288. 


94 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


As  Spain  and  Portugal  were  at  this  time  both  subject 
to  Philip  II,  the  Portuguese  also  suffered  from  the  sus- 
picions engendered  by  this  speech.  Moreover,  the 
Dutch,  who  were  at  war  with  Spain,  began  to  trade 
with  Japan,  and  to  tell  all  they  knew  against  Jesuits, 
Dominicans,  Franciscans,  and  papists  generally.  A 
breezy  Elizabethan  sea-captain,  Will  Adams,  was 
wrecked  in  Japan,  and  on  being  interrogated  naturally 
gave  a good  British  account  of  the  authors  of  the  Ar- 
mada. As  the  Japanese  had  by  this  time  mastered  the 
use  and  manufacture  of  fire  arms,  they  began  to  think 
that  they  had  nothing  more  to  learn  from  Christian 
nations. 

Meanwhile,  a succession  of  three  great  men — Nobu- 
naga,  Hideyoshi,  and  Iyeyasu — had  succeeded  in  unify- 
ing Japan,  destroying  the  quasi-independence  of  the  feu- 
dal nobles,  and  establishing  that  reign  of  internal  peace 
which  lasted  until  the  Restoration — a period  of  nearly 
two  and  a half  centuries.  It  was  possible,  therefore,  for 
the  central  government  to  enforce  whatever  policy  it 
chose  to  adopt  with  regard  to  the  foreigners  and  their 
religion.  The  Jesuits  and  the  friars  between  them 
had  made  a considerable’  number  of  converts  in  Japan, 
probably  about  300,000.  Most  of  these  were  in  the 
island  of  Kyushu,  the  last  region  to  be  subdued  by  Hide- 
yoshi. They  tended  to  disloyalty,  not  only  on  account 
of  their  Christianity,  but  also  on  account  of  their 
geographical  position.  It  was  in  this  region  that  the 
revolt  against  the  shogun  began  in  1867,  and  Satsuma, 
the  chief  clan  in  the  island  of  Kyushu,  has  had  great 


JAPAN  BEFORE  THE  RESTORATION  95 


power  in  the  government  ever  since  the  Restoration, 
except  during  its  rebellion  of  1887.  It  is  hard  to  dis- 
entangle what  belongs  to  Christianity  and  what  to 
mere  hostility  to  the  central  government  in  the  move- 
ments of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  How- 
ever that  may  be,  Iyeyasu  decided  to  persecute  the 
Christians  vigorously,  if  possible  without  losing  the 
foreign  trade.  His  successors  were  even  more  anti- 
Christian  and  less  anxious  for  trade.  After  an  abor- 
tive revolt  in  1637,  Christianity  was  stamped  out,  and 
foreign  trade  was  prohibited  in  the  most  vigorous 
terms : 

So  long  as  the  sun  warms  the  earth,  let  no  Christian  be 
so  bold  as  to  come  to  Japan,  and  let  ail  know  that  if  King 
Philip  himself,  or  even  the  very  God  of  the  Christians,  or 
the  great  Shaka  contravene  this  prohibition,  they  shall  pay 
for  it  with  their  heads.6 

The  persecution  of  the  Christians,  though  it  was  ruth- 
less and  exceedingly  cruel,  was  due,  not  to  religious 
intolerance,  but  solely  to  political  motives.  There  was 
reason  to  fear  that  the  Christians  might  side  with  the 
king  of  Spain  if  he  should  attempt  to  conquer  Japan; 
and  even  if  no  foreign  power  intervened,  there  was 
reason  to  fear  rebellions  of  Christians  against  the  newly 
established  central  power.  Economic  exploitation,  in 
the  modern  sense  of  the  word,  did  not  yet  exist  apart 
from  political  domination,  and  the  Japanese  would  have 

6 Murdoch,  II,  p.  667. 


96 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


welcomed  trade  if  there  had  been  no  danger  of  conquest. 
They  seem  to  have  overrated  the  power  of  Spain,  which 
certainly  could  not  have  conquered  them.  Japanese 
armies  were,  in  those  days,  far  larger  than  the  armies 
of  Europe;  the  Japanese  had  learned  the  use  of  fire- 
arms; and  their  knowledge  of  strategy  was  very  great. 
Kyoto,  the  capital,  was  one  of  the  largest  cities  in  the 
world,  having  about  a million  inhabitants.  The  popu- 
lation of  Japan  was  probably  greater  than  that  of  any 
European  state.  It  would  therefore  have  been  possible, 
without  much  trouble,  to  resist  any  expedition  that 
Europe  could  have  sent  againt  Japan.  It  would  even 
have  been  easy  to  conquer  Manila,  as  Hideyoshi  at  one 
time  thought  of  doing.  But  we  can  well  understand 
how  terrifying  would  be  a map  of  the  world  showing  the 
whole  of  North  and  South  America  as  belonging  to 
Philip  II.  Moreover  the  Japanese  Government  sent 
pretended  converts  to  Europe,  where  they  became  priests, 
had  audience  of  the  pope,  penetrated  into  the  inmost 
councils  of  Spain,  and  mastered  all  the  meditated  vil- 
lainies of  European  imperialism.  These  spies,  when  they 
came  home  and  laid  their  reports  before  the  government, 
naturally  increased  its  fears.  The  Japanese,  therefore, 
decided  to  have  no  further  intercourse  with  the  white 
men.  And  whatever  may  be  said  against  this  policy,  I 
cannot  feel  convinced  that  it  was  unwise. 

For  over  two  hundred  years,  until  the  coming  of 
Commodore  Perry’s  squadron  from  the  United  States 
in  1853,  Japan  enjoyed  complete  peace  and  almost  com- 
plete stagnation — the  only  period  of  either  in  Japanese 
history.  It  then  became  necessary  to  learn  fresh  lessons 


JAPAN  BEFORE  THE  RESTORATION  97 


in  the  use  of  fire-arms  from  Western  nations,  and  to 
abandon  the  exclusive  policy  until  they  were  learned. 
When  they  have  been  learned  perhaps  we  shall  see  an- 
other period  of  isolation. 


CHAPTER  VI 


MODERN  JAPAN 

THE  modern  Japanese  nation  is  unique,  not  only  in 
this  age,  but  in  the  history  of  the  world.  It  com- 
bines elements  which  most  Europeans  would  have  sup- 
posed totally  incompatible,  and  it  has  realized  an  orig- 
inal plan  to  a degree  hardly  known  in  human  affairs. 
The  Japan  which  now  exists  is  almost  exactly  that  which 
was  intended  by  the  leaders  of  the  Restoration  in  1867. 
Many  unforeseen  events  have  happened  in  the  world: 
America  has  risen  and  Russia  has  fallen,  China  has 
become  a Republic  and  the  Great  War  has  shattered 
Europe.  But  throughout  all  these  changes  the  leading 
statesmen  of  Japan  have  gone  along  the  road  traced  out 
for  them  at  the  beginning  of  the  Meiji  era,  and  the 
nation  has  followed  them  with  ever-increasing  faithful- 
ness. One  single  purpose  has  animated  leaders  and 
followers  alike:  the  strengthening  and  extension  of  the 
empire.  To  realize  this  purpose  a new  kind  of  policy 
has  been  created,  combining  the  sources  of  strength  in 
modern  America  with  those  in  Rome  at  the  time  of  the 
Punic  Wars,  uniting  the  material  organization 
and  scientific  knowledge  of  pre-war  Germany  with 
the  outlook  on  life  of  the  Hebrews  in  the  Book  of 
J oshua. 


98 


MODERN  JAPAN 


99 


The  transformation  of  Japan  since  1867  is  amazing, 
and  people  have  been  duly  amazed  by  it.  But  what 
is  still  more  amazing  is  that  such  an  immense  change  in 
knowledge  and  in  way  of  life  should  have  brought  so  lit- 
tle change  in  religion  and  ethics,  and  that  such  change  as 
it  has  brought  in  these  matters  should  have  been  in  a di- 
rection opposite  to  that  which  wTould  have  been  naturally 
expected.  Science  is  supposed  to  tend  to  rationalism; 
yet  the  spread  of  scientific  knowledge  in  Japan  has  syn- 
chronized with  a great  intensification  of  Mikado  worship, 
the  most  anachronistic  feature  in  the  Japanese  civiliza- 
tion. For  sociology,  for  social  psychology,  and  for  poli- 
tical theory,  Japan  is  an  extraordinarily  interesting 
country.  The  synthesis  of  East  and  West  which  has 
been  effected  is  of  a peculiar  kind.  There  is  far  more 
of  the  East  than  appears  on  the  surface;  but  there  is 
everything  of  the  West  that  tends  to  national  efficiency. 
How  far  there  is  a genuine  fusion  of  Eastern  and 
Western  elements  may  be  doubted;  the  nervous  excita- 
bility of  the  people  suggests  something  strained  and  arti- 
ficial in  their  way  of  life,  but  this  may  possibly  be  a 
merely  temporary  phenomenon. 

Throughout  Japanese  politics  since  the  Restoration, 
there  are  two  separate  strands,  one  analogous  to  that  of 
Western  nations  especially  pre-war  Germany,  the  other 
inherited  from  the  feudal  age,  which  is  more  analogous 
to  the  politics  of  the  Scottish  Highlands  down  to  1745. 
It  is  no  part  of  my  purpose  to  give  a history  of  modern 
Japan;  I wish  only  to  give  an  outline  of  the  forces 
which  control  events  and  movements  in  that  country, 
with  such  illustrations  as  are  necessary.  There  are1 


100 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


many  good  books  on  Japanese  politics;  the  one  that  I 
have  found  most  informative  is  McLaren ’s  “political 
History  of  Japan  during  the  Meiji  Era,  1867-1912” 
(Allen  & Unwin,  1916),  For  a picture  of  Japan  as  it 
appeared  in  the  early  days  of  the  Meiji  era,  Lafcadio 
Hearn  is  of  course  invaluable;  his  book  “Japan,  An 
Interpretation,”  shows  his  dawning  realization  of  the 
grim  sides  of  the  Japanese  character,  after  the  cherry- 
blossom  business  has  lost  its  novelty.  I shall  not  have 
much  to  say  about  cherry-blossom;  it  was  not  flowering 
when  I was  in  Japan. 

Before  1867,  Japan  was  a feudal  federation  of  clans, 
in  which  the  central  government  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
shogun,  who  was  the  head  of  his  own  clan,  but  had  by 
no  means  undisputed  sway  over  the  more  powerful  of 
the  other  clans.  There  had  been  various  dynasties  of 
shoguns  at  various  times,  but  since  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury the  shogunate  had  been  in  the  Tokugawa  clan. 
Throughout  the  Tokugawa  shogunate,  except  during  its 
first  few  years,,  Japan  had  been  closed  to  foreign  inter- 
course, except  for  a strictly  limited  commerce  with  the 
Dutch.  The  modern  era  was  inaugurated  by  two 
changes:  first,  the  compulsory  opening  of  the  country 
to  Western  trade;  secondly,  the  transference  of  power 
from  the  Tokugawa  clan  to  the  clans  of  Satsuma  and 
Choshu,  who  have  governed  Japan  ever  since.  It  is 
impossible  to  understand  Japan  or  its  politics  and  possi- 
bilities without  realizing  the  nature  of  the  governing 
forces  and  their  roots  in  the  feudal  system  of  the  former 
age.  I will  therefore  first  outline  these  internal  move- 


MODERN  JAPAN 


101 


ments,  before  coining  to  the  part  which  Japan  has  played 
in  international  affairs. 

What  happened,  nominally,  in  1867  was  that  the 
mikado  was  restored  to  power,  after  having  been  com- 
pletely eclipsed  by  the  shogun  since  the  end  of  the 
twelfth  century.  During  this  long  period,  the  mikado 
seems  to  have  been  regarded  by  the  common  people  with 
reverence  as  a holy  personage,  but  he  was  allowed  no 
voice  in  affairs,  was  treated  with  comtempt  by  the  sho- 
gun, was  sometimes  deposed  if  he  misbehaved,  and  was 
often  kept  in  great  poverty. 

Of  so  little  importance  was  the  Imperial  person  in  the 
days  of  early  foreign  intercourse  that  the  Jesuits  hardly 
knew  of  the  EmperoPs  existence.  They  seem  to  have  thought 
of  him  as  a Japanese  counterpart  of  the  Pope  of  Rome, 
except  that  he  had  no  aspirations  for  temporal  power.  The 
Dutch  writers  likewise  were  in  the  habit  of  referring  to  the 
Shogun  as  “His  Majesty,”  and  on  their  annual  pilgrimage 
from  Dashima  to  Yedo,  Kyoto  (where  the  Mikado  lived)  was 
the  only  city  which  they  were  permitted  to  examine  freely. 
The  privilege  was  probably  accorded  by  the  Tokugawa  to 
show  the  foreigners  how  lightly  the  Court  was  regarded. 
Commodore  Perry  delivered  to  the  Shogun  in  Yedo  the  auto- 
graph letter  to  the  Emperor  of  Japan  from  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  and  none  of  the  Ambassadors  of  the 
Western  Powers  seem  to  have  entertained  any  suspicion  that 
in  dealing  with  the  authorities  in  Yedo  they  were  not  ap- 
proaching the  throne. 

In  the  light  of  these  facts,  some  other  explanation  of  the 
relations  between  the  Shogunate  and  the  Imperial  Court 
must  be  sought  than  that  which  depends  upon  the  claim  now 


102 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


made  by  Japanese  historians  of  the  official  type,  that  the 
throne,  throughout  this  whole  period,  was  divinely  preserved 
by  the  Heavenly  Gods.1 

What  happened,  in  outline,  seems  to  have  been  a 
combination  of  very  different  forces.  There  were  anti- 
quarians who  observed  that  the  mikado  had  had  real 
power  in  the  tenth  century,  and  who  wished  to  revert 
to  the  ancient  customs.  There  were  patriots  who  were 
annoyed  with  the  shogun  for  yielding  to  the  pressure 
of  the  white  men  and  concluding  commercial  treaties 
with  them.  And  there  were  the  western  clans,  which 
had  never  willingly  submitted  to  the  authority  of  the 
shogun.  To  quote  McLaren  once  more  (p.  33) : 

The  movement  to  restore  the  Emperor  was  coupled  with 
a form  of  Chauvinism  or  intense  nationalism  which  may  be 
summed  up  in  the  expression  “Exhalt  the  Emperor!  Away 
with  the  barbarians  !”  (Kinno!  Joi!)  From  this  it  would 
appear  that  the  Dutch  scholars’  work  in  enlightening  the  na- 
tion upon  the  subject  of  foreign  scientific  attainments  was 
anathema,  but  a conclusion  of  that  kind  must  not  be  hastily 
arrived  at.  The  cry,  “Away  with  the  barbarians !”  was 
directed  against  Perry  and  the  envoys  of  other  foreign  Pow- 
ers, but  there  was  nothing  in  that  slogan  which  indicates  a 
general  unwillingness  to  emulate  the  foreigners’  achievements 
in  armaments  or  military  tactics.  In  fact,  for  a number  of 
years  previous  to  1853,  Satsuma  and  Choshu  and  other 
western  clans  had  been  very  busily  engaged  in  manufacturing 
guns  and  practising  gunnery:  to  that  extent,  at  any  rate, 


i McLaren,  op.  cit.  p.  19. 


MODERN  JAPAN 


103 


the  discoveries  of  the  students  of  European  sciences  had  been 
deliberately  used  by  those  men  who  were  to  be  foremost  in 
the  Restoration. 

This  passage  gives  the  key  to  the  spirit  which  has 
animated  modern  Japan  down  to  the  present  day. 

The  Restoration  was,  to  a greater  extent  than  is  usu- 
ally realized  in  the  West,  a conservative  and  even  re- 
actionary movement.  Professor  Murdoch,  in  his  author- 
itative “History  of  Japan,”  says:2 

In  the  interpretation  of  this  sudden  and  startling  develop- 
ment most  European  writers  and  critics  show  themselves 
seriously  at  fault.  Even  some  of  the  more  intelligent  among 
them  find  the  solution  of  this  portentous  enigma  in  the  very 
superficial  and  facile  formula  of  “imitation.”  But  the  Jap- 
anese still  retain  their  own  unit  of  social  organization,  which 
is  not  the  individual,  as  with  us,  but  the  family.  Further- 
more, the  resemblance  of  the  Japanese  administrative  sys- 
tem, both  central  and  local,  to  certain  European  systems  is 
not  the  result  of  imitation,  or  borrowing,  or  adaptation. 
Such  resemblance  is  merely  an  odd  and  fortuitous  resem- 
blance. When  the  statesmen  who  overthrew  the  Tokugawa 
regime  in  18G8,  and  abolished  the  feudal  system  in  1871,  were 
called  upon  to  provide  the  nation  with  a new  equipment  of 
administrative  machinery,  they  did  not  go  to  Europe  for 
their  models.  They  simply  harked  back  some  eleven  or 
twelve  centuries  in  their  own  history  and  resuscitated  the 
administrative  machinery  that  had  first  been  installed  in 
Japan  by  the  genius  of  Fujiwara  Kamatari  and  his  coad- 
jutors in  645  a.  d.,  and  more  fully  supplemented  and  organ- 
ized in  the  succeeding  fifty  or  sixty  years.  The  present 

2 Kegan  Paul,  1910,  Vol.  I,  p.  20. 


104 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


Imperial  Cabinet  of  ten  Ministers,  with  their  departments 
and  departmental  staff  of  officials,  is  a modified  revival  of 
the  Eight  Boards  adapted  from  China  and  established  in  the 
seventh  century.  . . . The  present  administrative  system  is 
indeed  of  alien  provenance;  but  it  was  neither  borrowed  nor 
adapted  a generation  ago,  nor  borrowed  nor  adapted  from 
Europe.  It  was  really  a system  of  hoary  antiquity  that  was 
revived  to  cope  with  pressing  modern  exigencies. 

The  outcome  was  that  the  clans  of  Satsuma  and 
Choshu  acquired  control  of  the  mikado,  made  his  exalta- 
tion the  symbol  of  resistance  to  the  foreigner  (with 
whom  the  shogun  had  concluded  unpopular  treaties),  and 
secured  the  support  of  the  country  by  being  the  cham- 
pions of  nationalism.  Under  extraordinarily  able 
leaders,  a policy  was  adopted  which  has  been  pursued 
consistently  ever  since,  and  has  raised  Japan  from  be- 
ing the  helpless  victim  of  Western  greed  to  being  one 
of  the  greatest  powers  in  the  world.  Feudalism  was 
abolished,  the  central  government  was  made  omnipo- 
tent, a powerful  army  and  navy  were  created,  China  and 
Russia  were  successively  defeated,  Korea  was  annexed 
and  a protectorate  established  over  Manchuria  and  Inner 
Mongolia,  industry  and  commerce  were  developed,  uni- 
versal compulsory  education  instituted,  and  worship  of 
the  mikado  firmly  established  by  teaching  in  the  schools 
and  by  professorial  patronage  of  historical  myths. 

The  artificial  creation  of  mikado  worship  is  one  of  the 
most  interesting  features  of  modern  Japan,  and  a model 
to  all  other  states  as  regards  the  method  of  preventing 
the  growth  of  rationalism.  There  is  a very  instructive 
little  pamphlet  by  Professor  B.  H.  Chamberlain,  who 


MODERN  JAPAN 


105 


was  professor  of  Japanese  and  philosophy  at  Tokyo, 
and  had  a knowledge  of  Japanese  which  few  Europeans 
had  equalled.  His  pamphlet  is  called  “The  Invention 
of  a New  Religion,”  and  is  published  by  the  Rational- 
ist Press  Association.  He  points  out  that,  until  recent 
times,  the  religion  of  Japan  was  Buddhism,  to  the  prac- 
tical exclusion  of  every  other.  There  had  been,  in  very 
ancient  times,  a native  religion  called  Shinto,  and  it  had 
lingered  on  obscurely.  But  it  is  only  during  the  last 
forty  years  or  so  that  Shinto  has  been  erected  into  a 
state  religion,  and  has  been  reconstructed  so  as  to  suit 
modern  requirements.3  It  is,  of  course,  preferable  to 
Buddhism  because  it  is  native  and  national ; it  is  a tribal 
religion,  not  one  which  aims  at  appealing  to  all  man- 
kind. Its  whole  purpose,  as  it  has  been  developed  by 
modern  statesmen,  is  to  glorify  Japan  and  the  mikado. 

Professor  Chamberlain  points  out  how  little  rever- 
ence there  was  for  the  mikado  until  some  time  after  the 
Restoration : 

The  sober  fact  is  that  no  nation  probably  has  ever  treated 
its  sovereigns  more  cavalierly  than  the  Japanese  have  done, 
from  the  beginning  of  authentic  history  down  to  within  the 
memory  of  living  men.  Emperors  have  been  deposed,  em- 
perors have  been  assassinated;  for  centuries  every  succession 
to  the  throne  was  the  signal  for  intrigues  and  sanguinary 

3 “What  popular  Shinto,  as  expounded  by  its  village  priests 
in  the  old  time,  was  we  simply  do  not  know.  Our  carefully 
selected  and  edited  official  edition  of  Shinto  is  certainly  not  true 
aboriginal  Shinto  as  practised  in  Yamato  before  the  introduc- 
tion of  Buddhism  and  Chinese  culture,  and  many  plausible  ar- 
guments which  disregard  that  indubitable  fact  lose  much  of 
their  weight.”  (Murdoch,  I,  p.  173  n.) 


106 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


broils.  Emperors  have  been  exiled;  some  have  been  mur- 
dered in  exile.  . . . For  long  centuries  the  Government  was 
in  the  hands  of  Mayors  of  the  Palace,  who  substituted  one 
infant  sovereign  for  another,  generally  forcing  each  to  ab- 
dicate as  he  approached  man’s  estate.  At  one  period,  these 
Mayors  of  the  Palace  left  the  Descendant  of  the  Sun  in  such 
distress  that  His  Imperial  Majesty  and  the  Imperial  Princes 
were  obliged  to  gain  a livelihood  by  selling  their  autographs! 
Nor  did  any  great  party  in  the  State  protest  against  this 
condition  of  affairs.  Even  in  the  present  reign  (that  of 
Meiji) — the  most  glorious  in  Japanese  history — there  have 
been  two  rebellions,  during  one  of  which  a rival  Emperor 
was  set  up  in  one  part  of  the  country,  and  a Republic  pro- 
claimed in  another. 

This  last  sentence,  though  it  states  sober  historical 
fact,  is  scarcely  credible  to  those  who  only  know  twen- 
tieth-century Japan.  The  spread  of  superstition  has 
gone  pari  passu  -with  the  spread  of  education,  and  a re- 
volt against  the  mikado  is  now  unthinkable.  Time  and 
again,  in  the  midst  of  political  strife,  the  mikado  has 
been  induced  to  intervene,  and  instantly  the  hottest  com- 
batants have  submitted  abjectly.  Although  there  is  a 
Diet,  the  mikado  is  an  absolute  ruler — as  absolute  as  any 
sovereign  ever  has  been. 

The  civilization  of  Japan,  before  the  Restoration,  came 
from  China.  Religion,  art,  writing,  philosophy,  and 
ethics,  everything  was  copied  from  Chinese  models. 
J apanese  history  begins  in  the  fifth  century  a.  d. 
whereas  Chinese  history  goes  back  to  about  2000  b.  c., 
or  at  any  rate  to  somewhere  in  the  second  millennium 
b.  c.  This  was  galling  to  Japanese  pride,  so  an  early 


MODERN  JAPAN 


107 


history  was  invented  long  ago,  like  the  theory  that  the 
Romans  were  descended  from  iEneas.  To  quote  Pro- 
fessor Chamberlain  again: 

The  first  glimmer  of  genuine  Japanese  history  dates  from 
the  fifth  century  after  Christ,  and  even  'the  accounts  of  what 
happened  in  the  sixth  century  must  be  received  with  caution. 
Japanese  scholars  know  this  as  well  as  we  do;  it  is  one  of 
the  certain  results  of  investigation.  But  the  Japanese  bu- 
reaucracy does  not  desire  to  have  the  light  let  in  on  this  in- 
convenient circumstance.  While  granting  a dispensation  re 
the  national  mythology,  properly  so  called,  it  exacts  belief 
in  every  iota  of  the  national  historic  legends.  Woe  to  the 
native  professor  who  strays  from  the  path  of  orthodoxy. 
His  wife  and  children  (and  in  Japan  every  man,  however 
young,  has  a wife  and  children)  will  starve.  From  the  late 
Prince  Ito’s  grossly  misleading  11  Commentary  on  the  Japanese 
Constitution”  down  to  school  compendiums,  the  absurd  dates 
are  everywhere  insisted  upon. 

This  question  of  fictitious  early  history  might  be  con- 
sidered unimportant,  like  the  fact  that,  with  us,  parsons 
have  to  pretend  to  believe  the  Bible,  which  some  people 
think  innocuous.  But  it  is  part  of  the  whole  system, 
which  has  a political  object,  to  which  free  thought  and 
free  speech  ar&  ruthlessly  sacrificed.  As  this  same 
pamphlet  says : 

Shinto,  a primitive  nature  cult,  which  had  fallen  into  dis- 
credit, was  taken  out  of  its  cupboard  and  dusted.  The  com- 
mon people,  it  is  true,  continued  to  place  their  affections  on 
Buddhism,  the  popular  festivals  were  Buddhist;  Buddhist 


108 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


also  the  temples  where  they  buried  their  dead.  The  govern- 
ing class  determined  to  change  all  this.  They  insisted  on  the 
Shinto  doctrine  that  the  Mikado  descends  in  direct  succession 
from  the  native  Goddess  of  the  Sun,  and  that  He  himself 
is  a living  God  on  earth  who  justly  claims  the  absolute  fealty 
of  his  subjects.  Such  things  as  laws  and  constitutions  are 
but  free  gifts  on  His  part,  not  in  any  sense  popular  rights. 
Of  course,  the  ministers  and  officials,  high  and  low,  who  carry 
on  His  government,  are  to  be  regarded  not  as  public  serv- 
ants, but  rather  as  executants  of  supreme — one  might  say 
supernatural — authority.  Shinto,  because  connected  with  the 
Imperial  family,  is  to  be  alone  honoured. 

All  this  is  not  mere  theorizing;  it  is  the  practical 
basis  of  Japanese  politics.  The  mikado,  after  hav- 
ing been  for  centuries  in  the  keeping  of  the  Toku- 
gawa  shoguns,  was  captured  by  the  clans  of  Satsuma 
and  Choshu,  and  has  been  in  their  keeping  ever  since. 
They  were  represented  politically  by  five  men,  the 
Genro  or  Elder  Statesmen,  who  are  sometimes  miscalled 
the  Privy  Council.  Only  two  still  survive.  The  Genro 
have  no  constitutional  existence ; they  are  merely  the  peo- 
ple who  have  the  ear  of  the  mikado.  They  can  make 
him  say  whatever  they  wish ; therefore  they  are  omnipo- 
tent. It  has  happened  repeatedly  that  they  have  had 
against  them  the  Diet  and  the  whole  force  of  public 
opinion;  nevertheless  they  have  invariably  been  able  to 
enforce  their  will,  because  they  could  make  the  mikado 
speak,  and  no  one  dare  oppose  the  mikado.  They  do 
not  themselves  take  office ; they  select  the  prime  minister 
and  the  ministers  of  war  and  marine,  and  allow  them 
to  bear  the  blame  if  anything  goes  wrong.  The  Genro 


MODERN  JAPAN 


109 


are  the  real  government  of  Japan,  and  will  presumably 
remain  so  until  the  mikado  is  captured  by  some  other 
clique. 

From  a patriotic  point  of  view,  the  Genro  have 
shown  very  great  wisdom  in  the  conduct  of  affairs. 
There  is  reason  to  think  that  if  J apan  were  a democracy 
its  policy  would  be  more  chauvinistic  than  it  is. 
Apologists  of  Japan,  such  as  Mr.  Bland,  are  in  the 
habit  of  telling  us  that  there  is  a Liberal  anti-militarist 
party  in  Japan,  which  is  soon  going  to  dominate  for- 
eign policy.  I see  no  reason  to  believe  this.  Un- 
doubtedly there  is  a strong  movement  for  increasing  the 
power  of  the  Diet  and  making  the  cabinet  responsible 
to  it;  there  is  also  a feeling  that  the  ministers  of  war 
and  marine  ought  to  he  responsible  to  the  cabinet  and 
the  prime  minister,  not  only  to  the  mikado  directly.4 

4 The  strength  of  this  movement  may,  however,  be  doubted. 
Murdoch  (op.  cit.,  I,  p.  162)  says:  “At  present,  1910,  the 

War  Office  and  Admiralty  are,  of  all  Ministries,  by  far  the 
strongest  in  the  Empire.  When  a party  Government  does  by 
any  strange  hap  make  its  appearance  on  the  political  stage,  the 
Ministers  of  War  and  of  Marine  can  afford  to  regard  its  advent 
with  the  utmost  insouciance.  For  the  most  extreme  of  party 
politicians  readily  and  unhesitatingly  admit  that  the  affairs  of 
the  Army  and  Navy  do  not  fall  within  the  sphere  of  party 
politics,  but  are  the  exclusive  concern  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  his  Imperial  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan.  On  none 
in  the  public  service  of  Japan  are  titles  of  nobility,  high  rank, 
and  still  more  substantial  emoluments  showered  with  a more 
liberal  hand  than  upon  the  great  captains  and  the  great  sailors 
of  the  Empire.  In  China,  on  the  other  hand,  the  military  man 
is,  if  not  a pariah,  at  all  events  an  exceptional  barbarian,  whom 
policy  makes  it  advisable  to  treat  with  a certain  amount  of 
gracious,  albeit  semi -contemptuous,  condescension.” 


110 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


But  democracy  in  Japan  does  not  mean  a diminution 
of  chauvinism  in  foreign  policy.  There  is  a small  So- 
cialist party  which  is  genuinely  anti-chauvinist  and 
anti-militarist ; this  party,  probably,  will  grow  as 
Japanese  industrialism  grows.  But  so-called  Japanese 
Liberals  are  just  as  chauvinistic  as  the  government,  and 
public  opinion  is  more  so.  Indeed  there  have  been  oc- 
casions when  the  Genro,  in  spite  of  popular  fury,  has 
saved  the  nation  from  mistakes  which  it  would  certainly 
have  committed  if  the  government  had  been  democratic. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  of  these  occasions  was  the 
conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth,  after  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War,  which  deserves  to  be  told  as  illustrative 
of  Japanese  politics.5 

In  1905,  after  the  battles  of  Tsushima  and  Mukden, 
it  became  clear  to  impartial  observers  that  Russia  could 
accomplish  nothing  further  at  sea,  and  Japan  could  ac- 
complish nothing  further  on  land.  The  Russian  Gov- 
ernment was  anxious  to  continue  the  war,  having 
gradually  accumulated  men  and  stores  in  Manchuria, 
and  greatly  improved  the  working  of  the  Siberian  Rail- 
way. The  Japanese  Government,  on  the  contrary,  knew 
that  it  had  already  achieved  all  the  success  it  could 
hope  for,  and  that  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to 
raise  the  loans  required  for  a prolongation  of  the  war. 
Under  these  circumstances,  Japan  appealed  secretly  to 
President  Roosevelt  requesting  his  good  offices  for  the 
restoration  of  peace.  President  Roosevelt  therefore  is- 
sued invitations  to  both  belligerents  to  a peace  confer- 

s The  following  account  is  taken  from  McLaren,  op.  tit., 
Chaps.  XII  and  XIII. 


J 


MODERN  JAPAN 


111 


ence.  The  Russian  Government,  faced  by  a strong  peace 
party  and  incipient  revolution,  dared  not  refuse  the 
invitation,  especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  sym- 
pathies of  neutrals  were  on  the  whole  with  Japan.  Ja- 
pan, being  anxious  for  peace,  led  Russia  to  suppose  that 
Japan’s  demands  would  be  so  excessive  as  to  alienate 
the  sympathy  of  the  world  and  afford  a complete  an- 
swer to  the  peace  party  in  Russia.  In  particular,  the 
Japanese  gave  out  that  they  would  absolutely  insist 
upon  an  indemnity.  The  government  had  in  fact  re- 
solved, from  the  first,  not  to  insist  on  an  indemnity, 
but  this  was  known  to  very  few  people  in  Japan,  and 
to  no  one  outside  Japan.  The  Russians,  believing  that 
the  Japanese  would  not  give  way  about  the  indemnity, 
showed  themselves  generous  as  regards  all  other  Jap- 
anese demands.  To  their  horror  and  consternation, 
when  they  had  already  packed  up  and  were  just  ready 
to  break  up  the  conference,  the  Japanese  announced  (as 
they  had  from  the  first  intended  to  do)  that  they  ac- 
cepted the  Russian  concessions  and  would  waive  the 
claim  to  an  indemnity.  Thus  the  Russian  Government 
and  the  Japanese  people  were  alike  furious,  because 
they  had  been  tricked — the  former  in  the  belief  that  it 
could  yield  everything  except  the  indemnity  without 
bringing  peace,  the  latter  in  the  belief  that  the  govern- 
ment would  never  give  way  about  the  indemnity.  In 
Russia  there  was  revolution ; in  Japan  there  were  riots, 
furious  diatribes  in  the  press,  and  a change  of  govern- 
ment— of  the  nominal  government,  that  is  to  say,  for 
the  Genro  continued  to  be  the  real  power  throughout. 
In  this  case,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  decision  of  the 


112 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


Genro  to  make  peace  was  the  right  one  from  every 
point  of  view;  there  is  also  very  little  doubt  that  a 
peace  advantageous  to  Japan  could  not  have  been  made 
without  trickery. 

Foreigners  unacquainted  with  Japan,  knowing  that 
there  is  a Diet  in  which  the  lower  house  is  elected,  im- 
agine that  Japan  is  at  least  as  democratic  as  pre-war 
Germany.  This  is  a delusion.  It  is  true  that  Marquis 
Ito,  who  framed  the  constitution,  which  was  promul- 
gated in  1889,  took  Germany  for  his  model,  as  the 
Japanese  have  always  done  in  all  their  Westernizing 
efforts,  except  as  regards  the  navy,  in  which  Great 
Britain  has  been  copied.  But  there  were  many  points 
in  which  the  Japanese  constitution  differed  from  that 
of  the  German  Empire.  To  begin  with,  the  Reichstag 
was  elected  by  manhood  suffrage,  whereas  in  J apan  there 
is  a property  qualification  which  restricts  the  franchise 
to  about  25  per  cent,  of  the  adult  males.  This,  however, 
is  a small  matter  compared  to  the  fact  that  the  mikado’s 
power  is  far  less  limited  than  that  of  the  Kaiser  was. 
It  is  true  that  Japan  does  not  differ  from  pre-war  Ger- 
many in  the  fact  that  ministers  are  not  responsible  to 
the  Diet,  but  to  the  emperor,  and  are  responsible  sever- 
ally, not  collectively.  The  war  minister  must  be  a gen- 
eral, the  minister  of  marine  must  be  an  admiral;  they 
take  their  orders,  not  from  the  prime  minister,  but  from 
the  military  and  naval  authorities  respectively,  who,  of 
course,  are  under  the  control  of  the  mikado.  But  in 
Germany  the  Reichstag  had  the  power  of  the  purse, 
whereas  in  Japan,  if  the  Diet  refuses  to  pass  the  budget, 
the  budget  of  the  previous  year  can  be  applied,  and, 


MODERN  JAPAN 


113 


when  the  Diet  is  not  sitting,  laws  can  be  enacted  tem- 
porarily by  imperial  decree — a provision  which  had  no 
analogue  in  the  German  constitution. 

The  constitution  having  been  granted  by  the  emperor 
of  his  free  grace,  it  is  considered  impious  to  criticize  it 
or  to  suggest  any  change  in  it,  since  this  would  imply 
t’hat  his  Majesty’s  work  was  not  wholly  perfect.  To 
understand  the  constitution,  it  is  necessary  to  read  it 
in  conjunction  with  the  authoritative  commentary  of 
Marquis  Ito,  which  was  issued  at  the  same  time.  Mr. 
Coleman  very  correctly  summarizes  the  Constitution  as 
follows : 6 

Article  I of  the  Japanese  Constitution  provides  that  “The 
Empire  of  Japan  shall  be  reigned  over  and  governed  by  a 
line  of  Emperors  unbroken  for  ages  eternal.” 

“By  reigned  over  and  governed,”  wrote  Marquis  Ito  in  his 
“Commentaries  on  the  Constitution  of  Japan,”  “it  is  meant 
that  the  Emperor  on  His  Throne  combines  in  Himself  the 
Sovereignty  of  the  State  and  the  Government  of  the  country 
and  of  His  subjects.” 

Article  3 of  the  Constitution  states  that  “the  Emperor  is 
sacred  and  inviolate.”  Marquis  Ito’s  comment  in  explanation 
of  this  is  peculiarly  Japanese.  He  says,  “The  Sacred  Throne 
was  established  at  the  time  when  the  heavens  and  earth  be- 
came separated.  The  Emperor  is  Heaven-descended,  divine 
and  sacred;  He  is  pre-eminent  above  all  His  subjects.  He 
must  be  reverenced  and  is  inviolable.  He  has,  indeed,  to  pay 
due  respect  to  the  law,  but  the  law  has  no  power  to  hold 
Him  accountable  to  it.  Not  only  shall  there  be  no  irrever- 
ence for  the  Emperor’s  person,  but  also  shall  He  neither  be 

6 ‘‘The  Far  East  Unveiled/’  pp.  252-53. 


114 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


made  a topic  of  derogatory  comment  nor  one  of  discussion.7’ 

Through  the  Constitution  of  Japan  the  Japanese  Emperor 
exercises  the  legislative  power,  the  executive  power,  and  the 
judiciary  power.  The  Emperor  convokes  the  Imperial  Diet, 
opens,  closes,  prorogues,  and  dissolves  it.  When  the  Imperial 
Diet  is  not  sitting,  Imperial  ordinances  may  be  issued  in 
place  of  laws.  The  Emperor  has  supreme  control  of  the 
Army  and  Navy,  declares  war,  makes  peace,  and  concludes 
treaties;  orders  amnesty,  pardon  and  commutation  of  pun- 
ishments. 

As  to  the  Ministers  of  State,  the  Constitution  of  Japan, 
Article  55,  says:  “The  respective  Ministers  of  State  shall 
give  their  advice  to  the  Emperor  and  be  responsible  for  it.” 

Ito’s  commentary  on  this  article  indicates  his  intention  in 
framing  it.  “When  a Minister  of  State  errs  in  the  discharge 
of  his  functions,  the  power  of  deciding  upon  his  responsi- 
bilities belongs  to  the  Sovereign  of  the  State:  he  alone  can 
dismiss  a Minister  who  has  appointed  him.  WTio  then  is  it, 
except  the  Sovereign,  that  can  appoint,  dismiss,  and  punish 
a Minister  of  State?  The  appointment  and  dismissal  of 
them  having  been  included  by  the  Constitution  in  the  sover- 
eign power  of  the  Emperor,  it  is  only  a legitimate  conse- 
quence that  the  power  of  deciding  as  to  the  responsibility  of 
Ministers  is  withheld  from  the  Diet.  But  the  Diet  may  put 
questions  to  the  Ministers  and  demand  open  answers  from 
them  before  the  public,  and  it  may  also  present  addresses  to 
the  Sovereign  setting  forth  its  opinions. 

“The  Minister  President  of  State  is  to  make  representa- 
tions to  the  Emperor  on  matters  of  State,  and  to  indicate, 
according  to  His  pleasure,  the  general  course  of  the  policy 
of  the  State,  every  branch  of  the  administration  being  under 
control  of  the  said  Minister.  The  compass  of  his  duties  is 
large,  and  his  responsibilities  cannot  but  be  proportionately 


MODERN  JAPAN 


115 


great.  As  to  the  other  Ministers  of  State,  they  are  severally 
held  responsible  for  the  matters  within  their  respective  com- 
petency; there  is  no  joint  responsibility  among  them  in  re- 
gard to  such  matters.  For,  the  Minister  President  and  the 
other  Ministers  of  State,  being  alike  personally  appointed  by 
the  Emperor,  the  proceedings  of  each  one  of  them  are,  in 
every  respect,  controlled  by  the  will  of  the  Emperor,  and  the 
Minister  President  himself  has  no  power  of  control  over  the 
posts  occupied  by  other  Ministers,  while  the  latter  ought  not 
to  be  dependent  upon  the  former.  In  some  countries,  the 
Cabinet  is  regarded  as  constituting  a corporate  body,  and 
the  Ministers  are  not  held  to  take  part  in  the  conduct  of 
the  Government  each  one  in  an  individual  capacity,  but  joint 
responsibility  is  the  rule.  The  evil  of  such  a system  is  that 
the  power  of  party  combination  will  ultimately  overrule 
the  supreme  power  of  the  Sovereign.  Such  a state  of 
things  can  never  be  approved  of  according  to  our  Constitu- 
tion.” 

In  spite  of  the  small  powers  of  the  Diet,  it  succeeded, 
in  the  first  four  years  of  its  existence  (1890-94),  in  caus- 
ing some  annoyance  to  the  government.  Until  1894  the 
policy  of  Japan  was  largely  controlled  by  Marquis  Ito, 
who  was  opposed  to  militarism  and  chauvinism.  The 
statesmen  of  the  first  half  of  the  Meiji  era  were  con- 
cerned mainly  with  introducing  modern  education  and 
modern  social  organization;  they  wished  to  preserve 
Japanese  independence  vis-a-vis  the  Western  powers, 
but  did  not  aim,  for  the  time  being,  at  imperialist  ex- 
pansion on  their  own  account.  Ito  represented  this 
older  school  of  Restoration  statesmen.  Their  ideas  of 
statecraft  were  in  the  main  derived  from  the  Germany 


116 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


of  the  eighties,  which  was  kept  by  Bismarck  from  un- 
due adventurousness.  But  when  the  Diet  proved  dif- 
ficult to  manage,  they  reverted  to  an  earlier  phase  of 
Bismarck ’s  career  for  an  example  to  imitate.  The  Prus- 
sian Landtag  (incredible  as  it  may  seem)  was  vigorously 
obstreperous  at  the  time  when  Bismarck  first  rose  to 
power,  but  he  tamed  it  by  glutting  the  nation  with  mili- 
tary glory  in  the  wars  against  Austria  and  France. 
Similarly,  in  1894,  the  Japanese  Government  embarked 
on  war  against  China,  and  instantly  secured  the  en- 
thusiastic support  of  the  hitherto  rebellious  Diet.  From 
that  day  to  this,  the  Japanese  Government  has  never 
been  vigorously  opposed  except  for  its  good  deeds  (such 
as  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth) ; and  it  has  atoned  for 
these  by  abundant  international  crimes,  which  the  na- 
tion has  always  applauded  to  the  echo.  Marquis  Ito  was 
responsible  for  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1894.  He  was 
afterward  again  opposed  to  the  new  policy  of  predatory 
war,  but  was  powerless  to  prevent  it.7  His  opposition, 
however,  was  tiresome,  until  at  last  he  was  murdered  in 
Korea. 

Since  the  outbreak  of  the  Sino- Japanese  War  in  1894, 
Japan  has  pursued  a consistent  career  of  imperialism, 
with  quite  extraordinary  success.  The  nature  and 
fruits  of  that  career  I shall  consider  in  the  next  two 
chapters.  For  the  time  being,  it  has  arrested  whatever 
tendency  existed  toward  the  development  of  democracy ; 
the  Diet  is  quite  as  unimportant  as  the  English  Parlia- 
ment was  in  the  time  of  the  Tudors.  Whether  the 
present  system  will  continue  for  a long  time,  it  is  im- 

7 See  McLaren,  op.  cit.  pp.  277,  228,  289. 


MODERN  JAPAN 


117 


possible  to  guess.  An  unsuccessful  foreign  war  would 
probably  destroy  not  only  the  existing  system,  but  the 
whole  unity  and  morale  of  the  nation;  I do  not  believe 
that  Japan  would  be  as  firm  in  defeat  as  Germany  has 
proved  to  be.  Diplomatic  failure,  without  war,  would 
probably  produce  a more  Liberal  regime,  without  revolu- 
tion. There  is,  however,  one  very  explosive  element  in 
Japan,  and  that  is  industrialism.  It  is  impossible  for 
Japan  to  be  a great  power  without  developing  her  in- 
dustry, and  in  fact  everything  possible  is  done  to  in- 
crease Japanese  manufactures.  Moreover,  industry  is 
required  to  absorb  the  growing  population,  which  can- 
not emigrate  to  English-speaking  regions,  and  will  not 
emigrate  to  the  mainland  of  Asia  because  Chinese  com- 
petition is  too  severe.  Therefore  the  only  way  to  sup- 
port a larger  population  is  to  absorb  it  into  industrial- 
ism, manufacturing  goods  for  export  as  a means  of  pur- 
chasing food  abroad.  Industrialism  in  Japan  requires 
control  of  China,  because  Japan  contains  hardly  any 
of  the  raw  materials  of  industry,  and  cannot  obtain  them 
sufficiently  cheaply  or  securely  in  open  competition  with 
America  and  Europe.  Also  dependence  upon  imported 
food  requires  a strong  navy.  Thus  the  motives  for  im- 
perialism and  navalism  in  Japan  are  very  similar  to 
those  that  have  prevailed  in  England.  But  this  policy 
requires  high  taxation,  while  successful  competition  in 
neutral  markets  requires — or  rather,  is  thought  to  re- 
quire— starvation  wages  and  long  hours  for  operatives. 
In  the  cotton  industry  of  Osaka,  for  example,  most  of  the 
work  is  done  by  girls  under  fourteen,  who  work  eleven 
hours  a day  and  got,  in  1916,  an  average  daily  wage  of 


118 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


fivepence.8  Labor  organization  is  in  its  infancy,  and  so 
is  socialism ; 9 but  both  are  certain  to  spread  if  the  num- 
ber of  industrial  workers  increases  without  a very 
marked  improvement  in  hours  and  wages.  Of  course 
the  very  rigidity  of  the  Japanese  policy,  which  has  given 
it  its  strength,  makes  it  incapable  of  adjusting  itself  to 
socialism  and  trade-unionism,  which  are  vigorously  per- 
secuted by  the  government.  And  on  the  other  hand 
socialism  and  trade-unionism  cannot  accept  mikado 
worship  and  the  whole  farrago  of  myth  upon  which  the 
Japanese  state  depends.10  There  is  therefore  a likeli- 
hood, some  twenty  or  thirty  years  hence — assuming  a 
peaceful  and  prosperous  development  in  the  meantime 
— of  a very  bitter  class  conflict  between  the  proletarians 
on  the  one  side  and  the  employers  and  bureaucrats  on 

8 Coleman,  op.  cit.,  Chap.  XXXV. 

9 See  an  invaluable  pamphlet,  “The  Socialist  and  Labour  Move- 
ments in  Japan,”  published  by  the  “Japan  Chronicle,”  1921,  for 
an  account  of  what  is  happening  in  this  direction. 

i°  “The  Times”  of  February  7,  1922,  contains  a telegram  from 
its  correspondent  in  Tokyo,  a propos  of  the  funeral  of  Prince 
Yamagata,  chief  of  the  Genro,  to  the  following  effect: 

“To-day  a voice  was  heard  in  the  Diet  in  opposition  to  the 
grant  of  expenses  for  the  State  funeral  of  Prince  Yamagata. 
The  resolution,  which  was  introduced  by  the  member  for  Osaka 
constituency,  who  is  regarded  as  the  spokesman  of  the  so-called 
Parliamentary  Labour  Party  founded  last  year,  states  that  the 
Chief  of  the  Genro  (Elder  Statesman)  did  not  render  true  serv- 
ice to  the  State,  and,  although  the  recipient  of  the  highest 
dignities,  was  an  enemy  of  mankind  and  suppressor  of  demo- 
cratic institutions.  The  outcome  was  a foregone  conclusion,  but 
the  fact  that  the  introducer  could  obtain  the  necessary  support 
to  table  the  resolution  formally  was  not  the  least  interesting 
feature  of  the  incident.” 


MODERN  JAPAN 


119 


the  other.  If  this  should  happen  to  synchronize  with 
agrarian  discontent,  it  would  prove  impossible  to  fore- 
tell the  issue. 

The  problems  facing  Japan  are  therefore  very  dif- 
ficult. To  provide  for  the  growing  population  it  is 
necessary  to  develop  industry;  to  develop  industry  it 
is  necessary  to  control  Chinese  raw  materials ; to  control 
Chinese  raw  materials  it  is  necessary  to  go  against  the 
economic  interests  of  America  and  Europe;  to  do  this 
successfully  requires  a large  army  and  navy,  which  in 
turn  involve  great  poverty  for  wage-earners.  And  ex- 
panding industry  with  poverty  for  wage-earners  means 
growing  discontent,  increase  of  socialism,  dissolution  of 
filial  piety  and  mikado  worship  in  the  poorer  classes, 
and  therefore  a continually  greater  and  greater  menace 
to  the  whole  foundation  on  which  the  fabric  of  the  state 
is  built.  From  without,  Japan  is  threatened  with  the 
risk  of  war  against  America  or  of  a revival  of  China. 
From  within,  there  will  be,  before  long,  the  risk  of  pro- 
letarian revolution. 

From  all  these  dangers,  there  is  only  one  escape,  and 
that  is  a diminution  of  the  birth-rate.  But  such  an 
idea  is  not  merely  abhorrent  to  the  militarists  as  di- 
minishing the  supply  of  cannon-fodder;  it  is  funda- 
mentally opposed  to  Japanese  religion  and  morality,  of 
which  patriotism  and  filial  piety  are  the  basis.  There- 
fore, if  Japan  is  to  emerge  successfully,  a much  more 
intense  westernizing  must  take  place,  involving  not  only 
mechanical  processes  and  knowledge  of  bare  facts,  but 
ideals  and  religion  and  general  outlook  on  life.  There 


120 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


must  be  free  thought,  skepticism,  diminution  in  the  in- 
tensity of  herd-instinct.  Without  these,  the  population 
question  cannot  be  solved ; and  if  that  remains  unsolved, 
disaster  is  sooner  or  later  inevitable. 


CHAPTER  YII 

JAPAN  AND  CHINA  BEFORE  1914 

BEFORE  going  into  detail  of  Japan’s  policy  toward 
China,  it  is  necessary  to  put  the  reader  on  his  guard 
against  the  habit  of  thinking  of  the  “Yellow  Races,”  as 
though  China  and  Japan  formed  some  kind  of  unity. 
There  are,  of  course,  reasons  which,  at  first  sight,  would 
lead  one  to  suppose  that  China  and  Japan  could  be  taken 
in  one  group  in  comparison  with  the  races  of  Europe 
and  of  Africa.  To  begin  with,  the  Chinese  and  Japanese 
are  both  yellow,  which  points  to  ethnic  affinities;  but 
the  political  and  cultural  importance  of  ethnic  affinities 
is  very  small.  The  Japanese  assert  that  the  hairy  Ainus, 
who  are  low  in  the  scale  of  barbarians,  are  a white  race 
akin  to  ourselves.  I never  saw  a hairy  Ainu,  and  I sus- 
pect the  Japanese  of  malice  in  urging  us  to  admit  the 
Ainus  as  poor  relations;  but,  even  if  they  really  are  of 
Aryan  descent,  that  does  not  prove  that  they  have  any- 
thing of  the  slightest  importance  in  common  with  us  as 
compared  to  what  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  have  in 
common  with  us.  Similarity  of  culture  is  infinitely 
more  important  than  a common  racial  origin. 

It  is  true  that  Japanese  culture,  until  the  Restoration, 
was  derived  from  China.  To  this  day,  Japanese  script 
is  practically  the  same  as  Chinese,  and  Buddhism,  which 

121 


122 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


is  still  the  religion  of  the  people,  is  of  the  sort  derived 
originally  from  China.  Loyalty  and  filial  piety,  which 
are  the  foundations  of  Japanese  ethics,  are  Confucian 
virtues,  imported  along  with  the  rest  of  ancient  Chinese 
culture.  But  even  before  the  irruption  of  European 
influences,  China  and  Japan  had  had  such  different 
histories  and  national  temperaments  that  doctrines  orig- 
inally similar  had  developed  in  opposite  directions. 
China  has  been,  since  the  time  of  the  First  Emperor  (c. 
200  b.  c.),  a vast  unified  bureaucratic  land  empire,  hav- 
ing much  contact  with  foreign  nations — Annamese,  Bur- 
mese, Mongols,  Tibetans,  and  even  Indians.  Japan,  on 
the  other  hand,  was  an  island  kingdom,  having  practi- 
cally no  foreign  contact  except  with  Korea  and  occasion- 
ally with  China,  divided  into  clans  which  were  con- 
stantly at  war  with  each  other,  developing  the  virtues 
and  vices  of  feudal  chivalry,  but  totally  unconcerned 
with  economic  or  administrative  problems  on  a large 
scale.  It  was  not  difficult  to  adapt  the  doctrines  of  Con- 
fucius to  such  a country,  because  in  the  time  of  Con- 
fucius China  was  still  feudal  and  still  divided  into  a 
number  of  petty  kingdoms,  in  one  of  which  the  sage 
himself  was  a courtier,  like  Goethe  at  Weimar.  But 
naturally  his  doctrines  underwent  a different  develop- 
ment from  that  which  befell  them  in  their  own  coun- 
try. 

In  old  Japan,  for  instance,  loyalty  to  the  clan  chief- 
tain is  the  virtue  one  finds  most  praised ; it  is  this  same 
virtue,  with  its  scope  enlarged,  which  has  now  become 
patriotism.  Loyalty  is  a virtue  naturally  praised  where 
conflicts  between  roughly  equal  forces  are  frequent,  as 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  BEFORE  1914  123 


they  were  in  feudal  Japan,  and  are  in  the  modern  inter- 
national world.  In  China,  on  the  contrary,  power 
seemed  so  secure,  the  empire  was  so  vast  and  immemorial, 
that  the  need  for  loyalty  was  not  felt.  Security  bred  a 
different  set  of  virtues,  such  as  courtesy,  considerate- 
ness, and  compromise.  Now  that  security  is  gone,  and 
the  Chinese  find  themselves  plunged  into  a world  of 
warring  bandits,  they  have  difficulty  in  developing  the 
patriotism,  ruthlessness,  and  unscrupulousness  which  the 
situation  demands.  The  Japanese  have  no  such  dif- 
ficulty, having  been  schooled  for  just  such  requirements 
by  their  centuries  of  feudal  anarchy.  Accordingly  we 
find  that  Western  influence  has  only  accentuated  the 
previous  differences  between  China  and  Japan:  modern 
Chinese  like  our  thought  but  dislike  our  mechanism, 
while  modern  Japanese  like  our  mechanism  but  dislike 
our  thought. 

From  some  points  of  view,  Asia,  including  Russia, 
may  be  regarded  as  a unity;  but  from  this  unity  Japan 
must  be  excluded.  Russia,  China,  and  India  contain 
vast  plains  given  over  to  peasant  agriculture;  they  are 
easily  swayed  by  military  empires  such  as  that  of  Jen- 
ghis  Khan;  with  modern  railways,  they  could  be  dom- 
inated from  a center  more  securely  than  in  former  times. 
They  could  be  self-subsistent  economically,  and  invulner- 
able to  outside  attack,  independent  of  commerce,  and  so 
strong  as  to  be  indifferent  to  progress.  All  this  may 
come  about  some  day,  if  Russia  happens  to  develop  a 
great  conqueror  supported  by  German  organizing 
ability.  But  Japan  stands  outside  this  order  of  possi- 
bilities. Japan,  like  Great  Britain,  must  depend 


124 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


upon  commerce  for  power  and  prosperity.  As  yet, 
Japan  has  not  developed  the  liberal  mentality  ap- 
propriate to  a commercial  nation,  and  is  still  bent  upon 
Asiatic  conquest  and  military  prowess.  This  policy 
brings  with  it  conflicts  with  China  and  Russia,  which 
the  present  weakness  of  those  powers  has  enabled  Japan, 
hitherto,  to  conduct  successfully.  But  both  are  likely 
to  recover  their  strength  sooner  or  later,  and  then  the 
essential  weakness  of  present  Japanese  policy  will  be- 
come apparent. 

It  results  naturally  from  the  situation  that  the 
Japanese  have  two  somewhat  incompatible  ambitions. 
On  the  one  hand,  they  wish  to  pose  as  the  champions  of 
Asia  against  the  oppression  of  the  white  man;  on  the 
other  hand,  they  wish  to  be  admitted  to  equality  by  the 
white  powers,  and  to  join  in  the  feast  obtained  by  ex- 
ploiting the  nations  that  are  inefficient  in  homicide. 
The  former  policy  should  make  them  friendly  to  China 
and  India  and  hostile  to  the  white  races;  the  latter  pol- 
icy has  inspired  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  and  its 
fruits  in  the  annexation  of  Korea  and  the  virtual  an- 
nexation of  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mongolia.  As  a mem- 
ber of  the  league  of  nations,  of  the  Big  Five  at  Ver- 
sailles, and  of  the  Big  Three  at  Washington,  Japan  ap- 
pears as  one  of  the  ordinary  great  powers ; but  at  other 
moments  Japan  aims  at  establishing  a hegemony  in  Asia 
by  standing  for  the  emancipation  from  white  tyranny 
of  those  who  happen  to  be  yellow  or  brown,  but  not 
black.  Count  Okuma,  speaking  in  the  Kobe  Chamber 
of  Commerce,  said:  “ There  are  three  hundred  million 

natives  in  India  looking  to  us  to  rescue  them  from  the 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  BEFORE  1911  125 


thraldom  of  Great  Britain.”1  While  in  the  Far  East, 
I inquired  of  innumerable  Englishmen  what  advantage 
our  government  could  suppose  that  we  derived  from 
the  Japanese  alliance.  The  only  answer  that  seemed 
to  me  to  supply  an  intelligible  motive  was  that  the  al- 
liance somewhat  mitigates  the  intensity  of  Japanese  anti- 
British  propaganda  in  India.  However  that  may  be, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Japanese  would  like  to 
pose  before  the  Indians  as  their  champions  against  white 
tryanny.  Mr.  Pooley  2 quotes  Dr.  Ichimura  of  the  Im- 
perial University  of  Kyoto  as  giving  the  following  list 
of  white  men’s  sins: 

(1)  White  men  consider  that  they  alone  are  human  beings, 
and  that  all  coloured  races  belong  to  a lower  order  of  civili- 
zation. 

(2)  They  are  extremely  selfish,  insisting  on  their  own  in- 
terests, but  ignoring  the  interests  of  all  whom  they  regard 
as  inferiors. 

(3)  They  are  full  of  racial  pride  and  conceit.  If  any  con- 
cession is  made  to  them  they  demand  and  take  more. 

(4)  They  are  extreme  in  everything,  exceeding  the  coloured 
races  in  greatness  and  wickedness. 

(o)  They  worship  money,  and  believing  that  money  is  the 
basis  of  everything,  will  adopt  any  measures  to  gain  it. 

This  enumeration  of  our  vices  appears  to  me  wholly 
just.  One  might  have  supposed  that  a nation  which 
saw  us  in  this  light  would  endeavor  to  be  unlike  us. 

1 Quoted  by  A.  M.  Pooley,  “Japan’s  Foreign  Policy,”  Allen  & 
Unwin,  1920,  p.  18. 

2 Op.  cit.,  p.  16  n. 


126 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


That,  however,  is  not  the  moral  which  the  Japanese 
draw.  They  argue,  on  the  contrary,  that  it  is  necessary 
to  imitate  us  as  closely  as  possible.  We  shall  find  that, 
in  the  long  catalogue  of  crimes  committed  by  Europeans 
toward  China,  there  is  hardly  one  which  has  not  been 
equaled  by  the  Japanese.  It  never  occurs  to  a Japanese, 
even  in  his  wildest  dreams,  to  think  of  a Chinaman  as 
an  equal.  And,  although  he  wants  the  white  man  to  re- 
gard him  as  an  equal,  he  himself  regards  Japan  as  im- 
measurably superior  to  any  white  country.  His  real 
desire  is  to  be  above  the  whites,  not  merely  equal  with 
them.  Count  Okuma  put  the  matter  very  simply  in  an 
address  given  in  1913 : 

The  white  races  regard  the  world  as  their  property  and 
all  other  races  are  greatly  their  inferiors.  They  presume  to 
think  that  the  role  of  the  whites  in  the  universe  is  to  govern 
the  world  as  they  please.  The  Japanese  were  a people  who 
suffered  by  this  policy,  and  wrongfully,  for  the  Japanese 
were  not  inferior  to  the  white  races,  but  fully  their  equals. 
The  whites  were  defying  destiny,  and  woe  to  them.3 

It  would  be  easy  to  quote  statements  by  eminent  men 
to  the  effect  that  Japan  is  the  greatest  of  all  nations. 
But  the  same  could  be  said  of  the  eminent  men  of  all 
other  nations  down  to  Ecuador.  It  is  the  acts  of  the 
Japanese  rather  than  their  rhetoric  that  must  concern 
us. 

The  Sino- Japanese  War  of  1894—95  concerned  Korea, 
with  whose  internal  affairs  China  and  Japan  had  mutu- 

3 Pooley,  op.  cit.,  p.  17. 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  BEFORE  1914  127 


ally  agreed  not  to  interfere  without  first  consulting  each 
other.  The  Japanese  claimed  that  China  had  infringed 
this  agreement.  Neither  side  was  in  the  right ; it  was  a 
war  caused  by  a conflict  of  rival  imperialisms.  The 
Chinese  were  easily  and  decisively  defeated,  and  from 
that  day  to  this  have  not  ventured  to  oppose  any  foreign 
power  by  force  of  arms,  except  unofficially  in  the  Boxer 
rebellion.  The  Japanese  were,  however,  prevented  from 
reaping  the  fruits  of  their  victory  by  the  intervention 
of  Russia,  Germany,  and  France,  England  holding  aloof. 
The  Russians  coveted  Korea  for  themselves,  the  French 
came  in  as  their  allies,  and  the  Germans  presumably 
joined  them  because  of  William  II ’s  dread  of  the  Yellow 
Peril.  However  that  may  be,  this  intervention  made  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  inevitable.  It  would  not  have 
mattered  much  to  Japan  if  the  Chinese  had  established 
themselves  in  Korea,  but  the  Russians  would  have  con- 
stituted a serious  menace.  The  Russians  did  not  be- 
friend China  for  nothing ; they  acquired  a lease  of  Port 
Arthur  and  Dalny  (now  called  Dairen),  with  railway 
and  mining  rights  in  Manchuria.  They  built  the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  running  right  through  Man- 
churia, connecting  Port  Arthur  and  Peking  with  the 
Siberian  Railway  and  Europe.  Having  accomplished 
all  this,  they  set  to  work  to  penetrate  Korea. 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  would  presumably  not  have 
taken  place  but  for  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  con- 
cluded in  1902.  In  British  policy,  this  alliance  has  al- 
ways had  a somewhat  minor  place,  while  it  has  been  the 
corner-stone  of  Japanese  foreign  policy  except  during 
the  Great  War,  when  the  Japanese  thought  that  Ger- 


128 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


many  would  win.  The  alliance  provided  that,  in  the 
event  of  either  power  being  attacked  by  two  powers  at 
once,  the  other  should  come  to  its  assistance.  It  was  of 
course,  originally  inspired  by  fear  of  Russia,  and  was 
framed  with  a view  to  preventing  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment, in  the  event  of  war  with  Japan  or  England,  from 
calling  upon  the  help  of  France.  In  1902  we  were  hostile 
to  France  and  Russia,  and  Japan  remained  hostile  to 
Russia  until  after  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  had  been 
supplemented  by  the  convention  of  1907.  The  alliance 
served  its  purpose  admirably  for  both  parties  during 
the  Russo-Japanese  War.  It  kept  France  from  joining 
Russia,  and  thereby  enabled  Japan  to  acquire  command 
of  the  sea.  It  enabled  Japan  to  weaken  Russia,  thus 
curbing  Russian  ambitions,  and  making  it  possible  for 
us  to  conclude  an  entente  with  Russia  in  1907.  With- 
out this  entente,  the  entente  concluded  with  France  in 
1904  would  have  been  useless,  and  the  alliance  which 
defeated  Germany  could  not  have  been  created. 

Without  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  Japan  could  not 
have  fought  Russia  alone,  but  would  have  had  to  fight 
France  also.  This  was  beyond  her  strength  at  that 
time.  Thus  the  decisive  step  in  Japan’s  rise  to  great- 
ness was  due  to  our  support. 

The  war  ended  with  a qualified  victory  for  Japan. 
Russia  renounced  ail  interference  in  Korea,  surrendered 
Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  (since  called  Dairen)  to  the 
Japanese,  and  also  the  railway,  as  far  north  as  Chang- 
chun. This  part  of  the  railway,  with  a few  branch  lines, 
has  since  then  been  called  the  South  Manchurian  Rail- 
way. From  Dairen  to  Changchun  is  437  miles  j Chang- 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  BEFORE  1914  129 


chun  is  150  miles  south  of  Harbin.  The  Japanese  use 
Dairen  as  the  commercial  port  for  Manchuria,  reserv- 
ing Port  Arthur  for  purely  naval  purposes.  In  regard 
to  Korea,  Japan  has  conformed  strictly  to  Western 
models.  During  the  Russo-Japanese  War  the  Japanese 
made  a treaty  guaranteeing  the  independence  and  in- 
tegrity of  Korea;  in  1910  they  annexed  Korea;  since 
then  they  have  suppressed  Korean  nationalists  with  every 
imaginable  severity.  All  this  establishes  their  claim  to 
be  fully  the  equals  of  the  white  men. 

The  Japanese  not  merely  hold  the  South  Manchurian 
Railway,  but  have  a monopoly  of  railway  construction 
in  South  Manchuria.  As  this  was  practically  the  be- 
ginning of  Japan’s  control  of  large  regions  in  China  by 
means  of  railway  monopolies,  it  will  be  worth  while  to 
quote  Mr.  Pooley’s  account  of  the  Fa-ku-Men  Railway 
incident,4  which  shows  how  the  South  Manchurian 
monopoly  was  acquired: 

In  November  1907  the  Chinese  Government  signed  a con- 
tract with  Messrs  Pauling  and  Co.  for  an  extension  of  the 
Imperial  Chinese  railways  northwards  from  Hsin-min-Tung 
to  Fa-ku-Men,  the  necessary  capital  for  the  work  being 
found  by  the  British  and  Chinese  Corporation.  Japan  pro- 
tested against  the  contract,  firstly,  on  an  alleged  secret 
protocol  annexed  to  the  treaty  of  Peking,  which  was  alleged 
to  have  said  that  “the  Chinese  Government  shall  not  construct 
any  main  line  in  the  neighbourhood  of  or  parallel  to  the 
South  Manchurian  Railway,  *nor  any  branch  line  which  should 
be  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  that  railway”;  and,  sec- 
ondly, on  the  Convention  of  1902,  between  China  and  Russia, 

* A.  M.  Pooley,  “Japan’s  Foreign  Policies,”  pp.  48-51. 


130 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


that  no  railway  should  be  built  from  Hsin-min-Tung  without 
Russian  consent.  As  by  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth,  Japan 
succeeded  to  the  Russian  rights,  the  projected  line  could  not 
be  built  without  her  consent.  Her  diplomatic  communica- 
tions were  exceedingly  offensive  in  tone,  and  concluded  with 
a notification  that,  if  she  was  wrong,  it  was  obviously  only 
Russia  who  could  rightfully  take  her  to  task! 

The  Chinese  Government  based  its  action  in  granting  the 
contract  on  the  clause  of  the  1898  contract  for  the  construc- 
tion of  the  Chung-hon-so  to  Hsin-min-Tung  line,  under  which 
China  specifically  reserved  the  right  to  build  the  Fa-ku-Men 
line  with  the  aid  of  the  same  contractors.  Further  although 
by  the  Russo-British  Note  of  1898  British  subjects  were 
specifically  excluded  from  participation  in  railway  con- 
struction north  of  the  Great  Wall,  by  the  Additional  Note 
attached  to  the  Russo-British  Note  the  engagements  between 
the  Chinese  Government  and  the  British  and  Chinese  Cor- 
poration were  specifically  reserved  from  the  purview  of  the 
agreement. 

Even  if  Japan,  as  the  heir  of  Russia’s  assets  and  liabilities 
in  Manchuria,  had  been  justified  in  her  protest  by  the  Con- 
vention of  1902  and  by  the  Russo-British  Note  of  1899,  she 
had  not  fulfilled  her  part  of  the  bargain,  namely,  the  Russian 
undertaking  in  the  Note  to  abstain  from  seeking  concession, 
rights  and  privileges  in  the  valley  of  the  Yangtsze.  Her  re- 
liance on  the  secret  treaty  carried  weight  with  Great  Britain, 
but  with  no  one  else,  as  may  be  gauged  from  the  records  of 
the  State  Department  at  Washington.  A later  claim  ad- 
vanced by  Japan  that  her  action  was  justified  by  Article  VI 
of  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth,  which  assigned  to  Japan  all 
Russian  rights  in  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  (South  Man- 
churian Railway)  “with  all  rights  and  properties  appertain- 
ing thereto,”  was  effectively  answered  by  China’s  citation  of 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  BEFORE  1914  131 


Articles  III  and  IY  of  the  same  Treaty.  Under  the  first 
of  these  articles  it  is  declared  that  “Russia  has  no  territorial 
advantages  or  preferential  or  exclusive  concessions  in  Man- 
churia in  impairment  of  Chinese  sovereignty  or  inconsistent 
with  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity”;  whilst  the  second 
is  a reciprocal  engagement  by  Russia  and  Japan  “not  to  ob- 
struct any  general  measures  common  to  all  countries  which 
China  may  take  for  the  development  of  the  commerce  and 
industry  of  Manchuria.” 

It  wTould  be  interesting  to  know  whether  a refusal  to  allow 
China  to  build  a railway  on  her  own  territory  is  or  is  not 
an  impairment  of  Chinese  sovereignty  and  whether  such  a 
railway  as  that  proposed  was  not  a measure  of  the  “develop- 
ment of  the  commerce  and  industry  of  Manchuria.” 

It  is  doubtful  if  even  the  Russo-Japanese  War  created  as 
much  feeling  in  China  as  did  the  Fa-ku-Men  incident.  Ja- 
pan’s action  was  of  such  flagrant  dishonesty  and  such  a 
cynical  repudiation  of  her  promises  and  pledges  that  her 
credit  received  a blow  from  which  it  has  never  since  recov- 
ered. The  abject  failure  of  the  British  Government  to  sup- 
port its  subjects’  treaty  rights  was  almost  as  much  an  eye- 
opener  to  the  world  as  the  protest  from  Tokio.  . . . 

The  methods  which  had  proved  so  successful  in  stopping 
the  Fa-ku-Men  railway  were  equally  successful  in  forcing  the 
abandonment  of  other  projected  railways.  Among  these  were 
the  Chin-chou-Aigun  line  and  the  important  Antung-Mukden 
line.5  The  same  alleged  secret  protocol  was  used  equally 
brutally  and  successfully  for  the  acquisition  of  the  Newch- 
wang  line,  and  participation  in  1909,  and  eventual  acquisi- 
tion in  1914,  of  the  Chan-Chun-Kirin  lines.  Subsequently 
by  an  agreement  with  Russia  the  sixth  article  of  the  Russo- 
Chinese  Agreement  of  1896  was  construed  to  mean  “the  ab- 

5 This  line  was  subsequently  built  by  the  Japanese. 


132 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


solute  and  exclusive  rights  of  administration  within  the  rail- 
way zone.” 

Japan’s  spheres  of  influence  have  been  subsequently 
extended  to  cover  the  whole  of  Manchuria  and  the  whole 
of  Shantung — though  the  latter  has  been  nominally  re- 
nounced at  Washington.  By  such  methods  as  the  above, 
or  by  loans  to  impecunious  Chinese  authorities,  the  Japa- 
nese have  acquired  vast  railway  monopolies  wherever 
their  influence  has  penetrated,  and  have  used  the  rail- 
ways as  a means  of  acquiring  all  real  power  in  the  prov- 
inces through  which  they  run. 

After  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  Russia  and  Japan  be- 
came firm  friends,  and  agreed  to  bring  pressure  on  China 
jointly  in  any  matter  affecting  Manchuria.  Their 
friendship  lasted  until  the  Bolshevik  revolution.  Russia 
had  entered  into  extensive  obligations  to  support  Japan’s 
claims  at  the  peace  conference,  which  of  course  the  Bol- 
sheviks repudiated.  Hence  the  implacable  hostility  of 
Japan  to  Soviet  Russia,  leading  to  the  support  of  in- 
numerable White  filibusters  in  the  territory  of  the  Far 
Eastern  Republic,  and  to  friendship  with  France  in  all 
international  questions. 

As  soon  as  there  began  to  be  in  China  a revolutionary 
party  aiming  at  the  overthrow  of  the  Manchus,  the 
Japanese  supported  it.  They  have  continuously  sup- 
ported either  or  both  sides  in  Chinese  dissensions,  as 
they  judged  most  useful  for  prolonging  civil  war  and 
weakening  China  politically.  Before  the  revolution  of 
1911,  Sun  Yat  Sen  was  several  times  in  Japan,  and  there 
is  evidence  that  as  early  as  1900  he  was  obtaining  finan- 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  BEFORE  1914  133 


cial  support  from  some  Japanese.6  When  the  revolu- 
tion actually  broke  out,  Japan  endeavored  to  support 
the  Manchus,  but  was  prevented  from  doing  so  effectively 
by  the  other  legations.  It  seems  that  the  policy  of 
Japan  at  that  time,  as  later,  was  to  prevent  the  union  of 
North  and  South,  and  to  confine  the  revolution  to  the 
South.  Moreover,  reverence  for  monarchy  made  Japan 
unwilling  to  see  the  emperor  of  China  dispossessed  and 
his  whole  country  turned  into  a republic,  though  it 
would  have  been  agreeable  to  see  him  weakened  by  the 
loss  of  some  southern  provinces.  Mr.  Pooley  gives  a 
good  account  of  the  actions  of  Japan  during  the  Chi- 
nese revolution,  of  which  the  following  quotation  gives 
the  gist : 7 

It  [the  Genro]  commenced  with  a statement  from  Prince 
Katsura  on  December  18th  [1911],  that  the  time  for  inter- 
vention had  arrived,  with  the  usual  rider  “for  the  sake  of 
the  peace  of  the  Far  East.”  This  was  followed  by  a private 
instruction  to  M.  Ijuin,  Japanese  Minister  in  Peking,  where- 
under  the  latter  on  December  23rd  categorically  informed 
Yuan-shi-kai  that  under  no  circumstances  would  Japan 
recognize  a republican  form  of  government  in  China.  ...  In 
connection  with  the  peace  conference  held  at  Shanghai,  Mr. 
Matsui  (now  Japanese  Ambassador  to  France),  a trusted 
Councillor  of  the  Foreign  Office,  was  dispatched  to  Peking 
to  back  M.  Ijuin  in  the  negotiations  to  uphold  the  dynasty. 
Simultaneously,  Mr.  Denison,  Legal  Adviser  to  the  Japanese 
Foreign  Office,  was  sent  to  Shanghai  to  negotiate  with  the 
rebel  leaders.  Mr.  Matsui’s  mission  was  to  bargain  for 

s Pooley,  op.  cit.,  pp.  57-8'. 

7 Page  6G. 


134 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


Japanese  support  of  the  Manchus  against  the  rebels,  Man- 
churia against  the  throne;  Mr.  Denison’s  mission  was  to  bar- 
gain for  Japanese  support  of  the  rebels  against  the  throne, 
recognition  by  Peking  of  the  Southern  Republic  against 
virtually  a Japanese  protectorate  of  that  Republic  and  ex- 
clusive railway  and  mining  concessions  within  its  borders. 
The  rebels  absolutely  refused  Mr.  Denison’s  offer,  and  sent 
the  proposed  terms  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Peking, 
through  whom  they  eventually  saw  the  light  of  day.  Needless 
to  say  the  Japanese  authorities  strenuously  denied  their  au- 
thenticity. 

The  British  Legation,  however,  supported  Yuan  Shih- 
k’ai,  against  both  the  Manchus  and  Sun  Yat’Sen;  and  it 
was  the  British  policy  which  won  the  day.  Yuan-Shih- 
k’ai  became  president,  and  remained  so  until  1915.  He 
was  strongly  anti- Japanese,  and  had,  on  that  ground, 
been  opposed  as  strongly  as  Japan  dared.  His  success 
was  therefore  a blow  to  the  influence  of  Japan  in  China. 
If  the  Western  powers  had  remained  free  to  make  them- 
selves felt  in  the  Far  East,  the  course  of  events  would 
doubtless  have  been  much  less  favorable  to  the  Japanese; 
but  the  war  came,  and  the  Japanese  saw  their  chance. 
How  they  used  it  must  be  told  in  a separate  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  DURING  THE  WAR 

THE  most  urgent  problem  in  China’s  relations  with 
foreign  powers  is  Japanese  aggression.  Originally 
Japan  was  less  powerful  than  China,  but  after  1868  the 
Japanese  rapidly  learned  from  us  whatever  we  had  to 
teach  in  the  way  of  skilful  homicide,  and  in  1894  they 
resolved  to  test  their  new  armaments  upon  China,  just 
as  Bismarck  tested  his  on  Denmark.  The  Chinese 
Government  preserved  its  traditional  haughtiness,  and 
appears  to  have  been  quite  unaware  of  the  defeat  in 
store  for  it.  The  question  at  issue  was  Korea,  over 
which  both  powers  claimed  suzerainty.  At  that  time 
there  would  have  been  no  reason  for  an  impartial  neu- 
tral to  take  one  side  rather  than  the  other.  The 
Japanese  were  quickly  and  completely  victorious,  but 
were  obliged  to  fight  Russia  before  obtaining  secure 
possession  of  Korea.  The  war  with  Russia  (1904-05) 
was  fought  chiefly  in  Manchuria,  which  the  Russians 
had  gained  as  a reward  for  befriending  China.  Port 
Arthur  and  Southern  Manchuria  up  to  Mukden  were 
acquired  by  the  Japanese  as  a result  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War;  the  rest  of  Manchuria  came  under 
Japanese  control  as  a result  of  Russia’s  collapse  after 
the  Great  War. 


i35 


136 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


The  nominal  sovereignty  in  Manchuria  is  still 
Chinese;  the  Chinese  have  the  civil  administration,  an 
army,  and  the  appointment  of  the  viceroy.  But  the 
Japanese  also  have  troops  in  Manchuria;  they  have  the 
railways,  the  industrial  enterprises,  and  the  complete 
economic  and  military  control.  The  Chinese  viceroy 
could  not  remain  in  power  a week  if  he  were  displeas- 
ing to  the  Japanese,  which,  however,  he  takes  care  not 
to  be.  (See  Note  A.)  The  same  situation  was  being 
brought  about  in  Shantung. 

'Shantung  brings  us  to  what  Japan  did  in  the  Great 
War.  In  1914,  China  could  easily  have  been  induced 
to  join  the  allies  and  to  set  to  work  to  turn  the  Ger- 
mans out  of  Kiao-Chow,  but  this  did  not  suit  the 
Japanese,  who  undertook  the  work  themselves  and  in- 
sisted upon  the  Chinese  remaining  neutral  (until  1917). 
Having  captured  Tsing-tau,  they  presented  to  the 
Chinese  the  famous  Twenty-one  Demands,  which  gave 
the  Chinese  Question  its  modern  form.  These  demands, 
as  originally  presented  in  January,  1915,  consisted  of 
five  groups.  The  first  dealt  with  Shantung,  demanding 
that  China  should  agree  in  advance  to  whatever  terms 
Japan  might  ultimately  make  with  Germany  as  regarded 
this  Chinese  province,  that  the  Japanese  should  have 
the  right  to  construct  certain  specified  railways,  and 
that  certain  ports  (unspecified)  should  be  opened  to 
trade;  also  that  no  privileges  in  Shantung  should  be 
granted  to  any  power  other  than  Japan.  The  second 
group  concerns  South  Manchuria  and  eastern  Inner 
Mongolia,  and  demands  what  is  in  effect  a protectorate, 
with  control  of  railways,  complete  economic  freedom  for 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  DURING  THE  WAR  137 


Japanese  enterprise,  and  exclusion  of  all  other  foreign 
industrial  enterprise.  The  third  group  gives  Japan  a 
monopoly  of  the  mines  and  iron  and  steel  works  in  a 
certain  region  of  the  Yangtze,1  where  we  claim  a sphere 
of  influence.  The  fourth  group  consists  of  a single  de- 
mand, that  China  shall  not  cede  any  harbor,  bay  or 
island  to  any  power  except  Japan.  The  fifth  group, 
which  was  the  most  serious,  demanded  that  Japanese 
political,  financial,  and  military  advisers  should  be 
employed  by  the  Chinese  Government;  that  the  police 
in  important  places  should  be  administered  by  Chinese 
and  Japanese  jointly,  and  should  be  largely  Japanese 
in  personnel ; that  China  should  purchase  from  Japan 
at  least  50  per  cent,  of  her  munitions,  or  obtain  them 
from  a Sino- Japanese  arsenal  to  be  established  in  China, 

i On  this  subject  George  Gleason,  “What  Shall  I Think  of  Ja- 
pan?” pp.  174-5,  says:  “This  paragraph  concerns  the  iron  and 

steel  mills  at  the  city  of  Hanyang,  which,  with  Wuchang  and 
Hangkow,  form  the  Upper  Yangtze  commercial  centre  with  a 
population  of  1,500,000  people.  The  Hanyeping  Company  owns 
a large  part  of  the  Tayeh  iron  mines,  eighty  miles  east  of  Hang- 
kow, with  which  there  are  water  and  rail  connections1.  The  ore 
is  67  per  cent,  iron,  fills  the  whole  of  a series  of  hills  500  feet 
high,  and  is  sufficient  to  turn  out  1,000,000  tons  a year  for  700 
years.  [Probably  an  over-statement.]  Coal  for  the  furnaces  is 
obtained  from  Pinghsiang,  200  miles  distant  by  water,  where  in 
1913  five  thousand  miners  dug  690,000  tons.  Japanese  have  es- 
timated that  the  vein  is  capable  of  producing  yearly  a million 
tons  for  at  least  five  centuries.  . . .. 

“Thus  did  Japan  attempt  to  enter  and  control  a vital  spot 
in  the  heart  of  China  which  for  many  years  Great  Britain  has 
regarded  as  her  special  trade  domain.” 

Mr.  Gleason  is  an  American,  not  an  Englishman.  The  best 
account  of  this  matter  is  given  by  Mr.  Coleman,  “The  Far  East 
Unveiled,”  Chaps.  X-XIV.  See  below,  pp.  232-3. 


138 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


controlled  by  Japanese  experts  and  employing  Japanese 
material;  that  Japan  should  have  the  right  to  construct 
certain  railways  in  and  near  the  Yangtze  Valley;  that 
Japan  should  have  industrial  priority  in  Fukien  (oppo- 
site Formosa) ; and  finally  that  the  Japanese  should 
have  the  right  of  missionary  propaganda  in  China,  to 
spread  the  knowledge  of  their  admirable  ethics. 

These  demands  involved,  as  is  obvious,  a complete 
loss  of  Chinese  independence,  the  closing  of  important 
areas  to  the  commerce  and  industry  of  Europe  and 
America,  and  a special  attack  upon  the  British  position 
in  the  Yangtze.  We,  however,  were  so  busy  with  the 
war  that  we  had  no  time  to  think  of  keeping  ourselves 
alive.  Although  the  demands  constituted  a grave 
menace  to  our  trade,  although  the  Far  East  was  in  an 
uproar  about  them,  although  America  took  drastic  dip- 
lomatic action  against  them,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  never 
heard  of  them  until  they  were  explained  to  him  by  the 
Chinese  delegation  at  Versailles.2  He  had  no  time  to 
find  out  what  Japan  wanted,  but  had  time  to  conclude 
a secret  agreement  with  Japan  in  February,  1917,  prom- 
ising that  whatever  Japan  wanted  in  Shantung  we 
should  support  at  the  peace  conference.3  By  the  terms 
of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  Japan  was  bound  to 
communicate  the  Twenty-one  Demands  to  the  British 
Government.  In  fact,  Japan  communicated  the  first 
four  groups,  but  not  the  fifth  and  worst,  thus  definitely 

2 See  letter  from  Mr.  Eugene  Chen,  “Japan  Weekly  Chronicle,” 
October  20,  1921. 

s The  notes  embodying  this  agreement  are  quoted  in  Pooley, 
“Japan’s  Foreign  Policies,”  Allen  & Unwin,  1920,  pp.  141-2. 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  DURING  THE  WAR  139 


breaking  the  treaty;4  but  this  also,  one  must  suppose, 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  only  discovered  by  chance  when  he 
got  to  Versailles. 

China  negotiated  with  Japan  about  the  Twenty-one 
Demands,  and  secured  certain  modifications,  but  was 
finally  compelled  to  yield  by  an  ultimatum.  There  was 
a modification  as  regards  the  Hanyehping  mines  on  the 
Yangtze,  presumably  to  please  us;  and  the  specially 
obnoxious  fifth  group  was  altered  into  an  exchange  of 
studiously  vague  notes.5  In  this  form,  the  demands 
were  accepted  by  China  on  May  9,  1915.  The  United 
States  immediately  notified  Japan  that  they  could  not 
recognize  the  agreement.  At  that  time  America  was 
still  neutral,  and  was  therefore  still  able  to  do  some- 
thing to  further  the  objects  for  which  we  were  sup- 
posed to  be  fighting,  such  as  protection  of  the  weaker 
nations.  In  1917,  however,  after  America  had  entered 
the  war  for  self-determination,  it  became  necessary  to 
placate  Japan,  and  in  November  of  that  year  the  Ishii- 
Lansing  agreement  was  concluded,  by  which  ‘ ‘ the 

4 On  this  subject,  Baron  Hayashi,  now  Japanese  ambassador 
to  the  United  Kingdom  said  to  Mr.  Coleman : “When  Viscount 

Kato  sent  China  a Note  containing  five  groups,  however,  and 
then  sent  to  England  what  purported  to  be  a copy  of  his  Note 
to  China,  and  that  copy  only  contained  four  of  the  groups  and 
omitted  the  fifth  altogether,  which  was  directly  a breach  of  the 
agreement  contained  in  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  he  did 
something  which  I can  no  more  explain  than  you  can.  Outside 
of  the  question  of  probity  involved,  his  action  was  unbelievably 
foolish.”  (“The  Far  East  Unveiled.”  p.  73) 

s The  demands  in  their  original  and  revised  forms,  with  the 
negotiations  concerning  them,  are  printed  in  Appendix  B of 
“Democracy  and  the  Eastern  Question,”  by  Thomas  F.  Millard, 
Allen  & Unwin,  1919. 


140 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


Government  of  the  United  States  recognizes  that  Japan 
has  special  interests  in  China,  particularly  for  the  parts 
to  which  her  possessions  are  contiguous.  The  rest  of 
the  agreement  (which  is  long)  consists  of  empty  ver- 
biage.6 

I come  now  to  the  events  leading  up  to  China’s 
entry  into  the  war.7  In  this  matter,  the  lead  was  taken 
by  America  so  far  as  severing  diplomatic  relations  was 
concerned,  hut  passed  to  Japan  as  regards  the  declara- 
tion of  war.  It  will  be  remembered  that,  when  America 
broke  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany,  President 
Wilson  called  upon  all  neutrals  to  do  likewise.  Dr. 
Paul  S.  Reinsch,  United  States  minister  in  Peking,  pro- 
ceeded to  act  with  vigor  in-  accordance  with  this  policy. 
He  induced  China  first,  on  February  9,  1917,  to  send  a 
note  of  expostulation  to  Germany  on  the  subject  of  the 
submarine  campaign;  then,  on  March  14,  to  break  off 
diplomatic  relations.  The  further  step  of  declaring 
war  was  not  taken  until  August  14.  The  intrigues  con- 
nected with  these  events  deserve  some  study. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Japanese  were  among  the 
allies,  the  Chinese  had  not  any  strong  tendency  to  take 

6 The  texts  concerned  in  the  various  stages  of  the  Shantung 
question  are  printed  in  S.  G.  Cheng’s  “Modern  China,”  Appendix 
II,  III,  and  IX.  For  text  of  Ishii-Lansing  agreement,  see 
Gleason,  op.  cit.,  pp.  214-6. 

7 Three  books,  all  by  Americans,  give  the  secret  and  official 

history  of  this  matter.  They  are:  “An  American  Diplomat  in 

China,”  by  Paul  S.  Reinsch,  Doubleday,  Page  & Co.,  1922;  “De- 
mocracy and  the  Eastern  Question,”  by  Thomas  F.  Millard,  Allen 
& Unwin,  1919;  and  “China,  Captive  or  Free?”  by  the  Rev. 
Gilbert  Reid,  A.M.,  D.D.,  director  of  International  Institute  of 
China,  Allen  & Unwin,  1922. 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  DURING  THE  WAR  141 


sides  against  Germany.  The  English,  French,  and 
Russians  had  always  desired  the  participation  of  China 
(for  reasons  which  I shall  explain  presently),  and  there 
appears  to  have  been  some  suggestion,  in  the  early  days 
of  the  wTar,  that  China  should  participate  in  return  for 
our  recognizing  Yuang  Shili-k’ai  as  emperor.  These 
suggestions,  however,  fell  through  owing  to  the  opposi- 
tion of  Japan,  based  partly  on  hostility  to  Yuang  Sliih- 
k’ai,  partly  on  the  fear  that  China  would  be  protected 
by  the  allies  if  she  became  a belligerent.  When,  in 
November,  1915,  the  British,  French,  and  Russian  am- 
bassadors in  Tokyo  requested  Japan  to  join  in  urging 
China  to  join  the  allies,  Viscount  Ishii  said  that  “Japan 
considered  developments  in  China  as  of  paramount 
interest  to  her,  and  she  must  keep  a firm  hand  there. 
Japan  could  not  regard  with  equanimity  the  organiza- 
tion of  an  efficient  Chinese  army  such  as  would  be  re- 
quired for  her  active  participation  in  the  war,  nor  could 
Japan  fail  to  regard  with  uneasiness  a liberation  of 
the  economic  activities  of  400,000,000  people.”8  Ac- 
cordingly the  proposal  lapsed.  It  must  be  understood 
that  throughout  the  war  the  Japanese  were  in  a position 
to  blackmail  the  allies,  because  their  sympathies  were 
with  Germany,  they  believed  Germany  would  win,  and 
they  filled  their  newspapers  with  scurrilous  attacks  on 
the  British,  accusing  them  of  cowardice  and  military 
incompetence.9 

But  when  America  severed  diplomatic  relations  with 

s Millard,  p.  99. 

9 See  Pooley,  “Japan’s  Foreign  Policies,”  pp.  23  ff;  Coleman, 
“The  Far  East  Unveiled,”  Chap.  V,  and  Millard,  Chap.  III. 


142 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


Germany,  the  situation  for  China  was  changed.  Amer- 
ica was  not  bound  to  subservience  to  Japan,  as  we  were ; 
America  was  not  one  of  the  allies ; and  America  had  al- 
ways been  China’s  best  friend.  Accordingly,  the 
Chinese  were  willing  to  take  the  advice  of  America, 
and  proceeded  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with  Ger- 
many in  March,  1917.  Dr.  Reinsch  was  careful  to  make 
no  promises  to  the  Chinese,  but  of  course  he  held  out 
hopes.  The  American  Government,  at  that  time,  could 
honestly  hold  out  hopes,  because  it  was  ignorant  of  the 
secret  treaties  and  agreements  by  which  the  allies  were 
bound.  The  allies,  however,  can  offer  no  such  excuse 
for  having  urged  China  to  take  the  further  step  of  de- 
claring war.  Russia,  France,  and  Great  Britain  had 
all  sold  China’s  rights  to  secure  the  continued  support 
of  Japan. 

In  May,  1916,  the  Japanese  represented  to  the  Rus- 
sians that  Germany  was  inviting  Japan  to  make  a 
separate  peace.  In  July,  1916,  Russia  and  Japan  con- 
cluded a secret  treaty,  subsequently  published  by  the 
Bolsheviks.  This  treaty  constituted  a separate  alliance, 
binding  each  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  other  in 
any  war,  and  recognizing  that  “the  vital  interests  of 
one  and  the  other  of  them  require  the  safeguarding 
of  China  from  the  political  domination  of  any  third 
Power  whatsoever,  having  hostile  designs  against  Russia 
or  Japan.”  The  last  article  provided  that  “the  present 
agreement  must  remain  profoundly  secret  except  to 
both  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties.”10  That  is  to 
io  Millard,  pp.  64-66, 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  DUPING  THE  WAP  143 


say,  the  treaty  was  not  communicated  to  the  other  allies, 
or  even  to  Great  Britain,  in  spite  of  Article  3 of  the 
Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  which  provides  that  “The 
High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  neither  of  them 
will,  without  consulting  the  other,  enter  into  a separate 
agreement  with  another  Power  to  the  prejudice  of 
the  objects  described  in  the  preamble  of  this  Agree- 
ment,’ ’ one  of  which  objects  was  the  preservation  of 
equal  opportunity  for  all  powers  in  China  and  of 
the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Em- 
pire. 

On  February  16,  1917,  at  the  very  time  when  America 
was  urging  China  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with 
Germany,  we  concluded  an  agreement  with  Japan  con- 
taining the  following  words: 

His  Britannic  Majesty’s  Government  accedes  with  pleasure 
to  the  request  of  the  Japanese  Government  for  an  assurance 
that  they  will  support  Japan’s  claims  in  regard  to  the  dis- 
posaj  of  Germany’s  rights  in  Shantung  and  possessions  in 
the  islands  north  of  the  equator  on  the  occasion  of  the  Peace 
Conference;  it  being  understood  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment will,  in  the  eventual  peace  settlement,  treat  in  the  same 
spirit  Great  Britain’s  claims  to  the  German  islands  south  of 
the  equator. 

The  French  .attitude  about  Shantung,  at  the  same 
time,  is  indicated  by  notes  which  passed  between  France 
and  Japan  at  Tokyo.11  On  February  19,  Baron 
Motono  sent  a communication  to  the  French  and  Rus- 

ii  Reid,  op.  tit.,  pp.  114-5;  Cheng,  op.  tit.,  pp.  343-6* 


144 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


sian  ambassadors  stating,  among  other  things,  that  “the 
Imperial  Japanese  Government  proposes  to  demand 
from  Germany  at  the  time  of  the  peace  negotiations,  the 
surrender  of  the  territorial  rights  and  special  inter- 
ests Germany  possessed  before  the  war  in  Shantung  and 
the  islands  belonging  to  her  situated  north  of  the  equa- 
tor in  the  Pacific  Ocean/  ’ The  French  ambassador,  on 
March  2,  replied  as  follows: 

The  Government  of  the  French  Republic  is  disposed  to 
give  the  Japanese  Government  its  accord  in  regulating  at 
the  time  of  the  Peace  Negotiations  questions  vital  to  Japan 
concerning  Shantung  and  the  German  islands  on  the  Pacific 
north  of  the  equator.  It  also  agrees  to  support  the  demands 
of  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  for  the  surrender  of 
the  rights  Germany  possessed  before  the  war  in  this  Chinese 
province  and  these  islands. 

M.  Briand  demands  on  the  other  hand  that  Japan  give  its 
support  to  obtain  from  China  the  breaking  of  its  diplomatic 
relations  with  Germany,  and  that  it  give  this  act  desirable 
significance.  The  consequences  in  China  should  be  the  fol- 
lowing : 

First,  handing  passports  to  the  German  diplomatic  agents 
and  consuls; 

Second,  the  obligation  of  all  under  German  jurisdiction  to 
leave  Chinese  territory; 

Third,  the  internment  of  German  ships  in  Chinese  ports 
and  the  ultimate  requisition  of  these  ships  in  order  to  place 
them  at  the  disposition  of  the  Allies,  following  the  example 
of  Italy  and  Portugal; 

Fourth,  requisition  of  German  commercial  houses,  estab- 
lished in  China;  forfeiting  the  rights  of  Germany  in  the  con- 
cessions she  possesses  in  certain  ports  of  China. 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  DURING  THE  WAR  145 


The  Russian  reply  to  Baron  Motono’s  note  to  the 
French  and  Russian  ambassadors,  dated  March  5,  1917, 
was  as  follows: 

In  reply  to  the  Note  of  the  Japanese  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  under  the  date  of  February  19th  last,  the  Russian 
Embassy  is  charged  with  giving  the  Japanese  Government 
the  assurance  that  it  can  entirely  count  on  the  support  of  the 
Imperial  Government  of  Russia  with  regard  to  its  desiderata 
concerning  the  eventual  surrender  to  Japan  of  the  rights 
belonging  to  Germany  in  Shantung  and  of  the  German  is- 
lands, occupied  by  the  Japanese  forces,  in  the  Pacific  Ocean 
to  the  north  of  the  Equator.12 

It  will  be  observed  that,  unlike  England  and  France, 
Russia  demands  no  quid  pro  quoy  doubtless  owing  to 
the  secret  treaty  concluded  in  the  previous  year. 

After  these  agreements,  Japan  saw  no  further  objec- 
tion to  China’s  participation  in  the  war.  The  chief  in- 
ducement held  out  to  China  was  the  hope  of  recovering 
Shantung ; but  as  there  was  now  no  danger  of  this  hope 
being  realized,  Japan  was  willing  that  America,  in  more 
or  less  honest  ignorance,  should  unofficially  use  this  hope 
for  the  persuasion  of  the  Chinese.  It  is  true  that  Japan 
had  reason  to  fear  America  until  the  last  days  of  the 
peace  conference,  but  this  fear  was  considerably  dimin- 
ished by  the  conclusion  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement 
in  November,  1917. 

12  See  Appendix  III  of  Cheng’s  “Modern  China.”  which  con- 
tains this  note  (p.  346)  as  well  as  the  other  “documents  rela- 
tive to  the  negotiations  between  Japan  and  the  Allied  Powers 
as  to  the  disposal  of  the  German  rights  in  respect  of  Shantung 
Province,  and  the  South  Sea  Islands  north  of  the  Equator.” 


146 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


Meanwhile  Japan  had  discovered  that  the  question 
of  China’s  entry  into  the  war  could  be  used  to  increase 
internal  strife  in  China,  which  has  been  one  of  the  aims 
of  Japanese  policy  ever  since  the  beginning  of  the 
revolutionary  movement.13  If  the  Chinese  had  not 
been  interfered  with  at  this  time,  there  was  some  pros- 
pect of  their  succeeding  in  establishing  a stable  demo- 
cratic government.  Yuan  was  dead,  and  his  successor 
in  the  presidency,  Li  Yuan  Hung,  was  a genuine  consti- 
tutionalist. He  reassembled  the  Parliament  which 
Yuan  had  dismissed,  and  the  work  of  drafting  a per- 
manent constitution  was  resumed.  The  president  was 
opposed  to  severing  diplomatic  relations,  and,  of  course, 
still  more  to  declaring  war.  The  prime  minister,  Tuan 
Chih-jui,  a militarist,  was  strongly  in  favor  of  war. 
He  and  his  cabinet  persuaded  a considerable  majority 
of  both  houses  of  the  Chinese  Parliament  to  side  with 
them  on  the  question  of  severing  diplomatic  relations, 
and  the  president,  as  in  duty  bound,  gave  way  on  this 
issue. 

On  the  issue  of  declaring  war,  however,  public  opin- 
ion was  different.  It  was  President  Wilson’s  summons 
to  the  neutrals  to  follow  him  in  breaking  off  diplomatic 
relations  that  had  given  force  to  the  earlier  campaign; 
but  on  June  5 the  American  minister,  acting  on  instruc- 
tions, presented  a note  to  the  Chinese  Government  urg- 
ing that  the  preservation  of  national  unity  was  more  im- 
portant than  entry  into  the  war,  and  suggesting  the 
desirability  of  preserving  peace  for  the  present.  What 

is  The  story  of  the  steps  leading  up  to  China’s  declaration 
of  war  is  admirably  told  in  Reid,  op.  cit.,  pp.  88-109. 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  DURING  TPIE  WAR  147 


had  happened  in  the  meantime  was  that  the  war  issue, 
which  might  never  have  become  acute  but  for  Presi- 
dent Wilson’s  action,  had  been  used  by  the  Japanese 
to  revive  the  conflict  between  North  and  South,  and  to 
instigate  the  Chinese  militarists  to  unconstitutional 
action.  Sun  Yat  Sen  and  most  of  the  Southern  politi- 
cians were  opposed  to  the  declaration  of  war;  Sun’s 
reasons  were  made  known  in  an  open  letter  to  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  on  March  7.  They  were  thoroughly 
sound.14  The  cabinet,  on  May  1,  decided  in  favor  of 
<rar,  but  by  the  constitution  a declaration  of  war  re- 
quired the  consent  of  Parliament.  The  militarists  at- 
tempted to  coerce  Parliament,  which  had  a majority 
against  war ; but,  as  this  proved  impossible,  they  brought 
military  force  to  bear  on  the  president  to  compel  him  to 
dissolve  Parliament  unconstitutionally.  The  bulk  of  the 
members  of  Parliament  retired  to  the  South,  where  they 
continued  to  act  as  a Parliament  and  to  regard  them- 
selves as  the  sole  source  of  constitutional  government. 
After  these  various  illegalities,  the  military  autocrats 
were  still  compelled  to  deal  with  one  of  their  number, 
who,  in  July,  effected  a five  days’  restoration  of  the 
Manchu  emperor.  The  president  resigned,  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  a person  more  agreeable  to  the  militarists,  who 
have  henceforth  governed  in  the  North  sometimes  with- 
out a Parliament,  sometimes  with  a subservient  uncon- 
stitutional Northern  Parliament.  Then  at  last  they 
were  free  to  declare  war.  It  was  thu's  that  China 
entered  the  war  for  democracy  and  against  militarism. 

Of  course  China  helped  little,  if  at  all,  toward  the 
14  Part  of  the  letter  is  quoted  by  Dr.  Eeid,  p.  108, 


148 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


winning  of  the  war,  but  that  was  not  what  the  allies 
expected  of  her.  The  objects  of  the  European  allies 
are  disclosed  in  the  French  note  quoted  above.  We 
wished  to  confiscate  German  property  in  China,  to  expel 
Germans  living  in  China,  and  to  prevent,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  revival  of  German  trade  in  China  after 
the  war.  The  confiscation  of  German  property  was 
duly  carried  out — not  only  public  property,  but  pri- 
vate property  also,  so  that  the  Germans  in  China  were 
suddenly  reduced  to  beggary.  Owing  to  the  claims  on 
shipping,  the  expulsion  of  the  Germans  had  to  wait  till 
after  the  armistice.  They  were  sent  home  through  the 
tropics  in  overcrowded  ships,  sometimes  with  only 
twenty-four  hours’  notice;  no  degree  of  hardship  was 
sufficient  to  secure  exemption.  The  British  authorities 
insisted  on  expelling  delicate  pregnant  women,  whom 
they  officially  knew  to  be  very  likely  to  die  on  the 
voyage.  All  this  was  done  after  the  armistice,  for  the 
sake  of  British  trade.  The  kindly  Chinese  often  took 
upon  themselves  to  hide  Germans,  in  hard  cases,  from 
the  merciless  persecution  of  the  allies;  otherwise,  the 
miseries  inflicted  would  have  been  much  greater. 

The  confiscation  of  private  property  during  the  war 
and  by  the  treaty  of  Versailles  was  a new  departure, 
showing  that  on  this  point  all  the  belligerents  agreed 
with  the  Bolsheviks.  Dr.  Reid  places  side  by  side  two 
statements,  one  by  President  Wilson  when  asking 
Congress  to  agree  to  the  Declaration  of  War:  “We 
shall,  I feel  confident,  conduct  our  operations  as  belliger- 
ents without  passion,  and  ourselves  observe  with  proud 
punctilio  the  principles  of  right  and  fair  play  we  pro- 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  DURING  THE  WAR  149 


fess  to  be  fighting  for”;  the  other  by  Senator  Hitch- 
cock, when  the  war  was  over,  after  a day  spent  with 
President  Wilson  in  learning  the  case  for  ratification  of 
the  Versailles  Treaty:  “Through  the  Treaty,  we  will 
yet  get  very  much  of  importance.  ...  In  violation  of 
all  international  law  and  treaties  we  have  made  dis- 
position of  a billion  dollars  of  German-owned  property 
here.  The  Treaty  validates  all  that.”  15  The  European 
allies  secured  very  similar  advantages  from  inducing 
China  to  enter  the  war  for  righteousness. 

We  have  seen  what  England  and  France  gained  by 
the  Chinese  declaration  of  war.  What  Japan  gained 
was  somewhat  different. 

The  Northern  military  faction,  which  controlled  the 
Peking  government,  was  completely  dependent  upon 
Japan,  and  could  do  nothing  to  resist  Japanese  aggres- 
sion. All  the  other  powers  were  fully  occupied  with 
the  war,  and  had  sold  China  to  Japan  in  return  for 
Japanese  neutrality — for  Japan  can  hardly  be  counted 
as  a belligerent  after  the  capture  of  Tsingtau  in  Novem- 
ber, 1914.  The  Southern  government  and  all  the  liberal 
elements  in  the  North  were  against  the  clique  which  had 
seized  the  central  government.  In  March,  1918,  mili- 
tary and  naval  agreements  were  concluded  between 
China  and  Japan,  of  which  the  text,  never  officially 
published,  is  given  by  Millar.16  By  these  agreements 
the  Japanese  were  enabled,  under  pretence  of  military 

is  Reid,  op.  cit.,  p.  161.  Chap.  VII  of  this  book,  “Commercial 
Rivalries  as  affecting  China,”  should  be  read  by  any  one  who 
still  thinks  that  the  allies  stood  for  honesty  or  mercy  or  any- 
thing except  money-grubbing. 

is  Appendix  C,  pp.  421-4. 


150 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


needs  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  to  send  troops  into 
Chinese  territory,  to  acquire  control  of  the  Chinese 
Eastern  Railway  and  consequently  of  Northern  Man- 
churia, and  generally  to  keep  all  Northern  China  at 
their  mercy.  In  all  this,  the  excuse  of  operations 
against  the  Bolsheviks  was  very  convenient. 

After  this  the  Japanese  went  ahead  gaily.  During 
the  year  1918,  they  placed  loans  in  China  to  the  extent 
of  yen  246, 000, 000, 17  i.  e.,  about  £25,000,000.  China  was 
engaged  in  civil  war,  and  both  sides  were  as  willing  as 
the  European  belligerents  to  sell  freedom  for  the  sake 
of  victory.  Unfortunately  for  J apan,  the  side  on  which 
Japan  was  fighting  in  the  war  proved  suddenly  victo- 
rious, and  some  portion  of  the  energies  of  Europe  and 
America  became  available  for  holding  Japan  in  check. 
For  various  reasons,  however,  the  effect  of  this  did  not 
show  itself  until  after  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  con- 
cluded. During  the  peace  negotiations,  England  and 
France,  in  virtue  of  secret  agreements,  were  compelled 
to  support  Japan.  President  Wilson,  as  usual,  sacrificed 
everything  to  his  league  of  nations,  which  the  Japanese 
would  not  have  joined  unless  they  had  been  allowed  to 
keep  Shantung.  The  chapter  on  this  subject  in  Mr.  Lan- 
sing ’s  account  of  the  negotiations  is  one  of  the  most 
interesting  in  his  book.18  By  article  156  of  the  Treaty 

17  A list  of  these  loans  is  given  by  Hollington  K.  Tong  in  an 
article  on  “China’s  Finances  in  1918”  in  “China  in  1918,”  pub- 
lished early  in  1919  by  the  “Peking  Leader,”  pp.  61-2.  The  list 
and  some  of  the  comments  appear  also  in  Putnam  Weale’s  “The 
Truth  about  China  and  Japan.” 

is  Mr.  Lansing’s  book,  in  so  far  as  it  deals  with  Japanese 
questions,  is  severely  criticized  from  a Japanese  point  of  view 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  DURING  THE  WAR  151 


of  Versailles,  “Germany  renounces,  in  favor  of  Japan, 
all  her  rights,  title,  and  privileges’ ’ in  the  province 
of  Shantung.19  Although  President  Wilson  had  con- 
sented to  this  gross  violation  of  justice,  America  re- 
fused to  ratify  the  treaty,  and  was  therefore  free  to 
raise  the  issue  of  'Shantung  at  Washington.  The 
Chinese  delegates  at  Versailles  resisted  the  clauses  con- 
cerning Shantung  to  the  last,  and  finally,  encouraged 
by  a vigorous  agitation  of  Young  China,20  refused  to 
sign  the  treaty.  They  saw  no  reason  why  they  should 
be  robbed  of  a province  as  a reward  for  having  joined 
the  allies.  All  the  other  allies  agreed  to  a proceeding 
exactly  as  iniquitous  as  it  would  have  been  if  we  had 
annexed  Virginia  as  a reward  to  the  Americans  for 
having  helped  us  in  the  war,  or  France  had  annexed 
Kent  on  a similar  pretext. 

Meanwhile,  Young  China  had  discovered  that  it 
could  move  Chinese  public  opinion  on  the  anti- Japanese 
cry.  The  government  in  Peking  in  1919-20  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  pro- Japanese  An  Fu  party,  but  they  were 
forcibly  ejected,  in  the  summer  of  1920,  largely  owing 
to  the  influence  of  the  Young  China  agitation  on  the 
soldiers  stationed  in  Peking.  The  An  Fu  leaders  took 
refuge  in  the  Japanese  legation,  and  since  then  the  Pek- 
in Dr.  Y.  Soyeda’s  pamphlet  “Shantung  Question  and  Japanese 
Case,”  League  of  Nations  Association  of  Japan,  June  1921.  I 
do  not  think  Dr.  Soyeda’s  arguments  are  likely  to  appeal  to 
any  one  who  is  not  Japanese. 

19  See  the  clauses  concerning  Shantung,  in  full,  in  Cheng’s 
“Modern  China,”  Clarendon  Press,  pp.  360-1. 

29  This  agitation  is  well  described  in  Mr.  M.  T.  Z.  Tyau’s 
“China  Awakened”  (Macmillan,  1922)  Chap.  IX,  “The  Student 
Movement.” 


152 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


ing  government  has  ventured  to  be  less  subservient  to 
Japan,  hoping  always  for  American  support.  Japan 
did  everything  possible  to  consolidate  her  position  in 
Shantung,  but  always  with  the  knowledge  that  America 
might  reopen  the  question  at  any  time.  As  soon  as  the 
Washington  conference  was  announced,  Japan  began 
feverishly  negotiating  with  China,  with  a view  to  having 
the  question  settled  before  the  opening  of  the  confer- 
ence. But  the  Chinese,  very  wisely,  refused  the  illusory 
concessions  offered  by  Japan,  and  insisted  on  almost 
unconditional  evacuation.  At  Washington,  both  parties 
agreed  to  the  joint  mediation  of  England  and  America. 
The  pressure  of  American  public  opinion  caused  the 
American  administration  to  stand  firm  on  the  question 
of  Shantung,  and  I understand  that  the  British  delega- 
tion, on  the  whole,  concurred  with  America.  Some  con- 
cessions were  made  to  Japan,  but  they  will  not  amount 
to  much  if  American  interest  in  Shantung  lasts  for 
another  five  years.  On  this  subject,  I shall  have  more 
to  say  when  I come  to  the  Washington  conference. 

There  is  a question  with  which  the  Washington  con- 
ference determined  not  to  concern  itself,  but  which 
nevertheless  is  likely  to  prove  of  great  importance 
in  the  Far  East — I mean  the  question  of  Russia.  It 
was  considered  good  form  in  diplomatic  circles,  until  the 
Genoa  conference,  to  pretend  that  there  is  no  such 
country  as  Russia,  but  the  Bolsheviks,  with  their  usual 
wickedness,  have  refused  to  fall  in  with  this  pretense. 
Their  existence  constitutes  an  embarrassment  to  Amer- 
ica, because  in  a quarrel  with  Japan  the  United  States 
would  unavoidably  find  themselves  in  unwilling  alliance 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  DURING  THE  WAR  153 


with  Russia.  The  conduct  of  Japan  toward  Russia  has 
been  quite  as  bad  as  that  of  any  other  power.  At  the 
time  of  the  Czecho-Slovak  revolt,  the  allies  jointly 
occupied  Vladivostok,  but  after  a time  all  withdrew 
except  the  Japanese.  All  Siberia  east  of  Lake  Baikal, 
including  Vladivostok,  now  forms  one  state,  the  Far 
Eastern  Republic,  with  its  capital  at  Chita.  Against 
this  republic,  which  is  practically  though  not  theoreti- 
cally Bolshevik,  the  Japanese  have  launched  a whole  se- 
ries of  miniature  Kolchaks — Semenov,  Horvath,  Un- 
gern,  etc.  These  have  all  been  defeated,  but  the 
Japanese  remain  in  military  occupation  of  Vladivostok 
and  a great  part  of  the  Maritime  Province,  though  they 
continually  affirm  their  earnest  wish  to  retire. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  Bolshevik  regime  the  Rus- 
sians lost  Northern  Manchuria,  which  is  now  controlled 
by  Japan.  A board  consisting  partly  of  Chinese  and 
partly  of  reactionary  Russians  forms  the  directorate 
of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  which  runs  through 
Manchuria  and  connects  with  the  Siberian  Railway. 
There  is  no  through  communication  by  rail  between 
Peking  and  Europe  as  in  the  days  before  1914.  This 
is  an  extreme  annoyance  to  European  business  men  in 
the  Far  East,  since  it  means  that  letters  or  journeys 
from  Peking  to  London  take  five  or  six  weeks  instead 
of  a fortnight.  They  try  to  persuade  themselves  that 
the  fault  lies  with  the  Bolsheviks,  but  they  are  gradu- 
ally realizing  that  the  real  cause  is  the  reactionary  con- 
trol of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway.  Meanwhile,  va- 
rious Americans  are  interesting  themselves  in  this  rail- 
way and  endeavoring  to  get  it  internationalized.  Mo- 


154 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


tives  similar  to  those  which  led  to  the  Vanderlip  con- 
cession are  forcing  friendship  with  Russia  upon  all 
Americans  who  have  Siberian  interests.  If  Japan  were 
engaged  in  a war  with  America,  the  Bolsheviks  would 
in  all  likelihood  seize  the  opportunity  to  liberate  Vladi- 
vostok and  recover  Russia’s  former  position  in  Man- 
churia. Already,  according  to  “The  Times”  corre- 
spondent in*  Peking,  Outer  Mongolia,  a country  about  as 
large  as  England,  France,  and  Germany  combined,  has 
been  conquered  by  Bolshevik  armies  and  propaganda. 

The  Bolsheviks  have,  of  course,  the  enthusiastic  sym- 
pathy of  the  younger  Chinese  students.  If  they  can 
weather  their  present  troubles,  they  have  a good  chance 
of  being  accepted  by  all  vigorous  progressive  people  in 
Asia  as  the  liberators  of  Asia  from  the  tyranny  of  the 
great  powers.  As  they  were  not  invited  to  Washington, 
they  are  not  a party  to  any  of  the  agreements  reached 
there,  and  it  may  turn  out  that  they  will  upset  impar- 
tially the  ambitions  of  Japan,  Great  Britain,  and 
America.21  For  America,  no  less  than  other  powers, 
has  ambitions,  though  they  are  economic  rather  than 

21  “Soviet  Russia  has  addressed  to  the  Powers  a protest 
against  the  discussion  at  the  Washington  Conference  of  the  East 
China  Railway,  a question  exclusively  affecting  China  and 
Russia,  and  declares  that  it  reserves  for  itself  full  liberty  of 
action  in  order  to  compel  due  deference  to  the  rights  of  the  Rus- 
sian labouring  masses  and  to  make  demands  consistent  with 
those  rights”  ( Daily  Herald,  December  22,  1921).  This  is  the 
new-style  imperialism.  It  was  not  the  “Russian  labouring 
masses,”  but  the  Chinese  coolies,  who  built  the  railway.  What 
Russia  contributed,  was  capital,  but  one  is  surprised  to  find  the 
Bolsheviks  considering  that  this  confers  rights  upon  themselves 
as  heirs  of  the  capitalists. 


JAPAN  AND  CHINA  DURING  THE  WAR  155 


territorial.  If  America  is  victorious  in  the  Far  East, 
China  will  be  Americanized,  and,  though  the  shell  of 
political  freedom  may  remain,  there  will  be  an  economic 
and  cultural  bondage  beneath  it.  Russia  is  not  strong 
enough  to  dominate  in  this  way,  but  may  become  strong 
enough  to  secure  some  real  freedom  for  China.  This, 
however,  is  as  yet  no  more  than  a possibility.  It  is 
worth  remembering,  because  everybody  chooses  to  for- 
get it,  and  because,  while  Russia  is  treated  as  a pariah, 
no  settlement  of  the  Far  East  can  be  stable.  But  what 
part  Russia  is  going  to  play  in  the  affairs  of  China  it 
is  as  yet  impossible  to  say. 


CHAPTER  IX 


THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE 

THE  Washington  conference,  and  the  simultaneous 
conference,  at  Washington,  between  the  Chinese 
and  Japanese,  have  somewhat  modified  the  Far  Eastern 
situation.  The  general*  aspects  of  the  new  situation  will 
be  dealt  with  in  the  next  chapter;  for  the  present  it 
is  the  actual  decisions  arrived  at  in  Washington  that 
concern  us,  as  well  as  their  effect  upon  the  Japanese 
position  in  Siberia. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  has 
apparently  been  brought  to  an  end,  as  a result  of  the 
conclusion  of  the  Four  Power  Pact  between  America, 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Japan.  Within  this  gen- 
eral alliance  of  the  exploiting  powers,  there  is  a sub- 
ordinate grouping  of  America  and  Great  Britain 
against  France  and  Japan,  the  former  standing  for  in- 
ternational capitalism,  the  latter  for  national  capitalism. 
The  situation  is  not  yet  plain,  because  England  and 
America  disagree  as  regards  Russia,  and  because  Amer- 
ica is  not  yet  prepared  to  take  part  in  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  Europe;  but  in  the  Far  East,  at  any  rate,  we 
seem  to  have  decided  to  seek  the  friendship  of  America 
rather  than  of  Japan.  It  may  perhaps  be  hoped  that 
this  will  make  our  Chinese  policy  more  liberal  than  it 

156 


THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE  157 


has  been.  We  have  announced  the  restoration  of  Wei- 
hai-wei — a piece  of  generosity  which  would  have  been 
more  impressive  but  for  two  facts:  first,  that  Wei-hai- 
wei  is  completely  useless  to  us,  and,  secondly,  that  the 
lease  had  only  two  more  years  to  run.  By  the  terms  of 
the  lease,  in  fact,  it  should  have  been  restored  as  soon 
as  Russia  lost  Port  Arthur,  however  many  years  it 
still  had  to  run  at  that  date. 

One  very  important  result  of  the  Washington  con- 
ference is  the  agreement  not  to  fortify  islands  in  the 
Pacific,  with  certain  specified  exceptions.  This  agree- 
ment, if  it  is  adhered  to,  will  make  war  between  America 
and  Japan  very  difficult,  unless  we  were  allied  with 
America.  Without  a naval  base  somewhere  near  Japan, 
America  could  hardly  bring  naval  force  to  bear  on  the 
Japanese  navy.  It  had  been  the  intention  of  the  Navy 
Department  to  fortify  Guam  with  a view  to  turning  it 
into  a first-class  naval  base.  The  fact  that  America  has 
been  willing  to  forego  this  intention  must  be  taken  as 
evidence  of  a genuine  desire  to  preserve  the  peace  with 
Japan. 

Various  small  concessions  were  made  to  China.  There 
is  to  be  a revision  of  the  customs  schedule  to  bring  it 
to  an  effective  5 per  cent.  The  foreign  post-offices  are 
to  be  abolished,  though  the  Japanese  have  insisted  that 
a certain  number  of  Japanese  should  be  employed  in 
the  Chinese  Post-office.  They  had  the  effrontery  to 
pretend  that  they  desired  this  for  the  sake  of  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  postal  service,  though  the  Chinese  post 
is  excellent  and  the  Japanese  is  notoriously  one  of  the 
worst  in  the  world.  The  chief  use  to  which  the  J apanese 


158 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


have  put  their  postal  service  in  China  has  been  the  im- 
portation of  morphia,  as  they  have  not  allowed  the 
Chinese  customs  authorities  to  examine  parcels  sent 
through  their  post-office.  The  development  of  the 
Japanese  importation  of  morphia  into  China,  as  well 
as  the  growth  of  the  poppy  in  Manchuria,  where  they 
have  control,  has  been  a very  sinister  feature  of  their 
penetration  of  China.1 

Of  course  the  Open  Door,  equality  of  opportunity, 
the  independence  and  integrity  of  China,  etc.,  etc.,  were 
reaffirmed  at  Washington;  but  these  are  mere  empty 
phrases  devoid  of  meaning. 

From  the  Chinese  point  of  view,  the  chief  achieve- 
ment at  Washington  was  the  Shantung  treaty.  Ever 
since  the  expulsion  by  the  Germans  at  the  end  of  1914, 
the  Japanese  had  held  Kiaochow  Bay,  which  includes 
the  port  of  Tsingtau ; they  had  stationed  troops  along  the 
whole  extent  of  the  Shantung  Railway;  and  by  the 
treaty  following  the  Twenty-one  Demands,  they  had 
preferential  treatment  as  regards  all  industrial  under- 
takings in  Shantung.  The  railway  belonged  to  them  by 
right  of  conquest  and  through  it  they  acquired  control 
of  the  whole  province.  When  an  excuse  was  needed 
for  increasing  the  garrison,  they  supplied  arms  to  brig- 
ands, and  claimed  that  their  intervention  was  necessary 
to  suppress  the  resulting  disorder.  This  state  of  affairs 
was  legalized  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  to  which,  how- 
ever, America  and  China  were  not  parties.  The  Wash- 

1 See  e.  g.  Chap.  VIII  of  Millard’s  “Democracy  and  the  East- 
ern Question.” 


THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE  159 


ington  conference,  therefore,  supplied  an  opportunity  of 
raising  the  question  afresh. 

At  first,  however,  it  seemed  as  if  the  Japanese  would 
have  things  all  their  own  way.  The  Chinese  wished  to 
raise  the  question  before  the  conference,  while  the 
Japanese  wished  to  settle  it  in  direct  negotiation  with 
China.  This  point  was  important,  because,  ever  since 
the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement,  the  Japanese  have  tried 
to  get  the  powers  to  recognize,  in  practice  if  not  in 
theory,  an  informal  Japanese  protectorate  over  China, 
as  a first  step  toward  which  it  was  necessary  to  establish 
the  principle  that  the  Japanese  should  not  be  interfered 
with  in  their  diplomatic  dealings  with  China.  The 
conference  agreed  to  the  Japanese  proposal  that  the 
Shantung  question  should  not  come  before  the  confer- 
ence, but  should  be  dealt  with  in  direct  negotiations  be- 
tween the  Japanese  and  Chinese.  The  Japanese  victory 
on  this  point,  however,  was  not  complete,  because  it  was 
arranged  that,  in  the  event  of  a deadlock,  Mr.  Hughes 
and  Sir  Arthur  Balfour  should  mediate.  A deadlock, 
of  course,  soon  occurred,  and  it  then  appeared  that  the 
British  were  no  longer  prepared  to  back  up  the  Japanese 
whole-heartedly,  as  in  the  old  days.  The  American  ad- 
ministration, for  the  sake  of  peace,  showed  some  dis- 
position to  urge  the  Chinese  to  give  way.  But  Amer- 
ican opinion  was  roused  on  the  Shantung  question,  and 
it  appeared  that,  unless  a solution  more  or  less  satis- 
factory to  China  was  reached,  the  Senate  would  prob- 
ably refuse  to  ratify  the  various  treaties  which  embodied 
the  work  of  the  conference.  Therefore,  at  the  last  mo- 


160 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


ment,  the  Americans  strongly  urged  J apan  to  give  way, 
and  we  took  the  same  line,  though  perhaps  less  strongly. 
The  result  was  the  conclusion  of  the  Shantung  treaty  be- 
tween China  and  Japan. 

By  this  treaty,  the  Chinese  recover  everything  in 
Shantung,  except  the  private  property  of  Japanese  sub- 
jects, and  certain  restrictions  as  regards  the  railway. 
The  railway  was  the  great  difficulty  in  the  negotiations, 
since,  so  long  as  the  Japanese  could  control  that,  they 
would  have  the  province  at  their  mercy.  The  Chinese 
offered  to  buy  back  the  railway  at  once,  having  raised 
about  half  the  money  as  a result  of  a patriotic  move- 
ment among  the  merchants.  This,  however,  the 
Japanese  refused  to  agree  to.  What  was  finally  done 
was  that  the  Chinese  were  compelled  to  borrow  the 
money  from  the  Japanese  Government  to  be  repaid  in 
fifteen  years,  with  an  option  of  repayment  in  five  years. 
The  railway  was  valued  at  53,400,000  gold  marks,  plus 
the  cost  involved  in  repairs  or  improvements  incurred 
by  Japan,  less  deterioration;  and  it  was  to  be  handed 
over  to  China  within  nine  months  of  the  signature  of 
the  treaty.  Until  the  purchase  price,  borrowed  from 
Japan,  is  repaid,  the  Japanese  retain  a certain  degree 
of  control  over  the  railway : a Japanese  traffic  manager 
is  to  be  appointed,  and  two  accountants,  one  Chinese 
and  the  other  Japanese,  under  the  control  of  a Chinese 
president. 

It  is  clear  that,  on  paper,  this  gives  the  Chinese  every- 
thing five  years  hence.  Whether  things  will  work  out 
so  depends  upon  whether,  five  years  hence,  any  power 
is  prepared  to  force  Japan  to  keep  her  word.  As  both 


THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE  161 


Mr.  Hughes  and  Sir  Arthur  Balfour  strongly  urged 
the  Chinese  to  agree  to  this  compromise,  it  must  be 
assumed  that  America  and  Great  Britain  have  some 
responsibility  for  seeing  that  it  is  properly  carried  out. 
In  that  case,  we  may  perhaps  expect  that  in  the  end 
China  will  acquire  complete  control  of  the  Shantung 
Railway. 

On  the  whole,  it  must  be  said  that  China  did  better 
at  Washington  than  might  have  been  expected.  As  re- 
gards the  larger  aspects  of  the  new  international  situa- 
tion arising  out  of  the  conference,  I shall  deal  with 
them  in  the  next  chapter.  But  in  our  present  connec- 
tion it  is  necessary  to  consider  certain  Far  Eastern  ques- 
tions not  discussed  at  Washington,  since  the  mere  fact 
that  they  were  not  discussed  gave  them  a new  form. 

The  question  of  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mongolia  was 
not  raised  at  Washington.  It  may  therefore  be  assumed 
that  Japan’s  position  there  is  secure  until  such  time 
as  the  Chinese,  or  the  Russians,  or  both  together,  are 
strong  enough  to  challenge  it.  America,  at  any  rate, 
will  not  raise  the  question  unless  friction  occurs  on 
some  other  issue.  (See  Appendix.) 

The  Siberian  question  also  was  not  settled.  There- 
fore Japan’s  ambitions  in  Vladivostok  and  the  Maritime 
Provinces  will  presumably  remain  unchecked  except 
in  so  far  as  the  Russians  unaided  are  able  to  check 
them.  There  is  a chronic  state  of  semi-war  between  the 
Japanese  and  the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  and  there 
seems  no  reason  why  it  should  end  in  any  near  future. 
The  Japanese  from  time  to  time  announce  that  they 
have  decided  to  withdraw,  but  they  simultaneously  send 


162 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


fresh  troops.  A conference  between  them  and  the  Chita 
government  has  been  taking  place  at  Dairen,  and  from 
time  to  time  announcements  have  appeared  to  the  effect 
that  an  agreement  has  been  reached  or  was  about  to  be 
reached.  But  on  April  16  (1922)  the  Japanese  broke 
up  the  conference.  “The  Times’ ’ of  April  27  contains 
both  the  Japanese  and  the  Russian  official  accounts  of 
this  break-up.  The  Japanese  statement  is  given  in 
“The  Times”  as  follows: 

The  Japanese  Embassy  communicates  the  text  of  a state- 
ment given  out  on  April  20th  by  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office 
on  the  Dairen  Conference. 

It  begins  by  recalling  that  in  response  to  the  repeatedly  ex- 
pressed desire  of  the  Chita  Government,  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment decided  to  enter  into  negotiations.  The  first  meeting 
took  place  on  August  26th  last  year. 

The  Japanese  demands  included  the  non-enforcement  of 
communistic  principles  in  the  Republic  against  Japanese,  the 
prohibition*  of  Bolshevist  propaganda,  the  abolition  of  menac- 
ing military  establishments,  the  adoption  of  the  principle  of 
the  open  door  in  Siberia,  and  the  removal  of  industrial  re- 
strictions on  foreigners.  Desiring  speedily  to  conclude  an 
agreement,  so  that  the  withdrawal  of  troops  might  be  carried 
out  as  soon  as  possible,  Japan  met  the  wishes  of  Chita  as  far 
as  practicable.  Though,  from  the  outset,  Chita  pressed  for 
a speedy  settlement  of  the  Nicolaievsk  affair,  Japan  eventually 
agreed  to  take  up  the  Nicolaievsk  affair  immediately  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  basis  agreement.  She  further  assured  Chita 
that  in  settling  the  affair  Japan  had  no  intention  of  violating 
the  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  Russia,  and  that 
the  troops  would  be  speedily  withdrawn  from  Saghalin  after 
the  settlement  of  the  affair,  and  that  Chita’s  wishes  in  regard 


THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE  163 


to  the  transfer  of  property  now  in  the  custody  of  the  Japanese 
authorities  would  be  met. 

The  11th  Division  of  the  troops  in  Siberia  was  originally 
to  be  relieved  during  April,  but  if  the  Dairen  Conference  had 
progressed  satisfactorily,  the  troops,  instead  of  being  relieved, 
would  have  been  sent  home.  Japan  therefore  intimated  to 
Chita  that  should  the  basis  agreement  be  concluded  within  a 
reasonable  period  these  troops  would  be  immediately  with- 
drawn, and  proposed  the  signature  of  the  agreement  by  the 
middle  of  April,  so  that  the  preparations  for  the  relief  of  the 
said  division  might  be  dispensed  with.  Thereupon  Chita  not 
only  proposed  the  immediate  despatch  of  Chita  troops  to  Vladi- 
vostok without  waiting  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Japanese 
troops,  but  urged  that  Japan  should  fix  a time-limit  for  the 
complete  withdrawal  of  all  her  troops. 

Japan  informed  Chita  that  the  withdrawal  would  be  carried 
out  within  a short  period  after  the  conclusion  of  the  detailed 
arrangements,  giving  a definite  period  as  desired,  and  at  the 
same  time  she  proposed  the  signing  of  the  agreement  drawn 
up  by  Japan. 

Whereas  Japan  thus  throughout  the  negotiations  maintained 
a sincere  and  conciliatory  attitude,  the  Chita  delegates  en- 
tirely ignored  the  spirit  in  which  she  offered  concessions  and 
brought  up  one  demand  after  another,  thereby  trying  to  gain 
time.  Not  only  did  they  refuse  to  entertain  the  Japanese  pro- 
posals, but  declared  that  they  would  drop  the  negotiations  and 
return  to  Chita  immediately.  The  only  conclusion  from  this 
attitude  of  the  Chita  government  is  that  they  lacked  a sincere 
effort  to  bring  the  negotiations  to  fruition,  and  the  Japanese 
Government  instructed  its  delegates  to  quit  Dairen. 

The  Russian  official  account  is  given  by  “The  Times” 
immediately  below  the  above.  It  is  as  follows: 


164 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


On  April  16th  the  Japanese  broke  up  the  Dairen  Conference 
with  the  Far  Eastern  Republic.  The  Far  Eastern  Delegation 
left  Dairen.  Agreement  was  reached  between  the  Japanese 
and  Russian  Delegations  on  March  30th  on  all  points  of  the 
general  treaty,  but  when  the  question  of  military  evacuation 
was  reached  the  Japanese  Delegation  proposed  a formula  per- 
mitting continued  Japanese  intervention. 

Between  March  30th  and  April  15th  the  Japanese  dragged 
on  the  negotiations  re  military  convention,  reproaching  the 
Far  Eastern  delegates  for  mistrusting  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment. The  Russian  delegation  declared  that  the  general  treaty 
would  be  signed  only  upon  obtaining  precise  written  guaran- 
tees of  Japanese  military  evacuation. 

On  April  15th  the  Japanese  Delegation  presented  an  ulti- 
matum demanding  a reply  from  the  Far  Eastern  representa- 
tives in  half  an  hour  as  to  whether  they  were  willing  to  sign 
a general  agreement  with  new  Japanese  conditions  forbidding 
an  increase  in  the  Far  Eastern  Navy  and  retaining  a Japanese 
military  mission  on  Far  Eastern  territory.  Ee  evacuation, 
the  Japanese  presented  a Note  promising  evacuation  if  “not 
prevented  by  unforeseen  circumstances.”  The  Russian  dele- 
gation rejected  this  ultimatum.  On  April  16th  the  Japanese 
declared  the  Dairen  Conference  broken  up.  The  Japanese 
delegates  left  for  Tokyo,  and  Japanese  troops  remain  in  the 
zone  established  by  the  agreement  of  March  29th. 

Readers  will  believe  one  or  other  of  these  official 
statements  according  to  their  prejudices,  while  those 
who  wish  to  think  themselves  impartial  will  assume 
that  the  truth  lies  somewhere  between  the  two.  For 
my  part,  I believe  the  Russian  statement.  But  even 
from  the  Japanese  communique  it  is  evident  that  what 
wrecked  the  conference  was  Japanese  unwillingness  to 


THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE  165 


evacuate  Vladivostok  and  the  Maritime  Province;  all 
that  they  were  willing  to  give  was  a vague  promise  to 
evacuate  some  day,  which  would  have  had  no  more  value 
than  Mr.  Gladstone’s  promise  to  evacuate  Egypt. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  conference  went  well  for 
Chita  until  the  Senate  had  ratified  the  Washington 
treaties.  After  that,  the  Japanese  felt  that  they  had 
a free  hand  in  all  Far  Eastern  matters  not  dealt  with 
at  Washington.  The  practical  effect  of  the  Washington 
decisions  will  naturally  be  to  make  the  Japanese  seek 
compensation,  at  the  expense  of  the  Far  Eastern  Re- 
public, for  what  they  have  had  to  surrender  in  China. 
This  result  was  to  be  expected,  and  was  presumably 
foreseen  by  the  assembled  peacemakers.2 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  Japanese  policy  involves 
hostility  to  Russia.  This  is  no  doubt  one  reason  for 
the  friendship  between  Japan  and  France.  Another 
reason  is  that  both  are  the  champions  of  nationalistic 
capitalism,  as  against  the  international  capitalism  aimed 
at  by  Messrs.  Morgan  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  because 
France  and  Japan  look  to  their  armaments  as  the  chief 
source  of  their  income,  while  England  and  America 
look  rather  to  their  commerce  and  industry.  It  would 
be  interesting  to  compute  how  much  coal  and  iron 

2 1 ought  perhaps  to  confess  that  I have  a bias  in  favor  of 
the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  owing  to  my  friendship  for  their 
diplomatic  mission  which  was  in  Peking  while  I was  there.  I 
never  met  a more  high-minded  set  of  men  in  any  country.  And, 
although  they  were  communists,  and  knew  the  views  that  I had 
expressed  on  Russia,  they  showed  me  great  kindness.  I do  not 
think,  however,  that  these  courtesies  have  affected  my  view  of 
the  dispute  between  Chita  and  Tokyo. 


166 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


France  and  Japan  have  acquired  in  recent  years  by* 
means  of  their  armies.  England  and  America  already 
possessed  coal  and  iron;  hence  their  different  policy. 
An  uninvited  delegation  from  the  Far  Eastern  Republic 
at  Washington  produced  documents  tending  to  show 
that  France  and  Japan  came  there  as  secret  allies.  Al- 
though the  authenticity  of  the  documents  was  denied, 
most  people,  apparently,  believed  them  to  be  genuine. 
In  any  case,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  France  and  Japan 
will  stand  together,  now  that  the  Anglo- Japanese  alli- 
ance has  come  to  an  end  and  the  Anglo-French  entente 
has  become  anything  but  cordial.  Thus  it  is  to  be 
feared  that  Washington  and  Genoa  have  sown  the  seeds 
of  future  wars — unless,  by  some  miracle,  the  ‘ ‘ civilized * ’ 
nations  should  grow  weary  of  suicide. 


CHAPTER  X 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

THE  Far  Eastern  situation  is  so  complex  that  it  is 
very  difficult  to  guess  what  will  be  the  ultimate 
outcome  of  the  Washington  conference,  and  still  more 
difficult  to  know  what  outcome  we  ought  to  desire.  I 
will  endeavor  to  set  forth  the  various  factors  each  in 
turn,  not  simplifying  the  issues,  but  rather  aiming  at 
producing  a certain  hesitancy  which  I regard  as  desir- 
able in  dealing  with  China.  I shall  consider  succes- 
sively the  interests  and  desires  of  America,  Japan, 
Russia,  and  China,  with  an  attempt,  in  each  case,  to 
gage  what  parts  of  these  various  interests  and  desires 
are  compatible  with  the  welfare  of  mankind  as  a whole.1 

I begin  with  America,  as  the  leading  spirit  in  the 
conference  and  the  dominant  power  in  the  world. 
American  public  opinion  is  in  favor  of  peace,  and  at 
the  same  time  profoundly  persuaded  that  America  is 
wise  and  virtuous  while  all  other  powers  are  foolish 
and  wicked.  The  pessimistic  half  of  this  opinion  I do 
not  desire  to  dispute,  but  the  optimistic  half  is  more 
open  to  question.  Apart  from  peace,  American  public 

i The  interests  of  England,  apart  from  the  question  of  India, 
are  roughly  the  same  as  those  of  America.  Broadly  speaking, 
British  interests  are  allied  with  American  finance,  as  against 
the  pacifistic  and  agrarian  tendencies  of  the  Middle  West. 

167 


168 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


opinion  believes  in  commerce  and  industry,  Protestant 
morality,  athletics,  hygiene,  and  hypocrisy,  which  may 
be  taken  as  the  main  ingredients  of  American  and  Eng- 
lish Kultur.  Every  American  I met  in  the  Far  East, 
with  one  exception,  was  a missionary  for  American  Kul- 
tur, whether  nominally  connected  with  Christian  mis- 
sions or  not.  I ought  to  explain  that  when  I speak  of 
hypocrisy  I do  not  mean  the  conscious  hypocrisy  prac- 
tised by  Japanese  diplomats  in  their  dealings  with 
Western  powers,  but  that  deeper,  unconscious,  kind 
which  forms  the  chief  strength  of  the.  Anglo-Saxons. 
Everybody  knows  Labouchere’s  comment  on  Mr.  Glad- 
stone, that  like  other  politicians  he  always  had  a card 
up  his  sleeve,  but,  unlike  the  others,  he  thought  the 
Lord  had  put  it  there.  This  attitude,  which  has  been 
characteristic  of  England,  has  been  somewhat  chas- 
tened among  ourselves  by  the  satire  of  men  like  Ber- 
nard Shaw;  but  in  America  it  is  still  just  as  prevalent 
and  self-confident  as  it  was  with  us  fifty  years  ago. 
There  is  much  justification  for  such  an  attitude.  Glad- 
stonian  England  was  more  of  a moral  force  than  the 
England  of  the  present  day;  and  America  is  more  of  a 
moral  force  at  this  moment  than  any  other  power  (ex- 
cept Russia).  But  the  development  from  Gladstone’s 
moral  fervor  to  the  cynical  imperialism  of  his  successors 
is  one  which  we  can  now  see  to  be  inevitable;  and  a 
similar  development  is  bound  to  take  place  in  the  United 
States.  Therefore,  when  we  wish  to  estimate  the  de- 
sirability of  extending  the  influence  of  the  United 
States,  we  have  to  take  account  of  this  almost  certain 
future  loss  of  idealism. 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  169 


Nor  is  idealism  in  itself  always  an  unmixed  blessing  to 
its  victims.  It  is  apt  to  be  incompatible  with  tolerance, 
with  the  practice  of  live-and-let-live,  which  alone  can 
make  the  world  endurable  for  its  less  pugnacious  and 
energetic  inhabitants.  It  is  difficult  for  art  or  the  con- 
templative outlook  to  exist  in  an  atmosphere  of  bus- 
tling practical  philanthropy,  as  difficult  as  it  would  be 
to  write  a book  in  the  middle  of  a spring  cleaning.  The 
ideals  which  inspire  a spring  cleaning  are  useful  and 
valuable  in  their  place,  but  when  they  are  not  enriched 
by  any  others  they  are  apt  to  produce  a rather  bleak 
and  uncomfortable  sort  of  world. 

All  this  may  seem,  at  first  sight,  somewhat  remote 
from  the  Washington  conference,  but  it  is  essential  if 
we  are  to  take  a just  view  of  the  friction  between 
America  and  Japan.  I wish  to  admit  at  once  that, 
hitherto,  America  has  been  the  best  friend  of  China, 
and  Japan  the  worst  enemy.  It  is  also  true  that 
America  is  doing  more  than  any  other  power  to  pro- 
mote peace  in  the  world,  while  Japan  would  probably 
favor  war  if  there  were  a good  prospect  of  victory. 
On  these  grounds,  I am  glad  to  see  our  Government 
making  friends  with  America  and  abandoning  the  mili- 
taristic Anglo- Japanese  alliance.  But  I do  not  wish 
this  to  be  done  in  a spirit  of  hostility  to  Japan,  or  in  a 
blind  reliance  upon  the  future  good  intentions  of 
America.  I shall  therefore  try  to  state  Japan’s  case, 
although,  for  the  present , I think  it  weaker  than 
America’s. 

It  should  be  observed,  in  the  first  place,  that  the 
present  American  policy,  both  in  regard  to  China  and 


170 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


in  regard  to  naval  armaments,  while  clearly  good  for 
the  world,  is  quite  as  clearly  in  line  with  American 
interests.  To  take  the  naval  question  first:  America, 
with  a navy  equal  to  our  own,  will  be  quite  strong 
enough  to  make  our  admiralty  understand  that  it  is 
out  of  the  question  to  go  to  war  with  America,  so  that 
America  will  have  as  much  control  of  the  seas  as  there 
is  any  point  in  having.2  The  Americans  are  adamant 
about  the  Japanese  navy,  but  very  pliant  about  French 
submarines,  which  only  threaten  us.  Control  of  the 
seas  being  secured,  limitation  of  naval  armaments  merely 
decreases  the  cost,  and  is  an  equal  gain  to  all  parties, 
involving  no  sacrifice  of  American  interests.  To  take 
next  the  question  of  China:  American  ambitions  in 
China  are  economic,  and  require  only  that  the  whole 
country  should  be  open  to  the  commerce  and  industry 
of  the  United  States.  The  policy  of  spheres  of  influ- 
ence is  obviously  less  advantageous,  to  so  rich  and 
economically  strong  a country  as  America,  than  the 
policy  of  the  universal  Open  Door.  We  cannot  there- 
fore regard  America’s  liberal  policy  as  regards 
China  and  naval  armaments  as  any  reason  for  ex- 
pecting a liberal  policy  when  it  goes  against  self-in- 
terest. 

2 It  is  interesting  to  observe  that,  since  the  Washington  con- 
ference, the  American  administration  has  used  the  naval  ratio 
there  agreed  upon  to  induce  Congress  to  consent  to  a larger 
expenditure  on  the  navy  than  would  otherwise  have  been  sanc- 
tioned. Expenditure  on  the  navy  is  unpopular  in  America,  but 
by  its  parade  of  pacifism  the  Government  has  been  enabled  to 
extract  the  necessary  money  out  of  the  pockets  of  reluctant  tax- 
payers. See  “The  Times’s”  New  York  correspondent’s  telegram 
in  “The  Times”  of  April  10,  1922;  also  April  17  and  22. 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  171 


In  fact,  there  is  evidence  that  when  American  inter- 
ests or  prejudices  are  involved  liberal  and  humanitarian 
principles  have  no  weight  whatever.  I will  cite  two 
instances:  Panama  tolls,  and  Russian  trade.  In  the 

matter  of  the  Panama  Canal,  America  i^  bound  by 
treaty  not  to  discriminate  against  our  shipping;  never- 
theless a bill  has  been  passed  by  a two-thirds  majority 
of  the  House  of  Representatives,  making  a discrimina- 
tion in  favor  of  American  shipping.  Even  if  the  Pres- 
ident ultimately  vetoes  it,  its  present  position  shows 
| that  at  least  two  thirds  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
J share  Bethmann-Hollweg’s  view  of  treaty  obligations. 
And  as  for  trade  with  Russia,  England  led  the  way, 
while  American  hostility  to  the  Bolsheviks  remained 
implacable,  and  to  this  day  Gompers,  in  the  name  of 
American  labor,  thunders  against  “shaking  hands  w*ith 
murder.”  It  cannot  therefore  be  said  that  America  is 
always  honorable  or  humanitarian  or  liberal.  The  evi- 
dence is  that  America  adopts  these  virtues  when  they 
suit  national  or  rather  financial  interests,  but  fails  to 
perceive  their  applicability  in  other  cases. 

I could  of  course  have  given  many  other  instances, 
but  I content  myself  with  one,  because  it  especially  con- 
cerns China.  I quote  from  an  American  weekly,  “The 
Freeman”  (November  23,  1921,  p.  244)  : 

On  November  1st,  the  Chinese  Government  failed  to  meet 
an  obligation  of  $5,500,000,  due  and  payable  to  a large  bank- 
ing-house in  Chicago.  The  State  Department  had  facilitated 
the  negotiation  of  this  loan  in  the  first  instance;  and  now,  in 
fulfilment  of  the  promise  of  Governmental  support  in  an  emer- 
gency, an  official  cablegram  was  launched  upon  Peking,  with 


172 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


intimations  that  continued  defalcation  might  have  a most 
serious  effect  upon  the  financial  and  political  rating  of  the 
Chinese  Republic.  In  the  meantime,  the  American  bankers 
of  the  new  international  consortium  had  offered  to  advance  to 
the  Chinese  Government  an  amount  which  would  cover  the 
loan  in  default,  together  with  other  obligations  already  in 
arrears,  and  still  others  which  will  fall  due  on  December  1st; 
and  this  proposal  had  also  received  the  full  and  energetic 
support  of  the  Department  of  State.  That  is  to  say,  Ameri- 
can financiers  and  politicians  were  at  one  and  the  same  time 
the  heroes  and  villians  of  the  piece;  having  co-operated  in 
the  creation  of  a dangerous  situation,  they  came  forward 
handsomely  in  the  hour  of  trial  with  an  offer  to  save  China 
from  themselves  as  it  were,  if  the  Chinese  Government  would 
only  enter  into  relations  with  the  consortium,  and  thus  pre- 
pare the  way  for  the  eventual  establishment  of  an  American 
financial  protectorate. 

It  should  be  added  that  the  Peking  Government,  af- 
ter repeated  negotiations,  had  decided  not  to  accept 
loans  from  the  consortium  on  the  terms  on  which  they 
were  offered.  In  my  opinion,  there  were  very  adequate 
grounds  for  this  decision.  As  the  same  article  in  ‘‘The 
Freeman”  concludes: 

If  this  plan  is  put  through,  it  will  make  the  bankers  of  the 
consortium  the  virtual  owners  of  China;  and  among  these 
bankers,  those  of  the  United  States  are  the  only  ones  who  are 
prepared  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  situation. 

There  is  some,  reason  to  think  that,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Washington  conference,  an  attempt  was  made  by 
the  consortium  banks,  with*  the  connivance  of  the  Brit- 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  173 


ish*  but  not  of  the  American  Government,  to  establish, 
by  means  of  the  conference,  some  measure  of  interna- 
tional control  over  China.  In  the  “Japan  Weekly 
Chronicle”  for  November  17,  1921  (p.  725),  in  a tele- 
gram headed  “International  Control  of  China,”  I find 
it  reported  that  America  is  thought  to  be  seeking  to 
establish  international  control,  and  that  Mr.  Welling- 
ton Koo  told  the  “Philadephia  Public  Ledger”:  “We 

suspect  the  motives  which  led  to  the  suggestion  and  we 
thoroughly  doubt  its  feasibility.  China  will  bitterly 
oppose  any  Conference  plan  to  offer  China  international 
aid.”  He  adds:  “International  control  will  not  do. 

China  must  be  given  time  and  opportunity  to  find  her- 
self. The  world  should  not  misinterpret  or  exaggerate 
the  meaning  of  the  convulsion  which  China  is  now  pass- 
ing through.”  These  are  wise  words,  with  which  every 
true  friend  of  China  must  agree.  In  the  same  issue  of 
the?  “Japan  Weekly  Chronicle,” — which,  by  the  way,  I 
consider  the  best  weekly  paper  in  the  world, — I find  the 
following  (p.  728)  : 

Mr.  Lennox  Simpson  [Putnam  Weale]  is  quoted  as  saying: 
“The  international  bankers  have  a scheme  for  the  inter- 
national control  of  China.  Mr.  Lamont,  representing  the 
consortium,  offered  a sixteen-million-dollar  loan  to  China, 
which  the  Chinese  Government  refused  to  accept  because  Mr. 
Lamont  insisted  that  the  Hukuang  bonds,  German  issue,  which 
had  been  acquired  by  the  Morgan  Company,  should  be  paid 
out  of  it.”  Mr.  Lamont,  on  hearing  this  charge,  made  an 
emphatic  denial,  saying:  “Simpson’s  statement  is  unquali- 

fiedly false.  When  this  man  Simpson  talks  about  resisting 
the  control  of  the  international  banks  he  is  fantastic.  We 


174 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


don’t  want  control.  We  are  anxious  that  the  Conference  re- 
sult in  such  a solution  as  will  furnish  full  opportunity  to 
China  to  fulfil  her  own  destiny .” 

Sagacious-  people  will  be  inclined  to  conclude  that  so 
much  anger  must  be  due  to  being  touched  on  the  raw, 
and  that  Mr.  Lamont,  if  he  had  nothing  to  conceal,  would 
not  have  spoken  of  a distinguished  writer  and  one  of 
China’s  best  friends  as  “this  man  Simpson.” 

I do  not  pretend  that  the  evidence  against  the  con- 
sortium is  conclusive,  and  I have  not  space  here  to  set 
it  all  forth.  But  to  any  European  radical  Mr.  Lamont ’s 
statement  that  the  consortium  does  not  want  control 
reads  like  a contradiction  in  terms.  Those  who  wish  to 
lend  to  a government  which  is  on  the  verge  of  bank- 
ruptcy, must  aim  at  control,  for,  even  if  there  were  not 
the  incident  of  the  Chicago  bank,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  believe  that  Messrs.  Morgan  are  so  purely  philan- 
thropic as  not  to  care  whether'  they  get  any  interest  on 
their  money  or  not,  although  emissaries  of  the  consortium 
in  China  have  spoken  as  though  this  were  the  case,  there- 
by greatly  increasing  the  suspicions  of  the  Chinese. 

In  “The  New  Republic”  for  November  30,  1921,  there 
is  an  article  by  Mr.  Brailsford  entitled  “A  New  Tech- 
nique of  Peace,”  which  I fear  is  prophetic  even  if  not 
wholly  applicable  at  the  moment  when  it  was  written. 
I expect  to  see,  if  the  Americans  are  successful  in  the 
Far  East,  China  compelled  to  be  orderly  so  as  to 
afford  a field  for  foreign  commerce  and  industry;  a 
government  which  the  West  will  consider  good  sub- 
stituted for  the  present  go-as-you-please  anarchy;  a 


A 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  175 


gradually  increasing  flow  of  wealth  from  China  to  the 
investing  countries,  the  chief  of  which  is  America;  the 
development  of  a sweated  proletariat;  the  spread  of 
Christianity;  the  substitution  of  the  American  democ- 
racy for  the  Chinese;  the  destruction  of  traditional 
beauty,  except  for  such  oh  jets  d’art  as  millionaires  may 
think  it  worth  while  to  buy;  the  gradual  awakening  of 
China  to  her  exploitation  by  the  foreigner ; and  o.ne  day, 
fifty  or  a hundred  years  hence,  the  massacre  of  every 
white  man  throughout  the  Celestial  Empire  at  a signal 
from  some  vast  secret  society.  All  this  is  probably  in- 
evitable, human  nature  being  what  it  is.  It  will  be  done 
in  order  that  rich  men  may  grow  richer,  but  we  shall 
be  told  that  it  is  done  in  order  that  China  may  have 
“good”  government.  The  definition  of  the  word 
“good”  is  difficult,  but  the  definition  of  “good  govern- 
ment” is  as  easy  as  A.B.C.:  it  is  government  that  yields 
fat  dividends  to  capitalists. 

The  Chinese  are  gentle,  urbane,  seeking  only  justice 
and  freedom.  They  have  a civilization  superior  to  ours 
in  all  that  makes  for  human  happiness.  They  have  a 
vigorous  movement  of  young  reformers,  who,  if  they  are 
allowed  a little  time,  will  revivify  China  and  produce 
something  immeasurably  better  than  the  worn-out  grind- 
ing mechanism  that  wre  call  civilization.  When  Young 
China  has  done  its  work,  Americans  will  be  able  to  make 
money  by  trading  with  China,  without  destroying  the 
soul  of  the  country.  China  needs  a period  of  anarchy 
in  order  to  work  out  her  salvation;  all  great  nations 
need  such  a period,  from  time  to  time.  When  America 
went  through  such  a period,  in  1861-65,  England 


176 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


thought  of  intervening'  to  insist  on  ‘ ‘ good  government, ’ ’ 
but  fortunately  abstained.  Nowadays,  in  China,  all  the 
powers  want  to  intervene.  Americans  recognize  this  in 
the  case  of  the  wicked  Old  World,  but  are  smitten  with 
blindness  when  it  comes  to  their  own  consortium.  All 
I ask  of  them  is  that  they  should  admit  that  they  are  as 
other  men,  and  cease  to  thank  God  that  they  are  not  as 
this  publican. 

So  much  by  way  of  criticism  by  America;  we  come 
now  to  the  defense  of  Japan. 

Japan’s  relations  with  the  powers  are  not  of  her  own 
seeking;  all  that  Japan  asked  of  the  world  was  to  be  let 
alone.  This,  however,  did  not  suit  the  white  nations, 
among  whom  America  led  the  way.  It  was  a United 
States  squadron  under  Commodore  Perry  that  first  made 
Japan  aware  of  Western  aggressiveness.  Very  soon  it 
became  evident  that  there  were  only  two  ways  of  deal- 
ing with  the  white  man,  either  to  submit  to  him,  or  to 
fight  him  with  his  own  weapons.  Japan  adopted  the 
latter  course,  and  developed  a modern  army  trained  by 
the  Germans,  a modern  navy  modeled  on  the  British, 
modern  machinery  derived  from  America,  and  modern 
morals  copied  from  the  whole  lot.  Everybody  except 
the  British  was  horrified,  and  called  the  Japanese  “yel- 
low monkeys.”  However,  they  began  to  be  respected 
when  they  defeated  Russia,  and  after  they  had  captured 
Tsing-tao  and  half -enslaved  China  they  were  admitted 
to  equality  with  the  other  great  powers  at  Versailles. 
The  Consideration  shown  to  them  by  the  West  is  due  to 
their  armaments  alone ; none  of  their  other  good  qualities 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  17T 


would  have  saved  them  from  being  regarded  as 
* ‘ niggers.’ ’ 

People  who  have  never  been  outside  Europe  can  hardly 
imagine  the  intensity  of  the  color  prejudice  that  white 
men  develop  when  brought  into  contact  with  any  dif- 
ferent pigmentation.  I have  seen  Chinese  of  the'  highest 
education,  men  as  cultured  as,  say,  Dean  Inge,  treated 
by  greasy  white  men  as  if  they  were  dirt,  in  a way 
which,  at  home,  no  duke  would  venture  to  treat  a cross- 
ing-sweeper. The’  Japanese  are  not  treated  in  this  way, 
because  they  have  a*  powerful  army  and  navy.  The  fact 
that  white  men,  as  individuals,  no  longer  dare  to  bully 
individual  Japanese,  is  important  as  a beginning  of 
better  relations  toward  the  colored  races  in  general.  If 
the  Japanese,  by  defeat  in  war,  are  prevented  froon  re- 
taining the  status  of  a great  power,  the  colored  races  in 
general  will  suffer,  and  the  tottering  insolence  of  the 
white  man  will  be  reestablished.  Also  the  world  will 
have  lost  the  last  chance  of  the  survival  of  civilizations 
of  a different  type  from  that  of  the  industrial  West. 

The  civilization  of  Japan,  in  its  material  aspect,  is 
similar  to  that  of  the  West,  though  industrialism,  as  yet, 
is  not  very  developed.  But  in  its  mental  aspect  it  is 
utterly  unlike  the  West,  particularly  the  Anglo-Saxon 
West.  Worship  of  the  mikado,  as  an  actually  divine 
being,  is  successfully  taught  in  every  village  school,  and 
provides  the  popular  support  for  nationalism.  The 
nationalistic  aims  of  Japan  are  not  merely  economic; 
they  are  also  dynastic  and  territorial  in  a mediaeval 
way.  The  morality  of  the  Japanese  is  not  utilitarian, 


178 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


but  intensely  idealistic.  Filial  piety  is  the  basis,  and  in- 
cludes patriotism,  because  the  mikado  is  the  father  of 
his  people.  The  Japanese  outlook  has  the  same  kind  of 
superstitious  absence  of  realism  that  one  finds  in  thir- 
teenth-century theories  as  to  the  relations  of  the  em- 
peror and  the  pope.  But  in  Europe  the  emperor  and 
the  pope  were  different  people,  and  their  quarrels  pro- 
moted freedom  of  thought;  in  Japan,  since  1868,  they 
are  combined  in  one  sacred  person,  and  there  are  no  in- 
ternal conflicts  to  produce  doubt. 

Japan,  unlike  China,  is  a religious  country.  The 
Chinese  doubt  a proposition  until  it  is  proved  to  be  true ; 
the  Japanese  believe  it  until  it  is  proved  to  be  false.  1 
do  not  know  of  any  evidence  against  the  view  that  the 
mikado  is  divine.  Japanese  religion  is  essentially 
nationalistic,  like  that  of  the  Jews  in  the  Old  Testament. 
Shinto,  the  state  religion,  has  been  in  the  main  invented 
since  1868, 3 and  propagated  by  education  in  schools. 
(There  was  of  course  an  old  Shinto  religion,  but  most  of 
what  constitutes  modern  Shintoism  is  new.)  It  is  not  a 
religion  which  aims  at  being  universal,  like  Buddhism, 
Christianity,  and  Islam;  it  is  a tribal  religion,  only  in- 
tended to  appeal  to  the  Japanese.  Buddhism  subsists 
side  by  side  with  it,  and  is  believed  by  the  same  people. 
It  is  customary  to  adopt  Shinto  rites  for  marriages  and 
Buddhist  rites  for  funerals,  because  Buddhism  is  con- 
sidered more  suitable  for  mournful  occasions.  Although 
Buddhism  is  a universal  religion,  its  Japanese  form  is 

3 See  Chamberlain,  “The  Invention  of  a New  Religion,”  pub- 
lished by  the  Rationalist  Press  Association. 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  179 


intensely  national,4  like  the  Church  of  England.  Many 
of  its  priests  marry,  and  in  some  temples  the  priesthood 
is  hereditary.  Its  dignitaries  remind  one  vividly  of 
English  archdeacons. 

The  Japanese,  even  when  they  adopt  industrial 
methods,  do  not  lose  their  sense  of  beauty.  One  hears 
complaints  that  their  goods  are  shoddy,  but  they  have 
a remarkable  power  of  adapting  artistic  taste  to  in- 
dustrialism. If  Japan  were  rich  it  might  produce  cities 
as  beautiful  as  Venice,  by  methods  as  modern  as  those 
of  New  York.  Industrialism  has  hitherto  brought  with 
it  elsewhere  a rising  tide  of  ugliness,  and  any  nation 
which  can  show  us  how  to  make  this  tide  recede  deserves 
our  gratitude.  The  Japanese  are  earnest,  passionate, 
strong-willed,  amazingly  hard  working,  and  capable  of 
boundless  sacrifice  to  an  ideal.  Most  of  them  have  the 
correlative  defects:  lack  of  humor,  cruelty,  intolerance, 
and  incapacity  for  free  thought.  But  these  defects  are 
by  no  means  universal ; one  meets  among  them  a certain 
number  of  men  and  women  of  quite  extraordinary  ex- 
cellence. And  there  is  in  their  civilization  as  a whole 
a degree  of  vigor  and  determination  which  commands 
the  highest  respect. 

The  growth  of  industrialism  in  Japan  has  brought 
with  it  the  growth  of  socialism  and  the  labor  move- 
ment.5 In  China  the  intellectuals  are  often  theoretical 
socialists,  but  in  the  absence  of  labor  organizations  there 

4 See  Murdoch,  “History  of  Japan,”  I,  pp.  500  ff. 

s An  excellent  account  of  these  is  given  in  “The  Socialist 
and  Labour  Movement  in  Japan,”  by  an  American  Sociologist, 
published  by  the  “Japan  Chronicle.” 


180 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


is  as  yet  little  room  for  more  than  theory.  In  Japan, 
trade-unionism  has  made  considerable  advances,  and 
every  variety  of  socialist  and  anarchist  opinion  is  vigor- 
ously represented.  In  time,  if  Japan  becomes  increas- 
ingly industrial,  socialism  may  become  a political  force ; 
as  yet,  I do  not  think  it  is.  Japanese  socialists  resemble 
those  of  other  countries,  in  that  they  do  not  share  the 
national  superstitions.  They  are  much  persecuted  by 
the  government,  but  not  so  much  as  socialists  in  America 
— so  at  least  I am  informed  by  an  American  who  is  in  a 
position  to  judge. 

The  real  power  is  still  in  the  hands  of  certain  aris- 
tocratic families.  By  the  constitution,  the  ministers  of 
war  and  marine  are  directly  responsible  to  the  mikado, 
not  to  the  Diet  or  the  prime  minister.  They  therefore 
can  and  do  persist  in  policies  which  are  disliked  by  the 
Foreign  Office.  For  example,  if  the  Foreign  Office  were 
to  promise  the  evacuation  of  Vladivostok,  the  War  Office 
might  nevertheless  decide  to  keep  the  soldiers  there,  and 
there  would  be  no  constitutional  remedy.  Some  part,  at 
least,  of  what  appears  as  Japanese  bad  faith  is  explic- 
able in  this  way.  There  is  of  course  a party  which 
wishes  to  establish  real  parliamentary  government,  but 
it  is  not  likely  to  come  into  power  unless  the  existing 
regime  suffers  some  severe  diplomatic  humiliation.  If 
the  Washington  conference  had  compelled  the  evacua- 
tion of  not  only  Shantung  but  also  Vladivostok  by  dip- 
lomatic pressure,  the  effect  on  the  internal  government 
of  Japan  would  probably  have  been  excellent. 

The  Japanese  are  firmly  persuaded  that  they  have  no 
friends,  and  that  the  Americans  are  their  implacable 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  181 


foes.  One  gathers  that  the  government  regards  war 
with  America  as  unavoidable  in  the  long  run.  The  ar- 
gument would  be  that  the  economic  imperialism  of  the 
United  States  will  not  tolerate  the  industrial  develop- 
ment of  a formidable  rival  in  the  Pacific,  and  that  sooner 
or  later  the  Japanese  will  be  presented  with  the  alter- 
native of  dying  by  starvation  or  on  the  battlefield. 
Then  Bushido  will  come  into  play,  and  will  lead  to  choice 
of  the  battlefield  in  preference  to  starvation.  Admiral 
Sato  6 (the  Japanese  Bernhardi,  as  he  is  called)  main- 
tains that  absence  of  Bushido  in  the  Americans  will  lead 
to  their  defeat,  and  that  their  money-grubbing  souls 
will  be  incapable  of  enduring  the  hardships  and  priva- 
tions of  a long  war.  This,  of  course,  is  romantic  non- 
sense. Bushido  is  no  use  in  modern  war,  and  the  Ameri- 
cans are  quite  as  courageous  and  obstinate  as  the  Japa- 
nese. A war  might  last  ten  years,  bat  it  would  certainly 
end  in  the  defeat  of  Japan. 

One  is  constantly  reminded  of  the  situation  between 
England  and  Germany  in  the  years  before  1914.  The 
Germans  wanted  to  acquire  a colonial  empire  by  means 
similar  to  those  which  we  have  employed;  so  do  the 
Japanese.  We  considered  such  methods  wicked  when 
employed  by  foreigners;  so  do  the  Americans.  The 
Germans  developed  their  industries  and  roused  our 
hostility  by  competition;  the  Japanese  are  similarly 
competing  with  America  in  Far  Eastern  markets.  The 
Germans  felt  themselves  encircled  by  our  alliances,  which 
we  regarded  as  purely  defensive ; the  Japanese,  similarly, 
found  themselves  isolated  at  Washington  (except  for 

6 Author  of  a book  called  “If  Japan  and  America  Fight.” 


182 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


French  sympathy)  since  the  superior  diplomatic  skill 
of  the  Americans  has  brought  us  over  to  their  side.  The 
Germans  at  last,  impelled  by  terrors  largely  of  their  own 
creation,  challenged  the  whole  world,  and  fell ; it  is  very 
much  to  be  feared  that  Japan  may  do  likewise.  The 
pros  and  cons  are  so  familiar  in  the  case  of  Germany 
that  I need  not  elaborate  them  further,  since  the  whole 
argument  can  be  transferred  bodily  to  the  case  of  Japan. 
There  is,  however,  this  difference,  that,  while  Germany 
aimed  at  hegemony  of  the  whole  world,  the  Japanese 
only  aim  at  hegemony  in  Eastern  Asia. 

The  conflict  between  America  and  Japan  is  super- 
ficially economic,  but,  as  often  happens,  the  economic 
rivalry  is  really  a cloak  for  deeper  passions.  Japan 
^till  believes  in  the  divine  right  of  kings;  America  be- 
lieves in  the  divine  right  of  commerce.  I have 
sometimes  tried  to  persuade  Americans  that  there  may 
be  nations  which  will  not  gain  by  an  extension  of  their 
foreign  commerce,  but  I have  always  found  the  attempt 
futile.  The  Americans  believe  also  that  their  .religion 
and  morality  and  culture  are  far  superior  to  those  of  the 
Far  East.  I regard  this  as  a delusion,  though  one 
shared  by  almost  all  Europeans.  The  Japanese,  pro- 
foundly and  with  all  the  strength  of  their  being,  long 
to  preserve  their  own  culture  and  to  avoid  becoming  like 
Europeans  or  Americans;  and  in  this  I think  we  ought 
to  sympathize  with  them.  The  color  prejudice  is  even 
more  intense  among  Americans  than  among  Europeans; 
the  Japanese  are  determined  to  prove  that  the  yellow 
man  may  be  the  equal  of  the  white  man.  In  this,  also, 
justice  and  humanity  are  on  the  side  of  Japan.  Thus 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  183 


on  the  deeper  issues,  which  underlie  the  economic  and 
diplomatic  conflict,  my  feelings  go  with  the  Japanese 
rather  than  with  the  Americans. 

Unfortunately,  the  Japanese  are  always  putting  them- 
selves in  the  wrong  through  impatience  and  contempt. 
They  ought  to  have  claimed  for  China  the  same  con- 
sideration that  they  have  extorted  toward  themselves; 
then  they  could  have  become,  what  they  constantly  pro- 
fess to  be,  the  champions  of  Asia  against  Europe.  The 
Chinese  are  prone  to  gratitude,  and  would  have  helped 
Japan  loyally  if  Japan  had  been  a true  friend  to  them. 
But  the  Japanese  despise  the  Chinese  more  than  the 
Europeans  do;  they  do  not  want  to  destroy  the  belief 
in  Eastern  inferiority,  but  only  to  be  regarded  as  them- 
selves belonging  to  the  West.  They  have  therefore  be- 
haved so  as  to  cause  a well-deserved  hatred  of  them  in 
China.  And  this  same  behavior  has  made  the  best 
Americans  as  hostile  to  them  as  the  worst.  If  America 
had  had  none  but  base  reasons  for  hostility  to  them, 
they  would  have  found  many  champions  in  the  United 
States;  as  it  is,  they  have  practically  none.  It  is  not 
yet  too  late;  it  is  still  possible  for  them  to  win  the  af- 
fection of  China  and  the  respect  of  the  best  Americans. 
To  achieve  this,  they  would  have  to  change  their  Chi- 
nese policy  and  adopt  a more  democratic  constitution; 
but  if  they  do  not  achieve  it,  they  will  fall  as  Germany 
fell.  And  their  fall  will  be  a great  misfortune  for  man- 
kind. 

A war  between  America  and  Japan  would  be  a very 
terrible  thing  in  itself,  and  a still  more  terrible  thing 
in  its  consequences.  It  would  destroy  Japanese  civiliza- 


184 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


tion,  insure  the  subjugation  of  China  to  Western 
culture,  and  launch  America  upon  a career  of  world- 
wide militaristic  imperialism.  It  is  therefore,  at  all 
costs,  to  be  avoided.  If  it  is  to  be  avoided,  Japan 
must  become  more  liberal;  and  Japan  will  only  become 
more  liberal  if  the  present  regime  is  discredited  by 
failure.  Therefore,  in  the  interests  of  Japan  no  less 
than  in  the  interests  of  China,  it  would  be  well  if  Japan 
were  forced,  by  the  joint  diplomatic  pressure  of  Eng- 
land and  America,  to  disgorge, not  only  Shantung,  but 
also  all  of  Manchuria  except  Port  Arthur  and  its  im- 
mediate neighborhood.  (I  make  this  exception  because 
I think  nothing  short  of  actual  war  would  lead  the 
Japanese  to  abandon  Port  Arthur.)  Our  alliance  with 
Japan,  since  the  end  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  has 
been  an  encouragement  to  J apan  in  all  that  she  has  done 
amiss.  Not  that  Japan  has  been  worse  than  we  have, 
but  that  certain  kinds  of  crime  are  only  permitted  to 
very  great  powers,  and  have  been  committed  by  the 
Japanese  at  an  earlier  stage  of  their  career  than 
prudence  would  warrant.  Our  alliance  has  been  a con- 
tributory cause  of  Japan’s  mistakes,  and  the  ending  of 
the  alliance  is  a necessary  condition  of  Japan’s  reform. 

We  come  now  to  Russia’s  part  in  the  Chinese  problem. 
There  is  a tendency  in  Europe  to  regard  Russia  as  de- 
crepit, but  this  is  a delusion.  True,  millions  are  starv- 
ing and  industry  is  at  a standstill.  But  that  does  not 
mean  what  it  would  in  a more  highly  organized  country. 
Russia  is  still  able  to  steal  a march  on  us  in  Persia  and 
Afghanistan,  and  on  the  Japanese  in  Outer  Mongolia. 
Russia  is  still  able  to  organize  Bolshevik  propaganda  in 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  185 


every  country  in  Asia.  And  a great  part  of  the  effec- 
tiveness of  this  propaganda  lies  in  its  promise  of  libera- 
tion from  Europe.  So  far,  in  China  proper,  it  has  af- 
fected hardly  any  one  except  the  younger  students,  to 
whom  Bolshevism  appeals  as  a method  of  developing  in- 
dustry without  passing  through  the  stage  of  private 
capitalism.  This  appeal  will  doubtless  diminish  as  the 
Bolsheviks  are  more  and  more  forced  to  revert  to  capital- 
ism. Moreover,  Bolshevism,  as  it  has  developed  in 
Russia,  is  quite  peculiarly  inapplicable  to  China,  for 
the  following  reasons:  (1)  It  requires  a strong  central- 
ized state,  whereas  China  has  a very  weak  state,  and  is 
tending  more  and  more  to  federalism  instead  of  central- 
ization; (2)  Bolshevism  requires  a very  great  deal  of 
government,  and  more  control  of  individual  lives  by  the 
authorities  than  has  ever  been  known  before,  whereas 
China  has  developed  personal  liberty  to  an  extraordi- 
nary degree,  and  is  the  country  of  all  others  where  the 
doctrines  of  anarchism  seem  to  find  successful  practical 
application;  (3)  Bolshevism  dislikes  private  trading, 
which  is  the  breath  of  life  to  all  Chinese  except  the 
literati.  For  these  reasons,  it  is  not  likely  that  Bol- 
shevism as  a creed  will  make  much  progress  in  China 
proper.  But  Bolshevism  as  a political  force  is  not  the 
same  thing  as  Bolshevism  as  a creed.  The  arguments 
which  proved  successful  with  the  ameer  of  Afghanistan 
or  the  nomads  of  Mongolia  were  probably  different  from 
those  employed  in  discussion  with  Mr.  Lansbury.  The 
Asiatic  expansion  of  Bolshevik  influence  is  not  a dis- 
tinctively Bolshevik  phenomenon,  hut  a continuation  of 
traditional  Russian  policy,  carried  on  by  men  who  are 


1S6 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


more  energetic,  more  intelligent,  and  less  corrupt  than 
the  officials  of  the  czar’s  regime,  and  who  moreover,  like 
the  Americans,  believe  themselves  to  be  engaged  in  the 
liberaton  of  mankind,  not  in  mere  imperialistic  expan- 
sion. This  belief,  of  course,  adds  enormously  to  the 
vigor  and  success  of  Bolshevik  imperialism,  and  gives 
an  impulse  to  Asiatic  expansion  which  is  not  likely  to 
be  soon  spent,  unless  there  is  an  actual  restoration  of 
the  czarist  regime  under  some  new  Kolchak  dependent 
upon  alien  arms  for  his  throne  and  his  life. 

It  is  therefore  not  at  all  unlikely,  if  the  international 
situation  develops  in  certain  ways,  that  Russia  may  set 
to  work  to  regain  Manchuria,  and  to  recover  that  in- 
fluence over  Peking  which  the  control  of  Manchuria  is 
bound  to  give  to  any  foreign  power.  It  would  probably 
be  useless  to  attempt  such  an  enterprise  while  Japan 
remains  unembarrassed,  but  it  would  at  once  become 
feasible  if  Japan  were  at  war  with  America  or  with 
Great  Britain.  There  is  therefore  nothing  improbable 
in  the  supposition  that  Russia  may,  within  the  next  ten 
or  twenty  3Tears,  recover  the  position  which  she  held  in 
relation  to  China  before  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  It 
must  be  remembered  also  that  the  Russians  have  an  in- 
stinct for  colonization,  and  have  been  trekking  eastward 
for  centuries.  This  tendency  has  been  interrupted  by 
the  disasters  of  the  last  seven  years,  but  is  likely  to  as- 
sert itself  again  before  long. 

The  hegemony  of  Russia  in  Asia  would  not,  to  my 
mind,  be  in  any  way  regrettable.  Russia  would  prob- 
ably not  be  strong  enough  to  tyrannize  as  much  as  the 
English,  the  Americans,  or  the  Japanese  would  do. 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES 


187 


Moreover,  the  Russians  are  sufficiently  Asiatic  in  out- 
look and  character  to  be  able  to  enter  into  relations  of 
equality  and  mutual  understanding  with  Asiatics,  in  a 
way  which  seems  quite  impossible  for  the  English-speak- 
ing nations.  And  an  Asiatic  bloc,  if  it  could  be 
formed,  wTould  be  strong  for  defense  and  weak  for  attack, 
which  would  make  for  peace.  Therefore,  on  the  whole, 
such  a result,  if  it  came  about,  would  probably  be  de- 
sirable in  the  interests  of  mankind  as  a whole. 

What,  meanwhile,  is  China’s  interest?  What  would 
be  ideally  best  for  China  would  be  to  recover  Manchuria 
and  Shantung,  and  then  be  let  alone.  The  anarchy  in 
China  might  take  a long  time  to  subside,  but  in  the  end 
some  system  suited  to  China  would  be  established.  The 
artificial  ending  of  Chinese  anarchy  by  outside  inter- 
ference means  the  establishment  of  some  system  con- 
venient for  foreign  trade  and  industry,  but  probably 
quite  unfitted  to  the  needs  of  the  Chinese  themselves. 
The  English  in  the  seventeenth  century,  the  French  in 
the  eighteenth,  the  Americans  in  the  nineteenth,  and  the 
Russians  in  our  own  day,  have  passed  through  years 
of  anarchy  and  civil  war,  which  were  essential  to  their 
development,  and  could  not  have  been  curtailed  by  out- 
side interference  without  grave  detriment  to  the  final 
solution.  So  it  is  with  China.  Western  political  ideas 
have  swept  away  the  old  imperial  system,  but  have  not 
yet  proved  strong  enough  to  put  anything  stable  into  its 
place.  The  problem  of  transforming  China  into  a 
modern  country  is  a difficult  one,  and  foreigners  ought 
to  be  willing  to  have  some  patience  while  the  Chinese 
attempt  its  solution.  They  understand  their  own 


188 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


country,  and  we  do  not.  If  they  are  let  alone,  they 
will,  in  the  end,  find  a solution  suitable  to  their  charac- 
ter, which  we  should  certainly  not  do.  A solution 
slowly  reached  by  themselves  may  he  stable,  whereas  one 
prematurely  imposed  by  outside  powers  will  be  artificial 
and  therefore  unstable. 

There  is,  however,  very  little  hope  that  the  decisions 
reached  by  the  Washington  conference  will  permanently 
benefit  China,  and  a considerable  chance  that  they  may 
do  quite  the  reverse.  In  Manchuria  the  status  quo  is  to 
be  maintained,  while  in  Shantung  the  Japanese  have 
made  concessions,  the  value  of  which  only  time  can  show. 
The  four  powers — America,  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Japan — have  agreed  to  exploit  China  in  combination, 
not  competitively.  There  is  a consortium  as  regards 
loans,  which  will  have  the  power  of  the  purse  and  will 
therefore  be  the  real  government  of  China.  As  the 
Americans  are  the  only  people  who  have  much  spare 
capital,  they  will  control  the  consortium.  As  they  con- 
sider their  civilization  the  finest  in  the  world,  they  will 
set  to  work  to  turn  the  Chinese  into  muscular  Chris- 
tians. As  the  financiers  are  the  most  splendid  feature 
of  the  American  civilization,  China  must  be  so  governed 
as  to  enrich  the  financiers,  who  will  in  return  establish 
colleges  and  hospitals  and  Y.M.C.A.’s  throughout  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  land,  and  employ  agents  to 
buy  up  the  artistic  treasures  of  China  for  sepulture  in 
their  mansions.  Chinese  intellect,  like  that  of  America, 
will  be,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  the  pay  of  the  trust 
magnates,  and  therefore  no  effective  voice  will  be  raised 
in  favor  or  radical  reform.  The  inauguration  of  this 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  189 


system  will  be  welcomed  even  by  some  socialists  in  the 
West  as  a great  victory  for  peace  and  freedom. 

But  it  is  impossible  to  make  a silk  purse  out  of  a sow ’s 
ear,  or  peace  and  freedom  out  of  capitalism.  The  four- 
fold agreement  between  England,  France,  America,  and 
Japan  is,  perhaps,  a safeguard  of  peace,  but  in  so  far 
as  it  brings  peace  nearer  it  puts  freedom  further  off. 
It  is  the  peace  obtained  when  competing  firms  join  in  a 
combine,  which  is  by  no  means  always  advantageous  to 
those  who  have  profited  by  the  previous  competition.  It 
is  quite  possible  to  dominate  China  without  infringing 
the  principle  of  the  Open  Door.  This  principle  merely 
insures  that  the  domination  everywhere  shall  be  Ameri- 
can, because  America  is  the  strongest  power  financially 
and  commercially.  It  is  to  America’s  interest  to  secure, 
in  China,  certain  things  consistent  with  Chinese  in- 
terests, and  certain  others  inconsistent  with  them.  The 
Americans,  for  the  sake  of  commerce  and  good  invest- 
ments, would  wish  to  see  a stable  government  in  China, 
an  increase  in  the  purchasing  power  of  the  people,  and 
an  absence  of  territorial  aggression  by  other  powers. 
But  they  will  not  wish  to  see  the  Chinese  strong  enough 
to  own  and  work  their  own  railways  or  mines,  and  they 
will  resent  all  attempts  at  economic  independence,  par- 
ticularly when  (as  is  to  be  expected)  they  take  the  form 
of  state  socialism,  or  what  Lenin  calls  state  capitalism. 
They  will  keep  a dossier  of  every  student  educated  in 
colleges  under  American  control,  and  will  probably  see 
to  it  that  those  who  profess  socialist  or  radical  opinions 
shall  get  no  posts.  They  will  insist  upon  the  standard 
of  hypocrisy  which  led  them  to  hound  out  Gorky  when 


190 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


he  visited  the  United  States.  They  will  destroy  beauty 
and  substitute  tidiness.  In  short,  they  will  insist  upon 
China  becoming  as  like  as  possible  to  ‘‘God’s  own 
country,”  except  that  it  will  not  be  allowed  to  keep  the 
wealth  generated  by  its  industries.  The  Chinese  have 
it  in  them  to  give  to  the  world  a new  contribution  to 
civilization  as  valuable  as  that  which  they  gave  in  the 
past.  This  would  be  prevented  by  the  domination  of 
the  Americans,  because  they  believe  their  own  civiliza- 
tion to  be  perfect. 

The  ideal  of  capitalism,  if  it  could  be  achieved,  would 
be  to  destroy  competition  among  capitalists  by  means  of 
trusts,  but  to  keep  alive  competition  among  workers. 
To  some  extent  trade-unionism  has  succeeded  in  di- 
minishing competition  among  wage-earners  within  the 
advanced  industrial  countries ; but  it  has  only  intensified 
the  conflict  between  workers  of  different  races,  particu- 
larly between  the  white  and  yellow  races.7  Under 
the  existing  economic  system,  the  competition  of  cheap 

7 The  attitude  of  white  labor  to  that  of  Asia  is  illustrated 
by  the  following  telegram  which  appeared  in  “The  Times” 
for  April  5.  1922,  from  its  Melbourne  correspondent:  “A  depu- 

tation of  shipwrights  and  allied  trades  complained  to  Mr.  Hughes, 
the  Prime  Minister,  that  four  Commonwealth  ships  had  been 
repaired  at  Antwerp  instead  of  in  Australia,  and  that  two  had 
been  repaired  in  India  by  black  labour  receiving  eight  annas  (8d.) 
a day.  When  the  deputation  reached  the  black  labour  allegation 
Mr.  Hughes  jumped  from  his  chair  and  turned  on  his  interviewers 
with,  ‘Black  labour  be  damned.  Go  to  blithering  blazes.  Don’t 
talk  to  me  about  black  labour.’  Hurrying  from  the  room,  he 
pushed  his  way  through  the  deputation.  ...”  I do  not  gen- 
erally agree  with  Mr.  Hughes,  but  on  this  occasion,  deeply  as 
I deplore  his  language,  I find  myself  in  agreement  with  his  senti- 
ments, assuming  that  the  phrase  “black  labour  be  damned”  is 
meant  to  confer  a blessing. 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  191 


Asiatic  labor  in  America,  Canada,  or  Australia  might 
well  be  harmful  to  white  labor  in  those  countries.  But 
under  socialism  an  influx  of  industrious,  skilled  workers 
in  sparsely  populated  countries  would  be  an  obvious  gain 
to  everybody.  Under  socialism,  the  immigration  of  any 
person  who  produces  more  than  he  or  she  consumes  will 
be  a gain  to  every  other  individual  in  the  community, 
since  it  increases  the  wealth  per  head.  But  under 
capitalism,  owing  to  competition  for  jobs,  a worker  who 
either  produces  much  or  consumes  little  is  the  natural 
enemy  of  the  others;  thus  the  system  makes  for  in- 
efficient work,  and  creates  an  opposition  between  the 
general  interest  and  the  individual  interest  of  the  ■wage- 
earner.  The  case  of  yellow  labor  in  America  and  the 
British  dominions  is  one  of  the  most  unfortunate  in- 
stances of  the  artificial  conflicts  of  interest  produced  by 
the  capitalist  system.  This  whole  question  of  Asiatic 
immigration,  which  is  liable  to  cause  trouble  for  cen- 
turies to  come,  can  only  be  radically  solved  by  socialism, 
since  socialism  alone  can  bring  the  private  interests  of 
workers  in  this  matter  into  harmony  with  the  interests 
of  their  nation  and  of  the  world. 

The  concentration  of  the  world’s  capital  in  a few 
nations,  which,  by  means  of  it,  are  able  to  drain  all  other 
nations  of  their  wealth,  is  obviously  not  a system  by 
which  permanent  peace  can  be  secured  except  through 
the  complete  subjection  of  the  poorer  nations.  In  the 
long  run,  China  will  see  no  reason  to  leave  the  profits 
of  industry  in  the  hands  of  foreigners.  If,  for  the 
present,  Russia  is  successfully  starved  into  submission 
to  foreign  capital,  Russia  also  will,  when  the  time  is 


192 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


ripe,  attempt  a new  rebellion  against  the  world  empire 
of  finance.  I cannot  see,  therefore,  any  establishment 
of  a stable  world  system  as  a result  of  the  syndicate 
formed  at  Washington.  On  the  contrary,  we  may  expect 
that,  when  Asia  has  thoroughly  assimilated  our  economic 
system,  the  Marxian  class  war  will  break  out  in  the  form 
of  a war  between  Asia  and  the  West,  with  America  as 
the  protagonist  of  capitalism,  and  Russia  as  the  cham- 
pion of  Asia  and  socialism.  In  such  a war,  Asia  would 
be  fighting  for  freedom,  but  probably  too  late  to  pre- 
serve the  distinctive  civilizations  which  now  make  Asia 
valuable  to  the  human  family.  Indeed,  the  war  would 
probably  be  so  devastating  that  no  civilization  of  any 
sort  would  survive  it. 

To  sum  up : The  real  government  of  the  world  is  in 

the  hands  of  the  big  financiers,  except  on  questions 
which  rouse  passionate  public  interest.  No  doubt  the 
exclusion  of  Asiatics  from  America  and  the  dominions  is 
due  to  popular  pressure,  and  is  against  the  interests  of 
big  finance.  But  not  many  questions  rouse  so  much 
popular  feeling,  and  among  them  only  a few  are  suf- 
ficiently simple  to  be  incapable  of  misrepresentation  in 
the  interests  of  the  capitalists.  Even  in  such  a case  as 
Asiatic  immigration,  it  is  the  capitalist  system  which 
causes  the  anti-social  interests  of  wage-earners  and  makes 
them  illiberal.  The  existing  system  makes  each  man’s 
individual  interest  opposed,  in  some  vital  point,  to  the 
interest  of  the  whole.  And  what  applies  to  individuals 
applies  also  to  nations;  under  the  existing  economic 
system,  a nation’s  interest  is  seldom  the  same  as  that  of 


PRESENT  FORCES  AND  TENDENCIES  193 


the  world  at  large,  and  then  only  by  accident.  Inter- 
national peace  might  conceivably  be  secured  under  the 
present  system,  but  only  by  a combination  of  the  strong 
to  explot  the  weak.  Such  a combination  is  being  at- 
tempted as  the  outcome  of  Washington;  but  it  can  only 
diminish,  in  the  long  run,  the  little  freedom  now  enjoyed 
by  the  weaker  nations. 

The  essential  evil  of  the  present  system,  as  socialists 
have  pointed  out  over  and  over  again,  is  production  for 
profit  instead  of  use.  A man  or  a company  or  a nation 
produces  goods,  not  in  order  to  consume  them,  but  in 
order  to  sell  them.  Hence  arise  competition  and  ex- 
ploitation and  all  the  evils,  both  in  internal  labor  prob- 
lems and  in  international  relations.  The  development 
of  Chinese  commerce  by  capitalistic  methods  means  an 
increase,  for  the  Chinese,  in  the  prices  of  the  things 
they  export,  which  are  also  the  things  they  chiefly  con- 
sume, and  the  artificial  stimulation  of  new  needs  for 
foreign  goods,  which  places  China  at  the  mercy  of  those 
who  supply  these  goods,  destroys  the  existing  content- 
ment, and  generates  a feverish  pursuit  of  purely  mate- 
rial ends.  In  a socialistic  world,  production  will  be  reg- 
ulated by  the  same  authority  which  represents  the 
needs  of  the  consumers,  and  the  whole  business  of  com- 
petitive buying  and  selling  will  cease.  Until  then,  it  is 
possible  to  have  peace  by  submission  to  exploitation,  or 
some  degree  of  freedom  by  continual  war,  but  it  is  not 
possible  to  have  both  peace  and  freedom.  The  success 
of  the  present  American  policy  may,  for  a time,  secure 
peace,  but  it  will  certainly  not  secure  freedom  for  the 


194 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


weaker  nations,  such  as  the  Chinese.  Only  international 
socialism  can  secure  both;  and,  owing  to  the  stimula- 
tion of  revolt  by  capitalist  oppression,  even  peace  alone 
can  never  be  secure  until  international  socialism  is  es- 
tablished throughout  the  world. 


CHAPTER  XI 


CHINESE  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION  CONTRASTED 

THERE  is  at  present  in  China,  as  we  have  seen  in 
previous  chapters,  a close  contact  between  our 
civilization  and  that  which  is  native  to  the  Celestial  Em- 
pire. It  is  still  a doubtful  question  whether  this  con- 
tact will  breed  a new  civilization  better  than  either  of 
its  parents,  or  whether  it  will  merely  destroy  the  native 
culture  and  replace  it  by  that  of  America.  Contacts  be- 
tween different  civilizations  have  often  in  the  past  proved 
to  be  landmarks  in  human  progress.  Greece  learned 
from  Egypt,  Rome  from  Greece,  the  Arabs  from  the 
Roman  Empire,  medieval  Europe  from  the  Arabs,  and 
Renaissance  Europe  from  the  Byzantines.  In  many 
of  these  cases,  the  pupils  proved  better  than  their  mas- 
ters. In  the  case  of  China,  if  we  regard  the  Chinese 
as  the  pupils,  this  may  be  the  case  again.  In  fact, 
we  have  quite  as  much  to  learn  from  them  as  they 
from  us,  but  there  is  far  less  chance  of  our  learning  it. 
If  I treat  the  Chinese  as  our  pupils,  rather  than 
vice  versa,  it  is  only  because  I fear  we  are  unteach- 
able. 

I propose  in  this  chapter  to  deal  with  the  purely 
cultural  aspects  of  the  questions  raised  by  the  contact 
of  China  with  the  West.  In  the  three  following  chap- 

195 


196 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


ters,  I shall  deal  with  questions  concerning  the  internal 
condition  of  China,  returning  finally  in  a concluding 
chapter,  to  the  hopes  for  the  future  which  are  per- 
missible in  the  present  difficult  situation. 

With  the  exception  of  Spain  and  America  in  the  six- 
teenth century,  I cannot  think  of  any  instance  of  two 
civilization  coming  into  contact  after  such  a long  period 
of  separate  development  as  has  marked  those  of  China 
and  Europe.  Considering  this  extraordinary  separate- 
ness, it  is  surprising  that  mutual  understanding  between 
Europeans  and  Chinese  is  not  more  difficult.  In  order 
to  make  this  point  clear,  it  will  be  worth  while  to  dwell 
for  a moment  on  the  historical  origins  of  the  two  civil- 
izations. 

Western  Europe  and  America  have  a practically 
homogeneous  mental  life,  which  I should  trace  to  three 
sources:  (1)  Greek  culture;  (2)  Jewish  religion  and 
ethics;  (3)  modern  industrialism,  which  itself  is  an 
outcome  of  modern  science.  We  may  take  Plato,  the 
Old  Testament,  and  Galileo  as  representing  these  three 
elements,  which  have  remained  singularly  separable 
down  to  the  present  day.  From  the  Greeks  we  derive 
literature  and  the  arts,  philosophy  and  pure  mathe- 
matics; also  the  more  urbane  portions  of  our  social  out- 
look. From  the  Jews  we  derive  fanatical  belief,  which 
its  friends  call  “faith”;  moral  fervor,  with  the  con- 
ception of  sin ; religious  intolerance,  and  some  part  of 
our  nationalism.  From  science,  as  applied  in  industrial- 
ism, we  derive  power  and  the  sense  of  power,  the  belief 
that  we  are  as  gods,  and  may  justly  be  the  arbiters  of 
life  and  death  for  unscientific  races.  We  derive  also 


CHINESE  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION  197 


the  empirical  method,  by  which  almost  all  real  knowl- 
edge has  been  acquired.  These  three  elements,  I think, 
account  for  most  of  our  mentality. 

No  one  of  these  three  elements  has  had  any  appre- 
ciable part  in  the  development  of  China,  except  that 
Greece  indirectly  influenced  Chinese  painting,  sculp- 
ture and  music.1  China  belongs,  in  the  dawn  of  its 
history,  to  the  great  river  empires,  of  which  Egypt  and 
Babylonia  contributed  to  our  origins,  by  the  influence 
which  they  had  upon  the  Greeks  and  Jews.  Just  as 
these  civilizations  were  rendered  possible  by  the  rich 
alluvial  soil  of  the  Nile,  the  Euphrates,  and  the  Tigris, 
so  the  original  civilization  of  China  was  rendered  possible 
by  the  Yellow  River.  Even  in  the  time  of  Confucius, 
the  Chinese  Empire  did  not  stretch  far  either  to  south 
or  north  of  the  Yellow  River.  But  in  spite  of  this 
similarity  in  physical  and  economic  circumstances,  there 
was  very  little  in  common  between  the  mental  outlook 
of  the  Chinese  and  that  of  the  Egyptians  and  Babylo- 
nians. Lao-Tze  2 and  Confucius,  who  both  belong  to  the 
sixth  century  b.  c.,  have  already  the  characteristics  which 
we  should  regard  as  distinctive  of  the  modern  Chinese. 
People  who  attribute  everything  to  economic  causes 
would  be  hard  put  to  it  to  account  for  the  differences 
between  the  ancient  Chinese  and  the  ancient  Egyptians 
and  Babylonians.  For  my  part,  I have  no  alternative 
theory  to  offer.  I do  not  think  science  can,  at  present, 
account  wholly  for  national  character.  Climate  and 

1 See  Cordier,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  368,  and  Giles,  op.  tit.,  p.  187. 

2 With  regard  to  Lao-Tze,  the  book  which  bears  his  name 
is  of  doubtful  authenticity  and  was  probably  compiled  two 
or  three  centuries  after  his  death  Cf.  Giles,  op.  tit.,  Lecture  V. 


198 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


economic  circumstances  account  for  part,  but  not  tbe 
whole.  Probably  a great  deal  depends  upon  the  char- 
acter of  dominant  individuals  who  happen  to  emerge 
at  a formative  period,  such  as  Moses,  Mohammed,  and 
Confucius. 

The  oldest  known  Chinese  sage  is  Lao-Tze,  the  founder 
of  Taoism.  “Lao-Tze”  is  not  really  a proper  name, 
but  means  merely  “the  old  philosopher.”  He  was 
(according  to  tradition)  an  older  contemporary  of  Con- 
fucius, and  his  philosophy  is  to  my  mind  far  more  in- 
teresting. He  held  that  every  person,  every  animal,  and 
every  thing  has  a certain  way  or  manner  of  behaving 
which  is  natural  to  him,  or  her,  or  it,  and  that  we  ought 
to  conform  to  this  way  ourselves  and  encourage  others  to 
conform  to  it.  “Tao”  means  “way,”  but  used  in  a 
more  or  less  mystical  sense,  as  in  the  text : “I  am  the 

Way  and  the  Truth  and  the  Life.”  I think  he  fancied 
that  death  was  due  to  departing  from  the  “way,”  and 
that  if  we  all  lived  strictly  according  to  nature  we  should 
be  immortal,  like  the  heavenly  bodies.  In  later  times 
Taoism  degenerated  into  mere  magic,  and  was  largely 
concerned  with  the  search  for  the  elixir  of  life.  But  I 
think  the  hope  of  escaping  from  death  was  an  element 
in  Taoist  philosophy  from  the  first. 

Lao-Tze’s  book,  or  rather  the  book  attributed  to  him, 
is  very  short  but  his  ideas  were  developed  by  his  dis- 
ciple Chaung-Tze,  who  is  more  interesting  than  his 
master.  The  philosophy  which  both  advocated  was  one 
of  freedom.  They  thought  ill  of  government,  and  of  all 
interferences  with  nature.  They  complained  of  the 
hurry  of  modern  life,  which  they  contrasted  with  the 


CHINESE  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION  199 


calm,  existence  of  those  whom  they  called  “the  pure 
men  of  old.”  There  is  a flavor  of  mysticism  in  the 
doctrine  of  the  Tao,  because  in  spite  of  the  multiplic- 
ity of  living  things  the  Tao  is  in  some  sense  one,  so 
that  if  all  live  according  to  it  there  will  be  no  strife 
in  the  world.  But  both  sages  have  already  the  Chinese 
characteristics  of  humor,  restraint,  and  under  statement. 
Their  humor  is  illustrated  by  Chuang-Tze’s  account  of 
Po-Lo,  who  “understood  the  management  of  horses,” 
and  trained  them  till  five  out  of  every  ten  died.3  Their 
restraint  and  understatement  are  evident  when  they  are 
compared  with  Western  mystics.  Both  characteristics 
belong  to  all  Chinese  literature  and  art,  and  to  the  con- 
versation of  cultivated  Chinese  in  the  present  day.  All 
classes  in  China  are  fond  of  laughter,  and  never  miss 
a chance  of  a joke.  In  the  educated  classes,  the  humor 
is  sly  and  delicate,  so  that  Europeans  often  fail  to  see 
it,  which  adds  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  Chinese.  Their 
habit  of  understatement  is  remarkable.  I met  one  day 
in  Peking  a middle-aged  man  who  told  me  he  was 
academically  interested  in  the  theory  of  politics;  being 
new  to  the  country,  I took  his  statement  at  its  face 
value,  but  I afterward  discovered  that  he  had  been 
governor  of  a province,  and  had  been  for  many  years 
a very  prominent  politician.  In  Chinese  poetry  there 
is  an  apparent  absence  of  passion,  which  is  due  to  the 
same  practice  of  understatement.  They  consider  that 
a wise  man  should  always  remain  calm,  and,  though 
they  have  their  passionate  moments  (being  in  fact  a 
very  excitable  race),  they  do  not  wish  to  perpetuate 
3 Quoted  in  Chap.  IV,  pp.  82. 


200 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


them  in  art,  because  they  think  ill  of  them.  Our  roman- 
tic movement,  which  led  people  to  like  vehemence,  has, 
so  far  as  I know,  no  analogue  in  their  literature.  Their 
old  music,  some  of  which  is  very  beautiful,  makes  so 
little  noise  that  one  can  only  just  hear  it.  In  art  they 
aim  at  being  exquisite,  and  in  life  at  being  reasonable. 
There  is  no  admiration  for  the  ruthless  strong  man,  or 
for  the  unrestrained  expression  of  passion.  After  the 
more  blatant  life  of  the  West,  one  misses  at  first  all 
the  effects  at  which  they  are  aiming;  but  gradually 
the  beauty  and  dignity  of  their  existence  become  visible, 
so  that  the  foreigners  who  have  lived  longest  in  China 
are  those  who  love  the  Chinese  best. 

The  Taoists,  though  they  survive  as  magicians,  were 
entirely  ousted  from  the  favor  of  the  educated  classes 
by  Confucianism.  I must  confess  that  I am  unable 
to  appreciate  the  merits  of  Confucius.  His  writings  are 
largely  occupied  with  trivial  points  of  etiquette,  and  his 
main  concern  is  to  teach  people  how  to  behave  correctly 
on  various  occasions.  When  one  compares  him,  how- 
ever, with  the  traditional  religious  teachers  of  some 
other  ages  and  races,  one  must  admit  that  he  has  great 
merits,  even  if  they  are  mainly  negative.  His  system, 
as  developed  by  his  followers,  is  one  of  pure  ethics,  with- 
out religious  dogma ; it  has  not  given  rise  to  a powerful 
priesthood,  and  it  has  not  led  to  persecution.  It  cer- 
tainly has  succeeded  in  producing  a whole  nation 
possessed  of  exquisite  manners  and  perfect  courtesy. 
Nor  is  Chinese  courtesy  merely  conventional ; it  is  quite 
as  reliable  in  situations  for  which  no  precedent  has 
been  provided.  And  it  is  not  confined  to  one  class;  it 


CHINESE  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION  201 


exists  even  in  the  humblest  coolie.  It  is  humiliating  to 
watch  the  brutal  insolence  of  white  men  received  by 
the  Chinese  with  a quiet  dignity  which  cannot  demean 
itself  to  answer  rudeness  with  rudeness.  Europeans 
often  regard  this  as  weakness,  hut  it  is  really  strength, 
the  strength  by  which  the  Chinese  have  hitherto  con- 
quered all  their  conquerors. 

There  is  one,  and  only  one,  important  foreign  ele- 
ment in  the  traditional  civilization  of  China,  and  that 
is  Buddhism.  Buddhism  came  to  China  from  India 
in  the  early  centuries  of  the  Christian  era,  and  acquired 
a definite  place  in  the  religion  of  the  country.  We, 
with  the  intolerant  outlook  which  we  have  taken  over 
from  the  Jews,  imagine  that  if  a man  adopts  one 
religion  he  cannot  adopt  another.  The  dogmas  of 
Christianity  and  Mohammedanism,  in  their  orthodox 
forms,  are  so  framed  that  no  man  can  accept  both.  But 
in  China  this  incompatibility  does  not  exist ; a man  may 
be  both  a Buddhist  and  a Confueian,  because  nothing 
in  either  is  incompatible  with  the  other.  In  Japan, 
similarly,  most  people  are  both  Buddhists  and  Shin- 
toists.  Nevertheless  there  is  a temperamental  difference 
between  Buddhism  and  Confucianism,  which  will  cause 
any  individual  to  lay  stress  on  one  or  the  other  even  if 
he  accepts  both.  Buddhism  is  a religion  in  the  sense  in 
which  we  understand  the  word.  It  has  mystic  doctrines 
and  a way  of  salvation  and  a future  life.  It  has  a 
message  to  the  world  intended  to  cure  the  despair  which 
it  regards  as  natural  to  those  who  have  no  religious 
faith.  It  assumes  an  instinctive  pessimism  only  to  be 
cured  by  some  gospel.  Confucianism  has  nothing  of 


202 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


all  this.  It  assumes  people  fundamentally  at  peace 
with  the  world,  wanting  only  instruction  as  to  how  to 
live,  not  encouragement  to  live  at  all.  And  its  ethical 
instruction  is  not  based  upon  any  metaphysical  or  re- 
ligious dogma;  it  is  purely  mundane.  The  result  of  the 
coexistence  of  these  two  religions  in  China  has  been 
that  the  more  religious  and  contemplative  natures  turned 
to  Buddhism,  while  the  active  administrative  type  was 
content  with  Confucianism,  which  was  always  the  offi- 
cial teaching,  in  which  candidates  for  the  civil  service 
were  examined.  The  result  is  that  for  many  ages  the 
government  of  China  has  been  in  the  hands  of  literary 
skeptics,  whose  administration  has  been  lacking  in  those 
qualities  of  energy  and  destructiveness  which  Western 
nations  demand  of  their  rulers.  In  fact,  they  have 
conformed  very  closely  to  the  maxims  of  Chuang-Tze. 
The  result  has  been  that  the  population  has  been  happy 
except  where  civil  war  brought  misery;  that  subject 
nations  have  been  allowed  autonomy;  and  that  foreign 
nations  have  had  no  need  to  fear  China,  in  spite  of  its 
immense  population  and  resources. 

Comparing  the  civilization  of  China  with  that  of 
Europe,  one  finds  in  China  most  of  what  was  to  be 
found  in  Greece,  but  nothing  of  the  other  two  elements 
of  our  civilization,  namely  Judaism  and  science.  China 
is  practically  destitute  of  religion,  not  only  in  the 
upper  classes,  but  throughout  the  population.  There  is 
a very  definite  ethical  code,  but  it  is  not  fierce  or  perse- 
cuting, and  does  not  contain  the  notion  “sin.”  Except 
quite  recently,  through  European  influence,  there  has 
been  no  science  and  no  industrialism. 


CHINESE  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION  203 


What  will  be  the  outcome  of  the  contact  of  this 
ancient  civilization  with  the  West?  I am  not  thinking 
of  the  political  or  economic,  .but  of  the  effect  on  the 
Chinese  mental  outlook.  It  is  difficult  to  dissociate  the 
two  questions  altogether,  because  of  course  the  cultural 
contact  with  the  West  must  be  affected  by  the  nature 
of  the  political  and  economic  contact.  Nevertheless,  I 
wish  to  consider  the  cultural  question  as  far  as  I can 
in  isolation. 

There  is,  in  China,  a great  eagerness  to  acquire  West- 
ern learning,  not  simply  in  order  to  acquire  national 
strength  and  be  able  to  resist  Western  aggression,  but 
because  a very  large  number  of  people  consider  learn- 
ing a good  thing  in  itself.  It  is  traditional  in  China 
to  place  a high  value  on  knowledge,  but  in  old  days  the 
knowledge  sought  was  only  of  the  classical  literature. 
Nowadays  it  is  generally  realized  that  Western  knowl- 
edge is  more  useful.  Many  students  go  every  year  to 
universities  in  Europe,  and  still  more  to  America,  to 
learn  science  or  economics  or  law  or  political  theory. 
These  men,  when  they  return  to  China,  mostly  become 
teachers  or  civil  servants  or  journalists  or  politicians. 
They  are  rapidly  modernizing  the  Chinese  outlook,  es- 
pecially in  the  educated  classes. 

The  traditional  civilization  of  China  had  become  un- 
progressive, and  had  ceased  to  produce  much  of  value 
in  the  way  of  art  and  literature.  This  was  not  due,  I 
think,  to  any  decadence  in  the  race,  but  merely  to  lack 
of  new  material.  The  influx  of  Western  knowledge 
provides  just  the  stimulus  that  was  needed.  Chinese 
students  are  able  and  extraordinarily  keen.  Higher 


204 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


education  suffers  from  lack  of  funds  and  absence  of 
libraries,  but  does  not  suffer  from  any  lack  of  the  finest 
human  material.  Although  Chinese  civilization  has 
hitherto  been  deficient  in  science,  it  never  contained  any- 
thing hostile  to  science,  and  therefore  the  spread  of 
scientific  knowledge  encounters  no  such  obstacles  as  the 
church  put  in  its  way  in  Europe.  I have  no  doubt  that 
if  the  Chinese  could  get  a stable  government  and  suffi- 
cient funds,  they  would,  within  the  next  thirty  years, 
begin  to  produce  remarkable  work  in  science.  It  is  quite 
likely  that  they  might  outstrip  us,  because  they  come 
with  fresh  zest  and  with  all  the  ardor  of  a renaissance. 
In  fact,  the  enthusiasm  for  learning  in  Young  China 
reminds  one  constantly  of  the  renaissance  spirit  in  fif- 
teenth-century Italy. 

It  is  remarkable,  as  distinguishing  the  Chinese  from 
the  Japanese,  that  the  things  they  wish  to  learn  from 
us  are  not  those  that  bring  wealth  or  military  strength, 
but  rather  those  that  have  either  an  ethical  and  social 
value,  or  a purely  intellectual  interest.  They  are  not 
by  any  means  uncritical  of  our  civilization.  Some  of 
them  told  me  that  they  were  less  critical  before  1914, 
but  that  the  war  made  them  think  there  must  be  im- 
perfection in  the  Western  manner  of  life.  The  habit  of 
looking  to  the  West  for  wisdom  was,  however,  very 
strong,  and  some  of  the  younger  ones  thought  that 
Bolshevism  could  give  what  they  were  looking  for. 
That  hope  also  must  be  suffering  disappointment,  and 
before  long  they  will  realize  that  they  must  work  out 
their  own  salvation  by  means  of  a new  synthesis.  The 
Japanese  adopted  our  faults  and  kept  their  own,  but  it 


CHINESE  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION  205 


is  impossible  to  hope  that  the  Chinese  will  make  the 
opposite  selection,  keeping  their  own  merits  and  adopt- 
ing ours. 

The  distinctive  merit  of  our  civilization,  I should  say, 
is  the  scientific  method;  the  distinctive  merit  of  the 
Chinese  a just  conception  of  the  ends  of  life.  It  is 
these  two  that  one  must  hope  to  see  gradually  uniting. 

Lao-Tze  describes  the  operation  of  Tao  as  “produc- 
tion without  possession,  action  without  self-assertion, 
development  without  domination.”  I think  one  could 
derive  from  these  words  a conception  of  the  ends  of 
life  as  reflective  Chinese  see  them  and  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  they  are  very  different  from  the  ends  which 
most  white  men  set  before  themselves.  Possession,  self- 
assertion,  domination,  are  eagerly  sought,  both  nation- 
ally and  individually.  They  have  been  erected  into  a 
philosophy  by  Nietzsche,  and  Nietzsche’s  disciples  are 
not  confined  to  Germany. 

But,  it  will  be  said,  you  have  been  comparing  Western 
practice  with  Chinese  theory ; if  you  had  compared 
Western  theory  with  Chinese  practice,  the  balance  would 
have  come  out  quite  differently.  There  is,  of  course, 
a great  deal  of  truth  in  this.  Possession,  which  is  one 
of  the  three  things  that  Lao-Tze  wishes  us  to  forego,  is 
certainly  dear  to  the  heart  of  the  average  Chinaman. 
As  a race,  they  are  tenacious  of  money — not  perhaps 
more  so  than  the  French,  but  certainly  more  than  the 
English  or  the  Americans.  Their  politics  are  corrupt, 
and  their  powerful  men  make  money  in  disgraceful 
ways.  All  this  it  is  impossible  to  deny. 

Nevertheless,  as  regards  the  other  two  evils,  self- 


206 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


assertion  and  domination,  I notice  a definite  superior- 
ity to  ourselves  in  Chinese  practice.  There  is  much 
less  desire  than  among  the  white  races  to  tyrannize 
over  other  people.  The  weakness  of  China  internation- 
ally is  quite  as  much  due  to  this  virtue  as  to  the  vices 
of  corruption  and  so  on  which  are  usually  assigned  as 
the  sole  reason.  If  any  nation  in  the  world  could  ever 
be  “too  proud  to  fight,”  that  nation  would  be  China. 
The  natural  Chinese  attitude  is  one  of  tolerance  and 
friendliness,  showing  courtesy  and  expecting  it  in  re- 
turn. If  the  Chinese  chose,  they  could  be  the  most 
powerful  nation  in  the  world.  But  they  only  desire 
freedom,  not  domination.  It  is  not  improbable  that 
other  nations  may  compel  them  to  fight  for  their  free- 
dom, and  if  so,  they  may  lose  their  virtues  and  acquire 
a taste  for  empire.  But  at  present,  though  they  have 
been  an  imperial  race  for  tw'o  thousand  years,  their  love 
of  empire  is  extraordinarily  slight. 

Although  there  have  been  many  wars  in  China,  the 
natural  outlook  of  the  Chinese  is  very  pacifistic.  I do 
not  know  of  any  other  country  where  a poet  would 
have  chosen,  as  Po-Chui  did  in  one  of  the  poems  trans- 
lated by  Mr.  Waley,  called  by  him  “The  Old  Man  with 
the  Broken  Arm,”  to  make  a hero  of  a recruit  who 
maimed  himself  to  escape  military  service.  Their  paci- 
fism is  rooted  in  their  contemplative  outlook,  and  in 
the  fact  that  they  do  not  desire  to  change  whatever 
they  see.  They  take  a pleasure — as  their  pictures  show 
— in  observing  characteristic  manifestations  of  differ- 
ent kinds  of  life,  and  they  have  no  wish  to  reduce 
everything  to  a preconceived  pattern.  They  have  not 


CHINESE  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION  207 


the  ideal  of  progress  which  dominates  the  Western 
nations,  and  affords  a rationalization  of  our  active  im- 
pulses. Progress  is,  of  course,  a very  modern  ideal  even 
with  us;  it  is  part  of  what  we  owe  to  science  and  in- 
dustrialism. The  cultivated  conservative  Chinese  of  the 
present  day  talk  exactly  as  their  earliest  sages  write. 
If  one  points  out  to  them  that  this  shows  how  little  prog- 
ress there  has  been,  they  will  say:  “Why  seek  prog- 

ress when  you  already  enjoy  what  is  excellent?”  At 
first,  this  point  of  view  seems  to  a European  unduly 
indolent;  but  gradually  doubts  as  to  one’s  own  wisdom 
grow  up,  and  one  begins  to  think  that  much  of  what  we 
call  progress  is  only  restless  change,  bringing  us  no 
nearer  to  any  desirable  goal. 

It  is  interesting  to  contrast  what  the  Chinese  have 
sought  in  the  West  with  what  the  West  has  sought  in 
China.  The  Chinese  in  the  West  seek  knowledge,  in 
the  hope — which  I fear  is  usually  vain — that  knowledge 
may  prove  a gateway  to  wisdom.  White  men  have  gone 
to  China  with  three  motives:  to  fight,  to  make  money, 
and  to  convert  the  Chinese  to  our  religion.  The  last  of 
these  motives  has  the  merit  of  being  idealistic,  and  has 
inspired  many  heroic  lives.  But  the  soldier,  the  mer- 
chant, and  the  missonary  are  alike  concerned  to  stamp 
our  civilization  upon  the  world;  they  are  all  three,  in 
a certain  sense,  pugnacious.  The  Chinese  have  no  wish 
to  convert  us  to  Confucianism;  they  say  “religions 
are  many,  but  reason  is  one,”  and  with  that  they  are 
content  to  let  us  go  our  way.  They  are  good  merchants, 
but  their  methods  are  quite  different  from  those  of 
European  merchants  in  China,  who  are  perpetually 


208 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


seeking  concessions,  monopolies,  railways,  and  mines, 
and  endeavoring  to  get  their  claims  supported  by  gun- 
boats. The  Chinese  are  not,  as  a rule,  good  soldiers, 
because  the  causes  for  which  they  are  asked  to  fight  are 
not  worth  fighting  for,  and  they  know  it.  But  that  is 
only  a proof  of  their  reasonableness. 

I think  the  tolerance  of  the  Chinese  is  in  excess  of 
anything  that  Europeans  can  imagine  from  their  ex- 
perience at  home.  We  imagine  ourselves  tolerant,  be- 
cause we  are  more  so  than  our  ancestors.  But  we  still 
practise  political  and  social  persecution,  and  what  is 
more,  we  are  firmly  persuaded  that  our  civilization  and 
our  way  of  life  are  immeasurably  better  than  any  other, 
so  that  when  we  come  across  a nation  like  the  Chinese, 
we  are  convinced  that  the  kindest  thing  we  can  do  to 
them  is  to  make  them  like  ourselves.  I believe  this  to  be 
a profound  mistake.  It  seemed  to  me  that  the  average 
Chinaman,  even  if  he  is  miserably  poor,  is  happier  than 
the  average  Englishman,  and  is  happier  because  the 
nation  is  built  upon  a more  humane  and  civilized  out- 
look than  our  own.  Restlessness  and  pugnacity  not  only 
cause  obvious  evils,  but  fill  our  lives  with  discontent,  in- 
capacitate us  for  the  enjoyment  of  beauty,  and  make 
us  almost  incapable  of  the  contemplative  virtues.  In 
this  respect  we  have  grown  rapidly  worse  during  the 
last  hundred  years.  I do  not  deny  that  the  Chinese 
go  too  far  in  the  other  direction;  but  for  that  very 
reason  I think  contact  between  East  and  West  is  likely 
to  be  fruitful  to  both  parties.  They  may  learn  from 
us  the'  indespensable  minimum  of  practical  efficiency, 
and  we  may  learn  from  them  something  of  that  con- 


CHINESE  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION  209 


templative  wisdom  which  has  enabled  them  to  persist 
while  all  the  other  nations  of  antiquity  have  perished. 

When  I went  to  China,  I went  to  teach ; but  every  day 
that  I stayed  I thought  less  of  what  I had  to  teach  them 
and  more  of  what  I had  to  learn  from  them.  Among 
Europeans  who  had  lived  a long  time  in  China,  I found 
this  attitude  not  uncommon;  but  among  those  whose 
stay  is  short,  or  who  go  only  to  make  money,  it  is  sadly 
rare.  It  is  rare  because  the  Chinese  do  not  excel  in  the 
things  we  really  value — military  prowess  and  industrial 
enterprise.  But  those  who  value  wisdom  or  beauty,  or 
even  the  simple  enjoyment  of  life,  will  find  more  of 
these  things  in  China  than  in  the  distracted  and  tur- 
bulent West,  and  will  be  happy  to  live  where  such  things 
are  valued.  I wish  I could  hope  that  China,  in  return 
for  our  scientific  knowledge,  may  give  us  something  of 
her  large  tolerance  and  contemplative  peace  of  mind. 


CHAPTER  XII 


THE  CHINESE  CHARACTER 

THERE  is  a theory  among  Occidentals  that  the 
Chinaman  is  inscrutable,  full  of  secret  thoughts, 
and  impossible  for  us  to  understand.  It  may  be  that 
a greater  experience  of  China  would  have  brought  me 
to  share  this  opinion;  but  I could  see  nothing  to  sup- 
port it  during  the  time  when  I was  working  in  that 
country.  I talked  to  the  Chinese  as  I should  have 
talked  to  English  people,  and  they  answered  me  much 
as  English  people  would  have  answered  a Chinese  whom 
they  considered  educated  and  not  wholly  unintelligent. 
I do  not  believe  in  the  myth  of  the  ‘‘subtle  Oriental’': 
I am  convinced  that  in  a game  of  mutual  deception  an 
Englishman  or  an  American  can  beat  a Chinese  nine 
times  out  of  ten.  But,  as  many  comparatively  poor  Chi- 
nese have  dealings  with  rich  white  men,  the  game  is 
often  played  only  on  one  side.  Then,  no  doubt,  the 
white  man  is  deceived  and  swindled ; but  not  more  than 
a Chinese  mandarin  would  be  in  London. 

One  of  the  most  remarkable  things  about  the  Chinese 
is  their  power  of  securing  the  affection  of  foreigners. 
Almost  all  Europeans  like  China,  both  those  who  come 
only  as  tourists  and  those  who  live  there  for  many 

210 


THE  CHINESE  CHARACTER 


211 


years.  In  spite  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  I 
can  recall  hardly  a single  Englishman  in  the  Far 
East  -who  liked  the  Japanese  as  well  as  the  Chi- 
nese. Those  who  have  lived  long  among  them  tend 
to  acquire  their  outlook  and  their  standards.  New 
arrivals  are  struck  by  obvious  evils:  the  beggars,  the 
terrible  poverty,  the  prevalence  of  disease,  the  anarchy 
and  corruption  in  politics.  Every  energetic  Westerner 
feels  at  first  a strong  desire  to  reform  these  evils,  and  of 
course  they  ought  to  be  reformed. 

But  the  Chinese,  even  those  who  are  the  victims  of 
preventable  misfortunes,  show  a vast  passive  indiffer- 
ence to  the  excitement  of  the  foreigners ; they  wait  for  it 
to  go  off,  like  the  effervescence  of  soda-water.  And 
gradually  strange  hesitations  creep  into  the  mind  of 
the  bewildered  traveler;  after  a period  of  indignation, 
he  begins  to  doubt  all  the  maxims  he  has  hitherto  ac- 
cepted without  question.  Is  it  really  wise  to  be  al- 
ways guarding  against  future  misfortune?  Is  it  pru- 
dent to  lose  all  enjoyment  of  the  present  through  think- 
ing of  the  disasters  that  may  come  at  some  future  date  ? 
Should  our  lives  be  passed  in  building  a mansion  that 
we  shall  never  have  leisure  to  inhabit? 

The  Chinese  answer  these  questions  in  the  negative, 
and  therefore  have  to  put  up  with  poverty,  disease,  and 
anarchy.  But,  to  compensate  for  these  evils,  they  have 
retained,  as  industrial  nations  have  not,  the  capacity 
for  civilized  enjoyment,  for  leisure  and  laughter,  for 
pleasure  in  sunshine  and  philosophical  discourse.  The 
Chinese,  of  all  classes,  are  more  laughter-loving  than  any 
other  race  with  which  I am  acquainted ; they  find  amuse- 


212 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


ment  in  everything,  and  a dispute  can  always  be  softened 
by  a joke. 

I remember  one  hot  day  when  a party  of  us  were  cross- 
ing the  hills  in  chairs — the  way  was  rough  and  very 
steep,  the  work  for  the  coolies  very  severe.  At  the 
highest  point  of  our  journey,  we  stopped  for  ten  min- 
utes to  let  the  men  rest.  Instantly  they  all  sat  in  a row, 
brought  out  their  pipes,  and  began  to  laugh  among  them- 
selves as  if  they  had  not  a care  in  the  world.  In  any 
country  that  had  learned  the  virtue  of  forethought,  they 
would  have  devoted  the  moments  to  complaining  of  the 
heat,  in  order  to  increase  their  tip.  We,  being  Euro- 
peans, spent  the  time  worrying  whether  the  automobile 
would  be  waiting  for  us  at  the  right  place.  Well-to-do 
Chinese  would  have  started  a discussion  as  to  whether 
the  universe  moves  in  cycles  or  progresses  by  a rectilinear 
motion;  or  they  might  have  set  to  work  to  consider 
whether  the  truly  virtuous  man  shows  complete  self-ab- 
negation, or  may,  on  occasion,  consider  his  own  interest. 

One  comes  across  white  men  occasionally  who  suffer 
under  the  delusion  that  China  is  not  a civilized  country. 
Such  men  have  quite  forgotten  what  constitutes  civiliza- 
tion. It  is  true  that  there  are  no  trams  in  Peking, 
and  that  the  electric  light  is  poor.  It  is  true  that  there 
are  places  full  of  beauty,  which  Europeans  itch  to  make 
hideous  by  digging  up  coal.  It  is  true  that  the  educated 
Chinaman  is  better  at  writing  poetry  than  at  remember- 
ing the  sort  of  facts  which  can  be  looked  up  in 
“Whitaker’s  Almanac.”  A European,  in  recommend- 
ing a place  of  residence,  will  tell  you  that  it  has  a good 
train  service;  the  best  quality  he  can  conceive  in  any 


THE  CHINESE  CHARACTER 


213 


place  is  that  it  should  be  easy  to  get  away  from.  But 
a Chinaman  will  tell  you  nothing  about  the  trains;  if 
you  ask,  he  will  tell  you  wrong.  What  he  tells  you  is 
that  there  is  a palace  built  by  an  ancient  emperor,  and 
a retreat  in  a lake  for  scholars  weary  of  the  world, 
founded  by  a famous  poet  of  the  Tang  dynasty.  It  is 
this  outlook  that  strikes  the  Westerner  as  barbaric. 

The  Chinese,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  have  an 
imperturbable  quiet  dignity,  which,  is  usually  not  de- 
stroyed even  by  a.-  European  education.  They  are  not 
self-assertive,  either  individually  or  nationally;  their 
pride  is  too  profound  for  self-assertion.  They  admit 
China’s  military  weakness  in  comparison  with  foreign 
powers,  but  they  do  not  consider  efficiency  in  homicide 
the  most  important  quality  in  a man  or  a nation.  I 
think  that,  at  bottom,  they  almost  all  believe  that  China 
is  the  greatest  nation  in  the  world,  and  has  the  finest 
civilization.  A Westerner  cannot  be  expected  to  ac- 
cept this  view,  because  it  is  based  on  traditions  utterly 
different  from  his  own.  But  gradually  one  comes  to 
feel  that  it  is,  at  any  rate,  not  an  absurd  view;  that  it 
is,  in  fact,  the  logical  outcome  of  a self-consistent  stand- 
ard of  values.  The  typical  Westerner  wishes  to  be  the 
cause  of  as  many  changes  as  possible  in  his  environment ; 
the  typical  Chinaman  wishes  to  enjoy  as  much  and  as 
delicately  as'  possible.  This  difference  is  at  the  bottom 
of  most  of  the  contrast  between  China  and  the  English- 
speaking  world. 

We  in  the  West  make  a fetish  of  “ progress,”  which 
is  the  ethical  camouflage  of  the  desire  to  be  the  cause 
of  changes.  If  we  are  asked,  for  instance,  whether 


214 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


machinery  has-  really  improved  the  world,  the  question 
strikes  us  as  foolish:  it  has  brought  great  changes  and 
therefore  great  “progress.”  What  we  believe  to  be 
a love  of  progress  is  really,  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  a 
love  of  power,  an  enjoyment  of  the  feeling  that  by  our 
fiat  we  can  make  things  different.  For  the  sake  of  this 
pleasure,  a young  American  will  work  so  hard  that,  by 
the  time  he  has  acquired  his  millions,  he  has  become  a 
victim  of  dyspepsia,  compelled  to  live  on  toast  and 
water,  and  to  be  a mere  spectator  of  the  feasts  that  he 
offers  to  his  guests.  But  he  consoles  himself  with  the 
thought  that  he  can  control  politics,  and  provoke  or  pre- 
vent wars  as  may  suit  his  investments.  It  is  this 
temperament  that  makes  Western  nations  “progres- 
sive. ’ ’ 

There  are,  of  course,  ambitious  men  in  China,  but 
they  are  less  common  than  among  ourselves.  And  their 
ambition  takes  a different  form — not  a better  form, 
but  one  produced  by  the  preference  of  enjoyment  to 
power.  It  is  a natural  result  of  this  preference  that 
avarice  is  a wide-spread  failing  of  the  Chinese.  Money 
brings  the  means  of  enjoyment;  therefore  money  is 
passionately  desired.  With  us,  money  is  desired  chiefly 
as  a means  to  power ; politicians,  who  can  acquire  power 
without  much  money,  are  often  content  to  remain  poor. 
In  China  the  tuchuns  (military  governors),  who  have 
the  real  power,  almost  always  use  it  for  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  amassing  a fortune.  Their  object  is  to  escape 
to  Japan  at  a suitable  moment,  with  sufficient  plunder 
to  enable  them  to  enjoy  life  quietly  for  the  rest  of  their 
days.  The  fact  that  in  escaping  they  lose  power  does 


THE  CHINESE  CHARACTER 


215 


not  trouble  them  in  the  least.  It  is,  of  course,  obvious 
that  such  politicians,  who  spread  devastation  only  in  the 
provinces  committed  to  their  care,  are  far  less  harmful 
to  the  world  than  our  own,  who  ruin  whole  continents  in 
order  to  win  an  election  campaign. 

The  corruption  and  anarchy  in  Chinese  politics  do 
much  less  harm  than  one  would  be  inclined  to  expect. 
But  for  the  predatory  desires  of  the  great  powers — es- 
pecially Japan — the  harm  would  be  much  less  than  is 
done  by  our  own  “ efficient  ” governments.  Nine  tenths 
of  the  activities  of  a modern  government  are  harmful; 
therefore  the  worse  they  are  performed,  the  better.  In 
China,  where  the  government  is  lazy,  corrupt,  and  stu- 
pid, there  is  a degree  of  individual  liberty  which  has 
been  wholly  lost  in  the  rest  of  the  world. 

The  laws  are  just  as  bad  as  elsewhere  ; occasionally, 
under  foreign  pressure,  a man  is  imprisoned  for  Bolshe- 
vist propaganda,  just  as  he  might  be  in  England  or 
America.  But  this  is  quite  exceptional;  as  a rule,  in 
practice,  there  is  very  little  interference  with  free 
speech  and  a free  press.1  The  individual  does  not 
feel  obliged  to  follow  the  herd,  as  he  has  in  Europe 
since  1914,  and  America  since  1917.  Men  still  think 
for  themselves,  and  are  not  afraid  to  announce  the  con- 
clusions a.t  which  they  arrive.  Individualism  has  per- 
ished in  the  West,  but  in  China  it  survives,  for  good 
as  well  as  for  evil.  Self-respect  and  personal  dignity 
are  possible  for  every  coolie  in  China,  to  a degree  which 

1 This  vexes  the  foreigners,  who  are  attempting  to  establish 
a very  severe  press  censorship  in  Shanghai.  See  “The  Shanghai 
Printed  Matter  Bve-Law.”  Hollington  K.  Tong,  “Review  of  the 
Far  East,”  April  15,  1922. 


216 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


is,  among  ourselves,  possible  only  for  a few  leading 
financiers. 

The  business  of  “ saving,  face,”  which  often  strikes 
foreigners  in  China  as  ludicrous,  is  only  the  carrying-out 
of  respect  for  personal  dignity  in  the  sphere  of  social 
manners.  Everybody  has  ‘ ‘ face,  even  the  humblest  beg- 
gar; there  are  humiliations  that  you  must  not  inflict 
upon  him,  if  you  are  not  to  outrage  the  Chinese  ethical 
code.  If  you  speak  to  a Chinaman  in  a way  that  trans- 
gresses the  code,  he  will  laugh,  because  your  words  must 
be  taken  as  spoken  in  jest  if  they  are  not  to  constitute 
an  offense.. 

Once  I thought  that  the  students  to  whom  I was  lectur- 
ing were  not  as  industrious  as  they  might  be  and  I told 
them  so  in  just  the  same  words  that  I should  have 
used  to  English  students  in  the  same  circumstances. 
But  soon  I found  I was  making  a mistake.  They  all 
laughed  uneasily,  which  surprised  me  until  I saw  the 
reason.  Chinese  life,  even  among  the  most  modern- 
ized, is  far  more  polite  than  anything  to  which  we  are 
accustomed.  This,  of  course,  interferes  with  efficiency, 
and  also  (what  is  more  serious)  with  sincerity  and  truth 
in  personal  relations.  If  I were  Chinese,  I should  wish 
to  see  it  mitigated.  But,  to  those  who  suffer  from  the 
brutalities  of  the  West,  Chinese  urbanity  is  very  restful. 
Whether  on  the  balance  it  is  better  or  worse  than  our 
frankness,  I shall  not  venture  to  decide. 

The  Chinese  remind  one  of  the  English  in  their  love 
of  compromise  and  in  their  habit  of  bowing  to  public 
opinion.  Seldom  is  a conflict  pushed  to  its  ultimate 
brutal  issue.  The  treatment  of  the  Manchu  emperor 


THE  CHINESE  CHARACTER 


217 


may  be  taken  as  a case  in  point.  When  a Western 
country  becomes  a republic,  it  is  customary  to  cut  of! 
the  head  of  the  deposed  monarch,  or  at  least  to  cause 
him  to  fly  the  country.  But  the  Chinese  have  left  the 
emperor  his  title,  his  beautiful  palace,  his  troops  of 
eunuchs,  and  an  income  of  several  million  dollars  a 
year.  He  is  a boy  of  sixteen,  living  peaceably  in  the 
Forbidden  City.  Once,  in  the  course  of  a civil  war, 
he  was  nominally  restored  to  power  for  a few  days; 
but  he  was  desposed  again,  without  being  in  any  way 
punished  for  the  use  to  which  he  had  been  put. 

Public  opinion  is  a very  real  force  in  China,  when 
it  can  be  roused.  It  was,  by  all  accounts,  mainly  re- 
sponsible for  the  downfall  of  the  An  Fu  party  in  the 
summer  of  1920.  This  party  was  pro- Japanese  and  was 
accepting  loans  from  Japan.  Hatred  of  Japan  is  the 
strongest  and  most  wide-spread  of  political  passions  in 
China,  and  it  was  stirred  up  by  the  students  in  fiery 
orations.  The  An  Fu  party  had,  at  first,  a great  pre- 
ponderance of  military  strength ; but  their  soldiers 
melted  away  when  they  came  to  understand  the  cause 
for  which  they  were  expected  to  fight.  In  the  end,  the 
opponents  of  the  An  Fu  party  were  able  to  enter  Peking 
and  change  the  goverment  almost  without  firing  a shot. 

The  same  influence  of  public  opinion  was  decisive 
in  the  teachers’  strike,  which  was  on  the  point  of  being 
settled  when  I left  Peking.  The  government,  which  is 
always  impecunious,  owing  to  corruption,  had  left  its 
teachers  unpaid  for  many  months.  At  last  they  struck 
to  enforce  payment,  and  went  on  a peaceful  deputation 
to  the  government,  accompanied  by  many  students. 


218 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


There  was  a clash,  with  the  soldiers  and  police,  and  many 
teachers  and  students  were  more  or  less  severely 
wounded.  This  led  to  a terrific  outcry,  because  the  love 
of  education  in  China  is  profound  and  wide-spread. 
The  newspapers  clamored  for  revolution.  The  govern- 
ment had  just  spent  nine  million  dollars  in  corrupt 
payments  to  three  tucliwns  who  had  descended  upon  the 
capital  to  extort  blackmail.  It  could  not  find  any  color- 
able pretext  for  refusing  the  few  hundred  thousands  re- 
quired by  the  teachers,  and  it  capitulated  in  panic.  I 
do  not  think  there  is  any  Anglo-Saxon  country  where 
the  interests  of  teachers  would  have  roused  the  same  de- 
gree of  public  feeling. 

Nothing  astonishes  a European  more  in  the  Chinese 
than  their  patience.  The  educated  Chinese  are  well 
aware  of  the  foreign  menace.  They  realize  acutely  what 
the  Japanese  have  done  in  Manchuria  and  Shantung. 
They  are  aware  that  the  English  in  Hong-Kong  are  do- 
ing their  utmost  to  bring  to  naught  the  Canton  attempt 
to  introduce  good  government  in  the  South.  They  know 
that  all  the  great  powers,  without  exception,  look  with 
greedy  eyes  upon  the  undeveloped  resources  of  their 
country,  especially  its  coal  and  iron.  They  have  before 
them  the  example  of  Japan,  which,  by  developing  a 
brutal  militarism,  a cast-iron  discipline,  and  a new  re- 
actionary religion,  has  succeeded  in  holding  at  bay  the 
fierce  lusts  of  1 1 civilized 9 ’ industrialists.  Yet  they 
neither  copy  Japan  nor  submit  tamely  to  foreign  domin- 
ation. They  think  not  in  decades,  but  in  centuries. 
They  have  been  conquered  before,  first  by  the  Tartars 
and  then  by  the  Manchus;  but  in  both  cases  they  ab- 


THE  CHINESE  CHARACTER 


219 


sorbed  their  conquerors.  Chinese  civilization  persisted, 
unchanged;  and  after  a few  generations  the  invaders 
became  more  Chinese  than  their  subjects. 

Manchuria  is  a rather  empty  country,  with  abundant 
room  for  colonization.  The  Japanese  assert  that  they 
need  colonies  for  their  surplus  population,  yet  the 
Chinese  immigrants  into  Manchuria  exceed  the  Japanese 
a hundredfold.  Whatever  may  be  the  temporary 
political  status  of  Manchuria,  it  will  remain  a part  of 
Chinese  civilization,  and  can  be  recovered  whenever 
Japan  happens  to  be  in  difficulties.  The  Chinese  derive 
such  strength  from  their  four  hundred  millions,  the 
toughness  of  their  national  customs,  their  power  of  pas- 
sive resistance,  and  their  unrivaled  national  cohesive- 
ness— in  spite  of  the  civil  wars,  which  merely  ruffle  the 
surface — that  they  can  afford  to  despise  military 
methods,  and  to  wait  till  the  feverish  energy  of  their 
oppressors  shall  have  exhausted  itself  in  internecine 
combats. 

China  is  much  less  a political  entity  than  a civiliza- 
tion— the  only  one  that  has  survived  from  ancient  times. 
Since  the  days  of  Confucius,  the  Egyptian,  Babylonian, 
Persian,  Macedonian,  and  Roman  empires  have  perished ; 
but  China  has  persisted  through  a continuous  evolution. 
There  have  been  foreign  influences — first  Buddhism,  and 
now  Western  science.  But  Buddhism  did  not  turn  the 
Chinese  into  Indians,  and  Western  science  will  not  turn 
them  into  Europeans.  I have  met  men  in  China  who 
knew  as  much  of  Western  learning  as  any  professor 
among  ourselves ; yet  they  had  not  been  thrown  off  their 
balance,  nor  lost  touch  with  their  own  people.  What  is 


220 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


bad  in  the  West — its  brutality,  its  restlessness,  it  readi- 
ness, to  oppress  the  weak,  its  preoccupation  with  purely 
material  aims — they  see  to  be  bad,  and  do  not  wish 
to  adopt.  What  is  good,  especially  its  science,  they 
do  wish  to  adopt. 

The  old  indigenous  culture  of  China  has  become  rather 
dead ; its  art  and  literature  are  not  what  they  were,  and 
Confucius  does  not  satisfy  the  spiritual  needs  of  a 
modern  man,  even  if  he  is  Chinese.  The  Chinese  who 
have  had  a European  or  American  education  realize  that 
a new  element  is  needed  to  vitalize  native  traditions, 
and  they  look  to  our  civilization  to  supply  it.  But  they 
do  not  wish  to  construct  a civilization  just  like  ours ; and 
it  is  precisely  in  this  that  the  best  hope  lies.  If  they 
are  not  goaded  into  militarism,  they  may  produce  a gen- 
uinely new  civilization,  better  than  any  that  we  in  the 
West  have  been  able  to  create. 

So  far,  I have  spoken  chiefly  of  the  good  sides  of 
the  Chinese  character;  but  of  course  China,  like  every 
other  nation,  has  its  bad  sides  also.  It  is  disagreeable 
to  me  to  speak  of  these,  as  I experienced  so  much  cour- 
tesy and  real  kindness  from  the  Chinese  that  I should 
prefer  to  say  only  nice  things  about  them.  But  for  the 
sake  of  China,  as  well  as  for  the  sake  of  truth,  it  would 
be  a mistake  to  conceal  what  is  less  admirable.  I will 
only  ask  the  reader  to  remember  that,  on  the  balance, 
I think  the  Chinese  one  of  the  best  nations  I have  come 
across,  and  am  prepared  to  draw  up  a graver  indictment 
against  every  one  of  the  great  powers.  Shortly  before 
I left  China,  an  eminent  Chinese  writer  pressed  me  to 
say  what  I considered  the  chief  defects  of  the  Chinese. 


THE  CHINESE  CHARACTER 


221 


With  some  reluctance,  I mentioned  three:  avarice, 
cowardice,  and  callousness.  Strange  to  say,  my  inter- 
locutor, instead  of  getting  angry,  admitted  the  justice 
of  my  criticism,  and  proceeded  to  discuss  possible  reme- 
dies. This  is  a sample  of  the  intellectual  integrity  which 
is  one  of  China’s  greatest  virtues. 

The  callousness  of  the  Chinese  is  bound  to  strike  every 
Anglo-Saxon.  They  have  none  of  that  humanitarian 
impulse  which  leads  us  to  devote  1 per  cent,  of  our 
energy  to  mitigating  the  evils  wrought  by  the  other  99 
per  cent.  For  instance,  we  have  been  forbidding  the 
Austrians  to  join  with  Germany,  to  emigrate,  or  to  ob- 
tain the  raw  materials  of  industry.  Therefore  the 
Viennese  have  starved,  except  those  whom  it  has  pleased 
us  to  keep  alive  from  philanthropy.  The  Chinese  would 
not  have  had  the  energy  to  starve  the  Viennese,  nor  the 
philanthropy  to  keep  some  of  them  alive.  While  I was  in 
China,  millions  were  dying  of  famine;  men  sold  their 
children  into  slavery  for  a few  dollars,  and  killed  them 
if  this  sum  was  unobtainable.  Much  was  done  by  white 
men  to  relieve  the  famine,  but  very  little  by  the  Chinese, 
and  that  little  vitiated  by  corruption.  It  must  be  said, 
however,  that  the  efforts  of  the  white  men  were  more 
effective  in  soothing  their  own  consciences  than  in  help- 
ing the  Chinese.  So  long  as  the  present  birth-rate  and 
the  present  methods  of  agriculture  persist,  famines  are 
bound  to  occur  periodically;  and  those  whom  philan- 
thropy keeps  alive  through  one  famine  are  only  too 
likely  to  perish  in  the  next. 

Famines  in  China  can  be  permanently  cured  only  by 
better  methods  of  agriculture  combined  with  emigration 


222 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


or  birth-contral  on  a large  scale.  Educated  Chinese 
realize  this,  and  it  makes  them  indifferent  to  efforts  to 
keep  the  present  victims  alive.  A great  deal  of  Chinese 
callousness  has  a similar  explanation,  and  is  due  to  per- 
ception of  the  vastness  of  the  problems  involved.  But 
there  remains  a residue  which  cannot  be  so  explained. 
If  a dog  is  run  over  by  an  automobile  and  seriously 
hurt,  nine  out  of  ten  passers-by  will  stop  to  laugh  at 
the  poor  brute’s  howls.  The  spectacle  of  suffering  does 
not  of  itself  rouse  any  sympathetic  pain  in  the  average 
Chinaman ; in  fact,  he  seems  to  find  it  mildly  agreeable. 
Their  history,  and  their  penal  code  before  the  revolu- 
tion of  1911,  show  that  they  are  by  no  means  destitute 
of  the  impulse  of  active  cruelty ; but  of  this  I did  not 
myself  come  across  any  instances.  And  it  must  be  said 
that  active  cruelty  is  practised  by  all  the  great  nations, 
to  an  extent  concealed  from  us  only  by  our  hypocrisy. 

Cowardice  is  prima  facie  a fault  of  the  Chinese ; but  I 
am  not  sure  that  they  are  really  lacking  in  courage.  It 
is  true  that,  in  battles  between  rival  tuchuns,  both  sides 
run  away,  and  victory  rests  with  the  side  that  first  dis- 
covers the  flight  of  the  other.  But  this  proves  only 
that  the  Chinese  soldier  is  a rational  man.  No  cause  of 
any  importance  is  involved,  and  the  armies  consist  of 
mere  mercenaries.  When  there  is  a serious  issue,  as, 
for  instance,  in  the  Tai-Ping  Rebellion,  the  Chinese  are 
said  to  fight  well,  particularly  if  they  have  good  officers. 
Nevertheless,  I do  not  think  that,  in  comparison  with  the 
Anglo-Saxons,  the  French,  or  the  Germans,  the  Chinese 
can  be  considered  a courageous  people,  except  in  the 
matter  of  passive  endurance.  They  will  endure  torture, 


THE  CHINESE  CHARACTER 


223 


and  even  death,  for  motives  which  men  of  more  pugna- 
cious races  would  find  insufficient — for  example,  to  con- 
ceal the  hiding-place  of  stolen  plunder.  In  spite  of  their 
comparative  lack  of  active  courage,  they  have  less  fear 
of  death  than  we.  have,  as  is  shown  by  their  readiness 
to  commit  suicide. 

Avarice  is,  I should  say,  the  greatest  defect  of  the 
Chinese.  Life  is  hard,  and  money  is  not  easily  obtained. 
For  the  sake  of  money,  all  except  a very  few  foreign- 
educated  Chinese  will  be  guilty  of  corruption.  For  the 
sake  of  a few  pence,  almost  any  coolie  will  run  an  immi- 
nent risk  of  death.  The  difficulty  of  combating  Japan 
has  arisen  mainly  from  the  fact  that  hardly  any  Chinese 
politician  can  resist  Japanese  bribes.  I think  this  defect 
is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that,  for  many  ages,  an  honest 
living  has  been  hard  to  get;  in  which  case  it  will  be 
lessened  as  economic  conditions  improve.  I doubt  if  it 
is  any  worse  now  in  China  than  it  was  in  Europe  in  the 
eighteenth  century.  I have  not  heard  of  any  Chinese 
general  more  corrupt  than  Marlborough  or  of  any  poli- 
tician more  corrupt  than  Cardinal  Dubois.  It  is,  there- 
fore, quite  likely  that  changed  industrial  conditions  will 
make  the  Chinese  as  honest  as  we  are — which  is  not  say- 
ing much. 

I have  been  speaking  of  the  Chinese  as  they  are  in 
ordinary  life,  when  they  appear  as  men  of  active  and 
skeptical  intelligence,  but  of  somewhat  sluggish  passions. 
There  is,  however,  another  side  to  them:  they  are  cap- 
able of  wild  excitement,  often  of  a collective  kind.  I saw 
little  of  this  myself,  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the 
fact.  The  Boxer  rising  was  a case  in  point,  and  one 


224 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


which  particularly  affected  Europeans.  But  their  his- 
tory is  full  of  more  or  less  analogous  disturbances.  It 
is  this  element  in  their  character  that  makes  them  incal- 
culable, and  makes  it  impossible  even  to  guess  at  their 
future.  One  can  imagine  a section  of  them  becoming 
fanatically  Bolshevist,  or  anti- Japanese,  or  Christian,  or 
devoted  to  some  leader  who  would  ultimately  declare 
himself  emperor.  I suppose  it  is  this  element  in  their 
character  that  makes  them,  in  spite  of  their  habitual 
caution,  the  most  reckless  gamblers  in  the  world.  And 
many  emperors  have  lost  their  thrones  through  the  force 
of  romantic  love,  although  romantic  love  is  far  more 
despised  than  it  is  in  the  West. 

To  sum  up  the  Chinese  character  is  not  easy.  Much 
of  what  strikes  the  foreigner  is  due  merely  to  the  fact 
that  they  have  preserved  an  ancient  civilization  which 
is  not  industrial.  All  this  is  likely  to  pass  away,  under 
the  pressure  of  the  Japanese,  and  of  European  and 
American  financiers.  Their  art  is  already  perishing, 
and  being  replaced  by  crude  imitations  of  second-rate 
European  pictures.  Most  of  the  Chinese  who  have  had 
a European  education  are  quite  incapable  of  seeing  any 
beauty  in  native  painting,  and  merely  observe  contemp- 
tuously that  it  does  not  obey  the  laws  of  perspective. 

The  obvious  charm  which  the  tourist  finds  in  China 
cannot  be  preserved ; it  must  perish  at  the  touch  of  in- 
dustrialism. But  perhaps  something  may  be  preserved, 
something  of  the  ethical  qualities  in  which  China  is  su- 
preme, and  which  the  modern  world  most  desperately 
needs.  Among  these  qualities  I place  first  the  pacific 
temper,  which  seeks  to  settle  disputes  on  grounds  of 


THE  CHINESE  CHARACTER 


225 


justice  rather  than  by  force.  It  remains  to  be  seen 
whether  the  West  will  allow  this  temper  to  persist,  or 
will  force  it  to  give  place,  in  self-defense,  to  a frantic 
militarism  like  that  to  which  Japan  has  been  driven. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


HIGHER  EDUCATION  IN  CHINA 

CHINA,  like  Italy  and  Greece,  is  frequently  mis- 
judged by  persons  of  culture  because  they  regard 
it  as  a museum.  The  preservation  of  ancient  beauty  is 
very  important,  but  no  vigorous  forward-looking  man  is 
content  to  be  a mere  curator.  The  result  is  that  the  best 
people  in  China  tend  to  be  Philistines  as  regards  all  that 
is  pleasing  to  the  European  tourist.  The  European  in 
China,  quite  apart  from  interested  motives,  is  apt  to  be 
ultra-conservative,  because  he  likes  everything  distinc- 
tive and  non-European.  But  this  is  the  attitude  of  an 
outsider,  of  one  who  regards  China  as  a country  to  be 
looked  at  rather  than  lived  in,  as  a country  with  a past 
rather  than  a future.  Patriotic  Chinese  naturally  do 
not  view  their  country  in  this  way;  they  wish  their 
country  to  acquire  what  is  best  in  the  modern  world, 
not  merely  to  remain  an  interesting  survival  of  a by- 
gone age,  like  Oxford  or  the  Yellowstone  Park.  As  the 
first  step  to  this  end,  they  do  all  they  can  to  promote 
higher  education,  and  to  increase  the  number  of  Chinese 
who  can  use  and  appreciate  Western  knowledge  without 
being  the  slaves  of  Western  follies.  What  is  being  done 
in  this  direction  is  very  interesting,  and  one  of  the  most 
hopeful  things  happening  in  our  not  very  cheerful  epoch. 

There  is,  first,  the  old  traditional  curriculum,  the 
learning  by  rote  of  the  classics  without  explanation  in 

226 


HIGHER  EDUCATION  IN  CHINA 


227 


early  youth,  followed  by  a more  intelligent  study  in 
later  years.  This  is  exactly  like  the  traditional  study 
of  the  classics  in  this  country,  as  it  existed,  for  example, 
in  the  eighteenth  century.  Men  over  thirty,  even  if, 
in  the  end,  they  have  secured  a thoroughly  modern  edu- 
cation, have  almost  all  begun  by  learning  reading  and 
writing  in  old-fashioned  schools.  Such  schools  still  form 
the  majority,  and  give  most  of  the  elementary  education 
that  is  given.  Every  child  has  to  learn  by  heart  efvery 
day  some  portion  of  the  classical  text,  and  repeat  it  out 
loud  in  class.  As  they  all  repeat  at  the  same  time,  the 
din  is  deafening.  (In  Peking  I lived  next  to  one  of  these 
schools,  so  I can  speak  from  experience.)  The  number 
of  people  who  are  taught  to  read  by  these  methods  is 
considerable;  in  the  large  towns  one  finds  that  even 
coolies  can  read  as  often  as  not.  But  writing  (which 
is  very  difficult  in  Chinese)  is  a much  rarer  accomplish- 
ment. Probably  those  who  can  both  read  and  write  ^ 
form  about  5 per  cent,  of  the  population. 

The  establishment  of  normal  schools  for  the  training 
of  teachers  on  modern  lines,  which  grew  out  of  the  edict 
of  1905  abolishing  the  old  examination  system  and  pro- 
claiming the  need  of  educational  reform,  has  done  much, 
and  will  do  much  more,  to  transform  and  extend  elemen- 
tary education.  The  following  statistics  showing  the 
increase  in  the  number  of  schools,  teachers,  and  students 
in  China  are  taken  from  Mr.  Tyau’s  “China  Awakened,’’ 
p.  4:— 

1910  1914  1917  1919 

Number  of  Schools  . . 42,444  59,796  12S,048  134,000 

Number  of  Teachers  ..  185,566  200,000  326,417  326,000 

Number  of  Students  . . 1,625,534  3,849,554  4,269,197  4,500,000 


228  THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 

Considering  that  the  years  concerned  are  years  of 
revolution  and  civil  war,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
progress  shown  by  these  figures  is  very  remarkable. 

There  are  schemes  for  universal  elementary  education, 
but  so  far,  owing  to  the  disturbed  condition  of  the  coun- 
try and  the  lack  of  funds,  it  has  been  impossible  to  carry 
them  out  except  in  a few  places  on  a small  scale.  They 
would,  however,  be  soon  carried  out  if  there  were  a stable 
government. 

The  traditional  classical  education  was,  of  course,  not 
intended  to  be  only  elementary.  The  amount  of  Chinese 
literature  is  enormous,  and  the  older  texts  are  extremely 
difficult  to  understand.  There  is  scope,  within  the  tradi- 
tion, for  all  the  industry  and  erudition  of  the  finest 
renaissance  scholars.  Learning  of  this  sort  has  been 
respected  in  China  for  many  ages.  One  meets  old 
scholars  of  this  type,  to  whose  opinions,  even  in  politics, 
it  is  customary  to  defer,  although  they  have  the  inno- 
cence and  unworldliness  of  the  old-fashioned  don.  They 
remind  one  almost  of  the  men  whom  Lamb  describes  in 
his  essay  on  Oxford  in  the  vacation — learned,  lovable, 
and  sincere,  but  utterly  lost  in  the  modern  world,  basing 
their  opinions  of  socialism,  for  example,  on  what  some 
eleventh-century  philosopher  said  about  it.  The  argu- 
ments for  and  against  the  type  of  higher  education  that 
they  represent  are  exactly  the  same  as  those  for  and 
against  a classical  education  in  Europe,  and  one  is 
driven  to  the  same  conclusion  in  both  cases:  that  the 
existence  of  specialists  having  this  type  of  knowledge  is 
highly  desirable,  but  that  the  ordinary  curriculum  for 


HIGHER  EDUCATION  IN  CHINA 


229 


the  average  educated  person  should  take  more  account 
of  modern  needs,  and  give  more  instruction  in  science, 
modern  languages,  and  contemporary  international  rela- 
tions. This  is  the  view,  so  far  as  I could  discover,  of  all 
reforming  educationists  in  China. 

The  second  kind  of  higher  education  in  China  is  that 
initiated  by  the  missionaries,  and  now  almost  entirely  in 
the  hands  of  the  Americans.  As  every  one  knows, 
America’s  position  in  Chinese  education  was  acquired 
through  the  Boxer  indemnity.  Most  of  the  powers,  at 
that  time,  if  their  own  account  is  to  be  believed,  de- 
manded a sum  representing  only  actual  loss  and  damage, 
but  the  Americans,  according  to  their  critics,  demanded 
(and  obtained)  a vastly  larger  sum,  of  which  they  gen- 
erously devoted  the  surplus  to  educating  Chinese  stu- 
dents, both  in  China  and  at  American  universities.  This 
course  of  action  has  abundantly  justified  itself,  both 
politically  and  commercially;  a larger  and  larger  num- 
ber of  posts  in  China  go  to  men  who  have  come  under 
American  influence,  and  who  have  come  to  believe  that 
America  is  the  one  true  friend  of  China  among  the  great 
powers. 

One  may  take  as  typical  of  American  work  three  insti- 
tutions of  which  I saw  a certain  amount : Tsing- 

Hua  College  (about  ten  miles  from  Peking),  the 
Peking  Union  Medical  College  (connected  with  the 
Rockefeller  Hospital),  and  the  so-called  Peking  Uni- 
versity. 

Tsing-Hua  College,  delightfully  situated  at  the  foot 
of  the  western  hills,  with  a number  of  fine  solid  build- 


230 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


ings,1  in  a good  American  style,  owes  its  existence  en- 
tirely to  the  Boxer  indemnity  money.  It  has  an  atmos- 
phere exactly  like  that  of  a small  American  university, 
and  a (Chinese)  president  who  is  an  almost  perfect  re- 
production of  the  American  college  president.  The 
teachers  are  partly  American,  partly  Chinese  educated 
in  America,  and  there  tends  to  be  more  and  more  of  the 
latter.  As  one  enters  the  gates,  one  becomes  aware  of 
the  presence  of  every  virtue  usually  absent  in  China; 
cleanliness,  punctuality,  exactitude,  efficiency.  I had 
not  much  opportunity  to  judge  of  the  teaching,  but 
whatever  I saw  made  me  think  that  the  institution  was 
thorough  and  good.  One  great  merit,  which  belongs  to 
American  institutions  generally,  is  that  the  students  are 
made  to  learn  English.  Chinese  differs  so  profoundly 
from  European  languages  that  even  with  the  most  skil- 
ful translations  a student  who  knows  only  Chinese  can- 
not understand  European  ideas;  therefore  the  learning 
of  some  European  language  is  essential,  and  English  is 
far  the  most  familiar  and  useful  throughout  the  Far 
East. 

The  students  at  Tsing-Hua  College  learn  mathemat- 
ics and  science  and  philosophy,  and,  broadly  speaking, 
the  more  elementary  parts  of  what  is  commonly  taught 
in  universities.  Many  of  the  best  of  them  go  afterward 
to  America,  where  they  take  a doctor’s  degree.  On  re- 
turning to  China  they  become  teachers  or  civil  servants. 
Undoubtedly  they  contribute  greatly  to  the  improvement 

1 It  should  be  said  that  one  sees  just  as  fine  buildings  in 
purely  Chinese  institutions,  such  as  Peking  Government  Univer- 
sity and  Nanking  Teachers’  Training  College. 


HIGHER  EDUCATION  IN  CHINA 


231 


of  their  country  in  efficiency  and  honesty  and  technical 
intelligence. 

The  Rockefeller  Hospital  is  a large,  conspicuous 
building,  representing  an  interesting  attempt  to  combine 
something  of  Chinese  beauty  with  European  utilitarian 
requirements.  The  green  roofs  are  quite  Chinese,  but 
the  walls  and  windows  are  European.  The  attempt  is 
praiseworthy,  though  perhaps  not  wholly  successful. 
The  hospital  has  all  the  most  modern  scientific  appara- 
tus but,  with  the  monopolistic  tendency  of  the  Standard 
Oil  Co.,  it  refuses  to  let  its  apparatus  be  of  use  to  any- 
one not  connected  with  the  hospital.  The  Peking  Union 
Medical  College  teaches  many  things  besides  medicine, 
— English  literature,  for  example, — and  apparently 
teaches  them  well.  They  are  necessary  in  order  to  pro- 
duce Chinese  physicians  and  surgeons  who  will  reach  the 
European  level,  because  a good  knowledge  of  some  Eu- 
ropean language  is  necessary  for  medicine  as  for  other 
kinds  of  European  learning.  And  a sound  knowledge 
of  scientific  medicine  is,  of  course,  of  immense  impor- 
tance to  China,  where  there  is  no  sort  of  sanitation  and 
epidemics  are  frequent. 

The  so-called  Peking  University  is  an  example  of  what 
the  Chinese  have  to  suffer  on  account  of  extraterritori- 
ality. The  Chinese  Government  (so  at  least  I was  told) 
had  already  established  a university  in  Peking,  fully 
equipped  and  staffed,  and  known  as  the  Peking  Uni- 
versity. But  the  Methodist  missionaries  decided  to 
give  the  name  “Peking  University”  to  their  schools,  so 
the  already  existing  university  had  to  alter  its  name  to 
“Government  University.”  The  case  is  exactly  as  if  a 


232 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


collection  of  old-fashioned  Chinamen  had  established 
themselves  in  London  to  teach  the  doctrine  of  Confucius, 
and  had  be.en  able  to  force  London  University  to  aban- 
don its  name  to  them.  However,  I do  not  wish  to  raise 
the  question  of  extraterritoriality,  the  more  so  as  I do 
not  think  it  can  be  abandoned  for  some  years  to  come, 
in  spite  of  the-  abuses  to  which  it  sometimes  gives 
rise. 

Returned  students  (i.e.,  students  who  have  been  at 
foreign  universities)  form  a definite  set  in  China.2 
There  is  in  Peking  a “Returned  Students’  Club,”  a 
charming  place.  It  is  customary  among  Europeans  to 
speak  ill  of  returned  students,  but  for  no  good  reason. 
There  are  occasionally  disagreements  between  different 
sections;  in  particular,  those  who  have  been  only  to 
Japan  are  not  regarded  quite  as  equals  by  those  who 
have  been  to  Europe  or  America.  My  impression  was 
that  America  puts  a more  definite  stamp  upon  a stu- 

2 Mr.  Tyau  {op.  cit.  p.  27)  quotes  from  “Who’s  Who  of  Amer- 
ican Returned  Students,”  a classification  of  the  occupations  of 
596  Chinese  who  have  returned  from  American  universities. 
The  larger  items  are:  In  education,  38  as  administrators  and 

197  as  teachers;  in  government  service,  129  in  executive  offices 
(there  are  also  three  members  of  Parliament  and  four  judges)  ; 
95  engineers;  35  medical  practitioners  (including  dentists)  ; CO 
in  business;  and  21  social  and  religious  workers.  It  is  esti- 
mated that  the  total  number  of  Chinese  holding  university  de- 
grees in  America  is  1700,  and  in  Great  Britain  400  {ib.) . This 
disproportion  is  due  to  the  more  liberal  policy  of  America  in 
the  matter  of  the  Boxer  indemnity.  In  1916  there  were  292 
Chinese  university  students  in  Great  Britain,  and  Mr.  Tyau 
(p.  28)  gives  a classification  of  them  by  their  subjects.  The 
larger  groups  are:  Medicine,  50;  law  and  economics,  47;  en- 

gineering. 42;  mining,  22;  natural  science  (including  chemistry 
and  geology,  which  are  classified  separately),  19. 


HIGHER  EDUCATION  IN  CHINA 


233 


dent  than  any  other  country;  certainly  those  returning 
from  England  are  less  Anglicized  than  those  returning 
from  the  United  States  are  Americanised.  To  the 
Chinaman  who  wishes  to  be  modern  and  up-to-date,  sky- 
scrapers and  hustle  seem  romantic,  because  they  are  so 
unlike  his  home.  The  old  traditions  which  conservative 
Europeans  value  are  such  a mushroom  growth  compared 
to  those  of  China  (where  authentic  descendants  of  Con- 
fucius abound)  that  it  is  useless  to  attempt  that  way 
of  impressing  the  Chinese.  One  is  reminded  of  the  con- 
versation in  “Eothen”  between  the  English  country 
gentleman  and  the  pasha,  in  which  the  pasha  praises 
England  to  the  refrain:  “Buzz,  buzz,  all  by  steam; 

whir,  whir,  all  on  wheels,”  while  the  Englishman  keeps 
saying:  “Tell  the  Pasha  that  the  British  yeoman  is 

still,  thank  God,  the  British  yeoman.” 

Although  the  educational  work  of  the  Americans  in 
China  is  on  the  whole  admirable,  nothing  directed  by 
foreigners  can  adequate^  satisfy  the  needs  of  the 
country.  The  Chinese  have  a civilization  and  a national 
temperament  in  many  ways  superior  to  those  of  white 
men.  A few  Europeans  ultimately  discover  this,  but 
Americans  never  do.  They  remain  always  missionaries 
— not  of  Christianity,  though  they  often  think  that  is 
what  they  are  preaching,  but  of  Americanism.  What 
is  Americanism?  “Clean  living,  clean  thinking,  and 
pep,”  I think  an  American  would  reply.  This  means, 
in  practice,  the  substitution  of  tidiness  for  art,  cleanli- 
ness for  beauty,  moralizing  for  philosophy,  prostitutes 
for  concubines  (as  being  easier  to  conceal),  and  a general 
air  of  being  fearfully  busy  for  the  leisurely  calm  of  the 


234 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


traditional  Chinese.  Voltaire — that  hardened  old  cynic 
— laid  it  down  that  the  true  ends  of  life  are  “ aimer  et 
penser.”  Both  are  common  in  China,  but  neither  is 
compatible  with  “pep.”  The  American  influence,  there- 
fore, inevitably  tends  to  eliminate  both.  If  it  prevailed 
it  would,  no  doubt,  by  means  of  hygiene,  save  the  lives 
of  many  Chinamen,  but  would  at  the  same  time  make 
them  not  worth  saving.  It  cannot  therefore  be  regarded 
as  wholly  and  altogether  satisfactory. 

The  best  Chinese  educationists  are  aware  of  this,  and 
have  established  schools  and  universities  which  are 
modern  but  under  Chinese  direction.  In  these,  a cer- 
tain proportion  of  the  teachers  are  European  or  Ameri- 
can, but  the  spirit  of  the.  teaching  is  not  that  of  the 
Y.  M.  Q.  A.  One  can  never  rid  oneself  of  the  feeling 
that  the*  education  controlled  by  white  men  is  not  dis- 
interested; it  seems  always  designed,  unconsciously  in 
the  main,  to  produce  convenient  tools  for  the  capitalist 
penetration  of  China  by  the  merchants  and  manufactur- 
ers of  the  nation  concerned.  Modern  Chinese  schools 
and  universities  are  singularly  different;  they  are  not 
hotbeds  of  rabid  nationalism  as  they  would  be  in  any 
other  country,  but  institutions  where  the  student  is 
taught  to  think  freely,  and  his  thoughts  are  judged  by 
their  intelligence,  not  by  their  utility  to  exploiters.  The 
outcome,  among  the  best  young  men,  is  a really  beautiful 
intellectual  disinterestedness.  The  discussions  which  I 
used  to  have  in  my  seminar  (consisting  of  students  be- 
longing to  the  Peking  Government  University)  could 
not  have  been  surpassed  anywhere  for  keenness,  candor, 
and  fearlessness.  I had  the  same  impression  of  the 


HIGHER  EDUCATION  IN  CHINA 


235 


Science  Society  of  Nanking*,  and  of  all  similar  bodies 
wherever  I came  across  them.  There  is,  among  the 
young,  a passionate  desire  to  acquire  Western  knowl- 
edge, together  with  a vivid  realization  of  Western  vices. 
They  wish  to  be  scientific  but  not  mechanical,  industrial 
but  not  capitalistic.  To  a man  they  are  Socialists,  as  are 
most  of  the  best  among  their  Chinese  teachers.  They 
respect  the  knowledge  of  Europeans,  but  quietly 
put  aside  their  arrogance.  For  the  present,  the  purely 
Chinese  modern  educational  institutions,  such  as  the 
Peking  Government  University,  leave  much  to  be  de- 
sired from  the  point  of  view  of  instruction;  there  are 
no  adequate  libraries,  the  teaching  of  English  is  not  suf- 
ficiently thorough,  and  there  is  not  enough  mental  dis- 
cipline. But  these  are  the  faults  of  youth,  and  are  un- 
important compared  with  the  profoundly  humanistic  at- 
titude to  life  which  is  formed  in  the  students.  Most  of 
the  faults  may  be  traced  to  the  lack  of  funds,  because 
the  government — loved  by  the  powers  on  account  of  its 
weakness — has  to  part  with  all  its  funds  to  the  military 
chieftains  who  fight  each  other  and  plunder  the  country, 
as  in  Europe — for  China  must  be  compared  with  Eu- 
rope, not  with  any  one  of  the  petty  states  into  which  Eu- 
rope is  unhappily  divided. 

The  students  are  not  only  full  of  public  spirit  them- 
selves, but  are  a powerful  force  in  arousing  it  through- 
out the  nation.  What  they  did  in  1919,  when  Versailles 
awarded  Shangtung  to  Japan,  is  well  told  by  Air.  Tyau 
in  his  chapter  on  “The  Student  Movement.”  And  what 
they  did  was  not  merely  political.  To  quote  Mr.  Tyau 
(p.  146)  : 


236 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


Having  aroused  the  nation,  prevented  the  signature  of  the 
Versailles  Treaty  and  assisted  the  merchants  to  enforce  the 
Japanese  boycott,  the  students  then  directed  their  energies  to 
the  enlightenment  of  their  less  educated  brothers  and  sisters. 
For  instance,  by  issuing  publications,  by  popular  lectures 
showing  them  the  real  situation,  internally  as  well  as  exter- 
nally; but  especially  by  establishing  free  schools  and  main- 
taining them  out  of  their  own  funds.  No  praise  can  be  too 
high  for  such  self-sacrifice,  for  the  students  generally  also 
teach  in  these  schools.  The  scheme  is  endorsed  everywhere 
with  the  greatest  enthusiasm,  and  in  Peking  alone  it  is  esti- 
mated that  fifty  thousand  children  are  benefited  by  such  edu- 
cation. 

One  thing  which  came  as  a surprise  to  me  was  to  find 
that,  as  regards  modern  education  under  Chinese  con- 
trol, there  is  complete  equality  between  men  and  women. 
The  position  of  women  in  Peking  Government  University 
is  better  than  at  Cambridge.  Women  are  admitted  to 
examinations  and  degrees,  and  there  are  women  teachers 
in  the  university.  The  Girls’  Higher  Normal  School  in 
Peking,  where  prospective  women  teachers  are  taught, 
is  a most  excellent  and  progressive  institution,  and  the 
spirit  of  free  inquiry  among  girls  would  horrify  most 
British  head  mistresses. 

There  is  a movement  in  favor  of  coeducation,  especi- 
ally in  elementary  education,  because,  owing  to  the  in- 
adequate supply  of  schools,  the  girls  tend  to  be  left  out 
altogether  unless  they  can  go  to  the  same  school  as  the 
boys.  The  first  time  I met  Professor  and  Mrs.  Dewey 
was  at  a banquet  in  Chang-sha,  given  by  the  tuchun. 
When  the  time  came  for  after-dinner  speeches,  Mrs. 


HIGHER  EDUCATION  IN  CHINA 


237 


Dewey  told  the  tuchun  that  his  province  must  adopt  co- 
education. He  made  a statesmanlike  reply,  saying  that 
the  matter  should  receive  his  best  consideration,  but  he 
feared  the  time  was  not  ripe  in  Hunan.  However,  it 
was  clear  that  the  matter  was  within  the  sphere  of 
practical  politics.  At  the  time,  being  new  to  China  and 
having  imagined  China  a somewhat  backward  country,  I 
was  surprised.  Later  on  I realized  that  reforms  which 
we  only  talk  about  can  be  actually  carried  out  in 
China. 

Education  controlled  by  missionaries  or  conservative 
white  men  cannot  give  what  Young  China  needs.  After 
throwing  off  the  native  superstitions  of  centuries,  it 
would  be  a dismal  fiasco  to  take  on  the  European  super- 
stitions which  have  been  discarded  here  by  all  progres- 
sive people.  It  is  only  where  progressive  Chinese  them- 
selves are  in  control  that  there  is  scope  for  the  renais- 
sance of  the  younger  students,  and  for  that  free  spirit  of 
skeptical  inquiry  by  which  they  are  seeking  to  build  a 
new  civilization  as  splendid  as  their  old  civilization  in 
its  best  days. 

While  I was  in  Peking,  the  government  teachers 
struck,  not  for  higher  pay,  but  for  pay,  because  their 
salaries  had  not  been  paid  for  many  months.  Accom- 
panied by  some  of  the  students,  they  went  on  a deputa- 
tion to  the  government,  but  were  repulsed  by  soldiers 
and  policemen,  who  clubbed  them  so  severely  that  many 
had  to  be  taken  to  the  hospital.  The  incident  produced 
such  universal  fury  that  there  was  nearly  a revolution, 
and  the  government  hastened  to  come  to  terms  with  the 
teachers  with  all  possible  speed.  The  modern  teachers 


238 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


have  behind  them  all  that  is  virile,  energetic,  and  public- 
spirited  in  China;  the  gang  of  bandits  which  controls 
the  government  has  behind  it  Japanese  money  and  Eu- 
ropean intrigue.  America  occupies  an  intermediate 
position.  One  may  say  broadly  that  the  old  traditional 
education,  with  the  military  governors  and  the  British 
and  Japanese  influence,  stands  for  conservatism; 
America  and  its  commerce  and  its  educational  institu- 
tions stand  for  liberalism ; while  the  native  modern  edu- 
cation, practically  though  not  theoretically,  stands  for 
socialism.  Incidentally,  it  alone  stands  for  intellectual 
freedom. 

The  Chinese  are  a great  nation,  incapable  of  per- 
manent suppression  by  foreigners.  They  will  not  con- 
sent to  adopt  our  vices  in  order  to  acquire  military 
strength;  but  they  are  willing  to  adopt  our  virtues  in 
order  to  advance  in  wisdom.  I think  they  are  the  only 
people  in  the  world  who  quite  genuinely  believe  that 
wisdom  is  more  precious  than  rubies.  That  is  why  the 
West  regards  them  as  uncivilized. 

Sc  C p Cj  Xh!  $ 


CHAPTER  XIV 


INDUSTRIALISM  IN  CHINA 

CHINA  is  as  yet  only  slightly  industrialized,  but  the 
industrial  possibilities  of  the  country  are  very 
great,  and  it  may  be  taken  as  nearly  certain  that  there 
will  be  a rapid  development  throughout  the  next  few 
decades.  China’s  future  depends  as  much  upon  the 
manner  of  this  development  as  upon  any  other  single 
factor;  and  China’s  difficulties  are  very  largely  con- 
nected with  the  present  industrial  situation.  I will 
therefore  first  briefly  describe  this  situation  and  then 
consider  the  possibilities  of  the  near  future. 

We  may  take  railways  and  mines  as  the  foundation 
of  a nation’s  industrial  life.  Let  us  therefore  consider 
first  the  railways  and  then  the  mines,  before  going  on 
to  other  matters. 

When  railways  were  new,  the  Manchu  government, 
like  the  universities  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge  (which  it 
resembled  in  many  ways),  objected  to  them,  and  did  all 
it  could  to  keep  them  at  a distance.1  In  1875  a short 
line  was  built  by  foreigners  from  Shanghai  to  Woosung, 
but  the  central  government  was  so  shocked  that  it  caused 
it  to  be  destroyed.  In  1881  the  first  permanent  rail- 

i For  the  history  of  Chinese  railways,  see  Tyau,  op.  tit.,  pp, 
183  ff. 


239 


240 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


way  was  constructed,  but  not  very  much  was  accom- 
plished until  after  the  Japanese  War  of  1894-95.  The 
powers  then  thought  that  China  was  breaking  up,  and 
entered  upon  a scramble  for  concessions  and  spheres  of 
influence.  The  Belgians  built  the  important  line  from 
Peking  to  Hankow;  the  Americans  obtained  a conces- 
sion for  a Hankow-Canton  railway,  which,  however,  has 
only  been  constructed  as  far  as  Changsha.  Russia  built 
the  Manchurian  Railways,  connecting  Peking  with  the 
Siberian  Railway  and  with  Europe.  Germany  built  the 
Shangtung  Railway,  from  Tsingtau  to  Tsinanfu.  The 
French  built  a railway  in  the  south.  England 
sought  to  obtain  a monopoly  of  the  railways  in  the 
Yangtze  Valley.  All  these  railways  were  to  be  owned 
by  foreigners  and  managed  by  foreign  officials  of  the 
respective  countries  which  had  obtained  the  concessions. 
The  Boxer  rising,  however,  made  Europe  aware  that 
som^  caution  was  needed  if  the  Chinese  were  not  to  be 
exasperated  beyond  endurance.  After  this,  ownership 
of  new  railways  was  left  to  the  Chinese  Government,  but 
with  so  much  foreign  control  as  to  rob  it  of  most  of  its 
value.  By  this  time,  Chinese  public  opinion  had  come 
to  realize  that  there  must  be  railways  in  China,  and  that 
the  real  problem  was  how  to  keep  them  under  Chinese 
control.  In  1908,  the  Tientsin-Pukow  line  and  the 
Shanghai-Hangchow  line  were  sanctioned,  to  be  built  by 
the  help  of  foreign  loans,  but  with  all  the  administra- 
tive control  in  the  hands  of  the  Chinese  Government. 
At  the  same  time,  the  Peking-Hankow  line  was  bought 
back  by  the  government,  and  the  Peking-Kalgan  line 
was  constructed  by  the  Chinese  without  foreign  financial 


INDUSTRIALISM  IN  CHINA 


241 


assistance.  Of  the  big  main  lines  of  China,  this  left  not 
much  foreign  control  outside  the  Manchurian  Railway 
(Chinese  Eastern  Railway)  and  the  Shantung  Railway. 
The  first  of  these  is  mainly  under  foreign  control  and 
must  now  be  regarded  as  permanently  lost,  until  such 
time  as  China  becomes  strong  enough  to  defeat  Japan 
in  war;  and  the  whole  of  Manchuria  has  come  more  or 
less  under  Japanese  control.  But  the  Shantung  Rail- 
way, by  the  agreement  reached  at  Washington,  is  to  be 
bought  back  by  China — five  years  hence,  if  all  goes  well. 
Thus,  except  in  regions  practically  lost  to  China,  the 
Chinese  now  have  control  of  all  their  more  important 
railways,  or  will  have  before  long.  This  is  a very  hope- 
ful feature  of  the  situation,  and  a distinct  credit  to  Chi- 
nese sagacity. 

Putnam  Weale  (Mr.  Lennox  Simpson)  strongly  urges 
— quite  rightly,  as  I think — the  great  importance  of 
nationalizing  all  Chinese  railways.  At  Washington  re- 
cently, he  helped  to  secure  the  Shantung  Railway  award, 
and  to  concentrate  attention  on  the  railway  as  the  main 
issue.  Writing  early  in  1919,  he  said:2 

The  key  to  the  proper  control  of  China  and  the  building-up 
of  the  new  Republican  State  is  the  railway  key.  . . . The  revo- 
lution of  1911,  and  the  acceptance  in  principle  of  Western 
ideas  of  popular  government,  removed  the  danger  of  foreign 
provinces  being  carved  out  of  the  old  Manchu  Empire. 
There  was,  however,  left  behind  a more  subtle  weapon.  This 
weapon  is  the  railway.  Russia  with  her  Manchurian  Railway 
scheme  taught  Japan  the  new  method.  Japan,  by  the  Treaty 
of  Portsmouth  in  1905,  not  only  inherited  the  richer  half  of 

2 “China  in  1918.”  Published  by  the  “Peking  Leader,”  pp. 
45-6. 


242 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


the  Manchurian  railways,  but  was  able  to  put  into  practice  a 
new  technique,  based  on  a mixture  of  twisted  economics,  police 
control,  and  military  garrisons.  Out  of  this  grew  the  latter- 
day  highly  developed  railway  zone  which,  to  all  intents  and 
purposes,  creates  a new  type  of  foreign  enclave , subversive  of 
the  Chinese  State.  The  especial  evil  to-day  is  that  Japan  has 
transferred  from  Manchuria  to  Shantung  this  new  technique, 
which  . . . she  will  eventually  extend  into  the  very  heart  of 
intramural  China  . . . and  also  into  extramural  Chihli  and 
Inner  Mongolia  (thus  outflanking  Peking)  unless  she  is  sum- 
marily arrested.  At  all  costs  this  must  he  stopped.  The 
method  of  doing  so  is  easy:  It  is  to  have  it  laid  down  cate- 
gorically, and  accepted  hy  all  the  Powers,  that  henceforth  all 
railways  on  Chinese  soil  are  a vital  portion  of  Chinese  sover- 
eignty and  must  he  controlled  directly  from  Peking  hy  a 
National  Pailway  Board ; that  stationmasters,  personnel  and 
police,  must  he  Chinese  citizens,  technical  foreign  help  being 
limited  to  a set  standard ; and  that  all  railway  concessions 
are  henceforth  to  he  considered  simply  as  building  concessions 
which  must  he  handed  over,  section  by  section,  as  they  are 
built,  to  the  National  Pailway  Board. 

If  the  Shangtung  Railway  agreement  is  loyally 
carried  out,  this  reform — as  to  whose  importance  I quite 
agree  with  Putnam  Weale — will  have  been  practically 
completed  five  years  hence.  But  we  must  expect  Japan 
to  adopt  every  possible  means  of  avoiding  the  carrying 
out  of  her  promises,  from  instigating  Chinese  civil  war 
to  the  murdering  of  Japanese  employees  by  Japanese 
secret  agents  masquerading  as  Chinese.  Therefore,  un- 
til the  Chinese  actually  have  complete  control  of  the 
Shantung  Railway,  we  cannot  feel  confident  that  they 
will  ever  get  it. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  Chinese  run  railways 


INDUSTRIALISM  IN  CHINA 


243 


badly.  The  Kalgan  Railway,  which  they  built,  is  just 
as  well  built  as  those  constructed  by  foreigners ; and  the 
lines  under  Chinese  administration  are  admirably  man- 
aged. I quote  from  Mr.  Tyau  3 the  following  statistics, 
which  refer  to  the  year  1919 : Government  railways,  in 

operation,  6027  kilometers ; under  construction,  383  kilo- 
meters, private  and  provincial  railways,  773  kilo-meters ; 
concessioned  railways,  3780  kilometres.  Total,  10,963 
kilometers,  or  6852  miles.  (The  concessioned  railways 
are  mainly  those  in  Manchuria  and  Shantung,  of  which 
the  first  must  be  regarded  as  definitely  lost  to  China, 
while  the  second  is  probably  recovered.  The  problem 
of  concessioned  railways  has  therefore  no  longer  the  im- 
portance that  it  had,  though,  by  detaching  Manchuria, 
the  foreign  railway  has  shown  its  power  for  evil).  As 
regards  financial  results,  Air.  Tyau  gives  the  following 
figures  for  the  principal  state  railways  in  1918: — 


Name  of  Line. 

Kilometres 

Operated. 

Year 

Completed. 

Per  cent,  earned 
on  Investment. 

Peking-Mukclen  . . 

987 

1897 

22.7 

Peking-Hankow  . . 

1306 

1905 

15.8 

S hanghai-N  anking 

327 

1908 

6.2 

Tientsin-Pukow  . . 

1107 

1912 

6.2 

Peking-Suiyuan  . . 

490 

1915 

5.6 

Subsequent  years,  for  which  I have  not  the  exact  figures, 
have  been  less  prosperous. 

I cannot  discover  any  evidence  of  incompetence  in 
Chinese  railway  administration.  On  the  contrary,  much 
3 Op.  tit.,  Chap.  XI. 


244 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


has  been  done  to  overcome  the  evils  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  various  lines  were  originally  constructed  by  dif- 
ferent powers,  each  following  its  own  customs,  so  that 
there  was  no  uniformity,  and  goods  trucks  could  not 
be  moved  from  one  line  to  another.  There  is,  how- 
ever, urgent  need  of  further  railways,  especially  to  open 
up  the  west  and  to  connect  Canton  with  Hankow,  the 
profit  of  which  would  probably  be  enormous. 

Mines  are  perhaps  as  important  as  railways,  for 
if  a country  allows  foreign  control  of  its  mineral  re- 
sources it  cannot  build  up  either  its  industries  or  its 
munitions  to  the  point  where  they  will  be  independent 
of  foreign  favor.  But  the  situation  as  regards  mining 
is  at  present  far  from  satisfactory. 

Mr.  Julean  Arnold,  American  commercial  attache  at 
Peking,  writing  early  in  1919,  made  the  following  state- 
ment as  regards  China ’s  mineral  resources : 

China  is  favoured  with  a wonderful  wealth  in  coal  and  in 
a good  supply  of  iron  ore,  two  essentials  to  modern  industrial 
development.  To  indicate  how  little  China  has  developed  its 
marvellous  wealth  in  coal,  this  country  imported,  during  1917, 

14.000. 000  tons.  It  is  estimated  that  China  produces  now 

20.000. 000  tons  annually,  but  it  is  supposed  to  have  higher 
resources  in  coal  than  has  the  United  States  which,  in  1918, 
produced  650,000,000  tons.  In  iron  ore  it  has  been  estimated 
that  China  has  400,000,000  tons  suitable  for  furnace  reaction, 
and  an  additional  300,000,000  tons  which  might  be  worked 
by  native  methods.  During  1917,  it  is  estimated  that  China’s 
production  of  pig  iron  was  500,000  tons.  The  developments 
in  the  iron  and  steel  industry  in  China  are  making  rapid 
strides,  and  a few  years  hence  it  is  expected  that  the  produc- 


INDUSTRIALISM  IN  CHINA 


245 


tion  of  pig  iron  and  of  finished  steel  will  be  several  millions 
of  tons  annually.  ...  In  antimony  and  tin  China  is  also 
particularly  rich,  and  considerable  progress  has  taken  place 
in  the  mining  and  smelting  of  these  ores  during  the  past  few 
years.  China  should  jealously  safeguard  its  mineral  wealth, 
so  as  to  preserve  it  for  the  country’s  welfare.4 

The  “China  Year  Book”  for  1919  gives  the  total  Chi- 
nese production  of  coal  for  1914  as  6,315,735  tons,  and  of 
iron  ore  at  468,938  tons.5  Comparing  these  with  Mr. 
Arnold’s  figures  for  1917,  namely  20,000,000  tons  of  coal 
and  500,000  tons  of  pig  iron  (not  iron  ore),  it  is  evi- 
dent that  great  progress  was  made  during  those  three 
years,  and  there  is  every  reason  to  think  that  at  least 
the  same  rate  of  progress  has  been  maintained.  The 
main  problem  for  China,  however,  is  not  rapid  develop- 
ment, but  national  development.  Japan  is  poor  in 
minerals  and  has  set  to  work  to  acquire  as  much  as 
possible  of  the  mineral  wealth  of  China.  This  is  im- 
portant to  Japan,  for  two  different  reasons:  first,  that 
only  industrial  development  can  support  the  growing 
population,  which  cannot  be  induced  to  emigrate  to 
Japanese  possessions  on  the  mainland;  secondly,  that 
steel  is  an  indispensible  requisite  for  imperialism. 

The  Chinese  are  proud  of  the  Kiangnan  dock  and 
engineering  work  at  Shanghai,  which  is  a government 

* “China  in  1918,”  p.  26.  There  is  perhaps  some  mistake  .in 
the  figures  given  for  iron  ore,  as  the  Tayeh  mines  alone  are 
estimated  by  some  to  contain  700,000,000  tons  of  iron  ore.  Cole- 
man, op.  cit.,  p.  51. 

5 Page  63.  The  1922  “Year  Book”  gives  19,500,000  tons  of 
coal  production. 


246 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


concern,  and  has  proved  its  capacity  for  ship-building’ 
on  modern  lines.  It  built  four  ships  of  10,000  tons  each 
for  the  American  Government.  Mr.  S.  G.  Cheng  says : 6 

For  the  construction  of  these  ships,  materials  were  mostly 
supplied  by  China,  except  steel,  which  had  to  be  shipped  from 
America  and  Europe  (the  steel  produced  in  China  being  so 
limited  in  quantity,  that  after  a certain  amount  is  exported  to 
Japan  by  virtue  of  a previous  contract,  little  is  left  for  home 
consumption). 

Considering  how  rich  China  is  in  iron  ore,  this  state 
of  affairs  needs  explanation.  The  explanation  is  valu- 
able to  any  one  who  wishes  to  understand  modern  poli- 
tics. 

The  “ China  Year  Book”  for  1919  7 (a  work  as  little 
concerned  with  politics  as  ‘‘Whitaker’s  Almanack”) 
gives  a list  of  the  five  principal  iron  mines  in  China, 
with  some  information  about  each.  The  first  and  most 
important  are  the  Tayeh  mines,  worked  by  the  Hanyehp- 
ing  Iron  and  Coal  Co.,  Ltd.,  which,  as  the  reader 
may  remember,  was  the  subject  of  the  third  group  in  the 
Twenty-one  Demands.  The  total  amount  of  ore  in  sight 
is  estimated  by  the  “China  Year  Book”  at  50,000,000 
tons,  derived  chiefly  from  two  mines,  in  one  of  which 
the  ore  yields  65  per  cent,  of  iron,  in  the  other  58  to  63 
per  cent.  The  output  for  1916  is  given  as  603,732  tons 
(it  has  been  greatly  increased  since  then).  The  “Year 
Book”  proceeds:  “Japanese  capital  is  invested  in  the 

Company,  and  by  the  agreement  between  China  and 

6 “Modem  China,”  p.  265. 

7 Pages  74-5. 


INDUSTRIALISM  IN  CHINA 


247 


Japan  of  May  1915  [after  the  ultimatum  which  enforced 
the  revised  Twenty-one  Demands],  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment undertook  not  to  convert  the  Company  into  a 
State-owned  concern  nor  to  compel  it  to  borrow  money 
from  other  than  Japanese  sources.”  It  should  be  added 
that  there  is  a Japanese  accountant  and  a Japanese  tech- 
nical adviser,  and  that  pig-iron  and  ore,  up  to  a speci- 
fied value,  must  be  sold  to  the  imperial  Japanese  works 
at  much  below  the  market  price  leaving  a paltry  resi- 
due for  sale  in  the  open  market.8 

The  second  item  in  the  4 ‘China  Year  Book’s”  list  is 
the  Tungkuan  Shan  mines.  All  that  is  said  about  these 
is  as  follows:  “Tungling  district  on  the  Yangtze,  55 
miles  above  Wuhu,  Anhui  province.  A concession  to 
work  these  mines,  granted  to  the  London  and  China 
Syndicate  (British)  in  1904,  was  surrendered  in  1910 
for  the  sum  of  £52,000,  and  the  mines  were  transferred 
to  a Chinese  Company  to  be  formed  for  their  exploita- 
tion.” These  mines,  therefore  are  in  Chinese  hands. 
I do  not  know  what  their  capacity  is  supposed  to  be, 
and,  in  view  of  the  price  at  which  they  were  sold,  it 
cannot  be  very  great.  The  capital  of  the  Hanyehping 
Co.  is  $20,000,000,  which  is  considerably  more  than 
£52,000.  This  was  the  only  one  of  the  five  iron  mines 
mentioned  in  the  “Year  Book”  which  was  not  in 
Japanese  hands  at  the  time  when  the  “Year  Book”  was 
published. 

Next  comes  the  Taochung  Iron  Mine,  Anhui  province. 
“The  concession  which  was  granted  to  the  Sino- Japanese 
Industrial  Development  Co.  will  be  worked  by  the 

8 Coleman,  op.  tit.,  Chap.  XIV. 


248 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


Orient  Steel  Manufacturing  Co.  The  mine  is  said  to 
contain  60,000,000  tons  of  ore,  containing  65  per  cent, 
of  pure  iron.  The  plan  of  operations  provides  for  the 
production  of  pig  iron  at  the  rate  of  170,000  tons  a 
year,  a steel  mill  with  a capicity  of  100,000  tons  of 
steel  ingots  a year,  and  a casting  and  forging  mill  to 
produce  75,000  tons  a year.” 

The  fourth  mine  is  at  Chinlingchen,  in  Shantung, 
‘‘worked  in  conjunction  with  the  Hengshan  Colliery  by 
the  railway.”  I presume  it  is  to  be  sold  back  to  China 
along  with  the  railway. 

The  fifth  and  last  mine  mentioned  is  the  Penhsihu 
Mine,  “one  of  the  most  promising  mines  in  the  nine 
mining  areas  in  South  Manchuria,  where  the  Japanese 
are  permitted  by  an  exchange  of  Notes  between  the 
Chinese  and  Japanese  Governments  (May  25,  1015) 
to  prospect  for  and  operate  mines.  The  seam  of  this 
mine  extends  from  near  Liaoyang  to  the  neighborhood 
of  Penhsihu,  and  in  size  is  pronounced  equal  to  the 
Tayeh  mine.”  It  will  be  observed  that  this  mine,  also, 
was  acquired  by  the  Japanese  as  a result  of  the  ultima- 
tum enforcing  the  Twenty-one  Demands.  The  “Year 
Book”  adds  “The  Japanese  Navy  is  purchasing  some 
of  the  Penhsihu  output.  Osaka  ironworks  placed  an 
order  for  15,000  tons  in  1915  and  the  arsenal  at  Osaka 
in  the  same  year  accepted  a tender  for  Penhsihu  iron.” 

It  will  be  seen  from  these  facts  that,  as  regards  iron, 
the  Chinese  have  allowed  the  Japanese  to  acquire  a 
position  of  vantage  from  which  they  can  only  be  ousted 
with  great  difficulty.  Nevertheless,  it  is  absolutely  im- 
perative that  the  Chinese  should  develop  an  iron  and 


INDUSTRIALISM  IN  CHINA 


249 


steel  industry  of  their  own  on  a large  scale.  If  they  do 
not  they  cannot  preserve  their  national  independence, 
their  own  civilization,  or  any  of  the  things  that 
make  them  potentially  of  value  to  the  world.  It  should 
be  observed  that  the  chief  reason  for  which  the  Japanese 
desire  Chinese  iron  is  in  order  to  be  able  to  exploit  and 
tyrannize  over  China.  Confucius,  I understand,  says 
nothing  about  iron  mines ; 9 therefore  the  old-fashioned 
Chinese  did  not  realize  the  importance  of  preserving 
them.  Now  that  they  are  awake  to  the  situation,  it  is 
almost  too  late.  I shall  later  come  back  to  the  question 
of  what  can  be  dne.  For  the  present,  let  us  continue 
our  survey  of  facts. 

It  may  be  presumed  that  the  population  of  China 
will  always  be  mainly  agricultural.  Tea,  silk,  raw 
cotton,  grain,  the  soya  bean,  etc.,  are  crops  in  which 
China  excels.  In  production  of  raw  cotton,  China  is 
the  third  country  in  the  world,  India  being  the  first 
and  the  United  States  the  second.  There  is,  of  course, 
room  for  great  progress  in  agriculture,  but  industry  is 
vital  if  China  is  to  preserve  her  national  independence, 
and*  it  is  industry  that  is  our  present  topic. 

To  quote  Mr.  Tyau:  “At  the  end  of  1916  the  num- 

ber of  factory  hands  was  officially  estimated  at  560,000 
and  that  of  mine  workers  406,000.  Since  then  no  official 

9 It  seems  it  would  be  inaccurate  to  maintain  that  there  is 
nothing  on  the  subject  in  the  Gospels.  An  eminent  American 
divine  pointed  out  in  print,  as  regards  the  advice  against  laying 
up  treasure  where  moth  and  rust  doth  corrupt,  that  “moth 
and  rust  do  not  get  at  Mr.  Rockefeller’s  oil  wells,  and  thieves 
do  not  often  break  through  and  steal  a railway.  What  Jesus 
condemned  was  hoarding  wealth.”  See  Upton  Sinclair,  “The 
Profits  of  Religion,”  1918,  p.  175. 


250 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


returns  for  the  whole  country  have  been  published  . . . 
but  perhaps  a million  each  would  be  an  approximate 
figure  for  the  present  number  of  factory  operatives  and 
mine  workers.  ’ 1 10  Of  course,  the  hours  are  very  long 
and  the  wages  very  low ; Mr.  Tyau  mentions  as  specially 
modern  and  praiseworthy  certain  textile  factories  where 
the  wages  range  from  15  to  45  cents  a day. 11  (The  cent 
varies  in  value,  but  is  always  somewhere  between  a 
farthing  and  a halfpenny.)  No  doubt  as  industry 
develops  socialism  and  labor  unrest  will  also  develop. 
If  Mr.  Tyau  is  to  be  taken  as  a sample  of  the  modem 
Chinese  governing  classes,  the  policy  of  the  government 
toward  labor  will  be  very  illiberal.  Mr.  Tyau’s  out- 
look is  that  of  an  American  capitalist',  and  shows  the 
extent  to  which  he  has  come  under  American  influence, 
as  well  as  that  of  conservative  England  (he  is  an  L.L.D. 
of  London).  Most  of  the  Young  Chinese  I came  across, 
however,  were  socialists,  and  it  may  be  hoped  that  the 
traditional  Chinese  dislike  of  uncompromising  fierce- 
ness will  make  the  government  less  savage  against  labor 
than  the  governments  of  America  and  J apan. 

There  is  room  for  the  development  of  a great  textile 
industry  in  China.  There  are  a certain  number  of 
modern  mills,  and  nothing  but  enterprise  is  needed  to 
make  the  industry  as  great  as  that  of  Lancashire. 

Ship-building  has  made  a good  beginning  in  Shanghai, 
and  would  probably  develop  rapidly  if  China  had  a 
flourishing  iron  and  steel  industry  in  native  hands. 

The  total  exports  of  native  produce  in  1919  were  just 

10  Page  237. 

11  Page  218. 


INDUSTRIALISM  IN  CHINA 


251 


under  £200,000,000  (630,000,000  taels),  and  the  total 
imports  slightly  larger.  It  is  better,  however,  to  con- 
sider such  statistics  in  taels,  because  currency  fluctua- 
tions make  the  results  deceptive  when  reckoned  in  ster- 
ling. The  tael  is  not  a coin,  but  a certain  weight  of 
silver,  and  therefore  its  value  fluctuates  with  the  value 
of  silver.  The  “China  Year  Book”  gives  imports  and 
exports  of  Chinese  produce  for  1902  as  325  million  taels 
and  214  million  taels  respectively;  for  1911,  as  482  and 
377 ; for  1917,  as  577  and  462 ; for  1920,  as  762  and  541. 
(The  corresponding  figures  in  pounds  sterling  for  1911 
are  sixty-four  millions  and  fifty  millions;  for  1917,  124 
millions  and  99,900,000.)  It  will  thus  be  seen  that,  al- 
though the  foreign  trade  of  China  is  still  small  in  pro- 
portion to  population,  it  is  increasing  very  fast.  To  a 
European  it  is  always  surprising  to  find  how  little  the 
economic  life  of  China  is  affected  by  such  incidents  as 
revolutions  and  civil  wars. 

Certain  principles  seem  to  emerge  from  a study  of 
the  Chinese  railways  and  mines  as  needing  to  be  adopted 
by  the  Chinese  Goverment  if  national  independence  is  to 
be  preserved.  As  regards  railways,  nationalization  is 
obviously  desirable,  even  if  it  somewhat  retards  the 
building  of  new  lines.  Railways  not  in  the  hands  of 
the  government  will  be  controlled,  in  the  end  if  not  in 
the  beginning,  by  foreigners,  who  will  thus  acquire  a 
power  over  China  which  will  be  fatal  to  freedom.  I 
think  we  may  hope  that  the  Chinese  authorities  now 
realize  this,  and  will  henceforth  act  upon  it. 

In  regard  to  mines,  development  by  the  Chinese  them- 
selves is  urgent,  since  undevelopment  by  foreigners 


252 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


makes  it  possible  to  keep  China  enslaved.  It  should 
therefore  be  enacted  that,  in  future,  no  sale  of  mines 
or  of  any  interest  in  mines  to  foreigners,  and  no  loan 
from  foreigners  on  the  security  of  mines,  will  be  recog- 
nized as  legally  valid.  In  view  of  extraterritoriality,  it 
will  be  difficult  to  induce  foreigners  to  accept  such  legis- 
lation, and  consular  courts  will  not  readily  admit  its 
validity.  But,  as  the  example  of  extraterritoriality  in 
Japan  shows,  such  matters  depend  upon  the  national 
strength ; if  the  powers  fear  China,  they  will  recognize 
the  validity  of  Chinese  legislation,  but  if  not,  not.  In 
view  of  the  need  of  rapid  development  of  mining  by 
Chinese,  it  would  probably  be  unwise  to  nationalize  all 
mines  here  and  now.  It  would  be  better  to  provide  every 
possible  encouragement  to  genuinely  Chinese  private 
enterprise,  and  to  offer  the  assistance  of  geological  and 
mining  experts,  etc.  The  government  should,  however, 
retain  the  right  (a)  to  buy  out  any  mining  concern  at  a 
fair  valuation;  (&)  to  work  minerals  itself  in  cases 
where  the  private  owners  fail  to  do  so,  in  spite  of  ex- 
pert opinion  in  favor  of  their  being  worked.  These 
powers  should  be  widely  exercised,  and,  as  soon  as  min- 
ing has  reached  the  point  compatible  with  national 
security,  the  mines  should  be  all  nationalized,  except 
where,  as  at  Tayeh,  diplomatic  agreements  stand  in  the 
way.  It  is  clear  that  the  Tayeh  mines  must  be  recovered 
by  China  as  soon  as  opportunity  offers,  but  when  or 
how  that  will  be  it  is  as  yet  impossible  to  say.  Of 
course  I have  been  assuming  an  orderly  government  es- 
tablished in  China,  but  without  that  nothing  vigorous 
can  be  done  to  repel  foreign  aggression.  This  is  a point 


INDUSTRIALISM  IN  CHINA 


253 


to  which,  along  with  other  general  questions  connected 
with  the  industrializing  of  China,  I shall  return  in  my 
last  chapter. 

It  is  said  by  Europeans  who  have  business  experience 
in  China  that  the  Chinese  are  not  good  at  managing 
large  joint-stock  companies,  such  as  modern  industry 
requires.  As  every  one  knows,  they  are  proverbially 
honest  in  business,  in  spite  of  the  corruption  of  their 
politics.  But  their  successful  businesses — so  one  gathers 
— do  not  usually  extend  beyond  a single  family;  and! 
even  they  are  apt  to  come  to  grief  sooner  or  later  through 
nepotism.  This  is  what  Europeans  say;  I cannot  speak 
from  my  own  knowledge.  But  I am  convinced  that 
modern  education  is  very  quickly  changing  this  state 
of  affairs,  which  was  connected  with  Confucianism  and 
the  family  ethic.  Many  Chinese  have  been  trained  in 
business  methods  in  America;  there  are  colleges  of  com* 
merce  at  Woosung  and  other  places;  and  the  patriotism 
of  Young  China  has  led  men  of  the  highest  education  to 
devote  themselves  to  industrial  development.  The 
Chinese  are  no  doubt,  by  temperament  and  tradition, 
more  suited  to  commerce  than  to  industry,  but  contact 
with  the  West  is  rapidly  introducing  new  aptitudes  and 
a new  mentality.  There  is,  therefore,  every  reason  to 
expect,  if  political  conditions  are  not  too  adverse,  that 
the  industrial  development  of  China  will  proceed 
rapidly  throughout  the  next  few  decades.  It  is  of  vital 
importance  that  that  development  should  be  controlled 
by  the  Chinese  rather  than  by  foreign  nations.  But  that 
is  part  of  the  larger  problem  of  the  recovery  of  Chinese 
independence,  with  which  I shall  deal  in  my  last  chapter. 


CHAPTER  XV 


THE  OUTLOOK  FOR  CHINA 

IN  this  chapter  I propose  to  take,  as  far  as  I am  able, 
the  standpoint  of  a progressive  and  public-spirited 
Chinese,  and  consider  what  reforms,  in  what  order,  I 
should  advocate  in  that  case. 

To  begin  with,  it  is  clear  that  China  must  be  saved 
by  her  own  efforts,  and  cannot  rely  upon  outside  help. 
In  the  international  situation,  China  has  had  both  good 
and  bad  fortune.  The  Great  War  was  unfortunate, 
because  it  gave  Japan  temporarily  a free  hand;  the 
collapse  of  Czarist  Russia  was  fortunate,  because  it  put 
an  end  to  the  secret  alliance  of  Russians  and  Japanese; 
the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  was  unfortunate,  because  it 
compelled  us  to  abet  Japanese  aggression  even  against 
our  own  economic  interests;  the  friction  between  Japan 
and  America  was  fortunate ; but  the  agreement  arrived 
at  by  the  Washington  conference,  though  momentarily 
advantageous  as  regards  Shantung,  is  likely,  in  the  long 
run,  to  prove  unfortunate,  since  it  will  make  America 
less  willing  to  oppose  Japan.  For  reasons  which  I set 
forth  in  Chapter  X,  unless  China  becomes  strong,  either 
the  collapse  of  Japan  or  her  unquestioned  ascendancy  in 
the  Far  East  is  almost  certain  to  prove  disastrous  to 
China ; and  one  or  other  of  these  is  very  likely  to  come 
about.  All  the  great  powers,  without  exception,  have 

254 


THE  OUTLOOK  FOR  CHINA 


255 


interests  which  are  incompatible,  in  the  long  run,  with 
China’s  welfare  and  with  the  best  development  of 
Chinese  civilization.  Therefore  the  Chinese  must  seek 
salvation  in  their  own  energy,  not  in  the  benevolence 
of  any  outside  power. 

The  problem  is  not  merely  one  of  'political  indepen- 
dence, a certain  cultural  independence  is  at  least  as 
important.  I have  tried  to  show  in  this  book  that  the 
Chinese  are,  in  certain  ways,  superior  to  us,  and  it 
would  not  be  good  either  for  them  or  for  us  if,  in  these 
ways,  they  had  to  descend  to  our  level  in  order  to  pre- 
serve their  existence  as  a nation.  In  this  matter,  how- 
ever, a compromise  is  necessary.  Unless  they  adopt 
some  of  our  vices  to  some  extent,  we  shall  not  respect 
them,  and  they  will  be  increasingly  oppressed  by  foreign 
nations.  The  object  must  be  to  keep  this  process  within 
the  narrowest  limits  compatable  with  safety. 

First  of  all,  a patriotic  spirit  is  necessary — not,  of 
course,  the  bigoted  anti-foreign  spirit  of  the  Boxers,  but 
the  enlightened  attitude  which  is  willing  to  learn  from 
other  nations  while  not  willing  to  allow  them  to  dom- 
inate. This  attitude  has  been  generated  among  edu- 
cated Chinese,  and  to  a great  extent  in  the  merchant 
class,  by  the  brutal  tuition  of  Japan.  The  danger  of 
patriotism  is  that,  as  soon  as  it  has  proved  strong  enough 
for  successful  defense,  it  is  apt  to  turn  to  foreign  aggres- 
sion. China,  by  her  resources  and  her  population,  is 
capable  of  being  the  greatest  power  in  the  world  after 
the  United  States.  It  is  much  to  be  feared  that,  in  the 
process  of  becoming  strong  enough  to  preserve  their 
independence,  the  Chinese  may  become  strong  enough 


256 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


to  embark  upon  a career  of  imperialism.  It  cannot  be 
too  strongly  urged  that  patriotism  should  be  only  de- 
fensive, not  aggressive.  But  with  this  proviso,  I think 
a spirit  of  patriotism  is  absolutely  necessary  to  the  re- 
generation of  China.  Independence  is  to  be  sought, 
not  as  an  end  in  itself,  but  as  a means  toward  a new 
blend  of  Western  skill  with  the  traditional  Chinese  vir- 
tues. If  this  end  is  not  achieved,  political  independence 
will  have  little  value. 

The  three  chief  requisites,  I should  say,  are:  (1)  the 
establishment  of  an  orderly  government;  (2)  industrial 
development  under  Chinese  control;  (3)  the  spread  of 
education.  All  these  aims  will  have  to  be  pursued  con- 
currently, but  on  the  whole  their  urgency  seems  to  me 
to  come  in  the  above  order.  We  have  already  seen  how 
large  a part  the  state  will  have  to  take  in  building  up 
industry,  and  how  impossible  this  is  while  the  political 
anarchy  continues.  Funds  for  education  on  a large 
scale  are  also  unobtainable  until  there  is  good  govern- 
ment. Therefore  good  government  is  the  prerequisite 
of  all  other  reforms.  Industrialism  and  education  are 
closely  connected,  and  it  would  be  difficult  to  decide  the 
priority  between  them;  but  I have  put  industrialism 
first,  because,  unless  it  is  developed  very  soon  by  the 
Chinese,  foreigners  will  have  acquired  such  a strong 
hold  that  it  will  be  very  difficult  indeed  to  oust  them. 
These  reasons  have  decided  me  that  our  three  problems 
ought  to  be  taken  in  the  above  order. 

1.  The  Establishment  of  an  Orderly  Government. 
At  the  moment  of  writing,  the  condition  of  China  is  as 
anarchic  as  it  has  ever  been.  A battle  between  Chang- 


THE  OUTLOOK  FOR  CHINA 


257 


tso-lin  and  Wu-Fei-Fu  is  imminent;  the  former  is  usu- 
ally considered,  though  falsely  according  to  some  good 
authorities,  the  most  reactionary  force  in  China;  Wu- 
Pei-Fu,  though  4 ‘The  Times ” calls  him  “the  Liberal 
leader,”  may  well  prove  no  more  satisfactory  than 
“Liberal”  leaders  nearer  home.  It  is  of  course  possible 
that,  if  he  wins*  he  may  be  true  to  his  promises  and 
convoke  a Parliament  for  all  China;  but  it  is  at  least 
equally  possible  that  he  may  not.  In  any  case,  to  de- 
pend upon  the  favor  of  a successful  general  is  as  preca- 
rious as  to  depend  upon  the  benevolence  of  a foreign 
power.  If  the  progressive  elements  are  to  win,  they 
must  become  a strong  organized  force. 

So  far  as  I can  discover,  Chinese  Constitutionalists 
are  doing  the  best  thing  that  is  possible  at  the  moment, 
namely,  concerting  a joint  program,  involving  the  con- 
voking of  a parliament  and  the  cessation  of  military 
usurpation..  Union  is  essential,  even  if  it  involves 
sacrifice  of  cherished  beliefs  on  the  part  of  some.  Given 
a program  upon  which  all  the  Constitutionalists  are 
united,  they  will  acquire  great  weight  in  public  opinion, 
which  is  very  powerful  in  China.  They  may  then  be 
able,  sooner  or  later,  to  offer  a high  constitutional  posi- 
tion to  some  powerful  general,  on  condition  of  his  ceas- 
ing to  depend  upon  mere  military  force.  By  this  means 
they  may  be  able  to  turn  the  scales  in  favor  of  the  man 
they  select,  as  the  student  agitation  turned  the  scales  in 
July,  1920,  in  favor  of  Wu-Pei-Fu  a-gainst  the  An  Fu 
party.  Such  a policy  can  only  be  successful  if  it  is  com- 
bined with  vigorous  propaganda,  both  among  the  civilian 
population  and  among  the  soldiers,  and  if,  as  soon  as 


258 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


peace  is  restored,  work  is  found  for  disbanded  soldiers 
and  pay  for  those  who  are  not  disbanded.  This  raises  the 
financial  problem,  which  is  very  difficult,  because  for- 
eign powers  will  not  lend  except  in  return  for  some  fur- 
ther sacrifice  of  the  remnants  of  Chinese  independence. 
(For  reasons  explained  in  Chapter  X,  I do  not  accept 
the  statement  by  the  American  consortium  bank- 
ers that  a loan  from  them  would  not  involve  control 
over  China’s  internal  affairs.  They  may  not  mean  con- 
trol to  be  involved,  but  I am  convinced  that  in  fact  it 
would  be.)  The  only  way  out  of  this  difficulty  that  I 
can  see  is  to  raise  an  internal  loan  by  appealing  to  the 
patriotism  of  Chinese  merchants.  There  is  plenty  of 
money  in  China,  but,  very  naturally,  rich  Chinese  will 
not  lend  to  any  of  the  brigands  who  now  control  the 
Government. 

When  the  time  comes  to  draft  a permanent  constitu- 
tion, I have  no  doubt  that  it  will  have  to  be  federal, 
allowing  a very  large  measure  of  autonomy  to  the  prov- 
inces, and  reserving  for  the  central  Government  few 
things  except  customs,  army  and  navy,  foreign  relations 
and  railways.  Provincial  feeling  is  strong,  and  it  is 
now,  I think,  generally  recognized  that  a mistake  was 
made  in  1912  in  not  allowing  it  more  scope. 

While  a constitution  is  being  drafted,  and  even  after 
it  has  been  agreed  upon,  it  will  not  be  possible  to  rely 
upon  the  inherent  prestige  of  Constitutionalism,  or  to 
leave  public  opinion  without  guidance.  It  will  be  neces- 
sary for  the  genuinely  progressive  people  throughout 
the  country  to  unite  in  a strongly  disciplined  society, 
arriving  at  collective  decisions  and  enforcing  support  of 


THE  OUTLOOK  FOR  CHINA 


259 


those  decisions  upon  all  its  members.  This  society  will 
have  to  win  the  confidence  of  public  opinion  by  a very 
rigid  avoidance  of  corruption  and  political  profiteering ; 
the  slightest  failure  of  a member  in  this  respect  must  be 
visited  by  expulsion.  The  society  must  make  itself  ob- 
viously the  champion  of  the  national  interest  as  against 
all  self-seekers,  speculators,  and  toadies  to  foreign  powers. 
It  will  thus  become  able  authoritatively  to  commend  or 
condemn  politicians  and  to  wield  great  influence  over 
opinion,  even  in  the  army.  There  exists  in  Young  China 
enough  energy,  patriotism,  and  honesty  to  create  such  a 
society  and  to  make  it  strong  through  the  respect  which 
it  will  command.  But,  unless  enlightened  patriotism  is 
organized  in  some  such  way,  its  power  will  not  be  equal 
to  the  political  problems  with  which  China  is  faced. 

Sooner  or  later,  the  encroachments  of  foreign  powers 
upon  the  sovereign  rights  of  China  must  be  swept  away. 
The  Chinese  must  recover  the  treaty  ports,  control  of 
the  tariff,  and  so  on;  they  must  also  free  themselves 
from  extraterritoriality.  But  all  this  can  probably  be 
done,  as  it  was  in  Japan,  without  offending  foreign 
powers  (except  perhaps  the  Japanese).  It  would  be  a 
mistake  to  complicate  the  early  stages  of  Chinese  re- 
covery by  measures  which  would  antagonize  foreign 
powers  in  general.  Russia  was  in  a stronger  position 
for  defense  than  China,  yet  Russia  has  suffered  terribly 
from  the  universal  hostility  provoked  by  the  Bolsheviks. 
Given  good  government  and  a development  of  China’s 
resources,  it  will  be  possible  to  obtain  most  of  the  needed 
concessions  by  purely  diplomatic  means;  the  rest  can 
wait  for  a suitable  opportunity. 


i 


260 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


2.  Industrial  Development.  On  this  subject  I 
have  already  written  in  Chapter  XIV ; it  is  certain  gen- 
eral aspects  of  the  subject  that  I wish  to  consider  now. 
F or  reasons  already  given,  I hold  that  all  railways  ought 
to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  state,  and  that  all  successful 
mines  ought  to  be  purchased  by  the  state  at  a fair  valua- 
tion, even  if  they  are  not  state-owned  from  the  first. 
Contracts  with  foreigners  for  loans  ought  to  be  care- 
fully drawn  so  as  to  leave  the  control  to  China.  There 
would  not  be  much  difficulty  about  this  if  China  had  a 
stable  and  orderly  government ; in  that  case,  many 
foreign  capitalists  would  be  willing  to  lend  on  good 
security,  without  exacting  any  part  in  the  management. 
Every  possible  diplomatic  method  should  be  employed 
to  break  down  such  a monopoly  as  the  consortium  seeks 
to  acquire  in  the  matter  of  loans. 

Given  good  government,  a large  amount  of  state  en- 
terprise would  be  desirable  in  Chinese  industry.  There 
are  many  arguments  for  state  socialism,  or  rather  what 
Lenin  calls  state  capitalism,  in  any  country  which  is 
economically  but  not  culturally  backward.  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  easier  for  the  state  to  borrow  than  for  a 
private  person;  in  the  second  place,  it  is  easier  for  the 
state  to  engage  and  employ  the  foreign  experts  who  are 
likely  to  be  needed  for  some  time  to  come ; in  the  third 
place,  it  is  easier  for  the  state  to  make  sure  that  vital 
industries  do  not  come  under  the  control  of  foreign 
powers.  "What  is  perhaps  more  important  than  any  of 
these  considerations  is  that,  by  undertaking  industrial 
enterprise  from  the  first,  the  state  can  prevent  the 
growth  of  many  evils  of  private  capitalism.  If  China 


THE  OUTLOOK  FOR  CHINA 


261 


can  acquire  a vigorous  and  honest  state,  it  will  be  pos- 
sible to  develop  Chinese  industry  without,  at  the  same 
time,  developing  the  overweening  power  of  private  capi- 
talists by  which  the  Western  nations  are  now  both  op- 
pressed and  misled. 

But  if  this  is  to  be  done  successfully,  it  will  require 
a great  change  in  Chinese  morals,  a development  of 
public  spirit  in  place  of  the  family  ethic,  a transference 
to  the  public  service  of  that  honesty  which  already  exists 
in  private  business,  and  a degree  of  energy  which  is  at 
present  rare.  I believe  that  Young  China  is  capable  of 
fulfilling  these  requisites,  spurred  on  by  patriotism; 
but  it  is  important  to  realize  that  they  are  requisites, 
and  that,  without  them,  any  system  of  state  socialism 
must  fail. 

For  industrial  development,  it  is  important  that  the 
Chinese  should  learn  to  become  technical  experts  and 
also  to  become  skilled  workers.  I think  more  has  been 
done  toward  the  former  of  these  needs  than  toward 
the  latter.  For  the  latter  purpose,  it  would  probably 
be  wise  to  import  skilled  workmen — say  from  Ger- 
many— and  cause  them  to  give  instructions  to  Chinese 
workmen  in  any  new  branch  of  industrial  work  that  it 
might  be  desired  to  develop. 

3.  Education.  If  China  is  to  become  a democracy, 
as  most  progressive  Chinese  hope,  universal  education  is 
imperative.  Where  the  bulk  of  the  population  cannot 
read,  true  democracy  is  impossible.  Education  is  a good 
in  itself,  but  is  also  essential  for  developing  political  con- 
sciousness, of  which  at  present  there  is  almost  none  in 
rural  China.  The  Chinese  themselves  are  well  aware  of 


262 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


this,  but  in  the  present  state  of  the  finances,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  establish  universal  elementary  education.  Until 
it  has  been  established  for  some  time,  China  must  be,  in 
fact,  if  not  in  form,  an  oligarchy,  because  the  unedu- 
cated masses  cannot  have  any  effective  political  opinion. 
Even  given  good  government,  it  is  doubtful  whether  the 
immense  expense  of  educating  such  a vast  population 
could  be  borne  by  the  nation  without  a considerable  in- 
dustrial development.  Such  industrial  development  as 
already  exists  is  mainly  in  the  hands  of  foreigners,  and 
its  profits  provide  war-ships  for  the  Japanese,  or  man- 
sions and  dinners  for  British  and  American  millionaires. 
If  its  profits  are  to  provide  the  funds  for  Chinese  educa- 
tion, industry  must  be  in  Chinese  hands.  This  is 
another  reason  why  industrial  development  must 
probably  precede  any  complete  scheme  of  education. 

For  the  present,  even  if  the  funds  existed,  there  would 
not  be  sufficient  teachers  to  provide  a schoolmaster  in 
every  village.  There  is,  however  such  an  enthusiasm 
for  education  in  China  that  teachers  are  being  trained 
as  fast  as  possible  with  such  limited  resources;  indeed 
a great  deal  of  devotion  and  public  spirit  is  being  shown 
by  Chinese  educators,  whose  salaries  are  usually  many 
months  in  arrears. 

Chinese  control  is,  to  my  mind,  as  important  in  the 
matter  of  education  as  in  the  matter  of  industry.  For 
the  present,  it  is  still  necessary  to  have  foreign  instruc- 
tors in  some  subjects,  though  this  necessity  will  soon 
cease.  Foreign  instructors,  however,  provided  they  are 
not  too  numerous,  do  no  harm,  any  more  than  foreign 
experts  in  railways  and  mines.  What  does  harm  is  for- 


THE  OUTLOOK  FOR  CHINA 


263 


eign  management.  Chinese  educated  in  mission  schools, 
or  in  lay  establishments  controlled  by  foreigners,  tend 
to  become  denationalized,  and  to  have  a slavish  attitude 
toward  Western  civilization.  This  unfits  them  for  tak- 
ing a useful  part  in  the  national  life,  and  tends  to  under- 
mine their  morals.  Also,  oddly  enough,  it  makes  them 
more  conservative  in  purely  Chinese  matters  than  the 
young  men  and  women  who  have  had  a modern  educa- 
tion under  Chinese  auspices.  Europeans  in  general  are 
more  conservative  about  China  than  the  modern  Chinese 
are,  and  they  tend  to  convey  their  conservatism  to  their 
pupils.  And  of  course  their  whole  influence,  unavoid- 
ably if  involuntarily,  militates  against  national  self-re- 
spect in  those  whom  they  teach. 

Those  who  desire  to  do  research  in  some  academic  sub- 
ject will,  for  some  time  to  come,  need  a period  of  resi- 
dence in  some  European  or  American  university.  But 
for  the  great  majority  of  university  students  it  is  far 
better,  if  possible,  to  acquire  their  education  in  China. 
Returned  students  have,  to  a remarkable  extent,  the 
stamp  of  the  country  from  which  they  have  returned, 
particularly  when  that  country  is  America.  A society 
such  as  was  forshadowed  earlier  in  this  chapter,  in 
which  all  really  progressive  Chinese  should  combine, 
would  encounter  difficulties,  as  things  stand,  from  the 
divergencies  in  national  bias  between  students  returned 
from,  say,  Japan,  America,  and  Germany.  Given  time, 
this  difficulty  can  be  overcome  by  the  increase  in  purely 
Chinese  university  education,  but  at  present  the  dif- 
ficulty would  be  serious. 

To  overcome  this  difficulty,  two  things  are  needed : in- 


264 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


spiring  leadership,  and  a clear  conception  of  the  kind 
of  civilization  to  be  aimed  at.  Leadership  will  have  to 
be  both  intellectual  and  practical.  As  regards  intellec- 
tual leadership,  China  is  a country  where  writers  have 
enormous  influence,  and  a vigorous  reformer  possessed 
of  literary  skill  could  carry  with  him  the  great  majority 
of  Young  China.  Men  with  the  requisite  gifts  exist  in 
China ; I might  mention,  as  an  example  personally  known 
to  me,  Dr.  Hu  Suh.1  He  has  great  learning,  wide  cul- 
ture, remarkable  energy,  and  a fearless  passion  for  re- 
form ; his  writings  in  the  vernacular  inspire  enthusiasm 
among  progressive  Chinese.  He  is  in  favor  of  assimilat- 
ing all  that  is  good  in  Western  culture,  but  by  no  means 
a slavish  admirer  of  our  ways. 

The  practical  political  leadership  of  such  a society  as 
I conceive  to  be  needed  would  probably  demand  different 
gifts  from  those  required  in  an  intellectual  leader.  It 
is  therefore  likely  that  the.  two  could  not  be  combined 
in  one  man,  but  would  need  men  as  different  as  Lenin 
and  Karl  Marx. 

The  aim  to  be  pursued  is  of  importance,  not  only  to 
China,  but  to  the  world.  Out  of  the  renaissance  spirit 
now  existing  in  China,  it  is  possible,  if  foreign  nations 
can  be  prevented  from  working  havoc,  to  develop  a new 
civilization  better  than  any  that  the  world  has  yet 
known.  This  is  the  aim  which  Young  China  should  set 
before  itself : the  preservation  of  the  urbanity  and  cour- 
tesy, the  candor  and  the  pacific  temper,  which  are 
characteristic  of  the  Chinese  nation,  together  with  a 

i An  account  of  a portion  of  his  work  will  be  found  in  Tyau, 
op.  cit.y  pp.  40  ff. 


THE  OUTLOOK  FOR  CHINA 


265 


knowledge  of  Western  science  and  an  application  of  it 
to  the  practical  problems  of  China.  Of  such  practical 
problems  there  are  two  kinds:  one  due  to  the  internal 
condition  of  China,  and  the  other  to  its  international 
situation.  In  the  former  class  come  education,  democ- 
racy, the  diminution  of  poverty,  hygiene  and  sanitation, 
and  the  prevention  of  famines.  In  the  latter  class  come 
the  establishment  of  a strong  government,  the  develop- 
ment of  industrialism,  the  revision  of  treaties  and  the 
recovery  of  the  treaty  ports  (as  to  which  Japan  may 
serve  as  a model),  and,  finally,  the  creation  of  an  army 
sufficiently  strong  to  defend  the  country  against  Japan. 
Both  classes  of  problems  demand  Western  science.  But 
they  do  not  demand  the  adoption  of  the  Western  philos- 
ophy of  life. 

If  the  Chinese  were  to  adopt  the  Western  philosophy 
of  life,  they  would,  as  soon  as  they  had  made  themselves 
safe  against  foreign  aggression,  embark  upon  aggres- 
sion on  their  own  account.  They  would  repeat  the  cam- 
paigns of  the  Han  and  Tang  djuiasties  in  Central  Asia, 
and  perhaps  emulate  Kublai  by  the  invasion  of  Japan. 
They  would  exploit  their  material  resources  with  a view 
to  producing  a few  bloated  plutocrats  at  home  and 
millions  dying  of  hunger  abroad.  Such  are  the  results 
which  the  West  achieves  by  the  application  of  science. 
If  China  were  led  astray  by  the  lure  of  brutal  power, 
she  might  repel  her  enemies  outwardly,  but  would  have 
yielded  to  them  inwardly.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  the 
great  military  nations  of  the  modern  world  will  bring 
about  their  own  destruction  by  their  inability  to  abstain 
from  war,  which  will  become,  with  every  year  that 


266 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 


passes,  more  scientific  and  more  devastating.  If  Cliina 
joins  in  this  madness,  China  will  perish  like  the  rest. 
But  if  Chinese  reformers  can  have  the  moderation  to 
stop  when  they  have  made  China  capable  of  self-defense, 
and  to  abstain  from  the  further  step  of  foreign  conquest ; 
if,  when  they  have  become  safe  at  home,  they  can  turn 
aside  from  the  materialistic  activities  imposed  by  the 
powers,  and  devote  their  freedom  to  science  and  art 
and  the  inauguration  of  a better  economic  system — then 
China  will  have  played  the  part  in  the  world  for  which 
she  is  fitted,  and  will  have  given  to  mankind  as  a whole 
new  hope  in  the  moment  of  greatest  need.  It  is  this 
hope  that  I wish  to  see  inspiring  Young  China.  This 
hope  is  realizable;  and,  because  it  is  realizable,  China 
deserves  a foremost  place  in  the  esteem  of  every  lover 
of  mankind. 


APPENDIX 


HILE  the  above  pages  were  going  through  the 


Press,  some  important  developments  have  taken 
place  in  China.  Wu-Pei-Fu  has  defeated  Chang-tso-lin 
and  made  himself  master  of  Peking.  Chang  has  re- 
treated toward  Manchuria  with  a broken  army,  and  pro- 
claimed the  independence  of  Manchuria.  This  might 
suit  the  Japanese  very  well,  but  it  is  hardly  to  be  sup- 
posed that  the  other  powers  would  acquiesce.  It  is, 
therefore,  not  unlikely  that  Chang  may  lose  Manchuria 
also,  and  cease  to  be  a factor  in  Chinese  politics. 

For  the  moment,  Wu-Pei-Fu  controls  the  greater  part 
of  China,  and  his  intentions  become  important.  The 
British  in  China  have,  for  some  years,  befriended  him, 
and  this  fact  colors  all  press  telegrams  appearing  in  our 
newspapers.  According  to  “The  Times/ ’ he  has  pro- 
nounced in  favor  of  the  reassembling  of  the  old  all- 
China  Parliament,  with  a view  to  the  restoration  of  con- 
stitutional government.  This  is  a measure  in  which  the 
South  could  concur,  and  if  he  really  adheres  to  this  in- 
tention he  has  it  in  his  power  to  put  an  end  to  Chinese 
anarchy.  “The  Times”  Peking  correspondent,  tele- 
graphing on  May  30,  reports  that  “Wu-Pei-Fu  declares 
that  if  the  old  Parliament  will  reassemble  and  work  in 
national  interests  he  will  support  it  up  to  the  limit,  and 
fight  any  obstructionists.” 


267 


268 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  CHINA 


On  May  18,  the  same  correspondent  telegraphed  that 
“Wu-Pei-Fu  is  lending  his  support  to  the  unification 
movements,  and  has  found  common  ground  for  action 
with  Chen  Chiung  Ming,”  who  is  Sun’s  colleague  at 
Canton  and  is  engaged  in  civil  war  with  Sun,  who  is 
imperialistic  and  wants  to  conquer  all  China  for  his 
government,  said  to  be  alone  constitutional.  The  pro- 
gram agreed  upon  between  ¥u  and  Chen  Ching  Ming 
is  given  in  the  same  telegram  as  follows: 

Local  self-government  shall  be  established  and  magistrates 
shall  be  elected  by  the  people;  District  police  shall  be  created 
under  District  Boards  subject  to  Central  Provincial  Boards; 
Civil  governors  shall  be  responsible  to  the  Central  Govern- 
ment, not  to  the  Tuchuns;  a national  army  shall  be  created, 
controlled  and  paid  by  the  Central  Government;  Provincial 
police  and  gendarmerie , not  the  Tuchuns  or  the  army,  shall  be 
responsible  for  peace  and  order  in  the  provinces;  the  whole 
nation  shall  agree  to  recall  the  old  Parliament  and  the  restora- 
tion of  the  Provisional  Constitution  of  the  first  year  of  the 
Republic;  Taxes  shall  be  collected  by  the  Central  Government, 
and  only  a stipulated  sum  shall  be  granted  to  each  province 
for  expenses,  the  balance  to  be  forwarded  to  the  Central  Gov- 
ernment as  under  the  Ching  dynasty;  Afforestation  shall  be 
undertaken,  industries  established,  highways  built,  and  other 
measures  taken  to  keep  the  people  on  the  land. 

This  is  an  admirable  program,  but  it  is  impossible  to 
know  how  much  of  it  will  ever  be  carried  out. 

Meanwhile,  Sun  Yat  Sen  is  still  at  war  with  Wu-Pei- 
Fu.  It  has  been  stated  in  the  British  press  that  there 
was  an  alliance  between  Sun  and  Chang,  but  it  seems 


APPENDIX 


269 


there  was  little  more  than  a common  hostility  to  Wu. 
Sun’s  friends  maintain  that  he  is  a genuine  constitu- 
tionalist, and  that  Wu  is  not  to  be  trusted,  but  Chen 
Chiung  Ming  has  a better  reputation  than  Sun  among 
reformers.  The  British  in  China  all  praise  Wu  and 
hate  Sun;  the  Americans  all  praise  Sun  and  decry  Wu. 
Sun  undoubtedly  has  a past  record  of  genuine  patriot- 
ism, and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Canton  govern- 
ment has  been  the  best  in  China.  What  appears  in  our 
newspapers  on  the  subject  is  certainly  designed  to  give 
a falsely  unfavorable  impression  of  Canton.  For  ex- 
ample, in  “The  Times”  of  May  15,  a telegram  appeared 
from  Hong-Kong  to  the  following  effect : 

I learn  that  the  troops  of  Sun  Yat  Sen,  President  of  South 
China,  which  are  stated  to  be  marching  north  from  Canton, 
are  a rabble.  Many  are  without  weapons  and  a large  per- 
centage of  the  uniforms  are  merely  rags.  There  is  no  disci- 
pline, and  gambling  and  opium-smoking  are  rife. 

Nevertheless,  on  May  30,  “The  Times”  had  to  con- 
fess that  this  army  had  won  a brilliant  victory,  captur- 
ing “the  most  important  stronghold  in  Kiangsi,”  to- 
gether with  forty  field-guns  and  large  quantities  of 
munitions. 

The  situation  must  remain  obscure  until  more  detailed 
news  has  arrived  by  mail.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
Canton  government,  through  the  victory  of  Chen  Chiung 
Ming,  will  come  to  terms  with  Wu-Pei-Fu,  and  will  be 
strong  enough  to  compel  him  to  adhere  to  the  terms. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  also  that  Chang’s  proclamation  of  the 


270  THE  PROBLEM  OP  CHINA 

independence  of  Manchuria  will  not  be  seized  upon  by 
Japan  as  an  excuse  for  a more  complete  absorption  of 
that  country.  If  Wu-Pei-Fu  adheres  to  the  declaration 
quoted  above,  there  can  be  no  patriotic  reason  why  Can- 
ton should  not  cooperate  with  him;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  military  strength  of  Canton  makes  it  more  likely 
that  Wu  will  find  it  prudent  to  adhere  to  his  declara- 
tion. There  is  certainly  a better  chance  than  there  was 
before  the  defeat  of  Chang  for  the  unification  of  China 
and  the  ending  of  the  tuchuns’  tyranny.  But  it  is  as 
yet  no  more  than  a chance,  and  the  future  is  still  prob- 
lematical. 

June  21,  1922. 


INDEX 


Academy,  Imperial,  41-42 
Adams,  Will,  94 
Afghanistan,  184 
Ainu,  121 

America,  11,  51,  52,  61,  67, 
152  ff.,  167  ff. 
and  naval  policy,  170 
and  trade  with  Russia,  171 
and  Chinese  finance,  171-4, 
258 

and  Japan,  176  ff. 
Americanism,  233 
Ancestor  worship,  35 
An  Fu  Party,  151,  217,  257 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  124, 
127,  138,  143,  156,  184 
Annam,  50 
Arnold,  Julean,  244 
Art,  5,  6,  23,  200 
Australia,  191 

Backhouse,  46 
Balfour,  159,  161 
Benthamites,  78 
Birth-rate — 

in  China,  71,  72 
in  Japan,  119 
Bismarck,  116,  135 
Bland,  46,  75  n.,  109 
Bolsheviks,  11,  12,  132,  142, 
150,  153  ff.,  184  ff.,  259 
Bolshevism,  81 

in  China,  185,  204,  215 
Books,  burning  of,  18  ff. 

Boxer  rising,  51,  52,  240 
indemnity,  52,  229 
Brailsford,  174 
Buddhism,  22,  26,  45,  201, 


in  Japan,  86,  91,  107,  178 
Burma,  50 
Bushido,  181 

Canada,  191 

Canton,  48,  66,  70,  75,  218 
Capitalism,  188 
Cassel  agreement,  67 
Chamberlain,  Professor  B.  H., 
104,  107 
Changchun,  128 
Chang-tso-lin,  66,  70,  75,  256, 
257,  267 
Chao  Ki,  37 

Chen  Chiung  Ming,  67,  268,  269 
Chen,  Eugene,  138  n. 

Cheng,  S.  G.,  52  n.,  63,  140  n., 
145  n.,  246 

Chien  Lung,  Emperor,  46  ff. 
Chi  Li,  Mr.,  33 
China — 

early  history,  15  ff. 
derivation  of  name,  19 
population,  26-30 
“Year  Book,”  28 
produce,  70-71 

influence  on  Japan,  85  ff., 
106 

and  the  war,  140  ff. 
post  offices,  157 
Chinese — 

character  of,  210-225 
love  of  laughter,  199,  211 
dignity,  213 
pacifism,  206,  224 
callousness,  221 
cowardice,  222 
avarice,  223 


271 


272 


INDEX 


patience,  218 
excitability.  223 
Chingkiang,  59 
C'hinlingchen  mine,  248 
Chita,  153.  162 
Choshu,  100,  102,  104,  108 
Chou  dynasty,  17 
Christianity  in  Japan,  91  IT. 
Chuang  Tze,  2,  81,  199 
Chu  Fu  Tze,  40 
Chu  Hsi,  42 
Civilization — 
alphabetical.  33 
Chinese,  197  If. 

European,  196 

Coal  in  China,  137  n.,  244  ff. 
Coleman,  75  n.,  113,  132  n, 
137  n. 

Color  prejudice.  177,  182 
and  labor,  190  ff. 

Confucius,  15,  16,  18,  34,  197, 
219 

Confucianism,  30,  34  ff.,  200 
in  Japan.  122 

Consortium,  8,  171  ff.,  188,  258 
Cordier,  Henri,  19  n.,  20,  22  n., 
24  n.,  25  n.,  27  n.,  197  n. 
Cotton,  74,  249 

industry  in  Osaka,  117 
Customs — 

Chinese,  52  ff. 
on  exports,  54 
internal,  54*55 

Dairen,  127 

Conferences  at,  162  ff. 
Denison,  134 

Dewey,  Professor.  67,  236 
Mrs.,  236 

Diet,  Japanese,  112  ff. 

Dutch  in  Japan,  91  ff.,  101 

Education.  41  ff..  75  ff.,  204, 
226-238,  261  ff. 
statistics,  227 


classical,  226-229 
European  and  American,  229- 
234 

modern  Chinese,  234  ff. 
of  women,  236-237 
Efficiency,  creed  of,  11 
“Eight  Legs,”  43,  44 
Emperor  of  China,  16,  36,  83, 
87,  217 
“First,”  18  ff. 

Empress  Dowager,  49  n. 
Examination,  competitive,  30, 
41  ff.,  75 

“Face,”  216 

Famines  in  China.  71,  221 
Far  Eastern  Republic.  153,  161 
Federalism  in  China,  69,  258 
Feudalism — 

in  China,  18,  20 
in  Japan,  89  ff. 

Filial  Piety,  35  ff.,  60 
and  patriotism,  38 
in  Japan,  122,  178 
Foreism  Trade  statistics,  250- 
251 

Forestry,  79 
Fourteen  Points,  51 
France,  50,  128 

and  Shantung.  143-145 
and  Japan,  165 
Fukien,  138 

Galileo,  196 

Genoa  Conference,  152 
Genro.  the,  91,  108  ff.,  133 
George  III,  47 

Germany,  25.  50,  112,  141.  181 
property  in  China  during 
war,  148  ff. 

Giles,  Lionel,  81  n. 

Giles,  Professor,  18  n.,  35  n., 
40  nv  46  n.,  197  n. 
Gladstone,  165,  168 
Gleason,  137,  140  n. 

Gobi  desert,  26 


INDEX 


273 


Gompers,  171 
Great  Britain — 
and  China,  49  ff. 
and  Shantung,  143 
Great  Wall,  18 
Greeks,  196 
Guam,  157 

Han  dynasty,  21 
Hanyehping  Co.,  137  n.,  246 
Hart,  Sir  Robert,  55 
Hayaslii,  139  n. 

Hearn,  Lafcadio,  100 
Heaven  (in  Chinese  religion), 
18,  40 

Temple  of.  18 
Hideyoshi,  86,  93,  94 
Hirth,  16  n.,  17  n.,  22  n. 

Hong  Kong,  50,  67,  74,  218 
Hsu  Shi-chang,  President,  41 
Hughes,  Premier,  190  n. 
Hughes,  Secretary,  159,  161 
Hung  Wu.  Emperor,  43 
Huns,  18,  22,  26 
Hu  Suh,  264 

Ichimura,  Dr.,  125 
Ideograms,  30  ff. 

Immigration,  Asiatic,  190  ff. 
Imperialism.  81 
India,  22,  24,  45,  123,  124 
Industrialism,  196 
in  China,  74,  75,  224,  239-253, 
260  ff. 

in  Japan,  117 
Inouye,  87 

Intelligentsia  in  China,  75 
Iron  in  China,  136,  137  n.,  244  ff. 

Japanese  control  of,  246  ff. 
Ishii,  141.  See  also  Lansing- 
Ishii  Agreement. 

Ito,  87,  112  ff. 

Iyeyasu,  90,  94,  95 

Japan,  8,  9,  25,  50,  51,  60,  61, 
85-184 


early  history,  85  ff. 
constitution.  112  ff. 
war  with  China,  116,  126, 
135 

war  with  China,  116,  126, 
135 

clan  loyalty,  122 
loyalty  to  Allies.  142 
hegemony  in  Asia,  124 
loans  to  China  in  1918,  150 
Socialism  in,  118,  179  . 
Jenghis  Khan,  24  ff. 

Jews,  196 

Kang  Hsi,  Emperor,  46  n. 
Kara  Korum,  25 
Kato,  139  n. 

Kiangnan  Dock,  245 
Kiaochow,  50,  136,  158 
Kieff,  24 

Koo,  Mr.  Wellington,  56  n.,  173 
Korea,  50,  85,  124,  126,  129 
Kublai  Khan,  25 
Kyoto,  96 
Kyushu,  92,  94 

Lama  religion,  40 
Lamont,  174 
Lansing.  150 

Lansing-Ishii  agreement,  140, 
145,  159 

Lao-Tze,  40,  81,  197,  205 
Legge,  16  n.,  35  n.,  81  n. 
Lenin.  189,  264 
Lennox,  Dr.,  72  n. 

Literati,  19,  20,  35  ff. 

Li  Ung  Bing,  20,  43 
Li  Yuan  Hung,  President, 
146  ff. 

Li  Yuen,  23  n. 

Lloyd  George,  138,  147,  165 
Louis  XIV.,  49 
Louis,  Saint,  25 

Macao,  92 
Macartney,  48 


274 


INDEX 


Maltlius,  71 

Manchu  dynasty,  26,  27,  40,  62, 
63 

Manchuria,  50,  66,  124,  127, 
132,  135,  153,  161,  186,  187, 
219 

Manila,  93 
Marco  Polo,  25 
Marcus  Aurelius,  22 
Marx,  264 
Masuda,  93 
McLaren,  100,  102 
Mechanistic  Outlook,  80  ff. 
Merv,  24 

Mikado,  86,  101,  108 
worship  of,  99,  104,  177 
Militarism,  10,  39,  40 
Millard,  139  n.?  149,  158  n. 
Minamoto  Yoritomo,  90 
Mines,  244  ff. 

Min"  dynasty,  26 
Missionaries,  207 

Roman  Catholic,  45,  46  n. 
in  Japan,  92  ff. 

Mongol  dynasty,  23  ff.,  40 
Mongolia,  25,  40,  124,  154,  161 
Morgan,  J.  P.,  65,  174 
Morphia,  158 
Moscow,  24 
Mukden,  135 

Murdoch,  23  n.,  86  n.,  103, 
105  n.,  109  n. 

Nationalism,  10 
Nestorianism,  45 
Nicolaievsk,  162 
Nietzsche,  83,  205 
Nishapur,  24 
Nobunaga,  94 
Northcliffe,  Lord,  75  n. 

Observatory,  Peking,  25,  46 
Okuma,  124,  126 
Open  Door,  53,  170,  189 
Opium,  49 


Panama  tolls,  171 
Peking,  25,  29,  49,  70 
Legation  Quarter,  51 
Union  Medical  College,  73  n.„ 
231 

Government  University,  230 
n.,  235 

Girl’s  High  Normal  School, 
236 

Penhsihu  mine,  248 

Perry,  Commodore,  96,  101,  176 

Persia,  22,  24,  184 

Phonetic  writing,  31 

Plato,  196 

Po  Chui,  206 

Po  Lo,  82 

Pooley,  125,  129,  133,  138  n. 
Pope,  the,  25,  178 
Port  Arthur,  51,  127,  135,  157, 
184 

Portsmouth,  Treaty  of,  110-11 
130 

Portuguese,  91  ff. 

Progress,  7,  207,  213 
Putnam  Weale,  27,  29,  63, 
150  n.,  173,  241 

Railways,  239  ff. 
nationalization  of,  241  ff. 
statistics  of,  243 
Chinese  Eastern,  127,  130, 
150,  153,  241 
Fa-ku-Men,  129 
Hankow-Canton,  240 
Peking-Kalgan,  240,  243 
Peking-Hankow,  240 
Shantung,  158  ff.,  240 
Siberian,  153,  240 
South  Manchurian,  128,  129, 
130 

Tientsin-Pukow,  240 
Reid,  Rev.  Gilbert,  140  n., 
146  n.,  149  n. 

Reinch,  140  n.,  142 
Restoration  in  Japan,  86, 
98  ff. 


INDEX 


275 


Revolution  of  1911,  26,  63  ff. 

and  Japan,  132  If. 

Rockefeller  Hospital,  231 
Rome,  22,  48 
Roosevelt,  110 
Rousseau,  39 

Russia,  10,  13,  14,  24,  50,  123, 
132,  152  ff,  184  ff. 
war  with  Japan,  110,  127,  135 
secret  treaty  with  Japan, 

142 

and  Shantung,  143-145 

Salt  tax,  57,  58 
San  Felipe,  93 
Sato,  Admiral,  181 
Satsuma,  94,  100,  102,  104,  108 
Science,  49,  79,  80,  196,  203 
Shank,  Mr.,  67 

Shantung,  50,  132,  136  ff.,  187 
secret  treaties  concerning, 

143 

in  Versailles  Treaty,  151 
and  Washington  Conference, 
151,  158 

Shaw,  Bernard,  168 
Sherfesee,  79 

Shih  Huang  Ti.  See  Emperor, 
“First” 

Shi-King,  19 

Shinto,  86  ff.,  105,  107,  178 
Shogun,  The,  90,  100  ff. 
Shu-King,  15,  16  n.,  19 
Simpson,  Lennox.  See  Putnam 
Weale 

Socialism,  62,  191  ff. 
state,  189,  260 
in  Japan,  118,  179 
in  China,  235,  250 
Soyeda,  151  n. 

Spaniards  in  Japan,  92 
Student  movement,  235,  257 
Students 

returned,  11,  203,  232 
statistics  of,  232  n. 


Summer  Palace,  49 
Sung  dynasty,  25,  42 
Sun  Yat  Sen,  64,  66,  132,  147, 
268-269 

Supreme  Ruler.  See  Heaven 

Taiping  Rebellion,  28,  54,  63 
Tai-tsung,  24  n. 

Tang  dynasty,  23,  41 
Taochung  iron  mine,  247 
Taoism,  40,  187  ff. 

Tartars,  22,  25 

Tayeh  mines,  254  n.,  246-7 

Teacher’s  strike,  217,  237 
Tenny,  Raymond,  P.,  28 
Tibet,  26,  40 
Ting,  Mr.  V.  K.  72  n. 
Tokugawa,  100 

Tong,  Hollington  K.,  150  n., 
215  n. 

Trade  Unionism,  190-8 
in  Japan,  118-119 
Treaty  Ports,  73 
Tsing-hua  College,  229 
Tsing-tau,  136,  158 
Tuan  Chih-jui,  146  ff. 
Tuangkuan  Shan  mines,  247 
Tuchuns,  59,  65,  69,  75,  214, 
218 

Twenty-one  Demands,  136  ff., 
246,  248 

Tyau.  M.  T.  Z.,  151  n.,  227, 
232  n.,  235,  239  n.,  243, 
249 

United  States.  See  America. 

Versailles  Treaty,  51,  148,  150, 
158 

Vladivostok,  153,  161 
Volga,  12 
Voltaire,  234 

Waley,  84,  206 

War,  Great,  idealistic  aims  of, 
147  ff. 


276 


INDEX 


Washington  Conference,  10, 
53  n.,  59,  61,  132,  152, 
156  ff.,  183 
Wei-hai-wei,  51,  157 
White  men,  virtues  of,  125 
William  II.,  127 
Wilson,  President,  140,  148 
Women,  position  of,  in  China, 
236-7 

Woosung  College,  253 


Wu-Pie-Fu,  39,  59,  67,  70,  257, 
267-75 

Yamagata,  Prince,  118  n. 
Yangtze,  50,  137 
Yao  and  Shun,  15,  16 
Yellow  River.  15,  197 
Y.  M.  C.  A.,  81.  83,  234 
Youns  China.  21,  60,  76  ff., 
151,  175,  204,  261,  264 
Yii,  16 

Yuan  Shi-k’ai,  64  ff.,  134,  141 


Date  Due 


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